

Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition

Acts of the symposium
The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy
January 10-13, 1996

organized by
The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters
and
**The Institute for Greek and Latin,
University of Copenhagen.**

Edited by
STEN EBBESEN & RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN



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Abstract

The present volume contains twenty-five articles about medieval analyses of problems in philosophy and grammar. Part 1 deals with modistic theory and the logical genres of *sophismata* and *consequentiae*. Part 2 focuses on the twelfth century, and in particular on the interplay between theology and logic. Part 3 takes up questions of cognition and in particular the notion of *intentiones*, which played a key role in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century theories. Part 4 addresses questions related to the fourteenth-century philosopher John Buridan, his environment and his spiritual descendants.

The expenses of printing this volume were covered by a grant from the Carlsberg Foundation.

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List of Abbreviations

AHDLMA = Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge

BGPTMA = Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters (Formerly: ... der Philosophie des Mittelalters)

CCSL = Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina

CCCM = Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis

CHLMP = N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1982

CIMAGL = Cahiers de l'institut du moyen âge grec et latin

CPhD = Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi

GdS = Geschichte der Sprachtheorie, ed. P. Schmitter

PIMS = Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

PL = Patrologia Latina, ed. J.P. Migne

Opening Address: The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy

STEN EBBESEN

Mr Minister,¹ dear symposiasts.

This symposium is to be both a celebration of Copenhagen as the *pro tempore* cultural capital of Europe,² an attempt to advance our understanding of medieval thought, and a family gathering.

It is, of course, an outrageous presumption to call Copenhagen the cultural capital of Europe. Paris would have a far better claim to the title, and so would several other cities. But I hope we can help show that for a *pro tem* capital it is all right.

For better and for worse, medieval Europe created much of the institutional and mental framework that now governs the world. One such creation was the kingdoms of England, Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, which survive to this day, and other territorial organizations which were to develop into such states as the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland. Another medieval creation was the international community of science and scientists, scholarship and scholars. Some medieval kingdoms did not survive, but the international community of science and scientists, scholarship and scholars never broke down, though it has seen difficult times. The stronger the states became, the stronger the temptation to provincialize teaching and study. But the urge to understand was stronger than national divisions. The community of research even survived the religious division of Western Europe in the sixteenth century and the loss of its common language, Latin, in the course of the next centuries. It also managed to spread far outside Western Europe.

This community of learning and research enables a minor European city like Copenhagen to have some role in science and scholarship alongside the big centres. In our field, it is the centre

1 The Danish minister of research, Mr Frank Jensen, honoured the opening of the symposium with his presence.

2 Copenhagen had been named Cultural Capital of Europe for the duration of 1996.

of one of the many informal networks that we symposiasts participate in. To me, at least, this particular network is very like that of a family. For the purpose of this meeting the family is called the Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy, and I consider this a family gathering.

People who do history of philosophy tend to operate with schools, the school of Aristotle or Peter Abelard, the Nominalist or the Hegelian school.

We all know that it is difficult to assign a precise sense to such locutions. A mixture of criteria are employed when school-affinity is established. A pupil of Mr X belongs to his school, but so does somebody who shares Mr X's opinions. All persons from the same institution may be grouped together as the school of whatever the name of the institution. There are several senses in which there is no Copenhagen school of medieval philosophy. There is no institution in this city whose primary purpose is to teach medieval philosophy. Very few scholars got their first introduction to the field here. Most of the people in this room have had most of their training elsewhere and can be claimed for other "schools" named after master, place, or theory. Nonetheless, I submit that there is a sense in which we may speak of a Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy, pioneered by Heinrich Roos (1904-77) in the 1940s, 50s, and early 60s, but reaching maturity only in the seventies with Jan Pinborg (1937-82).³ The school is held together by overlapping interests, similarities in methodology, and personal collaboration. – Just to prevent any non-initiated member of the audience from thinking that we suffer from megalomania, I must point out that it was not a Copenhagen idea to apply the term "The Copenhagen School" to the group whose most famous member was Jan Pinborg. The terminology was introduced by Prof.

³ For the life and work of Heinrich Roos, see the obituary in *CIMAGL* 24 (1978) and the bibliography in *CIMAGL* 13 (1974). For the life and work of Jan Pinborg, see obituary and bibliography in *CIMAGL* 41 (1982); obituary in *Københavns Universitets årbog* 1982, pp. 30-34; and the introduction to the memorial volume *De Ortu Grammaticae*, ed. G.L. Bursill-Hall, S. Ebbesen, K. Koerner, *Studies in the History of the Language Sciences* 43 (John Benjamins: Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1990). For both men, and for the school in general, see also S. Ebbesen, "Doing Philosophy the Sophistic way. The Copenhagen School, with Notes on the Dutch School", in: Alfonso Maierù (ed.), *Gli studi di filosofia medievale tra Otto e Novecento*, Roma 1991, pp. 331-359.

L.M. de Rijk of Leiden in the 1980s, and in the late 80s when a conference was gathered in Rome to sum up the last one hundred years of research on medieval philosophy one of the speakers was asked to cover the Copenhagen School and the Dutch School.⁴

Heinrich Roos had one pupil, Jan Pinborg. But as early as 1964 the minute Institute of Greek and Latin Medieval Philology⁵ in which master and pupil worked housed a foreign graduate student. The name of the guest was Winfried Fauser, and his topic of research was an obscure late 13th-century philosopher, one Radulphus Brito. I think Fauser played a pivotal role in making Pinborg and Roos interested in this obscure personality who now, as in his own days, is recognized as a first-rate thinker.

Fauser opened an era, though it took some time before we could see it, for we had to wait till 1974 before the next graduate student came here to work on his thesis. He was Christian Knudsen from Bonn, who stayed a year to study 14th-century thought and the theory of “intentiones” in particular. Then we had to wait another four years, and suddenly the place grew genuinely international. Two Americans arrived, Mary Sirridge and Katherine Tachau, both of them present at this symposium, as are all those who have worked for a longish time in Copenhagen in the eighties and nineties. They are: Iwakuma Yukio from Japan who obtained his Ph.D. degree from the University of Copenhagen. The Italian contingent, which consists of Alessandro Conti, the three Bolognesi – that is Roberto Lambertini, Costantino Marmo, Andrea Tabarroni – Riccardo Quinto, and Paolo Fait. More Americans, first Robert Andrews and now the second generation scholars, Russ Friedman and Kurt Boughan, both pupils of Katherine Tachau. From Germany, the country from where our first foreign guest arrived, we have had the pleasure of hosting Reinhard Hülsen. From Switzerland Christoph Flüeler. From Hungary Gyula Klima. And the line does not look like it will be broken. Italy, the great mother of medieval scholars at the moment, looks like she will send more of her sons and daughters to visit Copenhagen, and the first Russian has applied.⁶

⁴ See Ebbesen 1991 (preceding note).

⁵ In 1992 this institute was fused with the department of classical philology to form a new entity called the Institute for Greek and Latin.

⁶ Mrs Elena Lisaniuk of St Petersburg actually arrived in late 1996 in order to work on a dissertation about the theory of properties of terms.

If nothing else, then the alacrity with which our former guests signed up for this conference could make me believe that they do not regret their time in Copenhagen. But I did not need to be convinced. I knew. I knew because we have always stayed in contact, wherever people have ended up in the world.

The funny thing about the Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy is that this international non-organization started with a national Danish project, the edition of the collected works of Danish Philosophers from the Middle Ages.⁷ Fortunately, the Danish scholars who put their authority behind the project when it was first proposed in 1946 were not narrow-minded chauvinists. They left it in the hands of the man who had proposed it, Heinrich Roos, and he was a German who had only recently become a resident of this kingdom. The edition of the Danish philosophers has continued ever since, and two new volumes are to appear within the next couple of years, one edited by a Dane, Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, one by an Italian, Andrea Tabarroni.

It may be debatable whether the Copenhagen School is a real thing, a *res*, or just a modality, a *modus*, or perhaps a circumstance, a *status*. But whatever it is, it was born international.

There is an old Norse myth, very similar to the Greek myth about Meleagros. According to the myth a baby called Nornagest is granted by the Fates to live just as long as a firebrand from the hearth of his home is not consumed by the fire. Immediately, someone rescues the firebrand and extinguishes it, and Nornagest lives to see several generations of men until the brand is finally burned. The Copenhagen School is similar to Nornagest in that it was born with a simple condition of life or death. International collaboration equals life; isolation equals death. This symposium should help boost life and vigour.

It takes money to arrange a meeting like this. It is a pleasure to be able to express my gratitude to the Royal Danish Academy which provides us with roof and a variety of consumables; to the Carlsberg Foundation, to the Danish Research Council for the Humanities, and to the Faculty of Humanities of our university,

⁷ *Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi*, published by Det danske Sprog- og Litteraturselskab (The Society for Danish Language and Literature). Volume I, *Johannis Daci Opera*, appeared in 1955; volume XII, *Nicolai Drukken de Dacia Opera*, in 1997.

each of which has contributed a substantial sum to this enterprise. In particular I am happy that it was not even difficult to persuade the donors that this was a worthy cause.

Guests have been invited on three criteria. (1) Either they belong to the Danish contingent. (2) Or they have had or are having a long stay in Copenhagen. (3) Or they are distinguished scholars with whom we have collaborated, but who have never spent any long time here and may therefore be presumed to be free of whatever prejudices we cultivate in this place.

The themes of the conference were determined by the interests of the Danish contingent. These obviously overlap with those of the foreigners who have been here or have collaborated with us from afar.

Any good conference looks forward. But in this case I want us also to look backwards. The reason is that between us, and together with people now dead whom we remember, we have developed a number of theories, or historiographical schemata, if you wish. As I am growing old, I have started to worry about the way our theories are being accepted by scholars who have never seen the theories in their making and do not know which problems within the theories their creators were worried about, or even which problems they were designed to solve in the first place.

Allow me to quote a circular that I sent to the participants a little less than a year ago:⁸

“The purpose of the symposium is to discuss critically some subjects that have been studied by people working in the Institute of Greek and Latin (Medieval Philology) in Copenhagen; to test the tenability of our old beliefs and conceptual frameworks; to indicate avenues for new research.

Below, I suggest some topics for discussion.

1. Modism. People routinely speak about modism these days, and in one way or another they all depend on Jan Pinborg’s work. But for one thing, subsequent work has thrown much light on the development of grammar before the supposedly modist era, for another it has shown that there never was a period in which all theoretical work in grammar followed “modist” principles, and finally it seems as if some scholars think in terms of a “modist

8 This quotation was not included in the actual opening address.

school” with greater internal coherence than the label was originally meant to suggest. There are also problems with defining clearly what is meant by “modism” in logic.

2. Intentions. Again Jan Pinborg’s work remains important for what is routinely said about intentions. But there are problems with which several of us have struggled. How, in particular, does one combine the sort of intentions that occur in theories of sense-perception with the first and second intentions of logic and psychology in, say, Radulphus? Or what about Boethius of Dacia’s *intentiones*? In some contexts it seems helpful to think of an intention as a piece of information, but not everywhere.

3. *Elenchi*, fallacies, supposition, sophismata, topics, and consequences. Much pioneering work has been done independently of Copenhagen, but persons linked to Copenhagen have also been very active in the field. It is by now a commonplace that 12th- and 13th-century studies in fallacies contributed to the development of a/the theory of supposition. And it is a platitude that theories of fallacies were connected with the study of the *Elenchi*. But how does the triad of *Elenchi*, fallacies, and supposition really work? Did the occupation with the *Elenchi* contribute considerably to the development of a theory of supposition, or was it rather the case that the theory developed independently and was imported into an alien context, that of the *Elenchi*? How is the genre of sophismata related, at different times, to the study of the *Elenchi*, to theories of fallacies, and of supposition? How does the *instantiae*-literature fit into the picture? Can we throw new light on the origin of the genre of *consequentiae*? Finally, with so many texts on fallacies published, can we begin to write a history of commentaries on the *Elenchi* and the related genres?

4. Logic, grammar, and theology from the second half of the 12th century. Several members of our group have worked on twelfth-century theology and its connections to logic and grammar. In spite of the recent symposium in San Marino⁹ I feel we still need a clearer picture of the interpenetration of the disciplines. Nominalists have attracted much attention in later years, but it might be time to look again at the late Porretans. Besides: I still

⁹ See the acts in: C. Marmo (ed.), *Vestigia, imagines, verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIIth-XIVth Century)*, Semiotic and Cognitive Studies 4, Brepols: Turnhout, 1997.

feel I know much too little about the cultural environment of men like Andrew Sunesen and Stephen Langton, and of Langton's influence on posterity (which I believe was great).

5. The Buridanian Tradition. Andrea Tabarroni is finishing an edition of Thuo de Vibergia's *Metaphysics* commentary, written in Erfurt in the 1430s. It has turned out to be heavily dependent on Marsilius of Inghen, who in turn leans heavily on Buridan. Since some members of our group have worked on Buridan and later logic, it might be an idea to discuss some aspects of the Buridanian tradition."

It is my hope that our discussions during the next four days will help us remember why we thought it was a good idea to talk about modism, why we thought intentions were a key concept in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, why we thought medieval theory of fallacies was important, and so on. I hope, of course, that we can reconfirm our belief in the importance of those subjects. But I also hope that we can clarify our own views on them and explain these views in a way that a new generation of scholars can understand. The clarification and purification ought to imply also a realization that some of the things we have believed in should not be believed in. I hope to live to old age, but I would be happy if already now my pet beliefs, many of which were shaped by Jan Pinborg, could be winnowed while there are still people around who can remember their purpose and fragilities.

Those of you who remember Jan will know that the best tribute we can pay to his memory is to discuss his views instead of just parroting them.

I

Modism, Sophismata, and Consequences

Significatio generalis and *significatio specialis*:
Notes on Nicholas of Paris' Contribution
to Early Thirteenth-Century
Linguistic Thought

C.H. KNEEPKENS

Summary: The concepts of *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis* were extensively used by several authors in the 1230s, but primarily in works of logic. In spite of some attempts to introduce them into grammar, they never became a standard tool of that discipline. The functions they might have fulfilled were taken over by the notions of essential, special, and accidental modes of signifying, and of *primus* and *secundus intellectus*.

1. Introduction

In his seminal *Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter* of 1967, Jan Pinborg¹ describes in broad outline the six stages which he distinguishes in the development of grammatical thought from the logical grammar of the twelfth century to the modistic grammar of the last decades of the thirteenth century. The fourth stage coincides with the earliest period of the University of Paris and is associated by Pinborg with Jordanus of Saxony and a Parisian “*quaestiones* collection”, now known as the “Guide de l’étudiant”, which has been preserved in ms. Ripoll 109. The linguistic thinking of this stage is characterised by the introduction of the Aristotelian requirements for the construction of a scientific theory. Consequently, being a real Aristotelian speculative science, grammar needed to have a general, necessary, and immutable object, its *principia essentialia*; it was not allowed to be concerned with the superficial, corruptible, or mutable surface structures of the several languages. In the fifth stage, according to Pinborg, these *principia essentialia* were established in more detail: grammar is concerned with the general meanings of words, the *significata generalia*,² which are based on the common properties of things. Logic

1 Pinborg 1967, 55-56.

2 See also Pinborg 1982: 256.

is concerned with the *significata specialia*, the lexical meanings of words, which incidentally are universal as well, since they signify concepts and things which are the same for everybody at any time. The masters whose names are associated by Pinborg with this stage are Nicholas of Paris, Lambert de Lagny (formerly known as Lambert d'Auxerre), and Robert Kilwardby, all of whom flourished in the middle of the thirteenth century.

Recently, Irène Rosier-Catach has discussed at length the notions of '*significatum generale*', '*significatum speciale*', and their relationship of mutual opposition.³ She emphasizes that the notion of '*significatum generale*' is the forerunner of the *modus significandi essentialis*, whereas the *modi significandi* or *consignificata* which we meet in the grammatical treatises of the early thirteenth century, are succeeded by the *modi significandi accidentales*.⁴ Braakhuis⁵ has called our attention to the fact that the notions of *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis* and their corollaries, the *significata generalia* and *specialia*, play an important role in the semantic theories of John Pagus, Nicholas of Paris, and Peter of Spain, dealt with by these masters mainly in their treatises on the syncategorematic terms. This is a partial recapitulation and elaboration of a view which Braakhuis had already advanced in his pioneering study of 1979 on this subject.⁶

The surveys of the use of the *modus significandi* terminology given by Thurot,⁷ Pinborg,⁸ and Rosier-Catach⁹ show that in the first half of the twelfth century the term *modus significandi* was used sometimes to indicate that notion which in the thirteenth century would at first be called *significatio generalis* and later *modus significandi essentialis*. However, we should bear in mind the cautionary observation made by Karin Margareta Fredborg in her 1973 study on William of Conches and Peter Helias that the grammarians of the twelfth century were more interested in the *causa inventionis*

3 Rosier-Catach 1995.

4 Rosier-Catach 1995: 137.

5 Braakhuis 1997.

6 Braakhuis 1979: 110, 174-177, 251-252, 333-335.

7 Thurot 1869: 153 sqq.; cf. Petrus Helias, *Summa super Priscianum*, ed. L. Reilly, Vol. 1, p. 182, 40 sqq.

8 Pinborg 1967: 34.

9 Rosier-Catach 1995: 138.

terminology, and generally used the term *significatio* where their thirteenth-century colleagues would use *modus significandi* or the set *significatio generalis / specialis*.¹⁰ Furthermore, we must take into consideration that 1) the twelfth-century grammarians used the term *modus significandi*, 2) we do not come across the notion of *significatio generalis* as an equivalent of *modus significandi* in their writings, and finally 3) we do find, in Nicholas of Paris' *Synkategoreumata*, the term *modus significandi substantialis* used to indicate the semantic feature which mutually separates the parts of speech and is the essential, constitutive element of each part of speech, and the term *modus significandi accidentalis*,¹¹ on which the well-formed construction is founded.¹² So one may well ask, where does this special interest in the early thirteenth century in the *significatio generalis* and *specialis* come from, or rather, from where do these notions stem?

In this article I intend to discuss in more detail the occurrence of these notions, i.e. *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis*, and their mutual opposition, in order to contribute to our insight into the development of linguistic thought, or rather, thought on language in the first half of the thirteenth century. Why did the early thirteenth-century linguistic thinkers advance these notions?

10 See Fredborg 1973: 28. It has to be stressed that the set of *significatio secundaria* and *communis proprietas* is not at question here; these notions concern a distinction in the accidents of the words; cf. Fredborg 1973: 32.

11 It must be emphasized that this distinction is entirely different from the use of the term *modus significandi* that we find in Garlandus Compotista's *Dialectica*, where *modus significandi* is used in the general semantic way to make the logical distinction between those nouns which signify a subject and those which signify an accident. *Pace* Pinborg (1967: 34), one does not find the terms *modus significandi substantialis* and *accidental* in Garlandus' work; he only speaks about "in modo significandi, quia non significat substantialiter" (Garlandus Compotista, *Dialectica*, 10, 28).

12 Nicholas of Paris, *Synkategoreumata*, ed. Braakhuis, 16, 9: "Et loquor de modo significandi substantiali. Quia duplex est modus significandi: alter substantialis, alter accidentalis. Substantialis est per quem partes orationis discernuntur a se invicem et a quo habent esse in specie, sicut significare substantiam cum qualitate est id quod efficit nomen esse nomen. Accidental

2. The Early Thirteenth Century: The Grammatical Texts

In 1982 Gauthier¹³ showed that the commentary on the *Priscianus minor*, which in modern literature has traditionally been attributed to Jordanus of Saxony¹⁴ and was consequently dated to the second decade of the thirteenth century, could not have been composed before the 1240s. In itself this does not detract, from a scholarly point of view, from the observations made by Pinborg. On the other hand, Gauthier's finding has made the relative dating of the university grammar texts of the first part of the thirteenth century fairly insecure. Moreover, it confronts us with the fact that to date we have no text at our disposal about which it can be said with any certainty that it was part of the teaching of grammar in the first decades of the University of Paris. Therefore, Robert Kilwardby's commentary on the two books of the *Priscianus minor* and Nicholas of Paris' short *quaestiones* on the first book of the *Priscianus minor* are the oldest known witnesses of university grammar instruction; their teaching of the *artes* is traditionally dated to the 1240s at Paris. A first comparison of these texts with the Priscian commentaries dating from the twelfth century show that these thirteenth-century university commentaries have been composed in an entirely new style and format, in all probability the first obvious results of the standardisation of university teaching in the domain of grammar.

2.1 Robert Kilwardby

An inquiry into the occurrence of the terms *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis* in Kilwardby's commentary on the *Priscianus minor* shows that the future Archbishop of Canterbury hardly ever used these terms.¹⁵ Yet he does speak of the *significatio*

¹³ Gauthier 1982: 367-73.

¹⁴ Cf. Grabmann 1926: 115 and Grabmann 1956: 232-42; Pinborg 1967: 25-26: "Die erste Schrift, in der dieses neue Wissenschaftsideal mit aller Strenge auf die Grammatik angewandt wird, scheint der Kommentar zu Priscianus Minor des Jordanus von Sachsen (um 1220) zu sein."

¹⁵ My observations are based on a complete transcription of the first quarter of the text in MS Vat., BAV, Chigi L. V. 159, corrected with the help of MS Merton College 301, and of comprehensive extracts from other manuscripts.

generalis as opposed to the *significatio specialis* in his discussion of the relative, interrogative and infinite nouns. In the first book of the *Minor* (bk 17, ch. 29) Priscian stresses that the relative, the interrogative, and the infinite nouns, which we meet under the forms of ‘*qui*’ and ‘*quis*’ are not three different parts of speech because of their different endings, but one part of speech. He adduces the nouns ‘*qualis*’ and ‘*quantus*’ to prove his position: these nouns can be interrogative, infinite, or relative, and they change their accent accordingly, but notwithstanding this change of accidents they remain one part of speech. Peter Helias summarizes Priscian’s treatment of this subject by emphasizing that a difference in part of speech does not depend upon a difference caused by the accent.¹⁶

Discussing this topic, Kilwardby introduces the distinction between *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis*, and the distinction between *significatio* and *modus significandi*. According to Kilwardby, these nouns, i.e. the relative, the interrogative, and the infinite nouns, are one part of speech if one considers their vocal matter (*vox*), and if one considers their *significatio generalis*; they are separate parts of speech, if one considers their *significatio specialis*. The *modi significandi generales* and *speciales*, which also contribute to the unification and the diversification of these words, are only referred to; but it turns out that there exists a *modus significandi* on the level of the *significatio generalis*, which is called by Kilwardby a *modus generalis significandi*, and a *modus significandi* on the level of the *significatio specialis*, which is called accordingly a *modus significandi specialis*:

Deinde queritur de hoc quod iam ostenderat Priscianus, scilicet *quis* et *qui* esse eadem partem orationis. Contra. Relatiuum, infinitum et interrogatiuum sunt diuerse species nominum numerate a Prisciano in Magno [*Inst. gram.* II, 27] inter alias species. Cum igitur diuersitas secundum speciem sit uere diuersitas, et hec erunt diuerse species secundum istas diuersas differentias sub quibus cadunt. Idem etiam opponi potest de eo quod est *qualis*, et de eo quod est *quantus* et huiusmodi.

Et dicendum quod nomen interrogatiuum, relatiuum et infinitum conueniunt in significatione generali, sed differunt in speciali. Conueniunt etiam in uocum inflexionibus secundum quod cadunt sub eodem, ut patet in hac dictione *qui* et *qualis* et huiusmodi. Priscianus autem in Magno respiciens ad speciales significationes et ad speciales modos significandi, que differunt specie in interrogatiuis, re-

16 Peter Helias, *Summa super Priscianum*, ed. L. Reilly, vol. II, 906, 20-24.

latius et infinitis, posuit in Magno species diuersas esse nominis. Idem autem Priscianus respiciens hic modos generales significandi et significationem que reducuntur ad idem sub eodem nomine, respiciens etiam ad idempnitatem inflexionum, posuit ipsam esse partem eandem. Et quod hoc sit uerum, patet hoc per signa que ponit in litera ad hoc ostendendum.

Quomodo autem significatio generalis nominis secundum quod est infinitum, interrogatiuum et relatiuum sit eadem, patet, et quomodo significationes speciales diuerse sunt, sicut hoc nomen *qui* cum possit esse interrogatiuum, relatiuum et infinitum, omnibus modis habet significationem infinitam substantie et qualitatis indigens specificatione. Et hoc est significatio una generalis et modus significandi unus. Sed hec significatio infinita est: secundum quod respicit antecedens per quod finitatur, est relatiuum; secundum quod respicit subsequens in oratione per quod finitatur, sic est interrogatiuum; secundum quod respicit id quod simul cum ipso sumi potest siue sub ipso ut per aliquod suppositum infinite quod nec precedit in oratione nec subsequitur ipsum, sed sub eo sumi potest, sic est infinitum. Et sic sunt significationes speciales et modi significandi diuersi istius nominis secundum quod est infinitum et relatiuum et interrogatiuum. Eodem modo dicendum de hac dictione *qualis* et de huiusmodi. Ex hiis manifestum est quomodo idem nomen manens sub eadem uoce interrogatiuum et relatiuum et infinitum debet esse pars una et quomodo non, quia secundum uocem est pars una, secundum significationem est una pars in generali, sed diuerse in speciali. Patet etiam acceptio istarum trium differentiarum circa eandem significationem, scilicet interrogatiui, relatiui et infiniti.¹⁷

In the passage on the difference between the adverb and the interjection, Kilwardby expresses himself more clearly. Traditionally, the medieval grammarians had to explain why the Latin grammarians used to consider these two words as separate parts of speech, whereas their Greek colleagues did not. Kilwardby brings to the fore the usual view that the distinction between the parts of speech is based on the difference between their *modi significandi*. Some lines later he introduces the notions *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis* into the discussion. Since the *significatio generalis* is the same for both adverb and interjection, i.e. signifying the disposition of the act expressed by the verb, the Greek grammarians, Kilwardby argues, considered them to be one part of speech. The Latin grammarians, on the other hand, paid more attention to the *significatio specialis*; since these parts differed in their *significatio specialis*, the Latins treated them as two separate parts:

Dubitari potest hic an interiectio sit pars separata ab aduerbio, si ipsa pars sit. ...

Dicendum etiam ad secundum obiectum quod interiectio uno modo significat

17 MS Vat., BAV, Chigi, L. V. 159, f. 13^{ra-b}.

mentis conceptum, scilicet quantum ad audientem; quantum autem ad proferentem, mentis affectum. Et ideo potest esse pars orationis. Vel dicendum quod omnis pars et interiectio et alie significant mentis conceptum, sed alie partes expriment ipsum per modum conceptus, sola autem interiectio per modum affectus. Et ideo dicitur affectum significare et alie partes conceptum. Per modum enim significanti distinguuntur partes.

Deinde queritur utrum interiectio sit pars separata ab aduerbio. Et uidetur quod sic, quia separatim posuit eam Donatus et quia interiectio dat intelligere actum finitum et determinatum; de natura aduerbii est determinare actum et non dare intelligere actum determinatum, sicut patet discurrendo per singula. Ideo interiectio non erit de numero aduerbiorum.

Sed contra. Sicut adiectiuum nominis se habet ad suum substantiuum, sic adiectiuum uerbi ad suum; sed adiectiuum nominis aliquando dat intelligere subiectum determinatum ut curuum et rectum et par et impar et huiusmodi, aliquando non, sicut adiectiua que significant accidens per accidens, cuiusmodi sunt album et nigrum; tamen hec diuersitas non facit adiectiua nominis esse sub diuersis partibus; ergo similiter cum adiectiuum uerbi aliquando dat intelligere actum determinatum sicut interiectio et aliquando non dat sic intelligere determinatum actum sicut aduerbium, non fiet diuersa pars orationis propter diuersitatem. Et ita uidetur quod interiectio sub aduerbio collocetur.

Et dicendum quod est pars separata secundum Latinos. Hoc tamen sciendum quod in generali significatione conueniunt aduerbium et interiectio, scilicet in hoc quod est significare dispositionem actus. Secundum quam considerantes Greci posuerunt interiectionem sub aduerbio et non dixerunt eas esse partes separatas. In speciali autem discoherent, quia aduerbium significat dispositionem actus, communiter et non diffinitè intelligitur per ipsum. Interiectio autem significat dispositionem actus determinati et finiti et illum actum dat intelligere finite, ut *pape* determinat actum admirandi, *heu* actum dolendi et sic de aliis. Et sic considerantes Latini dicunt eas esse partes diuersas.¹⁸

These texts demonstrate that Kilwardby still uses the term *modus significanti* in a rather confused way.¹⁹ In the section on the difference between the adverb and the interjection, *modus significanti* is used to indicate what is constitutive of a part of speech as that part of speech, the *modus significanti essentialis*: “per modum enim significanti distinguuntur partes”. Furthermore, the term *modus significanti* is also used in opposition to the terms *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis* to indicate such accidents or secondary grammatical categories as accent, inflexion etc. The difference between Kilwardby’s use of *modus significanti generalis* and of *modus significanti specialis* must be sought on the level of the corresponding *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis*.

18 MS Vat., BAV, Chigi L. V. 159, f. 8^b.

19 Cf. Rosier 1995: 137.

The *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis* also are constitutive of a part of speech as that part of speech, but at the level of lexical meaning. The difference between them is a hierarchical one. They relate to each other as genus and species.²⁰ It must be stressed here that they are not responsible, in Kilwardby's theory, for the difference between Priscian's *nomen generale*, e.g. *animal*, versus *nomen speciale*, e.g. *homo*.²¹ The set of *modus significandi generalis* and *modus significandi specialis* corresponds to the notions *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis*, respectively, on the level of the secondary grammatical categories. The *accidentia* that are common to the "genus" are the *modi significandi generales* as, e.g., case, gender etc. The *accidentia* that are connected to one species only as, e.g., the accent of the relative,²² are the *modi significandi speciales*.

Moreover, we also find the term *consignificatio* and the corresponding *consignificatum* used by Kilwardby to indicate the secondary grammatical categories, e.g. in his treatment of the functions of the article:

ipsa res accipit diuersas consignificationes, scilicet diuersa genera, diuersos numeros et casus et huiusmodi.²³

2.2 Nicholas of Paris

We encounter a completely different use of the terms *significatum generale* and *speciale* in the writings of Nicholas of Paris. Pinborg has referred to a section of Nicholas' commentary on the *Barbarismus*, in which he discusses the three sermocinal levels, logic, grammar, and rhetoric.²⁴ This discussion shows that for Nicholas

²⁰ It is interesting to note that in the *Glose 'Admirantes'*, a commentary on Alexander de Villa Dei's *Doctrinale* dating to the middle of the thirteenth century, we find the term *significatio generalis* to indicate Kilwardby's *significatio generalis* and *specialis*: "[Thurot 1869: p. 353] Duplex namque est significatio generalis: una est que conuenit omni nomini, sicut significare substantiam cum qualitate; ... Est et alia significatio generalis, sicut illa que est alicuius speciei nominis, et hec non dicitur omni nomini conuenire, sicut nomen proprium et appellativum habent quodammodo significationem generalem diuersam ...". For some reason the anonymous commentator avoided using the term *significatio specialis* in this context.

²¹ Cf. Prisc., *Inst. gram.* II, 31, ed. Hertz, vol. I, 61, 28 sqq.

²² Cf. Prisc., *Inst. gram.* XIII, 13, ed. Hertz, vol. II, p. 9, 20-21.

²³ *ad* Prisc., *IG*, XVII, 26; MS Vat., BAV, Chigi L. V. 159, f. 10^{va}.

²⁴ Cf. Pinborg 1967: 27, n. 27; Nicholas of Paris, *In Barbarismus* (CLM 14460): "[f. 203^{va}] Ad aliud. Triplex est contextus: quantum significata specialia, et contra

well-formedness and ill-formedness (congruity and incongruity) were linked with the *significata generalia*; that is why they are said to be the *chasse gardée* of the grammarian; the logician, on the other hand, had the *significata specialia* as his area of special attention, for the truth or the falsity of a proposition is based on the *significata specialia*. We meet the same view in Nicholas' collection of *Questions on Priscian minor*. Immediately at the beginning of this collection it is said that the congruity and incongruity of a sentence are rooted in the *significata generalia*, its truth and falsity in the *significata specialia*.²⁵ However, it is not only the *significatum generale* which is responsible for the congruity of a sentence. Congruity is the result of the agreement of the *significata generalia* and of the *consignificata*, incongruity on the other hand is the result of their disagreement. Figurative speech is the result of the agreement of the *significata generalia* and the disagreement of the *consignificata* or vice versa:

Sed congruitas causatur ex conueniencia consignificatorum et significatorum generalium, incongruitas uero ex repugnancia eorundem. Potest ergo esse conueniencia significatorum et repugnancia consignificatorum uel econuerso.²⁶

Nicholas comes back to this subject in his discussion of figurative speech:

Sed congruum et incongruum causantur ex idemptitate accidencium et significatorum generalium, incongruum uero ex repugnancia eorundem. Potest ergo esse conueniencia accidencium et repugnancia significatorum generalium uel econuerso. Et sic est figuratiuum.²⁷

So for Nicholas four combinations are operational:

hunc [hoc MS] peccatur in falsitate; de quo [qua MS] uidet loycus. Alius est contextus quantum ad significata generalia, et contra hunc peccatur in <in>congruitate; de quo uidet gramaticus. Alius est quantum ad expressionem sententie pulchre, et contra hunc peccatur in inconcinnitate uel in inornatu; de quo uidet rethoricus."

²⁵ Nicholas of Paris [henceforth NP], *Quaestiones super Primum Priscianum* (MS Oxford, Bodl., Lat. misc. f. 34): "[f. 1^{ra}] Dicendum quod a parte significati generalis causatur congruitas, a parte significati specialis causatur ueritas, a parte utriusque ornatus."

²⁶ NP, *Quaestiones super Priscianum*, Oxford, Bodl. Lat. misc. f. 34, f. 1^{ra}.

²⁷ NP, *Quaestiones super Priscianum*, Oxford, Bodl. Lat. misc. f. 34, f. 23^{va}.

	SIGN GEN	CONSIG	e.g.(not in NP)
congruity	+	+	homo currit
figura ¹	+	-	turba ruunt
figura ²	-	+	sublime volat
incongruity	-	-	post currunt

Furthermore, we find the term *significatum generale* in Nicholas' treatment about the order of the parts of speech, when he deals with the traditional question of whether the preposition has priority over the adverb or vice versa. This discussion has its origin in a difference in the order of the parts of speech in the works of Donatus and Priscian. Donatus allotted the place immediately after the verb to the adverb and put the preposition in the seventh and penultimate place just before the interjection. Priscian, on the other hand, put the preposition in the fifth place before the adverb and the conjunction. Nicholas tries to explain this difference by saying that Donatus mainly looked at the syntactic behaviour of these parts, whereas Priscian paid attention to their *significata generalia*:

Ad hoc dicendum quod prepositio et aduerbium dupliciter possunt considerari: Vel ratione constructionis. Et sic considerat Donatus. Dicens quod aduerbium intransitiue construitur, prepositio uero transitiue, preordinauit prepositioni aduerbium. Vel possunt considerari ratione [f. 7ra] significatorum suorum generalium. Et sic considerans Priscianus preordinauit prepositionem aduerbio, quia significatum generale ipsius prepositionis a nomine dependet, significatum uero generale ipsius aduerbii dependet a uerbo. Et sic patet quomodo diuersimode ordinantur a Donato et a Prisciano.²⁸

Kilwardby also paid attention to this question, but he solved it without an appeal to the *significata generalia*:

ADVERBIVM quoque [Prisc. *Inst. gram.* XVII, 21, p. 121, 3]. Hic ordinat aduerbium sic. Sicut prepositio est nominis determinatio – preponitur enim nominibus et aliis casualibus per appositionem et tunc defendit sibi uim dictionis, sed in compositione non defendit sibi uim diuisionis, sed cedit in partem cum qua componitur,

28 NP, *Qua super Prisc.*, Oxford, Bodl. Lat.misc. f. 34, f. 6^{vb}.

sic aduerbium est adiectiuum et determinatio uerbi, sicut patet ex nominatione eius. Quare sicut post nomen immediate ponitur uerbum, sic competenter post prepositionem immediate ponitur aduerbium. Et hoc est *Aduerbium quoque*.²⁹

In this context it is important to mention that Robertus Anglicus whose *Lectura super Priscianum minorem* has been preserved in the MS Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. D.2.45, f. 1^r-24^v,³⁰ also refers to the *significata generalia* and the syntactic behaviour of the preposition and of the adverb. Although at first glance he seems to be close to Nicholas of Paris, his position is closer to that of Kilwardby. In Nicholas' view it is Donatus who took the syntactic aspects, i.e. the transitive or the intransitive construction, into account, whereas Priscian paid attention to the *significata generalia*. It is the position of Kilwardby and of Robertus Anglicus that Priscian looked at the syntactic relationship of these parts of speech with other parts of speech. Robertus Anglicus explicitly says that Priscianus did not pay attention to the *significata generalia*:

[f. 4^v] Ad ista duo argumenta respondetur simul, et dicitur quod Priscianus non respexit ad generalia significata, secundum quod probauit ista duo argumenta, sed magis respexit ad habitudines istarum partium adiciendas aliis partibus.³¹

²⁹ MS Vat., BAV, Chigi L. V. 159, f. 8^{ra}.

³⁰ Cf. Kneepkens 1995: 250.

³¹ Notwithstanding this agreement it is not certain whether Kilwardby's position is the same as that of Robert the Englishman (Robertus Anglicus). We do not know Robertus Anglicus' interpretation of the term *significatum generale*, that is, whether he follows Kilwardby's semantic genus / species model, or Nicholas' grammatical versus lexical meaning model. Robertus' work dates, in all probability, to the same period as Kilwardby's and Nicholas of Paris' works. We do not encounter the notion of the *significatum generale* in the discussion on the interrogative, relative, and infinite nouns.

It appears that Robert is acquainted with and uses the terms *modus significandi essentialis* and *modus significandi accidentalis*: “[f. 1^v] Item queritur utrum constructio possit fieri sub diuersitate accidentium. Et uidetur quod sic, quia testante Philosopho in secundo *Perierminias* ‘omnis generatio habet fieri ex oppositis’. Sed constructio est quedam generatio. Ergo habet fieri ex oppositis, ut ‘post currunt et stannum alba’. Solutio. Dico quod generatio non habet fieri ex quibuscumque oppositis. Non habet fieri ex illis que sunt omnino opposita, sed partim diuersa et partim conuenientia, debent esse, ut dicciones que differunt inter se quantum ad modum significandi essentialem, conueniunt quantum ad modum significandi accidentalem. Et sic patet solutio.”

This master Robertus Anglicus might be the master Robertus Anglicus who authored a commentary on Peter of Spain's *Tractatus*, and who used the terms *signifi-*

So it appears from the grammatical texts that we have at our disposal that within the domain of grammar two different sets of concepts of *significatio generalis* / *significatum generale* and *specialis* / *speciale* and their mutual opposition were operational, and that they acquired, albeit for a short time, a fundamental position in linguistic theory. For Kilwardby and Robert the Englishman, the *significatio generalis* / *significatum generale* functions in an operational way only in the discussions on the arrangement of the parts of speech and on questions on the subclassification of a part of speech. Incidentally, there is a complete silence about congruity and incongruity. According to Kilwardby, the adverb and the interjection share a common *significatio generalis*, that is, signifying the disposition of an act (*significare dispositionem actus*). The adverb, however, signifies the disposition in an indefinite way, the interjection on the other hand in a finite and determined way. So, says Kilwardby, they differ on the level of the *significatio specialis*. Whether Robertus Anglicus follows Kilwardby in this respect is not clear. We do not find the term *significatum speciale* in his *Lectura*.

It turns out that Kilwardby's notion of *significatio generalis* shows a partial agreement with Nicholas' *significatum generale*, but that their respective notions of *significatio specialis* / *significatum speciale* disagree fundamentally, and so the mutual opposition of these terms and their function in the respective semantic theories also disagree. Kilwardby's *significatio specialis* belongs to the grammarian's area of interest. In his view it is a grammatico-semantic concept. The sub-categorisation of a part of speech, constituted by its *significatio generalis*, not its lexical meaning, is based on it; it is the (future) *modus significandi specialis*. Factually, it is part of what is called the *significatum generale* by Nicholas.

Kilwardby's introduction of the opposition between *significatio generalis* and *specialis* in his discussion on the interrogative, infinite, and relative nouns stems from the same concept of *significatio specialis*. Here, too, we are confronted with the subclassification

catum generale and *speciale* in the same way that Nicholas of Paris did (cf. de Rijk 1969, 40-41). Further research is needed on the matter, however. [Editor's note: the possibility that the two Roberts were one and the same person was discussed and rejected in a joint paper by Irène Rosier-Catach and S. Ebbesen, presented at the 12th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics in Pamplona, 1997].

of a particular set of nouns, which was treated by Priscian in his *Maior* in a different way than in his *Minor*. Priscian, the grammarian par excellence, focused almost exclusively on the *significationes speciales* and the *modi significandi speciales* in his *Maior*, whereas in his *Minor* the *significatio generalis* and the *modi significandi generales* prevailed.

3. The Early Thirteenth Century: The Logical Texts

3.1 *Nicholas of Paris*

Pinborg (1967) and Braakhuis (1979) have pointed out that Nicholas of Paris, who was active in the 1240s in the Faculty of Arts at Paris,³² makes use of the notions of *significatio generalis* and of *significatio specialis* in his logical writings. Pinborg (1967: 27, n. 27) refers to the commentary on the *Peri hermeneias* in the manuscript München, CLM 14460 (f. 65^{ra}), commonly attributed to Nicholas.³³ In this text we find the very position that we have met in the *Questiones* on Priscian and in the *Barbarismus* commentary. The semantic stratification of a part of speech is twofold: it consists of the *significatio generalis*, which is constitutive of the part of speech and which is the *principium construendi* as well, the grammarian's special area of interest; and of the *significatio specialis*, on which the truth and falsity of a proposition is based, the domain of the logician:

Ad aliud dicendum quod logicus aliter considerat nomen quam gramaticus, quia loicus ratione specialis significati, gramaticus ratione generalis ut in lectione sequenti apparebit. Et etiam strictius quam gramaticus, quia aliquid est nomen apud gramaticum quod non est nomen apud logicum.³⁴

The discussion of these notions is the result of an examination of the task of the grammarian and of the logician which was caused by the confrontation of the diverse definitions of the noun and of the verb given by Priscian and Aristotle in the *Institutiones gram-*

³² See Braakhuis 1997: n. 17.

³³ See, however, Lohr 1972: 299.

³⁴ MS München, CLM 14460, f. 63^{ra}.

*maticae*³⁵ and the *Peri hermeneias*³⁶ respectively. Since the general signification of a part of speech is its *principium construendi* and the concern for congruity is the special task of the grammarian, it is obvious according to the author that if a grammarian has to define a noun, he will concentrate on the general signification and bring this general signification into his definition of a part of speech. The grammarian as a grammarian is not interested in the lexical meaning of a word, but in its position within the set of the parts of speech; for him the general signification is the foundation of construction. The logician on the other hand pays special attention to the lexical meaning, since the truth or falsity of a proposition depends on it. The lexical meaning in itself is *ad placitum*, the general signification is not. Furthermore, he is interested in the “tense” / “time” signification of the verb, since this aspect is also responsible for the truth or falsity of a proposition. That is why the logician puts the *significativa ad placitum* aspect and the time signification aspect in his definition of the noun and of the verb:

Ad aliud dicendum quod duplex est significatio nominis, scilicet generalis, quo nomen omne dicitur esse nomen, scilicet quia significat substantiam cum qualitate. Et hec significatio generalis est principium construendi. Ideo hanc ponit grammaticus in diffinitione nominis. Est etiam significatio specialis ad quam impositum est nomen ad placitum. Et hanc considerat logicus, quia penes hanc consistit ueritas et falsitas. Sed hanc non potuit ponere in diffinitione nominis, quia non est una sed diuersa in diuersis nominibus.

Per hoc patet responsio ad aliud, quod placitum non cadit supra generale significatum quod considerat grammaticus, sed supra specialia significata, que considerat logicus. Et per hoc patet solutio ad aliud, quia casus est principium ordinationis quam considerat grammaticus; propter hoc ponit casum in diffinitione nominis. Tempus uero non est principium ordinandi uerbum ad nomen, sed penes [presens MS] tempus inmutatur ueritas uel falsitas, que considerat logicus. Ideo ponit tempus in ratione uerbi.³⁷

35 Cf. Prisc., *Inst.gram.*, II, 18, ed. Hertz, vol. I, 55, 6-7: “Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare” or in the medieval version “substantiam cum qualitate significare”.

36 Arist. Lat., transl. Boethii, *De interpret.*, c. 2, ed. Minio-Paluello, 6, 4-6: “Nomen ergo est vox significativa secundum placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars est significativa separata”.

37 MS München, CLM 14460, f. 65^{ra}.

In Nicholas' commentary on the *Peri hermeneias* (MS. Vat. lat. 3011),³⁸ we find nearly the same views. In the beginning of this work Nicholas argues that the grammarian and the logician do not take the noun and the verb in the same way. The grammarian considers them from the point of view of *modus significandi* and *consignificandi*,³⁹ which are the cause of congruity and incongruity; the logician on the other hand considers them insofar as they are the principles of truth and falsity:

Sed gramaticus et loycus non eodem modo accipiunt nomen et uerbum, quia gramaticus accipit nomen et uerbum pro modo significandi et consignificandi, que sunt causa congruitatis et incongruitatis. Loycus autem non sic, sed accipit ea prout sunt principia ueritatis et falsitatis.⁴⁰

Nicholas comes back to this subject in his discussion of the definition of the noun. Here we meet the notions of *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis* used the same way as in the Munich commentary, the *Questiones* on Priscian and the *Barbarismus* commentary:

Hic solet queri quare gramaticus et loycus diuersimode diffiniunt nomen, quia cum unius rei unicum sit esse, uidetur quod istius uel illius diffinitio superfluat. Si ad hoc dicatur quod bene posuerint diuersas diffinitiones, ideo quod non eodem modo accipiant, tunc queritur quomodo.

38 Cf. Lohr 1972: 299.

39 We also meet the distinction between *significatum* and *consignificatum* in the CLM 14460 commentary in the section where the order of treatment of the infinite noun and the noun in the oblique case is discussed, that is, why Aristotle first speaks about the infinite noun, and then about the noun in the oblique case and not vice versa. In this context the term *significatum* indicates the "*substantia cum qualitate*", the term *consignificatum* the "*casus*": "[CLM 14460, f. 64^{va}] Prius est sumere diffinitionem nominis separando ipsum a uerbo quam diffinitionem uerbi, quia nomen et secundum logicum et secundum gramaticum prius est uerbo, sicut subiectum ante actum uel passionem et suppositum ante appositum. [f. 64^{vb}] Prius est etiam separare nomen a uerbo et ita preparare materiam enuntiationis in primo libro quam separare nomen simpliciter a nomine secundum quid, et ita preparare materiam enuntiationis in secundo libro.

Adhuc prius est diffinitionem proponere quam propositam explanare et quam condiciones per quas separaret nomen simpliciter a nomine secundum quid, prius finitum quam rectum, quia finitum a parte significati, rectum a parte consignificati.

In this context the author takes *significatum* as indicating the "*substantia cum qualitate*": "[CLM 14460, f. 64^{vb}] Gramaticus in diffinitione nominis ponit significatum, scilicet substantiam cum qualitate, logicus uero dicit nomen esse uocem significatiuam, sed non dicit quid significet, sicut gramaticus."

40 MS Vat. lat. 3011, f. 22^b.

Item. Queritur cum nomen sit pars enunciationis sicut est pars orationis, quare non posuerit loycus sic diffinitionem eius: "Nomen est pars enunciationis", sicut posuerit gramaticus quod nomen est pars orationis.

Preterea. Gramaticus cum gramaticus accipiat nomen pro significatione generali, diffinit etiam per generale significatum, quia dicit: nomen est quod significat substantiam etc. Et queritur quare loycus cum consideret nomen penes speciale significatum, quare etiam non diffiniat illud per [penes *MS*] speciale significatum.⁴¹

The answer to the first question is that the grammarian is interested in congruity. The correct order is a "*passio*" of the parts of speech, and the *totum*, i.e. the *oratio*, consists of the parts only. That is why the grammarian defines the noun on the level of the parts of speech. The logician is interested in the noun as the principle of a true or false proposition.

In his answer to the second question Nicholas stresses that Aristotle started from a well-formed sentence. The truth or falsity of a proposition does not originate from the order of the parts of speech in a proposition, but from the meaning of the words: that is why the logician put the term "*uox significatiua*" in his definition of the noun. Since, however, the *significata specialia*, i.e. the lexical meanings, are infinite, he brought in the "*modus significandi ad placitum*" as an all-embracing term:

Ad primum dicendum. Verum est quod speculantur diuersimode nomen gramaticus et loycus. Gramaticus enim prout est principium congrue ordinationis, et ordinatio est passio partium. Partes enim sunt ordinate adiuuicem et non totum nisi per partes, ideo diffinit per partem. Loycus uero prout est principium ueritatis et falsitatis. Item. Gramaticus pro generali significatione, iste pro speciali.

Ad hoc quod obicitur quare iste auctor non diffiniuit: Nomen est pars enunciationis, dicendum quod gramaticus propterea dixit: "Nomen est pars orationis", quia ipse considerat nomen prout potest ordinari congrue uel incongrue in oratione. Sed iste auctor supposuit eundem ordinem congruum, et tantum accipit nomen prout potest generare uerum uel falsum. Sed uerum uel falsum non fit ex ordine. Diffinit ergo per ea que faciunt ad ueritatem uel falsitatem. Hoc autem est significatio. Vnde diffinit per significationem, quia dicit "*uox significatiua*".

Ad aliud quod queritur quare non diffiniuit per speciale significatum, dicendum quod hoc non potuit facere, quia specialia significata nominis infinita sunt. Posuit quoddam quod est tanquam omnia comprehendens, uidelicet modum significandi ad placitum. Sic patet responsio ad hoc.⁴²

41 MS Vat. lat. 3011, f. 23^{ra}.

42 MS Vat. lat. 3011, f. 23^{ra}.

The texts which we have seen thus far show that Nicholas of Paris and the author of the CLM 14460 commentary used the distinction between *significatio generalis* and *specialis* to explain the dissimilarity in scope of the grammarian and of the logician within the whole of the sermocinal disciplines. Both deal with the signification of words, but the *significatio generalis* is constitutive of the grammarian's domain, the *significatio specialis* of that of the logician. However, it appears that besides this general aspect of the distinction between grammar and logic, Nicholas had important semantic reasons for introducing this distinction into his doctrine of signification.

Braakhuis has shown that the notions of *significatio generalis* and *specialis* played an important role in Nicholas' doctrine of the syncategorematic words.⁴³ In his introduction on the semantics of the syncategorematic words Nicholas says that there is a double signification in the parts of speech. First, there is a general signification which is responsible for the fact that every individual part of speech belongs to one of the main categories of parts of speech, like an individual to a species. Besides the general signification, every part of speech has a special signification: the cause through which this part has this – lexical – meaning. For example, the noun *homo* has to signify substance and quality as its general signification, but also an individual in a common way under the property of humanity as its special signification:

Dicendum quod duplex est significatio in partibus orationis: generalis and specialis. Generalis est a qua imponitur quelibet pars in specie partis, sicut significare substantiam cum qualitate est illud a quo nomen est nomen. Et specialis a qua vox specialiter imponitur, sicut nomen ad significandum hanc substantiam vel illam, idest communem vel propriam, sub qualitate hac vel illa, idest communi vel propria.⁴⁴

According to Nicholas the indeclinable parts of speech do not have a special signification of their own, but only *in potentia*. It can be actualized by the adjuncts, which determine and make perfect the special signification of the indeclinable part:

⁴³ Braakhuis 1979 and Braakhuis 1997.

⁴⁴ Braakhuis 1979: II, 4, 5-11; see also Braakhuis 1979: II, 58, 16-18: "Dicendum quod, quia per prepositionem vel coniunctionem non significatur nisi pure habitudo, que non trahitur in specialem significationem nisi per adiunctum ...".

Dico igitur quod partes indeclinabiles generalem habent significationem a qua et ad quam impositae sunt et inter se distinguuntur; et de hac est verum quod concludunt rationes affirmative. Sed specialem significationem non habent nisi possibiliter, et possibilitatem in actum reducunt per adiuncta, in quibus terminant et perficiunt suas significationes ...⁴⁵

However, the fullest account of the distinction between *significatio generalis* and *specialis* is found in Nicholas' section on negation, where he discusses the semantics of the infinite noun. Nicholas starts with his usual account about the distinction between the two levels of signification:

Dicendum quod duplex est significatio in partibus orationis, scilicet: generalis et specialis. Generalis est ad quam pars ipsa instituitur et per quam differt ab aliis, que est principium congruitatis in constructione ex convenientia, et incongruitatis ex inconvenientia. Est alia significatio que est specialis, ad quam partes specialiter instituitur, per quam differt una species partis ab alia specie eiusdem, que est principium in oratione veritatis <ex> convenientia intellectuum et falsitatis ex inconvenientia.⁴⁶

The *accidentia*, i.e. the secondary grammatical categories, are situated on the level of the general signification:

Significationem ergo generalem sequuntur accidentia que sunt genus, numerus etc. in parte casuali, tempus, modus, et persona, in verbo.⁴⁷

A negation does not remove the general signification, but the special signification:

Quia ergo negatio non amovet generalem significationem partis, – ut patet: cum dicitur: “non-homo”, nichilominus est nomen quam prius nec nominativi casus etc., – sed amovet specialem, – ut patet, quia idem est ‘non homo’ quam *aliud quam homo*, – ita similiter facit in verbo negatio amovere rem verbi, que est principium veritatis vel falsitatis, ab ipso verbo.⁴⁸

45 Braakhuis 1979: II, 4, 11-16.

46 Braakhuis 1979: II, 66, 19-67, 2.

47 Braakhuis 1979: II, 67, 3-4. It must be noted that Nicholas also uses the *modus significandi* terminology to indicate *significatio generalis* and the *accidentia*: “[ed. Braakhuis 1979: II, 16, 10-18] quia duplex est modus significandi: alter substantialis, alter accidentalis. Substantialis est per quem partes orationis discernuntur a se invicem et a quo habent esse in specie, sicut significare substantiam cum qualitate est id quod efficit nomen esse nomen. Accidentalibus est qui sequitur substantialem, a quo causatur constructio inter partes orationis secundum convenientiam ut est genus, numerus, persona, casus etc. Illius ergo modi qui est secundum substantiam convenientia causat esse partium, illius vero qui est secundum accidentia non.”

48 Braakhuis 1979: II, p. 67, 5-10.

But what does this mean? As we have seen above in his treatment of the syncategorematic words, according to Nicholas, the special signification consists in signifying not only the quality ‘*humanitas*’, but also – in the case of *homo* – this substance in a common way. We find an important refinement in Nicholas’ discussion on the infinite noun and verb in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Peri hermeneias*. Here it is said that in the case of an infinite noun the negation only deprives the noun of its special quality; its general quality is left untouched. That is why for a logician an infinite noun is not a noun any longer, whereas for a grammarian, who is interested in the *significatio generalis*, it remains a noun.⁴⁹

Item. Queritur de nomine infinito si dicatur infinitum a priuatione substantie uel qualitatis uel utriusque. Si dicatur quod a priuatione substantie, tunc nomen adiectiuum potest dici infinitum. Si dicatur quod ratione qualitatis, tunc pronomen potest dici nomen infinitum. Si a priuatione utriusque, tunc hoc nomen *quis* erit nomen infinitum.

Preterea queritur que sit differentia inter nomen infinitum apud gramaticum et apud loycum.

Item. Queritur quare gramaticus accipiat nomen infinitum, loycus autem refutet.

Ad primum dicendum quod dicitur infinitum a priuatione specialis qualitatis. Specialis dico qualitatis, quia cum dico ‘*non-homo*’, ibi priuatur illa specialis qualitas, scilicet *humanitas*, sed remanet adhuc *generalis*. Et per hoc patet quod loycus non recipit, gramaticus autem recipit.

Si tu obicias: “Si a priuatione qualitatis, ergo pronomen potest dici infinitum nomen”, non sequitur, quia pronomen a sua primaria inuentione est priuatum qualitate, illud autem a uiolentia, quia uirtute negationis. Per hoc patet differentia inter nomen infinitum apud gramaticum et loycum, quia illud infinitatur [infinitant *MS*], aliud uero infinitum a sui impositione.⁵⁰

These texts show that it is Nicholas of Paris who most intensively and fundamentally uses the doctrine of the *significatio generalis* and *specialis* in his semantics of term negation or infinitation. On both levels, i.e. those of the general signification and of the special signification, he discerns the significative functions, e.g. in the case of the noun to signify substance and quality generally and specially. Term negation is restricted to the level of the special signification. This enables Nicholas to make congruent sentences or

49 It is remarkable that in the *Peri hermeneias* commentary which has been preserved in CLM 14460 we do not find the notions of *significatio generalis* or *specialis* in the section on the infinite noun.

50 MS Vat. lat. 3011, f. 23^b.

propositions in which infinite terms occur. On the level of the special signification, for Nicholas, the negation only removes the quality signification, for if it were to remove the substance signification as well, the infinite term would mean “*non-ens*”.⁵¹

3.2 Johannes Pagus

Braakhuis⁵² has pointed out that the distinction between *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis* also occurs in John Pagus’ treatise on syncategorematic terms. Pagus’ treatise, and his teaching activities in the Parisian Faculty of Arts are commonly located in the beginning of the third decade of the thirteenth century.⁵³ In the first volume of his thesis, Braakhuis published large parts of Pagus’ treatise. Among these we find a long section in which the distinction between the *significatio generalis* and *specialis* plays a central role. Pagus states that a word, a *dictio*, has a double signification: the *significatio generalis* and the *significatio specialis*. The *significatio generalis* consists in signifying substance with quality: the *substantia generalis* and the *qualitas generalis*; the special signification is, e.g. in the case of the noun *homo*, the *significatio humanitatis*:

Duplex est significatio dictionum: generalis et specialis; sicut patet in hoc nomine ‘*homo*’; hoc enim nomen ‘*homo*’ significat substantiam cum qualitate, et hec est

51 Cf. MS Vat. lat. 3011, f. 23^{rb}: “Item. Queritur si nomen infinitum denotet ens uel non-ens uel utrumque. Et quod denotet ens, patet per Aristotilem, qui dicit quod huic quod est non-eguale subiacet aliquid, uidelicet inequale. Videtur ergo uelle quod infinitum denotet ens. Sed quod denotet non-ens, patet, quia dicit Boetius ‘*Cesar qui non est, est non-homo*’; uidetur ergo quod denotet non-ens.

Solutio. Nomen infinitum inuentum est ad significandum principia motus et mutacionis. Et dico de mutacione que est creatio. Si ergo significat principium mutacionis que est creatio, tunc dico quod denotat non-ens actu uel potentia, quia Deus creauit omnia ex nichilo, et huiusmodi nomina infinita sunt *nichil* et *non-ens*. Si autem significant principia motus, hoc dupliciter: aut motus substantie aut accidentis. Si substantie, tunc denotat ens in potentia et non in actu, ut ex non-homine fit homo, idest ex eo quod non est homo in actu, sed in potentia, fit homo. Si denotet motum accidentis, tunc ponit ens substantie actu et potentia, sed ponit priuacionem qualitatatis, ut ex non-albo fit albus. Ad hoc autem quod dicitur ‘*Cesar qui non est, <est> non-homo*’, hoc est: Cesar qui non est homo, est tamen aliquid quod aliquid est non-homo.”

52 In his introduction to his edition of Nicholas of Paris’ *Syncategoremata* and in Braakhuis 1997.

53 Braakhuis 1979: I, 168.

generalis significatio, specialis est significatio humanitatis. Similiter patet in uerbo [alio MS]: significare agere vel pati est significatio generalis, cursus vero est specialis significatio.⁵⁴

We meet a similar view in Pagus' discussion of the question of whether it is possible to infinitate the universal quantifier '*omnis*'. Pagus points out that '*omnis*' as a noun signifies substance with quality. But we must, Pagus argues, make a distinction between general quality and special quality. For example, the noun '*homo*' signifies substance with quality and it signifies a special quality with regard to the substance. The negation of the infinite noun removes the special quality, but the general quality remains. Since, according to Pagus, '*omnis*' signifies a general quality as its quality, the negation leaves the *significatio qualitatis generalis* untouched.⁵⁵ The reason for this is, says Pagus, that this, i.e. the *significatio qualitatis generalis*, is the principle of the *oratio* as far as the *oratio* provides us with a congruent and perfect *sententia*, and the negation does not influence the congruity of a sentence:

Ad hoc dicendum quoniam hoc signum '*omnis*' non potest infinitari. Et ratio huius est quoniam significat substantiam cum qualitate generali. Dicimus ergo quod duplex est qualitas: generalis et specialis. Hoc enim nomen '*homo*' significat substantiam cum qualitate et significat specialem qualitatem circa substantiam; et hec specialis qualitas potest removeri et privari per nomen infinitum. Sed generalis qualitas non potest privari; cum enim dicitur "non homo", privatur qualitas specialis sed non privatur qualitas generalis, sed remanet significatio qualitatis generalis. Et hoc est quoniam hoc est principium orationis prout oratio demonstrat sententiam congruam et perfectam⁵⁶, sed negatio non removet ibi congruitatem^{57,58}

In his answer to the question in which way the negation can cause a contradiction, Pagus comprehensively appeals to the notions of *significatio generalis* and *specialis* again.⁵⁹ In this context, he also argues that the secondary grammatical categories, the *accidentia*, are closely connected with the *significatio generalis*, and therefore im-

54 Braakhuis 1979: I, 189.

55 Incidentally, here Pagus intermingles two separate semantical levels, the level of the constitution of the part of speech and the level of the – lexical – meaning of a specific part of speech, which, e.g. in the case of the universal quantifier, can have a "general" range.

56 Cf. Prisc., *Inst. gram.*, II, 15, ed. Hertz, vol. I, 53, 28-29.

57 ibi congruitatem] *scr.* incongruitatem MS.

58 Braakhuis 1979: I, p. 225.

59 See Braakhuis 1979: I, 228-229, and Braakhuis 1997: n. 31.

muné to the violent influence of the negation.⁶⁰ The general signification is the semantic component of a word which causes a word to belong to that specific part of speech, e.g. for the noun ‘*homo*’, to signify substance and quality because of which it is a noun. It is also responsible for the well-formedness of a sentence. In the special signification we meet these components again, but this time on the level of the lexical meaning: ‘*homo*’ signifies substance presented under the quality of humanity.⁶¹ This happens not only to the noun, but also to the verb used in a sentence as a finite verb. The negation added removes the *compositio specialis*, but leaves the *compositio generalis* untouched.

The same notions are found in Pagus’ *Appellationes*, in the section in which he discusses the syntactic and the semantic relationship between an adjective noun and its substantive in a sentence.⁶²

3.3 *The Peri hermeneias Commentary in MS Padova, Bibl. Univ., 1589, ff. 69r-93v*

It has been suggested that a commentary on the *Peri hermeneias* preserved on folia 69^r-93^v of MS Padova, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1589, was possibly written by Johannes Pagus.⁶³ In his “Introduction” to the edition of Thomas Aquinas’ *Expositio libri peryermenias*, Gauthier⁶⁴ has argued in favour of Pagus’ authorship, but recently this attribution has been seriously contested. In any case, if Pagus were the author of the commentary, the date of its composition must be put later than the 1220s, since in this commentary a reference to Peter of Spain’s *Tractatus* is found.⁶⁵

In this context, it is remarkable that the way in which the author of the Padova commentary uses the notions of the *significatio generalis* and *specialis* deviates from what we find in the other writings

60 Braakhuis 1979: I, 229: “Secundum hoc ergo patet solutio prius quesitorum, quoniam modus et tempus non accidunt compositioni speciali sed generali; con-significationes enim partium orationis sequuntur significationem generalem partium orationis et non specialem.”

61 Cf. Braakhuis 1979: I, 228: “iterum significat substantiam que est sub qualitate que est humanitas”.

62 Cf. de Libera 1985: 217-218.

63 Cf. Lohr 1972: 124; Braakhuis 1979: I, 169, n. 14.

64 Gauthier 1989: 65*-66*.

65 Cf. Braakhuis 1997: n. 19; Tabarroni 1988: 404, n. 46; and Lafleur 1994: 196, n. 97.

of Pagus. As we have seen above, Pagus makes extensive use of these notions in his *Synkategoreumata* and in his *Appellationes*. In this *Peri hermeneias* commentary, however, we do not come across the terms *significatio generalis* and *specialis*, but only *significatum generale* and *speciale*. This would not be so important (we also find Nicholas of Paris using only the set *significatum generale / speciale* in his *Questiones* on Priscian) if it were not the case that the notions are absent in the section on the infinite noun and on the infinite verb, whereas Pagus uses them extensively when he deals with the infinite noun in his *Synkategoreumata*. In the Padova commentary they are only found in the discussion on the oblique noun. Here the author distinguishes not only between the *significatum generale* and the *significatum speciale*, but also between the *modus significandi generalis*, which embraces the secondary grammatical categories *per se*, and the *modus significandi specialis*, which depends on the *modus significandi generalis*, but in some particular form and function. For example, the noun ‘*homo*’ in the nominative case has the general signification to signify substance and quality, and the special signification to signify substance under the quality of humanity; it has the general mode of signifying a case, since it is a noun, and it has the special mode of signifying the nominative case, by which it can function in a proposition as the subject term or to signify a thing as the subject of the action expressed by the predicate:

Tertio notandum quare nomen obliquum non est nomen quoad logicum. Et debeas notare quod nomen obliquum est nomen sicut rectum quoad significatum generale, quoniam sicut rectum significat substantiam cum qualitate, et obliquum; similiter quoad significatum speciale, quoniam idem est significatum speciale in recto et obliquo; similiter et quoad modum significandi generalem, quoniam sicut rectum habet casum, numerum et personam et alia accidentia, ita et obliquum. Sed differunt quantum ad modum significandi specialem, quoniam significat rectum rem in ratione principii et in ratione materiali respectu actus, ratione cuius potest reddere suppositum uerbo; obliquum uero non significat rem isto modo. Vnde cum loycus consideret nomen in quantum reddit suppositum uerbo, quoniam tunc causatur ueritas uel falsitas in oratione, cum igitur obliquum non possit reddere suppositum uerbo et per consequens non causare ueritatem uel falsitatem in oratione, ideo loycus non dicit obliquum esse nomen, quoniam loycus considerat partes orationis solum que possunt causare ueritatem uel falsitatem in oratione.⁶⁶

66 MS Padova, UL, 1589, f. 70^b.

The discussion of the infinite noun focuses on the *privatio qualitatis* and the *impositio*:

et dico quod licet in nominibus infinitis priuetur qualitas seu forma, tamen priuatio qualitatis est eis pro forma, ut in hoc quod dico *nihil* secundum Petrum Elye priuatio qualitatis est ei [eis ? MS] pro qualitate. Vnde quidam dicebant quod nomini infinito non erat nomen impositum, quia omnis impositio a forma seu a qualitate.⁶⁷

It is noteworthy that in this commentary we do not encounter the notions *modus significandi substantialis* or *accidentalis* either, as we did in the writings of Nicholas of Paris. To my mind, the absence of the terms *significatio generalis* and *specialis* in the discussion of the infinite terms and the way in which the concepts of *modus significandi generalis* and *modus significandi specialis* are used in this commentary could be arguments for reconsidering Pagus' authorship, since in his *Synkategoremata* he explicitly argued that the *consignificationes* of the parts of speech followed the *significatio generalis* and not the *significatio specialis*:

Secundum hoc ergo patet solutio prius quesitorum, quoniam modus et tempus non accidunt compositioni speciali sed generali; consignificationes enim partium orationis sequuntur significationem generalem partium orationis et non specialem.⁶⁸

4. Final Remarks

We have seen that Robert Kilwardby only uses the terms *significatio generalis* and *specialis* on the level of the constitution of the parts of speech. He does not make any appeal to them in his discussion of congruity, incongruity, and figurative speech. In his commentary on the *Peri hermeneias* these terms are also lacking.⁶⁹

67 MS Padova, UL, 1589, f. 71^{ra}.

68 Braakhuis 1979: I, 229.

69 See Lewry 1981: 381: "Kilwardby lacks the distinction of a *significatio generalis* and *specialis nominis*, found in Nicholas of Paris and the *Summa Lamberti* around 1250". I will not discuss the occurrence of the distinction between *significatio generalis* and *specialis* in the *Synkategoremata* of Peter of Spain; he uses it only once, but he does so without any hesitation: obviously, it is a traditional part of his semantics; cf. Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalsensis), *Synkategoremata*, II, 22: "Sicut hoc nomen 'homo' duplicem habet significationem, scilicet generalem et specialem (generalis significatio est significare substantiam cum qualitate, specialis vero significare hanc substantiam que est homo) ...".

On the other hand, John Pagus and Nicholas of Paris frequently use these terms, but to indicate different concepts, at least where the term *significatio specialis* is concerned. In my opinion, the concepts of *significatio generalis* and *significatio specialis* and especially their mutual opposition and the connected terminology are not primarily the result of reflections on the part of masters teaching grammar in the Faculty of Arts, nor do they have their roots in grammar. On the contrary, as far as the texts which we have at our disposal allow us to conjecture, these notions were highly operational in the logical texts dating from the 1230s, especially in the doctrine of the infinite noun and the infinite verb, as the *Synkategoremata* treatises by Pagus and Nicholas, Nicholas' commentary on Aristotle's *Peri hermeneias*, and the commentary in MS München, CLM 14460 testify. Although these notions seem to have gained a fundamental position in grammatical contexts, their influence, or rather their operational force, was very restricted in that field; there, the basic notions remained the *modi significandi*. But further research in the *Peri hermeneias* commentaries from the first part of the thirteenth century is needed for a more definitive answer to the question about their operational force in early thirteenth-century semantics in general.

Nicholas of Paris, at least, tried to introduce the opposition *significatio generalis* versus *specialis* into grammatical discourse. This had the advantage of a uniform approach to semantics starting from one concept, *significatio*, while still allowing him to maintain the fundamental difference in fields of interest between the two sermocinal disciplines, grammar and logic, which was based on congruity versus truth. But his appeal to them even for the explanation of figurative speech was granted a short life. Robert Kilwardby, Master Jordan, Roger Bacon, Master Arnoldus, and the greater part of the grammarians after them do not appeal to these notions and their opposition in their discussions of figurative speech. So it appears that the *modi significandi essentielles, speciales*, and *accidentales*, and the doctrine of the *primus* and *secundus intellectus*⁷⁰ removed the *significatio generalis* and *specialis* from the core of grammar.⁷¹

70 Cf. Kneepkens 1985 and Rosier 1994, *passim*.

71 Thanks are due to Mrs. Liz Binkley for help with the translation of this article.

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Modisme, pré-modisme, proto-modisme: vers une définition modulaire

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Résumé. Grâce aux études effectuées récemment sur la grammaire et la sémantique médiévales, l'on peut tenter de caractériser les approches ou courants doctrinaux du XIII^e siècle de manière plus précise, à partir d'une analyse "modulaire", c'est-à-dire en comparant les positions ou les solutions retenues sur plusieurs grands ensembles de questions: (1) le module épistémologique, regroupant les questions sur la nature "scientifique" de la grammaire, (2) le module sémiologique, incluant les discussions sur les notions de signification et de mode de signifier, envisagées d'abord au plan de la description des unités linguistique (3) le module philosophique, où ces mêmes notions sont analysées par rapport à leur fondement psychologique et ontologique, (4) le module grammatical, comportant l'étude de certaines notions caractéristiques (emprunts à la *Physique* d'Aristote, notions de "dépendance", et de "transitivité", (5) le module "intentionaliste", avec toutes les questions touchant à l'interprétation des énoncés non canoniques, aux actes de langage, aux relations entre interlocuteurs. Ce type d'analyse met en évidence des traits communs à la production grammaticale universitaire, dès la première moitié du XIII^e siècle, traits qui ne peuvent donc en tant que tels et à eux seuls caractériser la production des "Modistes" (terme qualifiant au sens strict les auteurs des traités *De modis significandi*). L'on se trouve face à des oppositions multiples: opposition entre des considérations centrées sur l'aspect formel du langage ou à l'inverse sur son utilisation effective, recours plus ou moins important au corpus philosophique aristotélicien, innovations terminologiques vs. maintien de notions plus traditionnelles. Ces oppositions ne se laissent pas regrouper pour former des groupes d'auteurs homogènes, que l'on pourrait décrire selon des critères chronologiques (pré-modistes/ modistes), géographiques (anglais/parisiens), ou même doctrinaux (modistes/intentionalistes); elles font cependant parfois l'objet de discussions, reflétées par les textes, qui permettent de mieux comprendre l'évolution des théories linguistiques tout au long du XIII^e siècle.

Le but de cet exposé est de présenter quelques hypothèses pour tenter de mieux cerner le "modisme". En effet, depuis les travaux pionniers d'Heinrich Roos et de Jan Pinborg, le corpus de la production grammaticale et logique connu et étudié, pour le XIII^e siècle, s'est considérablement élargi. Il nous semble qu'il faut repenser les qualifications de "pré-modisme", "proto-modisme" ou "anti-modisme". Nous nous proposons de réfléchir à partir d'une analyse "modulaire". Nous nous intéresserons ici de manière exclusive aux questions grammaticales et sémiologiques. Il nous

semble néanmoins que les recherches récentes ont fait suffisamment avancer notre connaissance des doctrines du XIII^e siècle, pour qu'une analyse similaire, pour les questions qui relèvent du champ propre de la logique, puisse être tentée avec profit.

On peut, par commodité, regrouper en cinq groupes les textes dont nous parlerons ici, afin de permettre des comparaisons plus aisées:

(1) Les traités grammaticaux *De modis significandi*, qui méritent ès qualité le nom de "modistes", auxquels on peut associer un certain nombre de sophismes, mais aussi des commentaires sur les *Réfutations Sophistiques* écrits par les auteurs de ces traités, ou dont il a été montré qu'ils présentaient avec eux des affinités doctrinales très claires.

(2) Un ensemble de textes grammaticaux de genres divers, commentaires sur Priscien, sur le *Barbarismus* de Donat, sur le *Doctrinale* d'Alexandre de Villedieu, sommes de sophismes, sommes ou traités de grammaire. Parmi ceux-ci certains sont pré-modistes, au sens chronologique, au premier rang desquels se trouvent Robert Kilwardby ou Roger Bacon (ca. 1240), d'autres semblent contemporains des premiers modistes, tels le Robertus Anglicus qui écrivit une importante collection de *sophismata grammaticalia* ou le Magister Iohannes qui rédigea le traité *Sicut dicit Remigius*, d'autres sont postérieurs, comme le commentaire sur Priscien de Magister de Quili-Verbi. Ces textes ont tous en commun de présenter une approche que nous avons qualifiée d'"intentionnaliste" (Rosier 1994).

(3) Les traités de logique terministes des premiers maîtres parisiens de la première moitié du XIII^e siècle, de Jean le Page à Lambert de Lagny.

(4) Des textes de la seconde moitié du XIII^e siècle, relevant de la logique, mais discutant de questions linguistiques en relation avec celles discutées par le groupe (1), d'auteurs comme Gilles de Rome, Simon de Faversham, Duns Scot.

(5) Un ensemble de textes du XIV^e siècle, présentant des critiques que l'on a qualifiée d'"anti-modistes".

Jan Pinborg (1967, 1984), Sten Ebbesen (1977b, 1979b, 1988) et plus récemment Costantino Marmo (1994), ont bien mis en évidence, sur des questions précises, d'une part les évolutions au sein du courant modiste (1), d'autre part les relations complexes existant entre (1) et (4). Pour le groupe (5) nous possédons des ma-

tériaux nouveaux, les textes étudiés et édités récemment par C.H. Kneepkens (1990b, 1992) et L. Kaczmarek (1994) s'ajoutant à ceux qu'avait édités J. Pinborg (1967; 215-304).

Notre objet principal est ici de tenter de démêler les relations entre (1) et (2), en montrant que l'on ne peut appliquer à (2) le qualificatif de "pré-modiste", qui n'est mérité ni en un sens chronologique, ni en un sens doctrinal. Sur le plan de la doctrine grammaticale, certaines notions dites "modistes" sont communes aux groupes (1) et (2). Et des notions centrales, comme celle de dépendance par exemple, montrent une évolution parallèle dans les deux groupes de textes, mais également chez les logiciens du groupe (3) (Libera 1990, 1984). Par ailleurs, les textes les plus anciens du groupe (2) présentent des affinités manifestes avec ceux du groupe (3), comme en témoigne l'usage de la notion de *significatio generalis* vs. *specialis* par exemple. Le groupe (5) fait bien apparaître deux choses: d'une part, s'il est vrai que les critiques que l'on baptise du terme général d'"anti-modiste" visent les Modistes du groupe (1), par exemple sur l'existence et le fondement des modes de signifier (ce sont d'ailleurs les Boèce de Dacie, Michel de Marvais ou Thomas d'Erfurt qui sont cités)¹, il est important de voir qu'elles s'en prennent souvent à ce qui constitue une sorte de vulgate communément acceptée par (1) et (2), ou plus exactement, introduite par (2) et développée par (1).

La prise en compte des relations entre (1) et (2) permettra de mieux comprendre certaines évolutions à l'intérieur du groupe (1), et de mieux cerner les caractéristiques propres du groupe (1) et du "modisme". Sur les thèses intentionalistes qui opposent (1) et (2) il existe un dialogue réel entre (1) et (2) que l'on trouve durant toute la seconde moitié du XIII^e siècle. L'approche modulaire que nous proposons servira également à faire apparaître les différences, nuances et évolution au sein du groupe (2), montrant qu'il ne forme pas un groupe homogène: même si ces textes participent à des degrés divers à l'élaboration de certains thèmes intentionalistes, ils présentent des différences considérables, qui, sur le plan des doctrines sémiotique et grammaticale, les éloignent ou les rapprochent des traités modistes.

1 Voir par exemple le sophisme '*tantum unum est*', éd. par J. Pinborg 1967: 245.

1. Le module épistémologique

Ce module est essentiel parce qu'il conduit à décrire la grammaire comme grammaire "spéculative". Ce paradigme de la grammaire spéculative englobe le modisme comme une sous-partie, mais ne se réduit pas à ce courant.

1.1. La grammaire comme science

Les ouvrages de grammaire universitaire intègrent tous dans leurs prologues ou accessus, de taille variable, un certain nombre de questions sur le caractère scientifique de la grammaire. Remarquons que ceci est vrai pour les *commentaires*, quelle que soit leur forme (Robert Kilwardby, Boèce de Dacie, Raoul le Breton etc.), mais non pour les *traités* ou *sommes*, et ceci reste vrai, qu'ils soient modistes (Martin de Dacie, Thomas d'Erfurt, Siger de Courtrai etc.) ou non (Gosvin de Marbais, Simon *Domifex*), cette dernière catégorie incluant les nombreuses *sommes de sophismes* du milieu du XIII^e siècle (Roger Bacon, Robertus Anglicus, etc.; Rosier 1991). Ces questions générales, qui sont un élément essentiel des préambules théoriques qui commencent les traités modistes, sont largement répandues antérieurement, par exemple dans les commentaires sur Priscien de Nicolas de Paris ou de Robert Kilwardby, ou dans diverses gloses sur le *Doctrinale* d'Alexandre de Villedieu ou sur le *Grecismus* d'Evrard de Béthune, et déjà dans le *Guide de l'étudiant*. Ceci n'est pas étonnant, puisque c'est une caractéristique que présente l'ensemble des commentaires de la faculté des Arts, et que l'on retrouve ce même intérêt pour les questions épistémologiques dans la littérature d'introduction, typique de la période universitaire dès ses débuts.

Exemples de questions:²

1. *Utrum de sermone sit scientia* (Anon., *Super Doctrinale* [f. 2rb]; Petrus Croccus sur le *Doctrinale* [prologue 1]; *Guide de l'étudiant*: #135-138; Kilwardby: *De ortu*: cap. 47; Pseudo-Kilwardby: *Super*

² Pour l'analyse de telles questions chez les Modistes, voir Alessio 1992: 16 sq., chez Robert Kilwardby voir Sirridge 1992, voir aussi Rosier 1997: 264-267. Cette liste ne prétend pas à l'exhaustivité, mais à indiquer les questions les plus communément posées, par les groupes (1) et (2). De plus, on ne doit pas se laisser tromper par l'intitulé des questions: par exemple dans la question *Utrum grammatica sit scientia*, le Pseudo-Albert aborde les questions 4 et 7. Notons que certaines questions n'apparaissent que dans les traités modistes, et en particulier: *Utrum grammatica sit sermocinalis scientia* (voir Alessio, *ibid.*).

Prisc. mai. p. 9; Kilwardby [?]: *In Don.* III: p. 6:58; Anon., *Quaest. Prisc. min.* Q.1 [f.43rb])

Utrum de sermone in communi una possit esse scientia (Nicolas de Paris, *ibid.*; Anon., *Quaest. Prisc. min.* Q.2 [f.43rb]; Prologue de la Glose sur le Grecismus)³

Utrum de sermone in genere est scientia (*Guide de l'étudiant*: #139 & 142)

2. *Utrum grammatica sit scientia* (Prologue de la Glose du Grecismus; Nicolas de Paris, *Quaest. prim. Prisc.*;⁴ Anon., *Super Doctrinale* [f. 3ra]; Boèce de Dacie, *Modi signif.*: Q.3; Jean de Dacie, *Summa*: Q.AII; Simon de Dacie, *Quaest. 2° min. Prisc.* Q.1; Pseudo-Albert, *Quaest. de Modis Signif.*: Q.1; Gentilis de Cingulo, *Quaest. Prisc. min.* Q.1; Raoul le Breton, *Quaest. Prisc. min.* Q.II)

Utrum grammatica sit scientia sive ars (Prologue de la Glose du Grecismus; Jordanus, *Notulae Prisc. min.*: p. 4; *Glosa Admirantes*; Ps-Kilwardby, *Prisc. mai.*: p. 27)

3. *Utrum sit scientia una vel plures* (Anon., *Super Doctrinale* [f. 2rb]; Boèce de Dacie, *Modi signif.* Q.4; Jean de Dacie, *Summa*: Q.AI2; Simon de Dacie, *Quaest.* Q.1; Ps-Kilwardby, *Prisc. mai.*: p. 29)

4. *Utrum grammatica sit scientia specialis vel communis* (Anon., *Super Doctrinale* [f. 3ra]; Boèce de Dacie, *Modi signif.* Q. 8; Jean de Dacie, *Summa*: Q. AI5; Simon de Dacie, *Quaest.* Q.3)

5. *Utrum grammatica sit necessaria* (Jordanus, *Notulae*: p.5; Kilwardby, *Prisc. min.*: Q. 2 [V 1]; Boèce de Dacie Q. 5; Jean de Dacie Q. AIII)

Utrum sit necesse habere scientiam de sermone (Ps-Kilwardby, *Prisc. mai.* p. 13)

Utrum necessaria sit scientia de constructione (Kilwardby, *Prisc. min.*: V 2va)

6. *Utrum grammatica precedat logicam* (Prologue de la Glose du Grecismus; Nicolas de Paris, *ibid.*; BN lat. 18523)

De ordinatione grammaticae ad logicam (Jordanus, *Notulae*: p. 7; Anon., *Quaest. Prisc. min.*: Q.4 [f. 184va])

Utrum grammatica sit nobilior loyca (Simon de Dacie, *Quaest.*: Q.5)

³ Anne Grondeux prépare l'étude et l'édition de cette glose sur le Grecisme d'Evrard de Béthune, à laquelle sont attachés plusieurs prologues différents.

⁴ Ed. en préparation, par C.H. Kneepkens, qui m'a aimablement permis de consulter sa transcription.

Utrum grammatica subalternat sibi loycam (Anon., *Quaest. Prisc. min.* Q.5 [f. 183vb]; cf. *Guide de l'étudiant*, #141 & 144).

7. *Utrum ille qui invenit grammaticam fuit grammaticus* (Comm. de Petrus Croccus sur le Doctrinale [Prologue 2]; Boèce de Dacie, *Modi signif.*: Q.1; Jean de Dacie, *Summa*: Q. AIII1; Raoul le Breton, *Quaest.*: Q.I.3)

8. *Utrum grammatica sit eadem apud omnes* (*Guide de l'étudiant*: #162; Jean de Dacie, *Summa*: Q. AI3)

Utrum omnia idiomata sint una grammatica (Boèce de Dacie, *Modi signif.*: Q. 10)

9. *Utrum grammatica sit practica vel speculativa* (Ps-Kilwardby, *Prisc. mai.*: p. 30)

Ces questions portent de manière générale sur le caractère “scientifique” de la grammaire. La réponse positive à cette question est importante, car elle permet de donner à cette discipline une place dans le champs du savoir scientifique, objet de l’enseignement universitaire. La réponse implique généralement d’introduire une distinction, entre ce qui, dans le langage, se prête à une analyse scientifique, et ce qui est variable selon les langues. La grammaire est science en tant qu’elle peut abstraire des propriétés générales d’évènements contingents et particuliers. C’est dans le cours de ces discussions qu’est introduite la distinction entre *grammatica regularis* et *grammatica positiva*, la première couvrant tout ce qui peut se laisser décrire au moyen de règles générales, la seconde ce qui relève de l’*impositio* et donc des langues particulières. Le commentateur sur les *Flores gramatice* de Ludolphus de Luco,⁵ qui distingue bien l’enseignement des Modistes de celui des *communes grammaticis*, relèvera bien que cette grammaire “régulière” est la grammaire “spéculative”, celle qui s’intéresse aux premiers principes:

5 *Flores grammatice*, Incipit: Ego sum ostium: si quis per me intraverit salvabitur. Licet hec propositio sit theologialis et sint principaliter verba Christi, sumuntur tamen ad nostrum propositum sub illo sensu ut quod grammatica dicat ad studentem (Prologue); Iste liber qui intitulum liber florum ut previsum est dividitur primo in partes tres, scilicet in partem prohemiale et executivam et epilogativam sive in operis sui commendationem (Commentaire). Sur Ludolfus de Luckowe de Hildesheim (fl. ca. 1300), voir Powitz 1986. Il existe de nombreux commentaires manuscrits des *Flores*, voir Bursill-Hall 1981: 315. Aucun de ceux dont Bursill-Hall reproduit l’incipit ne semble correspondre au commentaire édité dans notre édition incunable.

Dubitatur consequenter quomodo dividatur grammatica.

Respondetur quod grammatica primo dividitur in **preceptivam** et est que docet nos per certas regulas congrue exprimere mentis conceptum, et de tali determinatur in Prisciano secundo minoris; **permissivam** <et> est que tractat de orationibus viciosis excusabiliter et de illa determinatur in secunda parte Alexandri ibi: *Apponens duplices* et in presenti libro ibi: *Plures structure*; **prohibitivam** et est que tractat de orationibus simpliciter incongruis et non proprie dicitur grammatica, sed potius error in grammatica, ex quo patet quod illa divisio est analogica.

Ulterius sciendum quod **regularis** est que docet per certas regulas congrue exprimere mentis conceptus, et alio nomine dicitur **speculativa** quia speculatur principia, regulas et conclusiones grammaticalis scientie. **Positiva** est que docet significata terminorum et dicitur a 'pono', quia ponit fundamentum in omnibus scientiis, et divisio illa iterum est analogica, quia grammatica positiva non est grammatica eo quod non est scientia sed est unum purum idioma (*Flores grammaticae, comm.*).

1.2. *Le sujet de la grammaire*

Parmi ces questions générales est abordée celle du sujet de la grammaire: *Quid sit subiectum in grammatica*. Les traités modistes sont ici en continuité avec leurs prédécesseurs, et les différentes solutions permettent bien d'établir une chronologie. On définit en effet successivement le *subiectum* comme *vox*, puis on distingue entre l'*oratio* qui est *subiectum attributionis*, et la *vox litterata* qui est *subiectum praedicationis*, et certains Modistes choisissent ensuite comme *subiectum* le *modus construendi*.⁶

1.3. *L'universalité de la grammaire*

Ces discussions permettent également d'introduire le postulat que la grammaire, ainsi définie comme science, est universelle, '*eadem apud omnes*', une idée que l'on trouve déjà dans le *Guide de l'étudiant* (#162) ou dans les *Notulae super Priscianum* de Jordanus.⁷ C'est un point sur lequel il convient d'insister. En effet, on le sait, ce postulat est une modification de la position bien connue d'Aristote selon laquelle ce sont les *passiones animae* qui sont *eadem apud omnes* (*Peri Hermeneias*, c. 1). Le déplacement est de taille puisqu'ici, c'est quelque chose qui relève de la sphère du langage, et

⁶ Pour les références de ces différentes positions, voir Rosier 1997: 266-267.

⁷ Ed. Sirridge, p. 5: "licet voces in quantum voces non sint eadem apud omnes, tamen secundum modum ordinandi et secundum intellectum quem constituunt sunt eadem apud omnes. Intellectus enim, ut vult Aristoteles, sunt idem apud omnes. Modus etiam ordinandi dictionum secundum conformitatem accidentium sive difformitatem idem est apud omnem linguam."

non de celui des concepts, qui est dit universel. On pourra alors se demander si la grammaire est bien science du discours (*sermocinalis scientia*), question qui suscitera des réponses divergentes (Rosier 1983a: 34-37, Alessio 1992: 16sq.). On devra définir ce niveau d'universalité dans le langage.⁸ Les Modistes diront clairement que le fait que les mots ont des modes de signifier et que ceux-ci soient les principes de leur construction est un trait universel. Ce point fera l'objet de critiques au XIV^e siècle. Ockham, tout comme Aurifaber ou Marcilius reviendront à l'idée que la grammaire doit s'occuper des langues particulières, alors que la logique a pour prérogative de s'intéresser aux règles générales et universelles, qui ne peuvent se situer qu'au plan des concepts, non à celui du langage (Pinborg 1967: 224, Kneepkens 1992: 143sq.). On se souviendra qu'une telle distinction était déjà affirmée avec netteté par Al-Farabi et Gundissalinus. La conséquence de ces critiques ne sera rien de moins que de dénier à la grammaire son statut de science spéculative,⁹ bien que d'autres auteurs, comme Marcilius, tirant les conséquences de leur "conceptualisation" de toutes les notions grammaticales, puissent admettre, qu'ainsi redéfinie, la grammaire soit bien spéculative (Kneepkens 1992: 149, 161).

2. Le module sémiologique.

La théorie des modes de signifier

C'est principalement par rapport à l'utilisation de la notion de "mode de signifier" qu'on a fait opérer l'opposition entre "pré-modiste" et "modiste". Or il convient de distinguer l'utilisation grammaticale de la théorie des modes de signifier et ses justifications philosophiques.

2.1. *Les modes de signifier comme principes de la grammaire*

Que les modes de signifier soient les principes de la grammaire est déjà largement admis dans les textes de la première moitié du XIII^e siècle, et c'est une idée que partagent les auteurs relevant

8 Par ex. chez le Ps-Kilw., les 'sign-types' par opposition aux 'sign-tokens' (signa sub ratione universalis abstracti a particularibus signis, p.8), le sens par opposition à la forme vocale (*ibid.* 4-5), voir Pinborg 1975: 6+. (Voir aussi l'article de C. Panaccio dans ce volume).

9 Ockham, *Scriptum*, I, prol. q. 11, 316-317, voir Maierù 1990: 134.

des groupes (1) et (2). L'on démontre qu'ils servent à fonder les parties du discours, et à expliquer les constructions et la correction des énoncés, par opposition aux signifiés 'spéciaux' (i.e. lexicaux) sur lesquels se fonde la logique.

2.2. *L'opposition entre res significata et modus significandi*

Le fait que les modes de signifier soient les principes de la grammaire devrait conduire le grammairien à s'occuper exclusivement des modes de signifier, c'est-à-dire de toutes les propriétés grammaticales des unités linguistiques, en mettant à l'écart ce qui relève de la signification lexicale. Le respect de cette contrainte est bien assumée par les Modistes, mais l'est de manière beaucoup plus lâche par les grammairiens du groupe (2).

Par exemple, on ne devrait pas faire de différence, sur le plan de la correction, entre *capa nigra* et *capa categorica*, puisque, dans les deux cas, on constate un accord des modes de signifier grammaticaux, la différence ne provenant que d'une impropriété sémantique de la seconde construction.¹⁰ De même, on ne devrait pas distinguer, pour la complétude, entre *currit* d'un côté, *lego*, *tonat* ou *fulminat* de l'autre, puisque le fait que les trois derniers verbes renvoient à un sujet de degré de détermination supérieur sur le plan sémantique ne peut être invoqué, par principe, pour les déclarer plus complets que le premier sur le plan syntaxique. Cependant, les auteurs du groupe (2) maintiennent généralement, comme Priscien, une distinction de complétude entre ces séquences, à la différence des Modistes (voir Rosier 1983b). Le commentaire de Magister de Quili Verbi, daté de 1294, est intéressant, car il mentionne la position modiste dans un argument *contra*. Cette solution vaut bien *grammatice loquendo*, dit l'auteur, même si *de bonitate intelligentis*, il est vrai de dire que *tonat* ou *fulminat* ont des sujets plus finis et déterminés:

//f. 12ra// ... Dictum est quod in verbis tercie persone intelligitur nominativus indefinitus. Verum dicit ipse nisi fiat excepta actio, idest verba <que> sint excepte actionis, ut fulminat, tonat et similia, que ad solum Iovem pertinent.

Contra hoc arguitur, et arguitur quod equaliter intelligatur nominativus certus et finitus et <in> aliis verbis et in istis. Et videtur quod sit equaliter perfecta *tonat* ut

10 Voir *Destructiones modorum significandi*, éd. Kaczmarek 1994: p. 19: "sanctus diabolus est substantia, vilissimus Deus est diabolus, homo est asinus rationalis. et tamen in rebus significatis est disproportio et non convenientia."

et *Socrates tonat* vel *Deus*. Nam ubicumque est equalis proportio in modis significandi ibi est equaliter oratio perfecta. Sed in <hoc> quod dico *Deus* et *Socrates* et *tonat* est equalis proportio in modis significandi. Ergo illa est equaliter perfecta *Socrates tonat* et *Deus tonat*.

Oppositum dicit, ergo male. Manifestum patet quia omnis constructio fit per proportionem modorum significandi. Probatio minoris, quia sicut *Deus* est tertie persone, ita //12rb// *Socrates*. <Et sicut *Socrates*> e<s>t nominativi casus et singularis<s> numeri, ita *Deus* et non magis. Ergo etc.

Ad hoc dicendum est quod eque sunt [est *cod.*] perfecte grammaticae loquendo, bene tamen de bonitate intelligentis *tonat* est magis perfecta quam *Socrates tonat*, quia intellectus respicit proprietates rerum, et videt quod talis actio ad solum Iovem pertinet. Eo potest dicere quod hec est magis <perfecta> *Deus tonat*, quam *Socrates tonat*, ideo quod attribuitur actio ei [actor *cod.*] cuius est et cui pertinet. Tamen grammaticae loquendo sunt equaliter perfecte. Unde rationem bene concedo grammaticae loquendo (Magister de Quili-Verbi, *Commentum super Prisc.*).

L'on voit que la position des intentionalistes est ici admise au seul plan de la *bonitas intelligentis*, qui fait intervenir l'*intellectus* de l'auditeur, alors que la position modiste correspond à celui de la *virtus sermonis*, qui est celui de la grammaire prise au sens strict, c'est-à-dire, d'une analyse qui exclut à la fois les considérations sémantiques et la prise en compte des locuteurs. Cette même distinction, qui permet d'admettre deux solutions différentes plutôt que de se déterminer de manière univoque pour l'une seule d'entre elles, se retrouvera dans l'analyse de l'équivocité (Ebbesen 1979, Marmo 1995) (voir *infra*, 5).

Nous verrons cette question de la place de la signification lexicale se poser à nouveau à propos de l'analyse de la complétude des énoncés, suscitant des divergences entre les auteurs des groupes (1) et (2) (*infra*, 5.1).

2.3. *L'application grammaticale de la théorie des modes de signifier*

L'utilisation de la notion de "mode de signifier", on le sait, est antérieure au XIII^e siècle. Elle a pour origine: (1) l'affirmation de Priscien que les parties du discours doivent être distinguées à partir des "propriétés de signification" qui permettent de les catégoriser comme nom, verbe, etc.; (2) l'idée aristotélicienne, reprise par Boèce, de consignification, d'abord posée pour le temps verbal (*Perihermeneias* 16b), puis étendue, d'une part, aux différents accidents grammaticaux, de l'autre à toute signification secondaire ou oblique; l'on peut ainsi décrire la différence entre certains couples de termes (par ex. *lectio* et *legit*) qui signifient la même

chose, mais sur des modes différents (*alio modo, aliter et aliter*) (Pinborg 1967; 30sq.; Fredborg, 1973: 28 sq. et 1988; Rosier 1995: 17-141).

Si l'on considère les textes logiques parisiens de la première moitié ou du milieu du XIII^e siècle (groupe 3), Jean le Page et Nicolas de Paris notamment, on y trouve un vocabulaire assez particulier, pour tout ce qui concerne la signification. Or ce vocabulaire est aussi celui que l'on rencontre dans plusieurs des traités de grammaire caractérisés par l'approche "intentionaliste", que ce soit le *Tractatus* de Gosvin de Marbais, la *Glosa Admirantes* sur le *Doctrinale* ou le *Sicut dicit Remigius*. Jean le Page oppose ainsi *significatio specialis* et *significatio generalis*, pour distinguer entre la signification lexicale et la signification grammaticale. D'autres auteurs distinguent sous la *significatio generalis*, la *significatio magis generalis*, qui donne la définition de la partie du discours (aussi appelée *modus significandi substantialis*), et la *significatio minus generalis* ou *specialis* qui décrit les espèces des parties du discours. *Significatio specialis* est ainsi un terme ambigu, renvoyant parfois à la signification lexicale, parfois à la signification *spécifique* d'une espèce (ex. substantif), qui s'oppose à la signification *générique* de la catégorie (ex. nom). Un certain nombre de manières de parler sont assez caractéristiques de cette époque, chez les logiciens comme chez les grammairiens, lorsqu'ils disent par exemple qu'il y a deux types de signification, la signification et le mode de signifier, ou qu'il y a deux types de modes de signifier, la signification (générale) et les consignifications, ce qui associe en fait les deux sources mentionnées au début de ce chapitre.¹¹

Robert Kilwardby, comme l'avait déjà souligné O. Lewry (1981), n'utilise jamais l'opposition entre *significatio generalis* et *specialis*, mais se sert de la notion de *modus significandi*, qu'il distingue en *modus essentialis* (*generalis* et *specialis*) et *modus accidentalis*. C'est le cas également pour Roger Bacon, dans sa *Summa gram-*

11 Nicolas de Paris, éd. Braakhuis 1979, vol.1: 216: "Sed distinguendus est dupliciter modus significandi: est enim quidam modus significandi qui dicitur significatio alicuius, alius qui dicitur consignificatio. Sicut patet in nomine. Substantia autem et qualitas sunt modi significandi qui dicuntur significatio. Et quod substantia et qualitas sint modi significandi in nomine, manifestum est: non enim est nomen, quia significet quod vere substantia est vel quod vere qualitas est, sed quia significat aliquid per modum substantie et qualitatis." Pour plus de détails voir l'article de Kneepkens, dans ce volume, et Rosier 1998a.

matica. On trouve chez Kilwardby l'idée, que reprendrons les Modistes, que le mode de signifier grammatical correspond à une manière d'appréhender la *res significata*, et qu'en conséquence n'importe quelle chose, quelle que soit la catégorie à laquelle elle appartient, peut être signifiée au moyen d'un mode de signifier nominal, par exemple:

Quia non distinguuntur partes orationis secundum distinctionem rerum, sed secundum distinctionem modorum significandi, possunt autem omnes res eodem modo significari, scilicet per modum habitus; ideo res omnium praedicamentorum per nomen possunt significari, ut quantitas, qualitas, et sic de aliis. Et hac de ratione non sunt decem partes orationis, sicut sunt x predicamenta rerum (*Super Priscianum minore*, cit. par Pinborg 1967: 48).

On retrouvera une formulation très proche chez Martin ou Boèce de Dacie.

Robert Kilwardby présente donc déjà tout le système des différents modes de signifier, essentiels, spécifiques, et accidentels. Chaque catégorie grammaticale, chaque espèce d'une catégorie, et chaque accident correspond à un mode de signifier distinct. Alors que dans les textes pré-modistes, les *consignificata* correspondent seulement aux accidents, les Modistes considéreront que chaque mode de signifier correspond à une consignification, puisqu'il s'agit d'une propriété qui vient s'ajouter à la signification proprement dite, la signification lexicale.

Sur le plan de la théorie des modes de signifier appliquée à la définition et à la description des parties du discours, on peut relever certaines différences entre les traités non modistes et les traités modistes. Un point particulièrement intéressant est celui de la définition des parties indéclinables. Plusieurs questions se posent en effet:

– Peut-on dire qu'elles ont un mode de signifier, au même titre que les parties déclinables?

– Ont-elles à la fois un mode de signifier et un signifié spécial, et les deux sont-ils distincts?

– Ont-elles un mode de signifier qui soit distinct de leur fonction (*officium*)?¹²

– Ont-elles des accidents?

¹² Voir Marmo 1994: 225; Michel de Marbais, *Summa*: p. 124, fait de la distinction entre mode de signifier et *officium* une conséquence de la distinction entre mode de signifier et *significatum*.

– Est-ce que les parties du discours indéclinables se distinguent des déclinables en ce que les premières se construisent en vertu de leur signification, les secondes en vertu de leurs modes de signifier?¹³

Sur tous ces points on constate des divergences sensibles, non seulement à l'intérieur du courant modiste lui-même, mais plus largement dans tous les traités du XIII^e siècle. La position modiste la plus radicale consiste à appliquer aux parties indéclinables exactement les mêmes principes de fonctionnement que ceux qui sont posés pour les parties déclinables. Michel de Marbais est particulièrement clair sur ce point, en vertu d'arguments plus théoriques que proprement linguistiques: le signifié précède naturellement le mode de signifier, et le mode de signifier la fonction, puisqu'une partie du discours ne peut être construite en acte que si elle possède les propriétés qui la rendent constructible en puissance. En outre, ces parties indéclinables possèdent aussi bien des modes essentiels que des modes accidentels.¹⁴ Boèce de Dacie, par contre, adhère à la position plus classique, selon laquelle, pour les parties indéclinables, le signifié est identique au mode de signifier.¹⁵ Le *dictum* tiré de Priscien, *praepositioni nihil accidit* est discuté avec beaucoup d'embarras dans les textes non-modistes. Si les prépositions n'ont pas d'accidents, comment expliquer qu'elles peuvent être construites? Robertus Anglicus retient une position assez contradictoire, selon laquelle la préposition peut être construite *per se*, par elle-même, à partir des propriétés des termes avec lesquels elle se combine. Magister de Quili-Verbi, mentionne à nouveau dans un argument *contra* la position modiste, pour re-

13 Voir par exemple le sophisme 'O Magister', éd. Rosier 1988: 93: "quandoque significatio est illud quo construitur et precipue in partibus indeclinabilis, quandoque vero consignificatio ut in partibus declinabilibus."

14 Michel de Marbais, *Summa*: p. 129 et 143 sq. pour l'adverbe; p. 153 sq. pour la conjonction, etc.

15 Voir les textes cités par Marmo 1994: 226-227 (voir aussi pp. 230-232) en faveur de cette identification du mode de signifier au signifié, à opposer à la position inverse, défendue par exemple par Michel de Marbais, *Summa*: p. 123:54-58: "In istis partibus indeclinabilibus differunt significatum et modus significandi, ita quod non sunt idem secundum essentiam et rationem. Cuius ratio brevis est quoniam significatum existens in aliqua parte necessario praecedat omnem eius modum significandi, tam essentialem quam accidentalem, eo quod significare necessario praecedat sic significare, sicut prius dictum est."

venir à une solution proche de celle que l'on vient de mentionner.¹⁶ Ces discussions sont intéressantes en ce qu'elles témoignent, de la part des grammairiens, d'une volonté de se dissocier de la logique, en ne confondant plus les parties indéclinables avec les syncatégorèmes:¹⁷ contrairement aux logiciens qui privilégient le nom et le verbe, comme constituants essentiels, par leur signification et leur fonction dans la proposition, les grammairiens doivent définir toutes les parties du discours comme des constructibles, de manière homogène et cohérente.

2.4. La définition "causale" de la construction

Constructio est constructibilium unio ex modis significandi causata ad exprimendum mentis conceptum finaliter ordinata.

Cette définition est attribuée aux Modistes par le commentateur des *Flores grammaticae*:

16 *Super Prisc.* ms. Bibl. Nat. lat. 15035: "/9vb/ Tunc arguitur. Omnis pars orationis est pars per suum modum significandi. Sed omne posterius presupponit suum prius. Sed modus posterior est significato. Videtur ergo quod omnis pars orationis habeat suum significatum, et per consequens significata. Oppositum dicit, ergo male. Ad hoc dicendum est quod esse significatum, hoc est dupliciter, aut finite [aut pro] et [in]determinate aut infinite et indefinite. Unde dico quod coniunctiones et prepositiones bene sunt significative, sed hoc est infinite et indefinite. Alie partes sicut nomen et verbum sunt significative per se finite et determinate. Et //9ra// si tu dicas infiniti (subiecti *cod.*) ad finitum non est proportio; sed ille partes coniunctiones et prepositiones sunt infinite, alie autem finite; ergo inter se non habent proportionem ergo etc. Ad hoc dicendum est quod bene verum est quod infiniti [aliquid] per se et per aliud ad finitum non est proportio, tamen infiniti de se simile <est> tamen per aliud, scilicet per hominem, et ideo bene dicitur similis homo. Similiter est in proposito, quia licet ille partes sunt infinite de se, tamen similes sunt bene per aliud, scilicet per alias partes finitas, scilicet per nomen et verbum, ideo non valet prima ratio, unde probat quod significative sunt per se, tamen infinite et indeterminate."

17 Michel de Marbais, *Summa*: p. 122: "Illae partes indeclinabiles dicuntur 'syncategorematicae' a nostris doctoribus grammaticae non pro tanto quod ipsae per se sumptae nihil significant sine partium declinabilium adiunctione, cum una pars eius significatum ex unione sui cum alia non capiat sed ipsum ex impositione ante omnem eius constructionem habeat – non enim partes orationis capiunt significationem ex adiunctis, sed ipsam habent a voluntate impositoris, – sed pro tanto dicuntur 'syncategorematicae' quia ipsae per se sumptae significatum habent confusum sine aliarum partium adiunctione, ita quod non significant aliquem mentis conceptum certum sive finitum."

/41/ Constructio ... est congrua dictionum ordinatio congruamque perfectam sententiam demonstrans. Sed quidam valde oppugnant illi divisioni ut quidam **auctores modi significandi** sic arguentes. Si divisio constructionis iam dicta valeret, sequeretur quod idem /42/ esset constructio et oratio, consequens est falsum... Et ergo **secundum auctores modorum significandi** magis late, constructio grammaticalis legitur sic: Est constructibilium unio ex modis significandi causata ad exprimendum mentis conceptus finaliter ordinata. Ex qua diffinitione etiam patet quod constructiones imperfecte sunt etiam constructiones. Et hec diffinitio est causalis cum detur per omnia genera causarum.

On a ici un bon exemple d'une position dont on se souvient ultérieurement comme étant une position modiste, mais que l'on trouve en fait dans les traités de grammaire dès les années 1240, et notamment chez Robert Kilwardby.¹⁸ Elle est très généralement admise par les tenants de l'approche intentionaliste comme par les Modistes. Les quatre causes se retrouvent dans la définition, comme l'expliquent de nombreux auteurs, de la *Glosa Admirantes* à Thomas d'Erfurt: "*constructibilium*" indique la cause matérielle, "*unio*" la cause formelle, "*ex modis significandi causata*" la cause efficiente et "*ad exprimendum mentis conceptum finaliter ordinata*" la cause finale.

La démonstration de l'adéquation de cette définition fait partie d'une discussion importante sur les "causes de la construction", que l'on rencontre tout au long du XIII^e siècle: pour chacun des constituants du mot, on s'interroge pour savoir quel est son rôle dans la construction: le signifié spécial, le mode de signifier essentiel général, essentiel spécial, accidentel, etc. La démonstration, menée à partir d'exemples et de contre-exemples, est commune aux traités non-modistes et aux traités modistes: Roger Bacon, par exemple, montre que le signifié n'est pas un principe de construction à partir de l'argument classique que le signifié étant identique pour les noms aux différents cas, on ne pourrait pas, s'il était principe de construction, expliquer la construction différente des différents cas.¹⁹

18 *Prisc. min.*, ms. Vatican Urb lat. 298, f. 26va: "Ex hiis iam patet quid sit subiectum et causa efficiens intra constructionis. Finem non oportet dubitare, quia ostenditur propter affectum perfectum iudicandum. Causa formalis eius non est aliud quam sua diffinitio. Ex hiis igitur perpendi potest quid sit constructio et diffiniri potest diffinitione sufficienti sic: constructio est congrua constructibilium unio ex modis significandi causata ad affectum plenum indicandum inventa."

19 *Summa grammatica*: p. 150; Kilwardby, *Prisc. min.*, ibid. f. 26rb; voir la discussion très détaillée sur les causes de la construction menée par Mathieu de Bologne, *Questiones*: p. 115-127.

On notera en outre que cette discussion sur les causes de la construction est exactement parallèle à celle que l'on trouve dans les commentaires sur l'*Ars Maior III* de Donat sur les causes du solécisme. Cette démonstration est importante, car elle permettra de poser, pour chacune des constructions, tous les modes de signifier que doivent posséder les constructibles en relation, et, de manière corrélatrice, d'expliquer que l'absence de l'un de ces modes entraîne automatiquement l'incorrection grammaticale. Ce type d'approche est très généralement partagé.

Contre ceux qui, au XIV^e siècle, essayeront de "détruire" les modes de signifier, certains de leurs défenseurs reprendront la même démonstration sur les causes des constructions, pour prouver la nécessité de poser l'existence de ceux-ci.²⁰ La définition "causale" de la construction à partir des modes de signifier sera critiquée au nom du principe de la subordination des mots et des constructions vocales aux mots et constructions mentales, ainsi que l'a bien montré C.H. Kneepkens (1992). Le commentateur des *Flores grammaticae* rejètera cependant cette idée d'une construction mentale, parallèle à la construction vocale et la construction écrite, la jugeant peu répandue:

Quidam dividunt constructionem magis generaliter quam in textu dividitur scilicet in constructionem mentalem, vocalem, et scriptam dicentes, quod constructio mentalis est ordinatio dictionum mentalium ad invicem, et vocalis vocalium et scripta scriptarum. Et illa divisio licet sit bene sustinenda, tamen ex quo non est communis tunc prout nunc est dimittenda.

3. Le module philosophique: psychologie et ontologie

S'il est généralement admis que les modes de signifier sont les principes de la grammaire, ce n'est que dans les *proemia* des traités modistes que sont justifiés, en termes psychologiques et ontologiques, c'est-à-dire en les mettant en relation avec des modes d'intelliger et des modes d'être, les modes de signifier. Nous souscrivons totalement à l'opinion communément retenue, qui fait de ce critère le critère essentiel pour caractériser le courant modiste, au sens le plus précis (Pinborg 1975a: 8+; Sirridge 1980: xiii).

²⁰ *Lumen grammaticale*, éd. Pinborg 1967: 279, par. 3; Commentaire sur les *Novi modi significandi* de Thomas d'Erfurt, *ibid*: 298, par. 3.

L'idée que l'aggrégat *vox + significatum* est la matière des modes de signifier, ou plus exactement des parties du discours dont les modes de signifier sont la forme, semble admise par l'ensemble des grammairiens qui raisonnent en termes de modes de signifier.²¹ Mais, comme l'a bien montré Constantino Marmo (1994), les Modistes développent une théorie de l'imposition à partir d'une double articulation, fondée sur une double relation: la relation de signification rend la *vox* signifiante et la transforme en *dictio*, la relation de consignification rend la *dictio* consignifiante en la dotant de modes de signifier qui la transforment en *pars orationis*. Dans des traités non-modistes, comme le commentaire sur Priscien Mineur d'un certain Magister Arnoldus, la seconde articulation est simplement définie comme l'ordonnement actuel d'un mot avec un autre²². Cette opposition entre les deux manières de définir la *secunda articulatio* sera bien décrite par le commentateur des *Flores grammaticae*.

Secundum modistas est prima impositio dictionis ad significandum unam rem sic quod non aliam, ut, cum ille terminus *homo* imponitur ad significandum animal rationale, est articulatio prima. Secunda est quando aliqua dictio imponitur ad significandum aliquam rem sub certa proprietate et sub certo modo significandi, sicut cum ille terminus *homo* imponebatur ad significandum animal rationale per modum per se stantis et sub modo habitus et quietis. Sed secundum communes grammaticos articulatio prima est cum terminus imponitur ad significandum unam rem sic quod non aliam. Sed articulatio secunda est quando terminus ordinatur cum alio termino sub debitis accidentibus grammaticalibus. Sic patet qualiter vox articulata articulatione secunda est hic subiectum, quia in isto libro docetur qualiter unus terminus debet combinari cum alio.

La différence est de taille: pour les Modistes, un mot ne peut être constructible en acte que s'il a été défini constructible en puissance par l'attribution de modes de signifier conférés au moment de cette seconde institution, d'où la nécessité d'une *articulatio secunda* qui correspond aussi, comme la première, à une *impositio*.

D'une certaine manière, les critiques du XIV^e siècle reviendront à une position assez proche de celle d'Arnoldus, en ce sens

21 Jordanus, *Notulae*. 48: "... vox et significatio quae materialis est ad modum significandi."

22 Arnoldus, *Prisc. min.*: f. 105ra: "Secunda articulatio habet fieri per actualem ordinationem dictionis cum alia dictione sub accidentibus determinatis ita quod non sub oppositis."

qu'ils ne poseront aucun niveau intermédiaire entre l'institution du mot signifiant et sa construction. Ils refuseront de subordonner la possibilité d'être construit, pour un constructible, à la possession d'un mode de signifier déterminé "surajouté" à l'expression vocale. De manière plus générale, ils critiqueront l'idée que les parties du discours aient besoin, pour exister comme telles, de se voir attribuer une telle *ratio consignificandi superaddita* (Rosier, 1996). Ces critiques reposent sur une conception différente de la relation. De même que la relation de signification n'est plus maintenue comme distincte des termes de cette relation (*vox et res significata*):

Non est aliqua res distincta a signo signficante relative vel a re ad aliam relatam vel referibilem; relatio que resultat per impositionem vocis, non est aliqua res distincta a signo signficante relative (*Destructiones modorum significandi*, éd. Kaczmarek 1995: 9, 92).

de même la relation de construction ne peut être conçue comme quelque chose de distinct des termes construits:

Unio constructibilium non est quid distinctum a constructibilibus unitis (Marcilius, éd. Kneepkens 1992: 166).

Contre une présentation "componentielle" des unités linguistiques comme conglomerats de propriétés ou *rationes*, lui conférant leur propriétés sémantiques et grammaticales²³, certains défendront l'unité globale de chaque concept: au lieu de dire qu'une même *dictio* est susceptible d'avoir des modes de signifier, accidentels par exemple, différents (d'où *homo, hominem, homines*, etc.), on considèrera *homo, hominem, homines* comme des entités distinctes et autonomes, des concepts différents (Kneepkens 1992: 153). C'est le fondement même du système modiste qui sera, ce faisant, remis en cause.

Ce sont bien ces discussions sur les relations entre modes de signifier, mode d'intelliger et modes d'êtres, qui constituent le trait le plus caractéristique du modisme. L'intérêt pour les questions métagrammaticales ira de pair avec l'intérêt pour les questions

²³ Cf. la formule concise de J. Pinborg 1976: 259: "description in terms of modi significandi is nothing but giving a componential analysis in a metalinguistic form."

métalogiques.²⁴ Elles ne se rencontrent pratiquement pas dans les traités du groupe (2), qui restent centrés sur les problèmes plus strictement linguistiques. Les implications sémiologiques, psychologiques et ontologiques de la théorie modiste sont extrêmement importantes et nous ne nous y étendrons pas car elles ont été bien étudiées. C'est sur tous ces plans que la théorie modiste sera critiquée au XIV^e siècle. Notons simplement qu'il peut y avoir un sens à parler de "proto-modiste" pour un ouvrage comme les questions de Mathieu de Bologne sur les modes de signifier. En effet, si l'on ne trouve pas le parallélisme caractéristique entre les trois types de modes, l'attention étant concentrée sur la relation entre mode de signifier et mode d'intelliger, le type de questionnement est identique, notamment sur les relations de dépendance existant entre le signifié et les modes de signifier, les modes de signifier essentiels et les modes de signifier accidentels (Rosier 1992).

4. Le module grammatical

4.1. *L'application de la Physique d'Aristote*

L'application de la *Physique* d'Aristote à divers aspects de la description grammaticale est caractéristique de la production universitaire, dès ses débuts. Elle revêt de nombreux aspects. La phrase se voit analysée comme un mouvement, se déroulant entre un *terminus a quo* ou *principium*, et un *terminus ad quem*. Dès les années 1240, on assiste à une redéfinition très particulière des cas: chacun d'entre eux se voit décrit à partir d'une propriété lui permettant d'occuper les fonctions de *principium* ou de *terminus* dans une construction. En fait, des textes plus anciens, comme le *Guide de l'étudiant*, juxtaposent des systèmes différents, définissant les cas non seulement à partir de ces notions de *terminus a quo* ou *ad quem*, mais également à partir des quatre causes (Rosier 1997a). Ce type d'analyse, développé de manière systématique par Robert Kilwardby ou Roger Bacon (Rosier 1997b), l'est de manière beaucoup plus légère par les auteurs parisiens du milieu du siècle, comme Nicolas de Paris. On la retrouve ensuite pleinement adoptée, par exemple par Gosvin de Marbais ou Robertus Anglicus (Rosier 1998a). Elle est développée systématiquement par les Mo-

24 Pinborg 1975b.

distes (Kelly 1977). L'évolution de la terminologie est assez sensible, qui fait, par exemple, passer, pour le verbe, du *modus motus* au *modus fluxus et fieri* puis au *modus esse*.

4.2. *La notion de dependentia*

La notion de dépendance se substitue progressivement à celle de *regimen*, comme principe général permettant d'expliquer la relation de construction (Covington 1984: chap. 4, Marmo 1994: chap. 6). Dépendance et détermination apparaissent, dans les années 1240, non seulement en grammaire, mais dans le cadre de l'analyse des ambiguïtés syntaxiques dans les commentaires sur les *Réfutations Sophistiques* (Libera 1990, 1984). On remarquera cependant que si certains Modistes s'avèrent très précis dans l'usage exclusif de la notion de dépendance, d'autres Modistes, comme le Pseudo-Albert le Grand ou Siger de Courtrai, maintiennent, comme leurs prédécesseurs, la notion de *regimen*.²⁵ Ce double usage des notions de *dependentia* et de *regimen* est assez fréquent hors des traités *De modis significandi*.²⁶ Certains traités pré-modistes ou non-modistes utilisent cette notion de dépendance, et permettent ainsi d'en saisir le contenu et l'origine. Roger Bacon en fait un usage très systématique (cf. "toute combinaison de mots est une relation naturelle de dépendance", *Summa*, p. 52), toujours exprimé dans le langage de la *Physique*, puisque, pour lui, cette relation calque la dépendance naturelle de l'accident par rapport à son sujet (ibid., p. 134), dont le prototype linguistique est celui de la construction de l'adjectif avec son substantif (ibid., p. 143). De manière encore plus élaborée, Robertus Anglicus explicite, dans ses *Sophismata*, les différents modèles qui ont permis de la mettre en place: (1) substance + accident; (2) matière + forme; (3) puissance + acte. Puisqu'en effet, selon la *Physique*, *omnis generatio fit ex oppositis*, il importe que les deux constructibles en relation soient d'une nature différente telle qu'elle leur permette de se combiner. La relation accident-substance est le paradigme de toute construction, dans

²⁵ Le commentaire sur le traité *Massa grammaticae* (XIVe) est intéressant à ce propos, car il suit fidèlement Thomas d'Erfurt dans un premier temps, puis ajoute une partie plus traditionnelle sur le régime des différents cas, à la manière du *Doctrinale*, éd. Gansiniek 1960, pp. 170 sq.

²⁶ Voir par exemple le *Tractatus de constructione* de Gosvin de Marbais dans Rosier 1998a.

laquelle un constructible est *dependens* et signifie *per modum adiacentis*, et l'autre termine la dépendance et signifie *per modum substantis* ou *per se stantis*. Elle concerne naturellement la construction substantif-adjectif, mais pas seulement, puisque le *modus adiacentis* est une propriété d'autres parties du discours, comme le participe ou le verbe. Ici encore, les Modistes se montrent plus cohérents, ou plus radicaux, puisque pour eux toute construction est une relation de dépendance, alors que les auteurs non-modistes admettent certaines constructions absolues, sans dépendance ni sans régime.

4.3. Transitivité/intransitivité

L'évolution des théories médiévales du XIII^e siècle sur la transitivité a été bien décrite (Covington 1984: chap. 4; Rosier 1984). Les nouvelles analyses combinent l'introduction d'éléments nouveaux impulsé par la lecture de la *Physique* (avec les notions de *terminus a quo* et *ad quem*) et la reprise de définitions anciennes héritées de Priscien, développées au XII^e siècle, selon lesquelles il y a *identité* des personnes dans une construction intransitive, et *diversité* dans une construction transitive (Kneepkens 1990a). Ici encore les textes du groupe (2) utilisent parfois exclusivement la théorie de l'identité, comme le *Sicut dicit Remigius*, ou bien mêlent les deux terminologies, de manière moins cohérente que ce que l'on trouve chez les Modistes. Ce vocabulaire de l'identité, rejeté par les Modistes, semble d'ailleurs revenir au XIV^e siècle, chez les auteurs qui critiquent la doctrine modiste (Kneepkens 1992: 158, 169).

5. Le module intentionaliste

Nous reprenons comme nom de ce module l'appellation que nous avons donnée à un groupe de grammairiens, où plus exactement à une approche grammaticale particulière de certains phénomènes linguistiques, à partir de traits que nous rappellerons brièvement (Rosier 1994). L'approche intentionaliste se caractérise principalement par le fait de proposer une analyse qui ne se fonde pas simplement sur les propriétés intrinsèques des parties du discours et des énoncés, mais qui prend aussi en compte leur engendrement et leur interprétation, du point de vue du locuteur (*proferens*) et de l'auditeur (*audiens*). Costantino Marmo a qualifié

cette approche de “communicationnelle” en l’opposant à une approche centrée sur le “code” linguistique, qui domine chez les Modistes (Marmo 1995). Il est clair que Robert Kilwardby a joué un rôle majeur dans l’élaboration de cette approche communicationnelle ou intersubjective, qui se manifeste non seulement dans l’analyse des énoncés figurés, mais également à propos des mots ou énoncés ambigus.

Il nous semble important d’insister sur l’opposition entre ces deux approches, qui se manifeste tout au long du XIII^e siècle. Elle est déjà exprimée dans le *Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum* ou par Roger Bacon en termes simples, lorsqu’ils disent que signifier s’entend de deux manières, soit au sens où le mot signifie, soit au sens où nous signifions au moyen du langage. L’exemple choisi par Bacon est explicite: on ne peut dire que le bâton frappe qu’au sens où c’est nous qui utilisons le bâton pour frapper (Rosier 1994: 175-177). Soit on met l’accent sur les propriétés propres du langage, la *virtus sermonis*, en tentant d’expliquer son fonctionnement et sa signification exclusivement à partir de celles-ci, soit on considère en outre l’utilisation effective du langage, en donnant au locuteur et à l’interprète un rôle déterminant dans la construction et l’interprétation des énoncés.

5.1. *Congruitas et perfectio*

La définition de la correction et de la perfection des énoncés est une des questions les plus controversées, dans les traités du XIII^e siècle, et elle constitue la première question traitée dans les sophismes grammaticaux du milieu du siècle.

D’abord développée à propos des constructions figurées, puis étendue à des constructions incomplètes, elliptiques, les intentionalistes admettent généralement que l’on puisse juger acceptables *secundum quid* des énoncés grammaticalement incorrects ou incomplets, les déviations par rapport à l’usage ordinaire étant justifiées par la nécessité d’exprimer un sens particulier. L’on a pu montrer que ce modèle d’interprétation n’était pas sans rapport avec celui de la lecture des textes sacrés: si l’on ne peut donner, au plan littéral, un sens adéquat à un énoncé, il importe de passer à un second niveau de sens, qui le rende intelligible. Cette approche pose une difficulté de taille, puisque d’un côté l’on soutient que les modes de signifier sont seuls les principes de la grammaire, et que de l’autre on recourt, dans certains cas, au sens,

pour expliquer certains types d'énoncés. Les textes les plus anciens justifient cette incohérence en distinguant soit deux types d'énoncés, soit, ce qui revient au même, deux types de locuteurs, les *communiter loquentes* d'un côté, les *sapientes* de l'autre, distinction qui permet d'assigner au grammairien deux tâches distinctes. Dans le même ordre d'idées, à propos des énoncés qui mettent en jeu des interjections ou des actes exercés, ces textes tendent à opérer une distinction entre ce qui relève de l'affectif d'un côté, du rationnel de l'autre. Ces auteurs semblent vouloir adopter à la fois la conceptualité de la grammaire spéculative, prise au sens large, telle qu'elle se définit par les modules (1) et (2) ci-dessus, et l'approche intentionaliste, pour un nombre limité d'énoncés. Des auteurs qui nous semblent postérieurs d'une bonne génération au commentaire sur Priscien de Robert Kilwardby ou à la *Summa grammatica* de Roger Bacon, s'inscrivent encore dans cette double démarche.

Les textes qui adoptent l'approche intentionaliste proposent tous, à des degrés divers, un modèle d'interprétation des énoncés corrects *ad intellectum*, qui exigent donc un effort d'interprétation du fait que tous les constructibles requis ne sont pas présents *ad sensum*:

Sed tunc perfecta est quantum ad intellectum quando completa sententia que apprehenditur, non habetur solum per voces expressas, sed ulterius querit intellectus alium intellectum quem ipse potest reperire multipliciter (*Sophisme 'O magister'*, éd. Rosier 1988: 81).

Parmi ces énoncés se trouvent (1) des énoncés incomplets tels que le constructible manquant puisse être automatiquement restitué *de virtute sermonis*, c'est le cas de *curro*; (2) des énoncés incorrects qui doivent être interprétés en faisant recours à l'*intentio proferentis*; (3) des énoncés incomplets où ce qui manque peut être restitué, avec un certain choix de la part de l'interprète, *ex discretionem lectoris* ou *auditoris*; (4) des énoncés où le constructible qui fait formellement défaut peut être retrouvé par recours à la situation ou au contexte linguistique, notamment ceux qui comportent un acte exercé.

Ce modèle est connu et discuté par les Modistes. En premier lieu, les Modistes n'acceptent plus comme acceptables *ad intellectum* que le premier cas cité précédemment, celui de *curro*: dans ce cas, on le voit, la restitution s'effectue *de virtute sermonis*, automatiquement.

En second lieu, Martin de Dacie rejète l'idée qu'un énoncé figuré puisse être jugé plus correct qu'un énoncé non figuré:

... Dicunt enim quod figurativa constructio plus est congrua et perfecta quam non figurativa, ut ista *turba ruunt*, quam ista *turba ruit*, quia magis movet intellectum quam non figurativa, ut ipsi dicunt (*Modi significandi*: p. 113).

Le débat continue à la génération suivante, puisque deux commentateurs de ce traité reprennent le même problème, en mentionnant de manière plus précise la position des intentionalistes. Gentilis de Cingulo réaffirme que la correction grammaticale ne peut provenir que de la proportion des modes de signifier:

Cum ergo in illa *turba ruunt* non fit proportio modorum significandi, sed in ista sic *turba ruit*, ideo illa est congrua. Illa autem oratio que est incongrua minus movet intellectum quam illa que est congrua, eo quod incongrua causatur ex disproportione in modis intelligendi, congrua autem causatur ex proportionem modorum intelligendi, et ideo ista *turba ruunt* nec est magis congrua nec magis perfecta quam ista *turba ruit*, immo est contrarium huius. Et ideo illi qui sic dicebant, male dicebant (*In Martinum*, [ad locum], f. 46ra).

Et Simon insiste avec fermeté sur l'idée qu'un énoncé ne peut être jugé qu'en fonction des propriétés intrinsèques de ses constituants, et non en prenant en compte la qualité de celui qui l'utilise. On retrouve la métaphore de l'instrument:

Uterius est notandum quod quedam sunt orationes sive constructiones perfecte quantum ad sensum, quedam quantum ad intellectum. Hoc solet a quibusdam valde debiliter exponi. Dicunt enim quod oratio perfecta quantum ad sensum est que est perfecta quantum ad utentes sensu, perfecta secundum intellectum per comparisonem ad illos qui utuntur intellectu. Isti autem dicunt falsum, cuius ratio est quia bonitas instrumenti sumitur ex propriis principiis et ... non ex bonitate utentis tali instrumento. Verbi gratia, bonitas securis non accidit ex bonitate utentis sed ex principiis suis Sed oratio est instrumentum intellectus, ideo non debet sumi bonitas orationis ex principiis vel bonitate intellectus sed debet sumi ex propriis principiis ... constructionis vel orationis (*Super Martinum*, f. 107vb-108ra).

Deux points sont à noter. D'une part, une critique exactement semblable est proposée par certains Intentionalistes tardifs, qui cherchent à montrer que l'incorrection des énoncés intelligibles ou acceptables peut toujours être linguistiquement explicable et justifiable (Rosier 1994: 44-55). D'autre part, cette métaphore de l'instrument nous ramène bien aux deux approches que Bacon notait déjà à propos du sens de 'signifier' avec la même image du bâton: soit l'on essaye de déduire le fonctionnement du langage

de ses principes propres, posés a priori au moment de l'institution, soit l'on tente de prendre en compte l'utilisateur (*utens*).

L'analyse de l'équivocité est naturellement à mettre en rapport avec celle de la correction. La position de Kilwardby, reposant sur la distinction entre une double considération des mots, *per se* et *quantum ad utentes*, sera discutée et rejetée par les premiers Modistes. A propos de la question de savoir si l'équivocité d'un terme peut être levée par l'adjonction d'une détermination, un commentateur anonyme sur les *Réfutations Sophistiques* et Simon de Faversham mentionnent l'opinion de ceux qui distinguent entre le terme considéré *per se* (point de vue du code) et le terme considéré *quantum ad utentes* (point de vue intersubjectif).²⁷ Le point de vue des premiers Modistes est clair: rien ne peut advenir au terme, en matière de signification ou de mode de signifier, par le fait d'être construit, toutes ses propriétés ayant été fixées au moment de l'institution. Mais le rôle du contexte, et des utilisateurs du langage, se fera peu à peu une place, en laissant apparaître, à côté de la *virtus sermonis*, qui définit les propriétés originelles et inaltérables du terme, le point de vue de l'utilisateur (*intentio proferentis* ou *bonitas intelligentis*; voir Ebbesen 1979, Marmo 1995). L'on peut ainsi maintenir que les propriétés intrinsèques du terme, attribuées au moment de l'*impositio*, restent inchangées, quelle que soit son utilisation effective, et donc quelles que soient les déterminations qui peuvent lui advenir ou la nature du prédicat qui en est affirmé; ces circonstances sont accidentelles et ne peuvent en rien modifier l'essence du terme. Mais en même temps, rien n'empêche que l'auditeur considère la proposition du point de vue de ses conditions de vérité (*verificatio propositionis*) et qu'il sélectionne alors l'acception du terme qui correspond à celle qui convient le mieux à la nature du prédicat ou de la détermination, et qui seule rend la proposition vraie. La *virtus sermonis* définit l'essence du terme, elle ne peut être modifiée par le contexte ou l'utilisation, mais par ailleurs l'auditeur a la liberté de choisir, parmi les possibilités offertes par la *virtus sermonis*, une interprétation qui soit cohérente avec le contexte. Cette position, déjà chez Simon de Faversham,²⁸ sera développée ultérieurement par Raoul

²⁷ *Incerti auctores*: p. 127; Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones veteres*, éd. Ebbesen & al. 1984: q. 17, p. 73.

²⁸ Pinborg 1975b: n. 105, p. 69.

le Breton et Duns Scot.²⁹ La position des Intentionalistes à propos de la correction des énoncés est analogue, tout en insistant davantage sur la liberté du locuteur. Ils ne se posent pas la question de savoir si une acception produite, ou une interprétation proposée, ne fait que sélectionner parmi des propriétés intrinsèques, ou au contraire attribue à la construction des valeurs nouvelles. Cependant ils expliquent bien que la nécessité d'exprimer un sens particulier (*ratio qua oportet fieri*) est limitée par les potentialités de la langue (*ratio qua potest fieri*). S'il existe bien une différence entre une approche "componentielle", attentive aux constituants de la proposition et leurs propriétés, et une approche "contextuelle" (Pinborg 1979a: 21), elle ne peut pas simplement servir à opposer Modistes et Terministes; on assiste, tout au long du XIII^e siècle, et jusque vers la dernière génération de Modistes, à différentes tentatives pour articuler ensemble les deux approches.

5.2 La dimension performative et expressive du langage

L'intérêt des Intentionalistes pour l'utilisation effective du langage les conduit à insister sur la différence entre deux modes de celle-ci, le mode du concept et le mode de l'affect, ce qui leur permet d'une part de distinguer entre les énoncés au moyen desquels nous énonçons quelque chose, et les énoncés qui nous servent à agir sur autrui (*actus significatus* vs. *actus exercitus*), d'autre part à s'intéresser de manière privilégiée à l'interjection qui s'oppose aux autres parties du discours (Rosier 1994: chap. 2 & 5). Ces analyses sont absentes des traités modistes.

6. Conclusion

Même si les différents modules que nous avons mis en place auraient mérité une étude plus approfondie que celle que nous avons pu mener ici, nous tenterons de proposer quelques conclusions, qui peuvent être dégagées d'une telle analyse 'modulaire'.

²⁹ *Ibid.* Radulphus Brito, *Anal. Pr.* I, qu. 46: "Sed intelligendum est quod licet praedicatum non potest restringere subiectum ut stet pro paucioribus quam secundum se stabat, tamen ad verificationem sermonis praedicatum potest aliquam acceptionem in subiecto exigere secundum quam habet verificari de subiecto ... Tamen de virtute sermonis praedicatum non restringit subiectum." Voir aussi Pinborg 1971, *Anonymus Quaestiones super Priora Analytica*, Q. 74, p. 274.

6.1. La démonstration du caractère scientifique de la grammaire (module 1), l'utilisation grammaticale de la notion de mode de signifier pour définir les parties du discours et assigner les causes de la construction (module 2), l'adaptation de notions empruntées à la *Physique* (module 4), sont des traits communs à la grammaire spéculative du XIII^e siècle, qui se retrouvent, à des degrés divers, dans tous les traités. Il semble cependant, pour ce dernier point, que les auteurs parisiens du milieu du siècle en fassent un usage beaucoup plus restreint que leurs contemporains d'origine anglaise.

6.2. Sur certaines questions grammaticales, on constate des développements parallèles dans les traités modistes et dans les traités intentionalistes, comme l'apparition de la notion de *convenientia similitudinis et proportionis*, dérivée de la théorie de l'analogie, dans les textes les plus tardifs des deux groupes. Si l'on resitue les textes modistes dans la production du XIII^e siècle, on peut constater que certaines divergences se comprennent par l'accord ou la rupture avec la tradition antérieure. Boèce de Dacie, notamment, se montre plus conservateur, pour ce qui est de la définition du cas, du choix du *modus distantis* pour définir le verbe, ou encore, on l'a vu, à propos de l'identification du signifié et du mode de signifier pour les parties indéclinables. Ce type de comparaison pourrait être menée de manière systématique.

6.3. L'idée que les modes de signifier sont les principes exclusifs de la grammaire n'est défendue avec cohérence que par les Modistes. Les Intentionalistes, tout en énonçant ce principe, admettent, en en donnant différentes justifications, que la signification puisse parfois jouer un rôle, ce qui s'exprime par l'opposition entre *intellectus primus*, constitué par les modes de signifier, et *intellectus secundus*, constitué par la signification (Rosier 1994: 46-49, 143-148). Pour le dire autrement, et un peu schématiquement, les Modistes considèrent que la signification sera automatiquement produite par l'agencement correct des constituants, alors que les Intentionalistes partent du sens à produire, laissant au locuteur une certaine liberté dans les moyens d'y parvenir, en utilisant un discours correct ou, si c'est nécessaire, déviant.

6.4. Les développements méta-théoriques sur les modes de signifier (incluant la démonstration de l'isomorphisme entre modes de signifier, modes d'intelliger, et modes d'être) se rencontrent de manière tout à fait caractéristique chez les Modistes,

mais aussi dans des textes contemporains (par ex. groupe 4, ou théologiens comme Henri de Gand). Ce type de développement est quasiment absent des traités représentant de l'approche intentionaliste que j'ai pu étudier. Certaines justifications de la notion de mode de signifier sont parfois proposées, mais en des termes très différents, par exemple dans le *Sicut dicit Remigius*:

Generalia vero significata et consignificata sunt causa congruitatis et incongruitatis et ideo pertinent ad grammaticum. Et appellantur modus vel modi significandi quia per illa moderantur et distinguuntur specialia significata, ut secundum diversos modos possumus loqui de illis, vel ut ipsa re significata est in fieri, ut *lego*, vel in quiete, ut *lectio*... (Magister Iohannes, *Sicut dicit Remigius*, f. 41va).

On pourrait penser que l'attention des Modistes pour les questions méta-théoriques vient du fait qu'ils seraient davantage "philosophes" que les Intentionalistes. La teneur philosophique de certains raisonnements des Intentionalistes (par ex. à propos de l'interjection, cf. Rosier 1994, chap. 2), et l'abondance des sources philosophiques citées et utilisées, notamment dans les traités intentionalistes tardifs, montrent qu'on ne peut se satisfaire d'une opposition simpliste entre des grammairiens qui seraient davantage philosophes et des grammairiens qui seraient davantage grammairiens. L'on a souligné l'influence des commentateurs arabes, notamment Averroès, sur les nouvelles orientations de la sémantique parisienne dans la seconde moitié du XIII^e siècle (notamment Pinborg 1979a: 30). Les Intentionalistes, par rapport à cette influence, se révèlent une fois de plus comme un groupe non homogène, certains citant facilement Aristote et Averroès, surtout pour la *Physique* et la *Métaphysique* (sophisme *O magister*, éd. Rosier 1988), d'autres préférant se référer à un éventail beaucoup plus large de sources classiques (*Sicut dicit Remigius*).

6.5. Les thèmes intentionalistes sont parfois cités et critiqués dans les traités modistes. Nous avons vu plus haut (*supra* 5.1), avec les commentateurs de Martin de Dacie, Gentilis et Simon, les discussions qui se développaient à propos de la notion de *congruitas*. Etant donné la réapparition de la distinction entre *virtus sermonis* et *intentio proferentis* dans le traitement de l'équivocité chez Raoul le Breton ou Duns Scot, il resterait à vérifier que les Modistes de cette même génération n'adoptent pas également une position plus souple sur la question de la correction des énoncés. Cette hypothèse ne se vérifie pas dans les textes modistes tardifs édités, et

notamment dans les *Questions sur Priscien Mineur* de Raoul le Breton. L'étude de commentaires sur le *Doctrinale*, et en particulier sur la dernière partie consacrée aux figures, serait intéressante dans cette perspective. En effet, il resterait à apprécier l'influence de la *Glosa Admirantes*, proche de l'enseignement de Kilwardby, dans des commentaires comme ceux de Petrus Croccus (Pierre d'Auvergne ?) par exemple.

6.6. Les développements des Intentionalistes sur l'interjection ont eu un grand poids dans les discussions sémantiques du XIII^e siècle. En premier lieu, nous l'avons montré ailleurs, ils ont eu un impact sur le plan sémiologique, puisqu'on retrouve chez Bacon cette idée que les interjections sont intermédiaires entre signification naturelle et signification conventionnelle (Rosier 1994: chap. 3). En second lieu, ils ont certainement pesé sur l'élaboration de la notion modiste de *dictio*, qui constitue, selon Costantino Marmo, le noyau de la sémantique modiste. En effet cette entité très particulière, qui n'a pas à proprement parler de correspondant linguistique, est très souvent illustrée par les Modistes au moyen de la série: *dolor, doleo, dolens, dolenter, heu*, dont on dit 'qu'ils signifient la même chose'. Cette idée que tous ces mots correspondent à des manières différentes d'appréhender la même chose vient certainement des discussions des grammairiens intentionalistes sur les différentes manières d'exprimer un affect, de manière naturelle par un gémissement ou un cri, de manière conventionnelle mais sur le mode de l'affect par une interjection, et sur le mode du concept par une autre partie du discours, l'exemple de la douleur étant fréquemment cité. Cependant tous ces développements sur l'interjection n'intéressent que peu les Modistes, en tant que tels.

6.7. Il existe une évolution de la doctrine au sein des représentants de l'approche intentionaliste. Pour ne prendre qu'un exemple, la différence entre la signification par mode d'affect et par mode de concept servait, dans les premiers textes, à caractériser d'un côté la différence entre l'interjection et les autres parties du discours, de l'autre celle existant entre les énoncés à fonction informative (avec un acte signifié) et les énoncés à fonction performative (avec un acte exercé), à partir d'une opposition entre les facultés irascible et concupiscible et la faculté rationnelle. Or les auteurs les plus tardifs, comme le Magister Iohannes qui écrit le *Sicut dicit Remigius*, à partir d'arguments à teneur toujours plus

philosophiques, critiquent cette opposition, en vertu du principe simple que, comme le dit Aristote dans le *De Anima*, le langage relève exclusivement de la faculté rationnelle. Une chose ne peut être signifiée que si elle est d'abord conçue, d'où la redéfinition de l'interjection comme signifiant non pas un affect, mais un concept sur le mode de l'affect. Discutant le sophisme *proch dolor*, il dit avec force:

Quomodo autem anima potest proferre quod non cogitat? Oportet ergo quod vox significans significat aliquid cogitatum et ita conceptum et etiam interiectio debet significare aliquid cogitatum (Magister Iohannes, *Sicut dicit Remigius*, f. 56va).

Il est à noter que Boèce de Dacie, à propos de la signification de l'interjection, fait une remarque identique:³⁰

Nihil enim significatur per vocem, nisi quod prius per mentem concipitur (*Modi significandi*: p. 296,54-55).

6.8. Il existe d'autres différences assez sensibles au sein des représentants de l'approche intentionaliste. On peut opposer deux témoins tardifs, le sophisme *O magister* et le *Sicut dicit Remigius*. Malgré des développements très similaires sur les modèles d'interprétation des énoncés incomplets ou figurés, leur style est très différent. Le premier montre une approche très formaliste, avec tout le vocabulaire technique grammatical que l'on rencontre chez les premiers modistes, alors que le second utilise un appareil beaucoup plus traditionnel (notions de *regimen*, d'*identitas* pour définir la transitivité, etc.). Le *Sicut dicit Remigius*, par ailleurs, fournit des indications intéressantes sur les influences qui ont pu peser sur l'élaboration des thèses intentionalistes les plus caractéristiques. En effet, non seulement il cite à plusieurs reprises Augustin, mais il se rapporte à l'adage – ou plus exactement à deux adages fusionnés, tirés du *De Trinitate* d'Hilaire de Poitiers, et souvent utilisés par les théologiens – selon lequel ce n'est pas la chose qui doit se soumettre au discours, mais le discours à la chose: *Verba subserviunt intellectui et <sermo> subiectus est rei* (Rosier 1998c). Il invoque explicitement Augustin pour justifier que, comme c'est le cas pour l'Écriture Sainte, l'on doit parfois s'écarter des règles du discours commun:

³⁰ Voir Alessio 1992: 18.

Unde cum non sermoni (?) res, sed sermo rei subiectus sit, mallebant actores intentionem ita fideliter exprimere, quam ipsam sub metris usualis sermonis seu regulis absorbere seu deprimere. Nam rei quandoque talis aut tanta est intentio, aut proferentis tantus affectus, ut ad eius veram expressionem [et?] regulas transgredi cogit necessitas (Magister Iohannes, *Sicut dicit Remigius*, f. 40ra).

On remarquera qu'un certain nombre d'exemples analysés dans une perspective intentionaliste proviennent de la liturgie, et on se souviendra que Roger Bacon étudie un certain nombre de formules liturgiques, à la fin de sa *Summa grammatica*, comme la formule *Deo gratias* (Rosier et Roy 1991). Les solutions qu'il propose pour expliquer leur caractère déviant ou elliptique sont d'ailleurs également discutées par le *Sicut dicit Remigius*.

Le fait que, comme nous l'avons montré ailleurs, la distinction entre *intellectus primus* et *intellectus secundus* semble avoir pour origine l'exégèse (Rosier 1994: 143-148), nous conforte dans l'hypothèse, formulée minimalement, que les auteurs de l'approche intentionaliste étaient plus perméables aux influences ou aux motivations théologiques, que les Modistes, par exemple. Plus exactement, on doit peut-être dire qu'ils étaient plus attentifs au langage réel, à l'usage effectif, incluant les formules liturgiques ou l'Écriture Sainte, qu'aux énoncés canoniques standards. Magister Iohannes étudie d'ailleurs de nombreuses expressions idiomatiques, dont la particularité s'explique soit par un affect particulier ressenti par le locuteur (la douleur, le trouble, la crainte), soit par souci de brièveté, pour éviter la répétition, etc. comme *et sic de singulis, et reliqua, et e converso*. Ce type d'analyse, et toutes les réflexions sur la notion d'*actus exercitus* est totalement absent des traités *De modis significandi*.

6.9. Une question qui reste pour nous entière, et qui est peut-être une mauvaise question, est celle de l'origine nationale des divers courants que l'on peut distinguer au XIII^e siècle. On peut donner simplement trois indices. (1) Nous avons noté une différence sensible, pour le milieu du XIII^e siècle, sur le vocabulaire de la signification, entre les auteurs parisiens, Jean le Page, Nicolas de Paris ou Pierre d'Espagne et les auteurs d'origine anglaise comme Kilwardby ou Bacon (utilisation par les premiers des notions de *significatio generalis*, *significatio specialis* ou par les seconds des distinctions des différents types de modes de signifier). Les Intentionalistes tardifs gardent le vocabulaire des logiciens parisiens, mais montrent en même temps qu'ils ont intégré, comme

les Modistes, le vocabulaire emprunté à Kilwardby, considéré dans les années 1280 comme l'autorité ancienne, par son commentaire sur Priscien Mineur (Roos 1952: 122 sq.). (2) L'apparition du vocabulaire emprunté à la *Physique* est plus importante, vers le milieu du XIII^e siècle, chez les auteurs d'origine anglaise que chez les auteurs parisiens. (3) L'approche intentionaliste est très difficile à situer en termes de provenance nationale. Il est certain que Robert Kilwardby et Roger Bacon, maîtres anglais ayant enseigné à Paris, ont joué un rôle important. Les traités conservés, anonymes dans leur grande majorité, sont extrêmement nombreux, et plusieurs sont sans conteste d'origine parisienne (*Sicut dicit Remigius*) alors que d'autres sont associés, par leur circulation dans les manuscrits, à Robert Kilwardby.

6.10. L'approche modulaire que nous avons ici présentée mériterait d'être affinée par l'élaboration de critères encore plus précis, et surtout, de comparaisons détaillées menées en fonction de ces différents critères. Elle a peut-être permis de montrer que l'appellation de 'modiste' ne pouvait se restreindre à la constatation de l'utilisation de la notion de mode de signifier et que la qualification de 'pré-modiste' ne pouvait convenir de manière indifférenciée à tout texte utilisant cette notion de manière jugée insuffisamment élaborée. D'autres approches existent, qui doivent se définir par des critères positifs et pas seulement négatifs. Lorsqu'on prend les critiques anti-modistes du XIV^e siècle, on peut distinguer d'un côté celles qui s'en prennent, comme chez Aurifaber ou dans les *Destructiones*, au fondement même de la démonstration de l'existence des modes de signifier, et visent bien les Modistes, nommément cités, et celles qui attaquent les conséquences de l'admission de ceux-ci pour la théorie proprement grammaticale, lesquelles constituent des positions largement consensuelles au XIII^e siècle. Il est notable que l'approche 'conceptualiste' qu'a bien mise en relief C.H. Kneepkens (1990, 1992), tout en introduisant cette idée tout à fait nouvelle, en contexte grammatical, de construction et de régime mental, utilise, en les adaptant à cette nouvelle conception, des notions plus traditionnelles, comme celle de régime ou d'identité.

6.11. Nous voudrions mentionner un dernier point, de portée plus large et qui regarde aussi la théologie. En premier lieu, comme nous l'avons vu, la distinction entre l'usage grammatical et la justification philosophique de la notion de mode de signifier doit

être prise en compte lorsque l'on tente de comprendre l'usage théologique de la même notion. En second lieu, nous l'avons montré ailleurs avec d'autres, il existe une histoire proprement théologique de la même notion, empruntant à des sources spécifiques, comme les *Noms divins* du Pseudo-Denys (Rosier 1995, voir la bibliographie citée). En troisième lieu, il nous semble que des débats sémantiques de fond traversent en parallèle les traités artiens et les traités théologiques, qui, nous semble-t-il, peuvent être schématiquement ramenés à deux grandes options: l'une, d'inspiration plus augustinienne, accorde plus d'importance à l'usage, au consensus, aux protagonistes de la communication, à leur intention de signifier, l'autre, d'orientation plus aristotélicienne, insiste davantage sur les propriétés intrinsèques et formelles du langage, dans leurs relations aux concepts et aux choses (Rosier, à paraître).

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The Semantics of the Modistae

COSTANTINO MARMO

Summary: Some late 13th-century logical texts written by authors connected with modistic grammar show an approach to logic that parallels the attempt to found grammar in reality. A distinctive mark of the Modistic approach to logic seems to lie in the conception of meaning that emerges from commentaries on the *Ars nova* and from sophismata: signification is the essence of linguistic signs, and this implies the semantic irrelevance of context with respect to both the elimination of ambiguity and the determination of denotation to present, past, or future objects. With this in mind, one should speak less of a “Logic of the Modistae” than of a “Semantics of the Modistae”.

0. Introductory remarks

In his famous article “Die Logik der Modistae” Jan Pinborg (1975a) analyzed three possible features of a modistic approach to logic:¹

- 1) the theory of meaning
- 2) the conception of the object of logic,
and – strictly dependent on the latter –
- 3) the theory of intentions.²

In this paper, I will not deal with the theory of first or second intentions, nor will I repeat what I wrote about the object of logic (cf. Marmo 1990, 1991a, 1991b), I would instead like to enlarge the scope of my previous work on the subject of modistic theory of meaning (Marmo 1994), considering here also commentaries on the *Ars vetus* and on the *Prior Analytics* stemming from the same group of logicians, in an attempt to uncover some specifically

¹ Since Pinborg 1975a, other scholars have accepted as an established fact that a ‘modistic paradigm’ was predominant in logic at the end of XIIIth century, in Paris and Bologna: cf. Knudsen 1982, Tabarroni 1988, Lambertini 1989 and 1992, Andrews (forthcoming).

² See also Pinborg 1974, 1975b, 1980.

modistic tenets on language and meaning.³ Many features of the modistic approach to language have already been pointed out by Pinborg (1975, 1976); I will arrange them in a different form, adding some more details and putting them in a larger framework.

I will discuss first whether any extrinsic criterion for recognizing modistic logical works might be worked out from the analysis of commentaries on the *De interpretatione*; then I will proceed to some points of doctrine, examining some commentaries on the *Categories*, on the *Topics*, on the *Elenchi*, and on the *Prior Analytics*.

1. The use of modistic grammar in commentaries on the *De interpretatione*

Among extrinsic criteria useful for recognizing modistic logical works I would list, first, the fact that they are written by authors who also commented on Priscian using the triplet of *modi significandi*, *modi essendi*, and *modi intelligendi*; and, second, that they apply specific modistic grammatical concepts to logical problems. Good examples are Peter of Auvergne's commentary on the *De interpretatione*—where the distinction between active and passive *modi significandi* is suggested for the first time⁴—and Gentilis of Cingoli's commentary on the same work, where the Bolognese master interprets Aristotle's distinction between noun and verb in plain modistic terms.⁵ There is no need to go into further detail; the latter is an ex-

3 In my book (Marmo 1994) I tried to draw a sharp distinction between the theory of grammatical signification (what I called “metasemantics”) and that of signification: in the modistic scheme of the construction of the *pars orationis* (see below, section 3.1, and Marmo 1994: ch. 3) signification precedes grammatical signification, and it is the object of a semantic theory, which is traditionally developed in logical works. That is why one should talk about a “semantics” of the Modists rather than about a “logic” (see also Perler 1995: 348).

4 In *Periherm.*, qq. 34-35, in Ebbesen 1993a: 167-68 (cf. Pinborg 1977: xxvi).

5 In *Periherm.*: 62rb: “Dico ergo quod nomen potest considerari tripliciter ut spectat ad propositum, quamquam unus illorum modorum non sit bene proprius. Vno modo ‘nomen’ potest dici aliquid intellectum sub debitis modis intelligendi (significandi, ms.) nominis, secundum quod nomen significat per modum habitus et quietis et determinate apprehensionis siue per modum substantie qualificate, sicut dixerunt antiqui. Alio modo ‘nomen’ dicitur esse aliquid significatum per uocem sub debito modo significandi, scilicet per modum habitus et quietis et determinate apprehensionis, ita quod hic [[nos]] uox applicatur ad rem. Alio modo dicitur ‘nomen’ uox significans sub debito modo significandi, scilicet per modum habitus

treme and rare case that easily finds exceptions: Parisian masters, such as Radulphus Brito,⁶ do not subscribe to Gentilis' interpretation. This means that extrinsic criteria, and analysis limited to one topic or one type of commentary, can be used only to draw positive conclusions, but not negative ones: even if Brito does not apply current grammatical definitions of noun and verb to the interpretation of the second chapter of the *De interpretatione*, he remains one of the outstanding modistic logicians, as we shall see.

In the majority of cases extrinsic relationships to modistic grammar are not sufficient either to label a logical or a semantical theory as modistic, or to include an author in a group of supposedly modistic logicians. In many cases, deeper connections between grammatical and logico-semantical theories have to be searched for.

And here comes a better example from the commentaries on the *Categories*.

2. The categories and the modi essendi: a real foundation for logic

If genera are different and co-ordinate (i.e., non-subordinate to one another), their differentiae are themselves different in kind. (*Cat.* 3, 1b16-17)

Commenting on this passage from the *Categories*, Gentilis of Cingoli says that the categories (as supreme genera) are separated not only by their essences, but also by something else, which he calls *modi praedicandi*. Similar passages can also be read in the

et quietis et determinate apprehensionis. Nec proprie potest accipi 'nomen' primo modo, scilicet secundum quod dicit aliquid intellectum [aliquid intellectum] sub debito modo intelligendi per modum habitus quia ut sic illi uero(?) non competit 'uox', nec per 'uocem' diffiniremus ipsum, set potius: nomen est aliquid intellectum per modum habitus et quietis et ad placitum cuius nulla pars separata intelligitur. Nec etiam proprie accipitur 'nomen' 3^o modo dictum, scilicet pro uoce significante aliquid sub debito modo significandi per modum habitus, quamquam ita esset bona predicatio et formalis 'nomen est uox' illo modo accipiendo 'nomen', quia sicut infra patebit hic determinatur de nomine secundum quod subicitur et predicatur; uox autem nec subicitur, nec predicatur; nam ut sic ista esset falsa 'homo est animal', quia ista uox 'homo' non est ista uox 'animal'; set potius predicatur et subicitur illud quod per uocem significatur, et ideo solum accipitur 'nomen' illo alio modo dicto, scilicet quod dicit michi significatum per uocem sub debito modo significandi per modum habitus."

6 In *Periherm.*, q. 5: 107rA-B.

commentaries by Peter of Auvergne, Simon of Faversham, Durandus of Auvergne, Radulphus Brito, Thomas of Erfurt, and Angelo of Arezzo, a pupil of Gentilis.⁷ All these commentators hold that the *modi praedicandi* proper to each category derive, thanks to an act of the intellect, from *modi essendi* and cannot be reduced to one another. As Simon of Faversham suggests, the grammarians' thesis of the origin of the *modi significandi* in the *modi essendi* finds its logical counterpart in the theory of the correspondence between *modi praedicandi* and *modi essendi* or *proprietas rerum*:

Predicamenta enim distinguuntur penes modos essendi, quia distinguuntur penes modum predicandi; propter hoc enim distinguitur substantia ab aliis. Sed modi predicandi sumuntur a modis essendi sicut modi significandi. (*In Pred.*, q. 12: 85)

In order to have a complete parallel between the two theories we would need some clarification of the relations that hold between *modi intelligendi* and *modi praedicandi*. In the commentaries on the *Categories*, however, almost no attention is paid to this topic. The only author, to my knowledge, who gives a complete and consistent description of the relations between *modi essendi*, *modi intelligendi* and *modi praedicandi* is Angelo of Arezzo at the outset of his commentary on the *Categories*.

He defines *praedicamentum* as the order of the predicables according to their higher or lower degree of generality. There are four sorts of 'order'.⁸ The first is the order that exists among all beings of the universe: it is called *perficimentum*, since it is the order of things according to their degree of perfection. But it is not relevant to my point, here. There is a second sense of 'order', where we meet the *modi essendi*: it is called *essentia* and it is the order of things insofar as they are distinguished by their *modi essendi* as such. Examples of these *modi essendi* are the properties of 'being independent of everything else' (*per se stare*), 'having a body' (*ratio corporis*), 'living', 'having sensations', 'thinking' (each of these properties is also an *apparens*). The third kind of order is called *intelligimentum*. It is caused by the same *modi essendi*, but only insofar as they are understood by the intellect and used in order to grasp the things themselves. (He acknowledges that this name sounds

⁷ See references to their texts in footnotes to the table at the end of the present chapter.

⁸ *In Pred.*: 24vA-B (see texts in Marmo 1992a: 361-62, nn. 35-38).

quite odd to his students' ears, and tries to excuse his word-coining by appealing to the *penuria nominum*). The last type of order is ascribed to things insofar as they are understood through the *modi intelligendi* and these are transformed into *modi* (or *rationes*) *praedicandi*. Taken this way the order is named *praedicamentum*. The result of this theoretical (and word-coining) effort is that of placing all the modes connected with the *modi praedicandi* in a system which corresponds to that of the *modi significandi*.

Two things, however, need to be considered here. First of all, it is difficult to say how far a system such as this was actually adopted by Parisian or Bolognese logicians of the last decades of the thirteenth century. I could only find very rare references to the *modi intelligendi* as distinct from the *modi praedicandi*. Furthermore, the problem of the *modi praedicandi* did not receive the same emphasis in the field of logic as did the *modi significandi* in the field of grammar. And this is, of course, quite understandable, since the notion of *modus praedicandi* did not play any relevant role except in the treatment of Aristotelian categories. Only Simon of Faversham, as seen above, hinted at a parallelism between the two series of modes.

However, in another text by Angelo and in a passage in an anonymous commentary on the *Sophistici elenchi*, I found what may be a clue to understanding the role of the *modi praedicandi*, not only in the first part of logic, but in the frame of a modistic approach to language as well. Solving a *dubitatio*, Angelo specifies that the fourth order did not receive the name of *subiectamentum* from the *modus subiciendi*. It could well have received this name, he argues, but since the predicate plays the role of the form in a proposition, while the subject plays that of the matter, the name has been drawn from the worthier element, that is, the form. In this context Angelo says something quite enlightening about the role of the *modi praedicandi*:

modus predicandi est formalis ratio predicati, modus uero subiciendi subiecti.⁹

⁹ *In Pred.*: 24vB: "Sed tu dices: cum in quolibet predicamento sint res apte nate subici et etiam predicari, quare non denominauit a modo subiciendi sicut a modo predicandi, ut dicatur 'subiectamentum'? Dico ad hoc quod denominauit a modo predicandi et non a modo subiciendi, eo quod predicatum ipsum habet rationem forme et per consequens dignioris. Sed subiectum habet rationem materie et indignioris. Et per consequens, quia modus predicandi est formalis ratio predicati, modus uero subiciendi subiecti, pro tanto a modo predicandi denominauit predicamentum et non a modo subiciendi, eo quod denominatio ut in pluribus fit a digniori."

I would like to recall in this connection a text by the Anonymous-SF on the *Elenchi*:

Terminus iterum addit supra ista rationem subicibilis et praedicabilis, et secundum istas distinctas rationes distinctos habemus terminos, scilicet subiectum et praedicatum, nam praedicatum cum subiecto habet rationem praedicabilis, et subiectum respectu praedicati habet rationem subicibilis.¹⁰

Angelo's system fits perfectly with the form-matter analysis of language that was largely adopted by the Modists.¹¹ From this point of view, the *modi* or *rationes praedicandi*¹² represent a new form which is added to a part of speech (as matter) in order to make it enter a proposition as predicate. Like the *modi significandi*, they originate from the properties of the things through the mediation of the intellect that receives them (as *modi intelligendi*).

The following table summarizes the system of the *modi essendi* (or *praedicandi*) that define the different categories:

¹⁰ Anonymous-SF, *In EL*, q. 41: 83-84. But see also a different explanation of the subject-predicate functions by Martin of Dacia, *Modi sign.*, IV.13: 9: "Terminus autem est dictio sive pars orationis et dicitur a terminando, quia terminus terminat totam resolutionem loyci. Loycus enim non potest ire ultra terminum, quia resolvit sillogismum in propositiones, propositiones autem in subiectum et praedicatum, qui sunt termini loyci. Unde subiectum et praedicatum a diverso situ denominantur." (cf. Thomas of Erfurt, *Gram. Spec.*, 6: 148).

¹¹ See Marmo 1994, ch. 2-3. Angelo of Arezzo does not seem to be completely consistent about this point. Elsewhere in his commentary on the *Categories*, he criticizes the application of the notion of form and matter to the analysis of the phonetic level of language (see Marmo 1994: 89, n. 30).

¹² In some sources, *modi significandi* and *rationes consignificandi* are used interchangeably (see Marmo 1994: 155); in some other sources, there seems to be a relation of presupposition between *rationes consignificandi* and *modi significandi activi*, so that the latter gives a vocal expression the possibility of consignifying the properties of things, or yields in it a relation of consignification (see Marmo 1994: 157, n. 61).

¹³ See Peter of Auvergne, *In Praed.*, q. 16: 28; Simon of Faversham, *In Pred.*, q. 13: 87; Durandus of Auvergne, *In Praed.*, q. 8: 12b; Gentile of Cingoli, *In Pred.*: 23vA; Angelo of Arezzo, *In Pred.*: 28vA, 30rA.

¹⁴ See Peter of Auvergne, *In Praed.*, q. 24: 42; Simon of Faversham, *In Pred.*, q. 33: 114; Durandus of Auvergne, *In Praed.*, q. 17: 18a; Gentile of Cingoli, *In Pred.*: 28vB; Radulphus Brito, *In Pred.*, q. 14: 81v; Thomas of Erfurt, *In Pred.*: 124rB.

<i>modi essendi / praedicandi</i>	<i>praedicamenta</i>
per se stantis / subsistendi in se ipso et substandi alii / non esse in subiecto ¹³	substantia
essendi in alio ut ipsum est habens partes / habendi partes per se ¹⁴	quantitas
informandi subiectum, sic quod nullum respectum et nullam extensionem causet; distinguendi; denominandi; cognoscendi; essendi principium operationis ¹⁵	qualitas
habendi se in respectu ad quoddam aliud / essendi in alio in comparatione ad aliud / ad alterum dependere tanquam ad terminum ¹⁶	relatio
motus vel fluxus ut est ab ipso agente ¹⁷	actio
motus vel fluxus ut recipitur in patiente ¹⁸	passio
(m. e.) causatus in locato corpore ex applicatione loci ad ipsum ¹⁹	ubi
(m. e.) causatus in corpore locatum ex habitudine quam locum habet ad ipsum et ad eius partes ²⁰	positio
(m. e.) causatus in re temporali ex habitudine et applicatione temporis ad ipsum ²¹	quando
ut accidens extrinsecum comparatum ad substantiam sicut habitum ad habentem ²²	habitus

15 Gentile of Cingoli, *In Praed.*: 42rA. He comments on this list of modes: “Set est intelligendum quod unus est ille modus qualitatis, set ipsum circumloquitur per omnes illos modos, eo quod sibi non est nomen impositum qualitatis et talis modus predicandi non reperitur in aliqua re alterius predicamenti.”

16 See Peter of Auvergne, *In Praed.*, q. 54: 75; Simon of Faversham, *In Praed.*, q. 41: 132; Durandus of Auvergne, *In Praed.*, q. 35: 24a; Gentile of Cingoli, *In Praed.*: 35vA and 36rA-B; Angelo of Arezzo, *In Praed.*: 48rA; Radulphus Brito, *In Praed.*, q. 25: 91v.

17 See Durandus of Auvergne, *In Praed.*, q. 5: 12a; Simon of Faversham, *In Praed.*, q. 12: 83; Gentile of Cingoli, *In Praed.*: 50rB.

18 *Ibid.*

19 See Durandus of Auvergne, *In Praed.*, q. 5: 12a; Simon of Faversham, *In Praed.*, q. 12: 83.

20 *Ibid.*

21 See Durandus of Auvergne, *In Praed.*, q. 5: 12a; Simon of Faversham, *In Praed.*, q. 12: 84.

22 *Ibid.*

3. Meaning, denotation, and context: commentaries on the *Elenchi*, on the *Topics*, and on the *Prior Analytics*

3.1. The passage quoted above from the anonymous commentary on the *Elenchi* is part of a text in which the concepts of *vox*, *signum*, *dictio*, *pars orationis*, and *terminus* are distinguished within a graded classification system. Parallel texts can be read both in grammatical and logical texts (commentaries on the *Categories*, on the *De interpretatione*, and on the *Sophistici elenchi*). The conception of meaning (or signification) that they imply can be seen as a distinctive mark of the modistic approach to language: the relation of signification (*ratio significandi*), posited by an act of voluntary imposition, is added to the voice as a form to its matter, so that it becomes a sign or, better, a ‘linguistic sign’ called *dictio*. As I have shown elsewhere,²³ the concept of *dictio* represents the common theoretical background of the approach to language and signification that was developed both in grammatical and logical texts by arts teachers in Paris and Bologna. In their view, the original imposition does for the linguistic sign what nature does for a natural thing, and the relation of signification is explicitly described by some authors as the essential or substantial form of the *dictio*, just like pronunciation is the essential form of the *vox*, or the *modus significandi* (or relation of consignification) is the essence of the *pars orationis*.²⁴ These properties or relations are crucial for the scientific foundation of grammar and logic, and they present language as a multi-layered object: every property informs the inferior layer and builds up a linguistic entity of a higher degree. As I will try to show, many positions developed by logicians of the group indicated by Pinborg (1975a) are directly connected with this general framework.

3.2. A direct consequence of the view that signification is the essence of linguistic signs is the thesis of the semantic irrelevance of the context, or the lexical item’s semantic independence of context.²⁵ It is motivated by the following type of argumentation:

²³ See Marmo 1994: ch. 3; and for a shorter presentation Marmo 1995.

²⁴ Angelo of Arezzo, as we saw, adds that the *modus praedicandi* is the essence of the predicate (*ratio formalis praedicati*).

²⁵ Pinborg talked about “kontextunabhängige Analyse der Bezeichnung” (1971: 251).

Accidentale non transmutat essentielle; set impositio est essentialis in termino, et additio huius quod <est> 'sanus est' uel alterius est accidentalis; ergo non potest tolli significatum eius per illius termini additionem (...).²⁶

As I have remarked (1994: ch. 5.5.1), from this principle many logicians of this period, commenting on the *Sophistici elenchi*, maintain that the context is relevant for solving equivocity only when the equivocal term is immediately linked to a modifier that pertains to just one of its meanings, as in *canis latrabilis currit* where *canis* and *latrabilis* make up one syntactical element (*extremum*); in all other instances, *de virtute sermonis*, the context is completely irrelevant. In particular:

- 1) when a modifier is added to the term mediately, i.e. as a predicate, so that subject and predicate do not constitute one syntactical component (as in *canis currit*), the resulting sentence is ambiguous and corresponds to as many sentences as the term has meanings;
- 2) when a quantifier is added to the term, as in *omnis canis currit*, it does not distribute the term over all its meanings, but it performs as many distributions as the term has meanings.²⁷

The commentators on the *Elenchi* distinguish the case of equivocal term from that of the analogical one, that is, from that of a term signifying different things according to a certain priority. The latter is affected by the context in exactly the opposite way an equivocal term is: when taken alone, that is with no modifier immediately added, it signifies only its first meaning; it becomes ambiguous, however, when a modifier is immediately added to it and the modifier pertains to its secondary meaning.²⁸

As a further consequence of the aforementioned principle, these commentators hold that word order is irrelevant for the elimination of syntactical ambiguity, since transposition of words is an accident as compared to the essential feature of their signification. This amounts to saying that *pugnantes vellem me accipere* and *pugnantes vellem accipere me* are equivalent and are both affected by the same kind of propositional ambiguity (that is, amphiboly).²⁹

²⁶ Anonymous of Prague, *In EL*, q. 19: 85vB.

²⁷ Cf. Ebbesen 1977, 1979, 1980; Marmo 1994: ch. 5, 1995.

²⁸ Cf. Marmo 1994: ch. 5.2, 1995: 170-71.

²⁹ Cf. Marmo 1994: ch. 6.2, 1995: 177-78.

As I remarked above, these logicians draw these conclusions *de virtute sermonis*, that is from the point of view of what the original imposition put in language. Some of them, however, are inclined to admit that from a different point of view, roughly speaking that of the actual usage of language, context (including word order) might be seen as a clue for interpreting ambiguous phrases.³⁰

3.3. As we will see, there is a remarkable parallel between the way in which some of these logicians (such as the pseudo-Boethius, Simon of Faversham, and Radulphus Brito) deal with the problem of denotation (or reference to individuals) in their commentaries on *Prior Analytics*, and the discussion on ambiguity I have sketched above.

There is a simple explanation for this fact: in this case as well as in that of polysemy the relevance of context is again in discussion, but this time with respect to denotation. In the following sections I will deal with the following issues:

1. universal quantification and denotation of *supposita*;
2. the relevance of predication for *ampliatio* and *restrictio*.

3.3.1. Before presenting the first question, it is expedient to outline the modistic treatment of universal quantifiers.

Boethius of Dacia discusses the nature of *omnis* both in his *Modi significandi* and in his commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*: according to him, *omnis* signifies a *modus rei* (rather than a *res*) and it refers specifically to the relationship holding between the term (or the common nature signified by it) and its *supposita*, i.e. the individuals which participate in that very nature. Boethius makes his point adding that *omnis* does not tell anything about the relation between subject and predicate:

dicendo 'omnis homo' significatum harum dictionum bene potest intellegi sine respectu ad praedicatum, sed non potest intellegi sine respectu termini ad supposita. (*Top.* II, q. 2: 111)

Boethius' position is the opposite of that of Kilwardby, Albert the Great, and the tradition of *Synkategoremata*. They maintained that the action of the distributive sign starts from the subject and ends

³⁰ Cf. Marmo 1994: ch. 5.5.4 and 6.2.3, 1995: 174-79.

with the predicate.³¹ At the end of the century, we read the same position as Boethius' in Brito's commentary on the *Topics*. Again, the relation between universal quantifier and subject term is explained in terms of *modi significandi*:

cum quocumque habet signum universale proportionem, ei potest addi; sed signum universale habet modum distribuentis et dividētis aliquid in plura supposita; ergo potest addi ei quod significat per modum per se stantis et multiplicabilis in plura supposita; sed terminus communis secundum se sumptus significat per modum per se stantis et est multiplicabilis in plura supposita; ideo etc.³²

Understandably, this way of dealing with logical relationships is highly problematic, but this is not my point here. For my purpose, it is important to stress the fact that the Modists always considered dyadic relations as the starting point of every syntactical analysis. A universal quantifier is syntactically connected to the term which immediately follows it, and distributes it over its individuals, making denotation possible. As we will see, this procedure is followed by Modists also in their discussions about *ampliatio* and *restrictio*.

Before proceeding to my second point, just a few words on the debates about the range of distribution of a universal term: if universally quantified, does a common term denote present, past, and future *supposita*?³³ Does it denote actual and potential *supposi-*

31 Cf. Robert Kilwardby, *In Periherm.*, ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206: 72vB (adverbium "habet compositionem essentialem ad uerbum, sic est in hac dictione 'omnis', quia eius potestas incipit ad subiectum et terminatur ad predicatum"); *In Analytica priora*, ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 205: 88rB-vA; Robert Bacon, *Synkategoremata*, ms. Digby 204: 88ra; Albert the Great, *Liber I Priorum analyticorum*, I.7, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. I, Paris, 1890: 468. It must be remembered also that archbishop Kilwardby in 1277 condemned a position like the one expressed by Boethius: "Item, quod signum non distribuit subiectum in comparatione ad praedicatum" (*Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I: 558, n. 474; cf. Lewry 1981: 245, nn. 89-93, and 267).

32 *In Top.* II, q. 2, ms. Paris, BN, lat. 11132: 27vA (transcr. N.-J. Green Pedersen).

33 Relevant texts are the following: Boethius of Dacia, *Top.* II, q. 5: 116-119 ("utrum hoc signum 'omnis' distribuat pro suppositis in potentia"); Anonymous-MF, *In An. post.* I, q. 26 (utrum signum additum termino communi distribuat ipsum pro suppositis praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris unica distributione), in Pinborg 1973: 52-54 (ed. as q. 24: see list of questions in Marmo 1991a: 109); Anonymous-C, *In An. post.* I, q. 33: 87vB; Anonymous, *In An. pr.* I, q. 56, in Pinborg 1971: 260-63; Siger of Brabant, *Sophisma* "Omnis homo de necessitate est animal", ed. in Bazán (ed.) 1974: 43-52; Radulphus Brito, *In Top.* II, q. 6, in Pinborg 1971: 274-75.

ta? Simplifying a bit, the two questions deal with very closely related subjects: as Boethius of Dacia suggests, future and potential *supposita* are just the same; past *supposita* are no *supposita* at all; therefore, actual *supposita* are only present individuals. But if according to him (and, later on, according to Brito) the universal quantifier distributes the subject term only over actual (or present) *supposita*, all the other logicians maintain that it distributes over all its *supposita*. This is considered by them a direct consequence of the nature of the *impositio nominum*: nouns are imposed to signify common natures, indifferent to existence and non-existence;³⁴ furthermore, according to Aristotle's definition of noun (and the grammarian's definition of its *modi significandi*) no noun signifies (or co-signifies) time; therefore, when a common noun is quantified, it must denote all its *supposita*, with no reference to their position in time.

3.3.2. Even if these logicians make no use of the subdivisions of the theory of *suppositio*, they discuss two other properties of terms traditionally linked to *suppositio*: *ampliatio* and *restrictio*. In one of the texts published in Pinborg 1971, the problem of *restrictio* is directly related to both the question of the relevance of predication for denotation, and that of the reference to present, past, and future individuals. In his commentary on *Prior Analytics*, an anonymous logician discusses the question whether a common term could be restricted by the predicate (a verb, in this case), so that if the verb is present, it is restricted to present individuals, if past to past ones, and if future to future individuals.³⁵ His position is consistent with the general frame I sketched above: a common term is indifferent to time in its signification as well as in its denotation, so that in a universal proposition it always refers to all its *supposita* and the verb has no influence whatsoever on it. The anonymous author makes

³⁴ "Sed nos videmus quod natura termini communis universalis potest determinari ad quodlibet tempus per aliquid adiunctum ex natura sua, ut homo praeteritus, futurus et praesens, manente eadem ratione. Quare indifferens se habet natura communis termini ad quodlibet tempus" (Anon.-MF, *In An. post.* I, q. 26: 53). Cf. Marmo 1989: 163-64 (where I presented this as "Scotus' solution to the problem of meaning", not realizing that it was common doctrine at Scotus' time).

³⁵ *In An. pr.* I, q. 57: 263-66.

reference to a group of logicians who maintain that such a *restrictio* is the case. He calls them “ponentes restrictionem”.³⁶

As a matter of fact, we can read a whole debate on this subject in at least two sophismata by Peter of Auvergne, preserved in three manuscripts (cf. Ebbesen 1993b: 58). In his sophisma “Omnis phoenix est”, two opinions are presented and rejected before Peter offers his own interpretation. According to the first one a *restrictio* of the range of denotation of the subject due to the verb is possible, because some verbs signify actions that can be true only of existing individuals (such as *currere* or *disputare*) and some other verbs signify actions that can be ‘saved’ also by non-existing objects (such as *contingere* or *posse*): when the first kind of verb is added, the subject term denotes existing individuals; when the second kind is added, the subject term signifies both existing and non-existing things.³⁷

The second opinion is an attempt to justify *restrictio* from a modistic point of view (significantly it is presented by Peter as a position worked out “by some colleague”). According to this opinion, a term followed by a present tense verb denotes present things, and so on for the other tenses; and this is because *compositio* (the *modus significandi* proper to the verb) is present in a present tense verb, past in a past tense one, and so on.³⁸

36 *In An. pr.* I, q. 57: 264; cf. Peter of Auvergne, *Sophisma* XIII “Omnis homo est”, ms. Firenze, Bibl. Medicea Laurenziana, S. Croce 12 sin., 3: 77vB (“secundum illos qui ponunt restrictiones”); Simon of Faversham, *In An. pr.* I, q. 60: 127^rA.

37 “Ad istud dicitur quandoque quod terminus communis supponens alicui verbo supponit secundum exigentiam illius verbi vel praedicati; sed supponens communibus verbis supponit pro praesentibus et contingentibus, et qualiter hoc contingat sic patet: Quaedam enim sunt verba quae significant actus suos qui nati sunt salvari in existentibus tantum, sicut ‘currere’, ‘disputare’, quae quidem supponunt esse, et terminus communis supponens talibus verbis supponit pro existentibus, quia supponit pro eis quae sequuntur ad ipsum; nunc autem sequitur ‘homo currit, ergo homo est’. Quaedam autem sunt quorum actus sunt nati salvari in non existentibus, sicut ‘potest’ et ‘contingit’, et ideo terminus supponens talibus verbis indifferenter supponit pro entibus et non entibus, ut ‘contingit hominem esse animal’ vel ‘homo potest esse animal’ supponit li ‘homo’ pro eo quod est homo vel quod potest esse homo, quia potentia hominis ad animal supponit potentiam alicuius hominum homo *spat. vac. VIII litt.* enim, et non potest nisi quia aliquid est in potentia ad ipsum” (Peter of Auvergne, *Sophisma* V, q. 2, transcr. and coll. by Sten Ebbesen.)

38 “Et propter hoc solet aliter dici, sicut etiam tangebatur a quodam sociorum,

It is easy for Peter to reject both of these opinions since the first one offers no explanation of its thesis, and the second one gives a wrong justification: *compositio*, as well as the other *modi significandi* of the verb, can have no tense. His conclusion is that

terminus supponens verbo de praesenti de se non habet quod supponit pro praesentibus: supponit enim suum significatum de se pro suppositis per indifferentiam, sicut etiam in suo significato non includit aliquod tempus (...). De se igitur non habet ut supponat pro praesentibus et praeteritis. Item, nec habet illud a praedicato (...). (*Ibid.*)

Other logicians of the next generation, such as Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito, agree with Peter's criticism. One of the strongest arguments put forward by Simon of Faversham in favour of this same position makes appeal to the grammatical and the lexical components of the verb, in order to conclude that none of them could exercise any influence on the common term:

dicendo sic 'homo currit', si li 'currit' restringat 'hominem', aut restringat ipsum per naturam compositionis aut per naturam rei uerbi aut per naturam temporis consignificati per uerbum. Non ratione compositionis, quia omne restringens aliud restringit ipsum ad sui naturam; si ergo li 'currit' restringit hominem ratione compositionis, cum compositio sit quidam modus significandi, tunc li 'currit' restringeret ipsum ad modum significandi, ita quod subiectum esset eiusdem modi significandi cum uerbo, quod nullus ponit (...). Nec potest dici quod dicendo 'homo currit' predicatum restringat subiectum ratione rei uerbi, quia tunc hec esset uera solum duobus currentibus 'omnis homo currit', quia omnis homo cui inest res significata per predicatum currit. Nec est dicendum quod predicatum restringat subiectum ratione temporis, quia idem tempus manet in uerbo in propositionibus affirmatiuis et negatiuis et \idem/ tempus consignificatum manet in uerbis ampliatiuis et restrictiuis, si ponantur.³⁹

quod terminus supponens verbo de praesenti restringitur ad supponendum pro praesentibus, compositio enim uerbi de praesenti praesens est, et de praeterito praeterita, et de futuro futura; compositio autem ipsa medium est inter subiectum et praedicatum, et denotatur esse unum mediante compositione, et propter hoc dicerent quod restringitur subiectum a compositione sicut et praedicatum ad supponendum pro praesentibus, et de modo significandi de praeterito quod est in uerbo de praeterito ad supponendum pro praeteritis, et in futuris pro futuris" (*ibid.*). The author of the sophism "Omnis phoenix est" (ms. Paris, BN, Lat. 16135: 62vB-67vB; part. ed. in Libera 1991: 211-17) might be the target of Peter's criticism (cf. Tabarroni 1993: 197-98).

³⁹ *In An. pr.* I, q. 60: 127^arA; cf. Anon., *In An. pr.* I, q. 57, in Pinborg 1971: 264; Radulphus Brito, *In An. pr.* I, q. 46, in Pinborg 1976: 272.

Simon makes explicit appeal to the grammatical definition of the verb which signifies *per modum distantis*, i.e. as a syntactical element distinct from the subject term.⁴⁰ The predicate (or the verb) cannot change the range of denotata of the subject term for the same reason a predicate cannot select the meaning of an equivocal subject term (as in *canis currit*): they do not constitute a unitary syntactical element, so they do not behave like *unum extremum*.⁴¹ It is no big surprise, therefore, to find out that *restrictio* is admitted only when a modifier is immediately added to a common term.⁴² *Ampliatio*, on the contrary, is admitted by virtue of the

40 "Dico quod non est necessarium subiectum restringi a predicato nec restringitur; et ratio huius est quia restringere nichil aliud est quam facere terminum stare pro paucioribus quam stare secundum naturam suam; set predicatum adueniens subiecto non potest hoc facere, nisi dicatur quod terminus hoc habeat ex sua impositione, et disputare de impositione nominis nichil est; quare etc. Probatio minoris: quia logicus nichil debet ponere nisi causa reddi possit ex ea que apparent in rebus <uel> fundatur super res; nunc autem uidemus in re quod determinans et determinatum oportet esse indistincta loco et subiecto, sicut apparet de forma et materia; nunc autem in propositionibus predicatum et subiectum sunt distincta loco et subiecto: predicatum enim et subiectum diuersos situs habent; predicatum enim \ut/ distans distinguitur(?) a subiecto, unde uerbum (quod est nota predicandi) dicitur significare in ratione distantis, quia cedit in alterum extremum. Arguamus ergo sic ex hiis que apparent in re: \in re autem/ uidemus quod determinans et determinatum sint indistincta loco \et subiecto/; ergo sic erit in propositionibus; set predicatum et subiectum sunt distincta loco, quia predicatum et subiectum habent diuersos situs, unde secundum gramaticos uerbum, quod est nota predicandi, significat[ur] per modum distantis; et ideo predicatum non determinat subiectum" (Simon of Faversham, *In An. pr.* I, q. 60: 127vB). About the *modus significandi distantis*, see Marmo 1994: 179-88.

41 "Nunc autem praedicatum et subiectum, quamquam significantur esse unum, non tamen ut unum extremum, nec tamen uno intellectu concipiuntur, sed ut diuersis, et ideo unum non determinat aliud vel restringit ita quod faciat ipsum esse minus quam esset illud" (Peter of Auvergne, *Sophisma V*, q. 2, quoted above).

42 "Nichilominus, si determinatio immediate adueniat determinabili, ipsa potest ipsum restringere, quia determinatio adueniens determinabili immediate significatur esse unum et ut unum; et ideo determinatio immediate addita suo determinabili ipsum restringit. Set loquendo de determinatione et determinabili que mediate adiunguntur, unum alterum non restringit; unde negantur restrictiones [restrictiones] mediate, quia dicendo 'homo est albus (-um ms.)' 'homo' non determinatur per 'album'; si autem dicatur 'homo albus currit', tunc homo et album significantur esse unum et ut unum; propter quod restrictiones immediate concedi possunt" (Simon of Faversham, *In An. pr.* I, q. 60: 127vB). Cf. Anon., *In An. pr.* I, q. 57 and q. 74, in Pinborg 1971: 265 and 273; Radulphus Brito, *In An. pr.* I, q. 46, in Pinborg 1976: 272-73.

res significata by verbs such as *contingit* or *potest*, and is considered as an application of the principles that govern analogical terms.⁴³

To complete the picture and the parallel with the discussions about equivocity in the commentaries on the *Sophistici elenchi*, it must be said that the rejection of *restrictio* is argued only *de virtute sermonis*. A different point of view on language allows *restrictio*, according to Simon of Faversham:

Dicendo ergo sic ‘homo currit’ ‘homo’ supponit pro presentibus, preteritis et futuris currentibus et non currentibus; unde in ista locutione sunt duo consideranda, scilicet *uirtus sermonis* et *ueritas locutionis*. Quantum est *ex uirtute locutionis* ‘homo’ non determinatur ad homines presentes, nec ad preteritos, nec ad futuros; quantum tamen *ex uerificatione locutionis* oportet quod determinetur ad presentes. Unde omnes tales orationes false sunt quantum ad sensum quem faciunt; sunt tamen uere quantum ad sensum in quo fiunt (hec est distinctio antiqua). (*In An. pr.* I, q. 60: 127^rA – emphasis mine)

The reference to the old distinction is quite enlightening; again, a pragmatic point of view on language, that of the language user,

⁴³ Cf. Simon of Faversham, *In An. pr.* I, q. 61: “dico quod hec uerba ‘potest’ et ‘contingit’ ampliant ratione rei significate, et hoc per hanc uiam: quando aliquid dicitur de duobus, de uno per prius, de alio per posterius, sumptum per se stat pro eo de quo dicitur per prius; acceptus autem mediate cum alico pertinente ad secundarium significatum stat pro utrumque” (f. 128^rA); cf. also q. 59: 127^rB-vB (“utrum iste diuerse acceptiones sint diuerse cause ueritatis, aut sint diuersi sensus multiplicis”); Anon., *In An. pr.* I, q. 76, ms. Firenze, Bibl. Medicea Laurenziana, S. Croce 12 sin., 3: 56^vB-57^rA (“utrum ista propositio ‘omne b contingit esse a’ habeat plures sensus uel acceptiones”); Radulphus Brito, *In An. pr.* I, q. 46: “ampliatio est quando terminus potest sumi pro pluribus suppositis ex adiunctione termini quam prius posset stare. Modo istud est possibile, ergo ampliatio est possibilis. Maior patet. Sed probatio minoris, quia terminus communis secundum se sumptus per prius dicitur de supposito in actu et per posterius de supposito in potentia et per attributionem ad suppositum per se (...). Modo ex usu auctorum habemus nec possumus aliter probare quod terminus communis sumptus secundum se stat pro illo de quo dicitur per prius, sed sumptus cum determinatione pertinente ad secundarium significatum et hoc mediate, tunc stabit pro utroque significato et est oratio tunc distinguenda (...). Modo quaedam sunt praedicata huiusmodi scilicet quae pertinent ad secundam acceptionem sive ad secundum significatum termini sicut ‘potest’ et ‘contingit’ et similia talia. Ergo talia praedicata ampliant terminum ipsum et faciunt ipsum stare pro pluribus quam si secundum se sumeretur, quia quando secundum se accipitur solum accipitur pro suppositis in actu, sed quando sibi additur ‘potest’ vel ‘contingit’ accipitur pro utrisque” (in Pinborg 1976: 274-75). About analogous terms and their criticism by Radulphus Brito (in his commentary on the *Elenchi*, where a different standpoint prevails) and John Duns Scotus, see Marmo 1994: ch. 5.4.3.

where the context, the intentions of the speaker and his presumed truthfulness have some weight, is opposed to the pure analysis of semantic content, to the code-based semiotics, which is confirmed as a characteristic feature of the earlier stage of Modism.

4. Conclusion

Even a cursory reading of the logical commentaries written by Masters of Arts between Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito shows some interesting correspondences and parallels between their approach to grammar and logic. First of all, and quite obviously, logic as well as grammar does not deal with the phonic side of language. The surface manifestation of thought does not concern the logician any more than the grammarian: logic and grammar are both rational sciences and can no longer be labelled as *sermocinales scientiae*.⁴⁴ The correspondences between grammar and logic, however, are not limited to this negative feature. Both disciplines share a concern with reality. Their objects cannot be mere creations of the human mind: it is necessary for them to have a foundation in reality. As a consequence, the *modi significandi*, which are the proper object of grammar, are conceived as derived from the properties of the things and as common to all individual languages: grammar is therefore a universal and a priori science having as its object a universal feature of language. Logic aspires to this same type of universality, and discussions about logic as a science reveal the same concern about its foundation in reality as those about the science of grammar.⁴⁵ In some authors, as we saw, the parallel between the two disciplines is pushed very far: the system of the derivation of the *modi significandi* from the *modi essendi* is applied to that of the *modi praedicandi* from the *modi essendi*.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Anonymous-C, *In An. post.*, pro., in Marmo 1991a: 122; Gentilis of Cingoli, *In Pred.*: 17rB; Radulphus Brito, *In Porph.*, q. 2: 37v-38r.

⁴⁵ See, for example, Boethius of Dacia, *Top.* I, q. 6: "omnis scientia aut est accepta a rebus aut est figmentum intellectus. Sed nulla scientia est figmentum intellectus, quia si sic, facile esset fingere infinitas scientias" (p. 25); cf. Simon of Faversham, *In Porph.*, q. 2: 19; Radulphus Brito, *In Porph.*, q. 2: 37r; Id., *In Pred.*, q. 5, ad 3: 73v.

This triadic system of derivation together with the conception of a multi-layered language ensures the theoretical priority of grammar over logic, on the one hand, and of lexical meaning over context and all the pragmatic circumstances of communication, on the other.

A consequence of the theoretical priority ascribed to grammar is that the Modists deal with logical problems from a grammatical point of view: as we saw above, the universal quantifier is first of all considered as a modifier of the subject term and, as I have tried to show elsewhere,⁴⁶ the same holds true for the modalities in their analysis of the fallacies of composition and division. The grammatical model of dyadic relationships between elements prevents their dealing *from a logical point of view* with problems like the scope of quantifiers or of modalities.

Furthermore, the absolute predominance of lexical meaning over context and communication, which can be seen in Martinus and Boethius of Dacia and was clearly shown by Jan Pinborg, seems to be mitigated with the second generation Modists (such as Simon of Faversham, the Anonymous of Prague), and leaves open the way to pragmatic considerations. But, even though the Modists admit the possibility of a pragmatic point of view on language, this remains only secondary: the original imposition still plays the role of essential feature of linguistic items. The theory of the properties of terms is theoretically allowed, but it can survive only in a sort of ecological niche (the Modists, as Pinborg said, prefer to talk about *acceptiones terminorum* rather than about different kinds of *suppositiones*). As a matter of fact, among these logicians there is no real interest in the properties that terms can get when inserted in a context nor, probably, in a definition of truth in terms of denotation, what Alfred Tarsky called a “semantic definition of truth”.

46 Cf. Marmo 1992b, 1994: ch. 6.3.

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Andrew of Cornwall and the Reception of Modism in England

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Summary: A set of questions on Porphyry by one Andrew of Cornwall is preserved in ms Clm 14383. Comparison of Andrew's questions with the Porphyry questions of Simon of Faversham and John Duns Scotus suggests the following scenario. Simon introduced Parisian modism into England, and Andrew used and criticized Simon; further, Andrew's critical account of Simon's modism influenced the young Scotus, who developed a critical stand towards modism.

In the course of preparing the critical edition of the philosophical works of John Duns Scotus, the research team at the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University has sought to identify as many of the works which influenced Scotus as possible. Towards that end, certain working hypotheses have come to be adopted concerning the composition of Scotus' logical works. One such hypothesis, generally conceded by scholars, is that the logical works are early compositions. Another theory, more controversial,¹ is that Scotus wrote his logical works in England, and that his influences were primarily British. In documenting the evidence, the editors have had much benefit from the critical editions of medieval British philosophical works available. At the same time, it has become painfully clear that much relevant material remains unedited.²

Presented in this article will be a little-known author hitherto unassociated with Scotus: Andrew of Cornwall. I shall argue that

1 Fr. Gedeon Gál thinks that Scotus wrote his logical works in Paris, where Antonius Andreas could have audited them, and thus around 1295-1298. Cf. Antonius Andreas *Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii* f. 71ra: "Haec de dictis magistri fratris Ioannis Duns, natione Scoti, sedentis supra cathedram magistralem, ut potui, colligens, in unum compilavi." In support of this hypothesis, see Balić 1965: 10-11 and Callebaut 1929: 355. Dr. Timothy Noone and I consider the logical works to have been written in England around 1281-87. In support of this hypothesis, see Brampton 1964: 18 and Wolter 1993: 9.

2 Some of the British logicians we have examined in editing Scotus include William of Sherwood, Robert Kilwardby, John of Secheville, Thomas Sutton, Simon of Faversham, William Bonkeys, and John Stycborn.

Andrew's commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* influenced Scotus, and that Andrew was one of the first to receive critically the modistic theory arriving in England from the continent, thereby helping to shape Scotus' assessment of modism. However, such claims must be offered tentatively, because of the following difficulties: (1) there reigns almost total ignorance about Andrew's life and works; (2) the dates and location of his activity are uncertain; (3) there is no certainty about the direction of influence among Andrew, Scotus, and Simon of Faversham.

All that is known about Andrew of Cornwall derives from the record of his work surviving in ms München, BSB clm. 14383, ff. 81ra-86ra of which contain *Quaestiones super librum Sex principiorum*, and ff. 86rb-92va *Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii*. Martin Grabmann provides the only published discussion of this author and these works.³ Grabmann dates the script to the beginning of the 14th century. This judgement can be corroborated by comparing the script to plate 95 in Thomson's *Latin Bookhands*,⁴ dated 1291 in England. The split ascender on the 'l' and other paleographical evidence indicates this to be an English hand.

Works contained in the ms are:

- ff. 1r-11v pseudo-Aristoteles *Secretum secretorum*
- ff. 12r-39v Hervaeus Natalis *Quodlibet* I
- ff. 40r-63v Jacob of Metz *In Sententiarum* I dist. 1-37
- ff. 64ra-72vb Thomas Aquinas *Quodlibet* III (*des. mutil.*)
- ff. 73ra-80vb *Miscellanea medica*
- ff. 81ra-86ra *Quaestiones super librum Sex principiorum*
- ff. 86rb-92va *Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii*
- ff. 93ra-102r Arwei (Hervaei) *Tractatus de articulis Durandi* (Colophon: "*Explicit de articulis pertinentibus ad primum librum Durandi reprobatis ab Aruueo.*")

But since the codex is compiled out of several fragments,⁵ the dating of any of these works is not of much significance. There is no date or localizing reference given in Andrew's section of the manuscript.

³ Grabmann 1936: 237-8.

⁴ Thomson 1969.

⁵ Shoener 1973: 393-4: "Codex memb., 280 X 196, ff. 102, e multis libellis consarcinatus."

Andrew of Cornwall is expressly identified as the author of the *Quaestiones super librum Sex principiorum* in its colophon (f. 86ra): “*Expliciunt quaestiones super librum Sex principiorum datae a domino Andrea de Cornubia.*” The subsequent work, by the same scribe, has the names at the titulus (f. 86rb) and colophon (f. 92va) erased (perhaps an examination under ultraviolet light would reveal more). Grabmann, on the basis of similarities between the works, attributes them to the same author. Indeed, the author of the *Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii* has certain peculiarities of expression which are echoed in the preceding commentary: “*patet per ea quae dicta sunt in positione*” (f. 85vb; cf. ff. 86va, 87va, 91vb, 93va); and the formulaic response to arguments is the same: “*Ad primam rationem*” etc.

While concurring with Grabmann regarding authorship and dating, I must disagree with him regarding location. Grabmann says that the commentary on the *Sex principia* has some similarities with the commentary by Robert of Paris in ms München, BSB clm 14246, and thus suggests that Andrew of Cornwall might have been a master of the Arts faculty in Paris. I would argue that the scribe and the author’s patronym are both English – the name ‘Cornubia’, of course, means the county Cornwall in England – and thus I suggest that the place of composition is there also. But of course there is little evidence upon which to confirm any such conclusion.

So, leaving aside the problems about the localization of Andrew’s work, I would like to state the evidence for a connection among the commentaries on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* of Andrew, Scotus,⁶ and Simon of Faversham.⁷ Plainly, they are all question-commentaries, without interposed literal commentary or inserted dubia. And this genre of commentary is a rather new phenomenon for logical commentaries, originating perhaps no earlier than the 1260’s, with Martin of Dacia and Peter of Auvergne. Furthermore, commentaries at the close of the thirteenth century exhibit an increasing complexity. The most elementary type of question consists of preliminary arguments, an argument *ad oppositum* (often from authority), the determination of the question, and replies to the preliminary arguments. Most of Simon of Faversham’s ques-

6 Johannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii*.

7 Simon de Faversham, *Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii*.

tions on Porphyry fit this pattern. However, certain questions receive a more complex treatment; they may contain sub-arguments and reports of alternative positions. A number of Andrew's questions exhibit this sort of complexity, as do Scotus'. I submit that this sort of complexity grows out of a tradition of successive treatments of an issue. I think that it is generally previous authors and their opinions who are responsible for alternative opinions inserted into the ordinary progression of argument, rather than merely the creativity of the author – although of course straw-man arguments are not uncommon. The increased complexity of Andrew's and Scotus' arguments arise from their being further along in the chain of development of tradition.

An obvious mark of a continuous tradition is similarity of questions. And the lists of questions of Simon, Andrew, and Scotus overlap to a remarkable extent. This is of course completely expected for such typical questions as whether a genus requires several species; but it is more remarkable when the questions are only loosely prompted by the original text – such as the question of whether 'mortal' is a differentia (motivated by a single aside from Porphyry),⁸ or the question of whether being is predicated univocally of diverse genera, an interesting question only tenuously motivated by Porphyry's text.⁹ Our three authors share these questions, and more.

Preliminary arguments, also, were regarded as common intellectual property among medieval commentators, and freely repeated and echoed without attribution. Similarity in preliminary arguments does not argue direction of influence, but it does indicate a shared tradition. Many of the same preliminary arguments to the same questions are to be found in Simon, Andrew, and Scotus. Following are a couple of examples common to Andrew and Scotus:

IA Andreas de Cornubia *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 4, f. 86vb: Praeterea omne accidens quod est in re ut in subiecto vel est proprium vel commune; sed universale est neutrum horum, quia tunc esset in individuo; igitur etc.

⁸ Cf. Simon de Faversham *Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii* q. 30; Andreas de Cornubia *Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii* q. 21; Johannes Duns Scotus *Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii* q. 29.

⁹ Cf. Simon de Faversham *Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii* q. 27; Andreas de Cornubia *Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii* q. 12; in Scotus, the treatment is found in his *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum* q. 34.

IB Johannes Duns Scotus *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 9-11 n. 1: Omne accidens, quod est in re, est proprium vel commune. Si proprium, inest individuus, licet non primo, quia proprium per se inest speciei, et 'per se' praesupponit 'de omni'. Si commune, primo inest individuus. Si igitur esset accidens in re, esset primo in individuus. Hoc est falsum, quia tunc individuum esset universale; igitur etc.

IIA Andreas de Cornubia *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 5, f. 87ra: Praeterea ad principale, si locus esset principium generationis quia est mensura rei, eadem ratione et tempus similiter, sicut omne quod est in loco sit et in tempore; igitur sicut locus est principium generationis, ideo et tempus.

IIB Johannes Duns Scotus *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 13 n. 2: Item, tempus est principium generationis, quia est mensura extrinseca sicut locus.

The question-commentary format, lists of questions, and shared preliminary arguments perhaps argue only a common tradition, and not direct influence. In authors where one has read the other, we should expect common arguments and turns of phrases. And that is just what we find in our three authors:

IIIA Simon de Faversham *Qq. super libro Porphyrii* q. 29, 56: Contra. Sicut animal est aliquid concretum respectu huius quod est animalitas, ita lignum est aliquid concretum respectu huius quod est lignitas; sed lignum ut concretum non praedicatur de eo cuius est pars, dicendo 'arca est lignum'; ergo si animal dicat partem, non poterit vere praedicari de specie, quamvis sic sit concretum. Pars enim nullo modo habet rationem essentialem totius, et ideo non praedicatur in quid de specie.

IIIB Andreas de Cornubia *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 6, f. 87rb: Dicendum quod principium vere potest praedicari de principiatis denominative, ut hic 'arca est lignea', sed non in abstracto, quia male dicitur 'arca est ligneitas'. Similiter in proposito, non obstante quod animalitas vere de specie non potest praedicari, tamen animal quod per modum concreti accipitur vere de specie potest praedicari.

IIIC Johannes Duns Scotus *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 16 n. 42: Contra responsum quae concedit quod materia in concreto praedicatur, arguitur aliter. Nam sicut animal significat materiam hominis in concreto, sic lignum materiam arcae in concreto. Igitur sicut haec est falsa 'arca est lignum', non obstante concrezione illa, sic et haec 'homo est animal'. Prima propositio patet, nam sicut animal est concretum respectu animalitatis, sic lignum respectu ligneitatis.

Simon's discussion is his opinion, presented in response to an objection. In Andrew, it is presented as someone else's view arguing against a preliminary argument, and is subsequently rejected. In Scotus, the view is presented as an alternative response ("argui-

tur aliter”), which is then also rejected. The unusual technical term ‘ligneitas’ appears in all three, and Scotus’ turn of phrase (“*non obstante*”) matches Andrew’s.

In what follows, I shall argue that there is a specific direction of influence among the three: from Simon, who studied in Paris and learned of modism there, to Scotus, who read Simon and learned of modism by means of him; with Andrew as a conduit, providing criticisms of Simon which helped to shape Scotus’ view. I believe that Scotus knew Simon’s work directly, for there are quotations from Simon in Scotus that were not mediated by Andrew. But likewise, I can argue, Scotus must have known Andrew, for there are passages common to Andrew and Scotus which are not found in Simon. For example, the following passages, which are responses to the preliminary arguments IIA and B, above.

IVA Andreas de Cornubia *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 5, f. 87ra-b: Ad ultimum dicendum est quod tempus non est principium generationis, sed potius corruptionis. Quia tempus est numerus motus; motus facit distare; ideo dicit Aristoteles quod omnia tabescunt et corrumpuntur. Locus autem principium conservativum est, quod patet quia plantae remotae ab uno loco ad alium corrumpuntur; et hoc non esset nisi primus locus esset principium conservativum.

IVB Johannes Duns Scotus *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 13 n. 8-9: Ad secundum dico quod tempus non per se coadiuvat ad generationem nec salvat generatum, sed magis est causa corruptionis per se, ut ostenditur IV Physicorum. Nota, IV Physicorum: omnia tabefiunt et corrumpuntur in tempore. Facit enim distare rem a dispositione in qua fuit prius. Tempus enim est numerus motus; et in numero, motus est successiva corruptio partium. Igitur tempus non adiuvat ad generationem per se. (Cf. Scotus *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 13 n. 4: Similiter, quaedam plantae fructificant in aliqua parte terrae, sed si plantarentur in alia parte terrae non fructificarent.)

The skeptic might argue, however, that such similarities are not conclusive for the direction of influence, for Andrew provides us with no dates, and we might just as well be looking at someone influenced by Scotus.

I shall respond to this objection in several ways.

First of all, Andrew is no Scotist. That is, he does not agree with Scotus in all of the questions which he has in common with Scotus; nor does he follow the traditional doctrines assembled from Scotus’ works under the rubric Scotism.

In the second place, it would be remarkable to find anyone who read Scotus’ logical works at the beginning of the 14th century,

from when our manuscript dates. Scotus' reputation derived chiefly from his great theological works; it seems a later development that interested philosophers went back to Scotus' logical works. The earliest manuscript we have of any of Scotus' logical works dates from about twenty years after his death.¹⁰ Furthermore, Scotus' logical works are in such a rough shape, reflecting often a hasty and careless style, that later readers preferred to read his theories in Antonius Andreas, who organized and clarified the *Logica vetus* commentaries of Scotus; it was often Antonius, rather than Scotus, who was read in the later schools of Scotism.¹¹

And finally, the most important evidence is that Scotus quotes and rejects views which Andrew sets forth as his considered opinion, as the following examples show:

VA Andreas de Cornubia *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 7, f. 87vb: Est intentio una, quae quidem unitas sumpta est ab unitate proportionis. Et tale unum potest diversis praedicamentis convenire secundum nomen et rationem. Quod sic patet, quia animal dicitur de homine et asino, qui differunt specie; similiter, color de albedine et nigredine praedicatur, quae differunt specie. Ideo propter unitatem huiusmodi proportionis attribuimus eis unam intentionem, quae dicitur genus, et eius definitionem.

VB Johannes Duns Scotus *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 15 n. 26-7: Dicitur quod aliqua unitas in re sufficit <ad unitatem generis>, scilicet unitas proportionis a qua movetur intellectus attribuens hanc intentionem univocam huic et illi. Similiter enim se habet color ad albedinem sicut animal ad hominem.

Contra: unitas univocationis maior est unitate proportionis. Igitur haec ab illa non sumitur.

VIA Andreas de Cornubia *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 6, f. 87ra: Ideo dicitur aliter quod duplex est <totum>, totum reale et totum rationis, et sic duplices sunt partes, scilicet partes reales et partes secundum rationem. Licet pars realis non praedicatur de toto, pars tamen secundum rationem de toto potest praedicari; animal est pars speciei secundum rationem, cum species sit totum secundum rationem; ideo non est inconveniens animal de homine praedicari.

VIB Johannes Duns Scotus *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 16 n. 11-12: Aliter dicitur

¹⁰ Ms Bruxelles, Bibl. Royale 2908 is tentatively dated to around 1325.

¹¹ Cf. Leader 1988: 168: "The *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* of the Scotist Antonius Andreas was the overwhelming favourite in this field. Organised for ready adaptation to disputations, it was virtually unchallenged in the later middle ages. Aquinas' commentary ran a poor second, followed by Averroës and Duns Scotus."

quod materia vel pars realis non praedicatur de toto; materia tamen vel pars rationis potest, cuiusmodi est genus.

Contra: VII *Metaphysicae* (VII,10 1034b20-24) dicit Aristoteles: "sicut ratio ad rem, sic partes rationis ad partes rei"; ergo permutatim 'sicut partes rei ad rem, sic partes rationis ad rationem'; sed partes rei, per te, non praedicantur de toto, igitur nec partes rationis.

I rule out the hypothesis that Andrew read Scotus, picked out theories which Scotus explicitly rejects, and presented them in an expanded version as his own. Thus Andrew was an influence on Scotus, and not the other way around.

The final excerpts I present, numbers VII A, B, and C, seem to me to show the way that Andrew stands between Simon and Scotus, serving as a mediator who helped to shape Scotus' views. The issue is the univocity of being, which arises here because of Porphyry's comment that that being cannot be a supreme genus to the ten categories (6.10-12). The solution that being should be applied analogously across different genera was perhaps first introduced by Avicenna,¹² but was given wide currency by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.

The first passage is Simon of Faversham's straightforward statement of this common position:

VIIA Simon de Faversham *Qq. super libro Porphyrii* q. 27, 51: Ergo ens non erit pure aequivocum ad substantiam et accidens; erit ergo analogum, dictum secundum prius et posterius, quia per prius dicitur de substantia, per posterius de accidente.

The second passage is this common position being reported by Andrew, following Simon's words. But remarkably, what follows in Andrew is not found in Simon, but it is a quick summary of the modist position of an isomorphism among being, understanding, and signifying – the cornerstone of modist doctrine. And Andrew applies this theory to explain why someone might hold the analogy of being. This allusion to modist doctrine, while provided by Andrew, was clearly intended to point out Simon of Faversham to anyone familiar with his ideas.

VIIIB Andreas de Cornubia *Qq. super librum Porphyrii* q. 12, f. 89va: Ad quaestionem dicunt quidam quod ens dicitur de substantia et accidente analogice, et hoc secundum prius et posterius. Per prius dicitur de substantia, per posterius de accidente. Cuius ratio est quia significare et intelligere sequuntur esse secundum ordinem. Sicut igitur se habet ad esse, ita ad intelligere et significare. Sed substantia

12 Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* I, 5; I 40.

est primum ens et per se ens; accidens autem non est nisi quia substantia eius in qua est, cum esse accidentis sit inesse. Propter hoc dicitur accidentaliter ens, quia <a> substantia capit suum esse. Sic igitur est intelligere et significare quod primo significabit ens substantiam, et postea per reductionem accidens.

See what happens in the third passage, number VIIC, when Scotus takes up this debate.¹³ Scotus is familiar with several ways of understanding analogy; Simon's version is the second one he reports. But he cites Simon along with the specific association with the key modistic doctrine, as earlier linked together by Andrew.

VIIC Johannes Duns Scotus *Qq. super librum Praedicamentorum* q. 34 n. 28-29: Ponitur autem analogia in vocibus tripliciter: vel quia significant unam rationem primo, quae in existendo diversimode convenit duobus vel pluribus, quae dicuntur analogata. Sicut hoc nomen 'causa' et hoc nomen 'principium' et multa alia nomina, quae distinguuntur in V *Metaphysicae* (1012b35-1014a25) significant unam rationem primo, tamen illa est in diversis secundum ordinem.

Alio modo ponitur analogia in vocibus, quia unum significatur per prius per vocem, et reliquum per posterius. Cuius causa ponitur: quia significare sequitur intelligere. Quod igitur per prius intelligitur alio, si significetur per eandem vocem per quam et illud aliud, per prius significabitur.

And then Scotus goes on to reject this view of the analogy of being, while using language that suggests he has the doctrines of modism in mind:

Johannes Duns Scotus *Qq. super librum Praedicamentorum* q. 34 n. 34: Ratio posita (*sc.*, n. 29) ad hoc non videtur valere. Quia significare non sequitur intelligere necessaria consequentia, sicut effectus necessariam causam. Quia aliquid potest intelligi prius alio tempore et natura, nec tamen tunc significari. Non enim necesse est, ut intelligens, vocem imponat ei quod intelligit, sed adhuc est ad placitum ut imponat vel non. Sed ista propositio 'significare sequitur intelligere' intelligenda est ut illud 'sine quo non', quia non potest aliquid significari nisi intelligatur; sed nec sequitur necessario nec quoad similem ordinem in intelligendo et significando.

Scotus' argument, that signification does not necessarily follow upon understanding, is an attack on a rather simple-minded version of modism; for a modist need not claim that everything that is understood *eo ipso* becomes signified, but rather that any signification presupposes understanding. But Scotus' choice of words shows that he intended to oppose the modists.

I have argued earlier, in a paper submitted to the proceedings of the Tenth European Symposium for Logic and Semantics, that

¹³ Johannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum* q. 34.

Scotus was not a modist.¹⁴ Here is another piece of evidence to add to the arguments there. Note also that, in this regard, Scotus is not a Scotist – for here he goes on to posit a complete equivocation among being in different categories. This is an uncomfortable position for the Scotists who were familiar with the later doctrine of Scotus claiming the univocity of being.¹⁵ The same position as here, when stated in Scotus' *Metaphysics* commentary,¹⁶ led to all sorts of scribal variants and annotations, and the question was revised when it appeared in Antonius Andreas.¹⁷ But the fact is that Scotus at the outset of his career was not a proponent of the univocity of being.

An interesting aspect of the discovery of Andrew's work is that it helps to clarify the progression of ideas in the introduction of modism in England. According to the scenario sketched above, modistic ideas were first transmitted to England in the works of the Englishman Simon of Faversham, who had studied in Paris. As they arrived in England, these theories were criticized by Andrew of Cornwall, who then helped to shape Scotus' attitude towards modism.

It is worth re-emphasizing that my reconstruction of events is conjectural, and is based upon features of texts currently available. Researchers in the future should be able to supply editions which will either confirm or challenge my version of events. (I plan to publish the complete text of Andrew's *Isagoge* commentary.) My hope is that these investigations will help to illuminate the milieu of Scotus and the state of British logic at the end of the thirteenth century.

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¹⁴ Andrews: forthcoming.

¹⁵ Cf. Johannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d. 3 pars 1 q. 3; III 68-123.

¹⁶ Johannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* IV q. 1.

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Convertibility of Being and One in a Sophism Attributed to Robert Kilwardby

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Summary: The present article deals with a collection of sophismata found in Erfurt WAB, ms Q. 328. The collection was probably written between 1237 and 1245 and has traditionally been ascribed to Robert Kilwardby. After initial discussion of both formal and doctrinal aspects of the sophismata collection as a whole, the article gives a detailed analysis of the sophism 'tantum unum est', which is in effect a discussion of the convertibility of being and one. This analysis includes an historical reconstruction of the semantic and ontological thought milieu in which the sophism was written, through an examination of the views on the subject by, among others, Peter of Spain, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas.

It was M. Grabmann who, in his pioneering study on the sophismata literature of the 12th and 13th centuries, first drew attention to the collection of sophismata found in Ms. Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek, CA, Q. 328, ff. 1-73v.¹ Grabmann suggested that this collection be attributed to Robert Kilwardby, mainly on the grounds that he also considered the latter to be the author of the other works found in the same manuscript. This is correct, indeed, with respect to the *Commentary on the Prior Analytics*, which is found from f. 94 onwards. The attribution of the sophismata to Kilwardby is by no means secure, however, since the *Syncategoremata* treatise that follows the collection of sophisms and precedes the *Prior Analytics* commentary, most probably is not by Kilwardby, as Grabmann suggested, but by Robert Bacon.² Of course this matter of attribution can only be determined with certainty on the basis of thorough analyses both of the works on the arts we know to be by Kilwardby and of our sophismata collection. However, in view of the fact that an expert on Kilwardby, the late Father Lewry, considered our collection to be by Kilwardby,³ we may, for the time being, assume this to be so, if only to save the

1 See Grabmann 1940: 41-45.

2 For this treatise and its attribution, cf. Braakhuis 1979, pt. I: 106-67.

3 See Lewry 1981: 382.

work from the abyss of anonymity. At any rate, the date of composition seems to correspond to the period of time when Kilwardby was a master of arts at Paris, i.e. c. 1237-1245.⁴

The collection is interesting from a formal perspective. Grabmann noticed that the collection contains passages that serve to connect the discussions of the various sophisms, which allow us, in his opinion, to characterize the collection as a *sophisteria* treatise, i.e. a theoretical treatise on the art of dealing with sophisms. On closer inspection, however, these passages tend to be more characteristic of a treatise on syncategorematic terms that starts with a discussion of the *signa quantitatis*, the quantifiers. In fact, these passages are remarkably similar to and sometimes even identical with the discussion on the *signa* found in the treatise on syncategorematic terms that was attributed to Robert Bacon and referred to earlier. In both texts we find the same division of the discussion of the *signa* into discussions of their signification and their virtue (*potestas*), and the latter topic is subdivided in both texts into discussions on their *potestas in oratione* and their *potestas in argumentatione*. The discussion of the sign 'omnis', too, follows the same course in both texts. These general passages, then, found connecting the discussions of the first eleven sophisms, and the explicit discussions of 'preter', 'tantum', 'nisi', and 'non' found in the following sophisms, show that the organizing principle underlying the discussion of the sophisms is in fact an analysis of the syncategorematic terms and the semantic difficulties they present.⁵

The discussion of the sophisms together with the general passages result in the following structure of the text:

infinita sunt finita		f. 1a
general passage on syncategorematic terms, especially on 'omnis'	f. 2vb	
omnis homo est omnis homo		f. 3a
general passage	f. 4va	
omne animal fuit in archa Noe		f. 4vb
general passage	f. 7vb	
omnis homo de necessitate est animal		f. 7vb

⁴ For this date see Judy's Introduction (pp. XIV-XVI) to Kilwardby's *De ortu*, and Lewry 1978: 6.

⁵ For this point, cf. Braakhuis 1979, pt. I: 84-90.

general passage	f. 10b	
omnis anima necessario est iusta		f. 10b
omnis homo est animal et econverso		f. 13b
omnis homo est unus solus homo		f. 16b
omnis fenix est		f. 19a
general passage	f. 27b	
omnis propositio vel eius contradictoria est vera		f. 27b
general passage, especially on 'totus'	f.35va	
totus Sortes est minor Sorte		f. 35vb
general passage	f. 39vb	
impossibile potest esse verum		f. 39vb
tantum verum opponitur falso		f. 47vb
decem preter quinque sunt quinque		f. 51a
si tantum pater est non tantum pater est		f. 53va
tantum unum est		f. 59a
nichil est verum nisi in hoc instanti		f. 61va
duo patres et duo filii sunt tria et non plura		f. 68a
Sortes dicit verum si solus Plato loquitur		f. 70va

Another formal characteristic of the text is its focus on the distinctions to be made in the sophismatic sentences; the discussion of each of the sophisms begins with a discussion of the proposed distinctions. This puts our text on a par with the so-called *distinctiones* treatises, for example Roger Bacon's *Summa de sophismatibus et distinctionibus*.

The text is also very interesting from a doctrinal perspective. Ebbesen and Pinborg took the considerations found in the discussion of the sophism 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal' to form part of the corpus of texts they presented, when they first investigated the 13th-century discussions of the problem of the truth-value of propositions about empty classes, i.e. whether a general proposition such as '(omnis) homo est animal' is true even if there is no man in existence.⁶ Later, de Libera was able to show that in that same discussion views are referred to that are verbatim the same as those voiced by Roger Bacon with regard to

⁶ See Ebbesen & Pinborg 1970: 37(87)-40(90).

this problem. Bacon was, as we know, of the opinion that every noun should refer to (an) existing thing(s) and hence that the above question should be denied completely.⁷ Later Braakhuis showed that, in the discussion of the sophism 'omnis fenix est', views that are nearly verbatim those of Roger Bacon are referred to so often that one might get the impression that the consideration of Bacon's views, or views similar to his, forms the real focus of the discussion in this sophism.⁸

Our text is also doctrinally interesting inasmuch as it allots so much space to the discussion of each sophism (see the list of contents presented above); this sets our text off from most other contemporary *syncategoremata* treatises or *sophismata* collections.

Thus our text presents a number of substantial discussions of problems having to do with the sophisms under consideration. In addition to the doctrinal points referred to above, the section on the sophism 'omnis anima necessario est iusta', for example, includes an interesting discussion on whether the mode of necessity ampliates the tense of the substantive verb (an 'necessario' habeat virtutem ampliandi compositionem importatam per hoc verbum 'est'; f. 11va). In the section on the sophism 'omnis propositio vel eius contradictoria est vera' we find a thorough discussion of the relationship between two syncategorematic terms and of the question of whether one of two syncategorematic terms can include the other and how this relates to the formation of speech (f. 28b). Finally the section on the sophism 'impossibile potest esse verum' includes an interesting discussion of *privatio* and of analogy vs. univocity and equivocity (f. 40b). The space allotted in the text to the discussion of each sophism also leaves room for a presentation and discussion of the different solutions that had been offered. In this way the text effectively constitutes an overview or catalogue of these different viewpoints and provides an important source of information on the development of logico-semantic views in the second quarter of the 13th century.

This contribution will deal with the discussion of the sophism '*tantum unum est*'. In fact, the discussion found in this sophism

⁷ See de Libera 1981.

⁸ See Braakhuis 1985.

amounts to a consideration of the convertibility of being and one.⁹

The general structure of the discussion of ‘tantum unum est’ is similar to that of other sophisms. A short introduction, which sets out the way the sophism was usually solved, is followed by a three-fold discussion. This discussion begins with a consideration of the distinction used in the usual solution to the sophism. This is followed by a consideration of the truth or falsity of the sophistical proposition. Next the ways in which the proposition is proved to be true or false are considered. The next section is the *responsio* or *determinatio* which includes a discussion of the various solutions proposed for the sophism and presents the view of the author himself. Finally the text ends with a discussion of the arguments that support the views rejected by the author. The discussion as a whole presents the structure of a scholastic question in a somewhat more elaborated form.¹⁰

The distinction that is presented in the introduction is the distinction between *one* taken as convertible with *being* and *one* taken as the principle of number (in Antiquity and the Middle Ages *one* – or the unity – was considered to be the principle of number and not a number in itself).¹¹

In the first section of the discussion, which is devoted to the proposed distinction, two arguments are given to support this distinction. The first holds that *being* and *one* are convertible, since what has being, has being one and vice versa; on the other hand, *one* taken as a principle of quantity is inferior to *being* and is therefore not convertible with *being*. The second holds, with regard to convertibility, that it is the form that gives both being and being one.

Next the arguments are given that support a rejection of the proposed distinction. With reference to Boethius and Aristotle it is first argued that *one* as principle of number is also convertible with *being*. Then two further arguments are presented which hold that the distinction is not valid, since *one* is not convertible with *be-*

⁹ For a thorough treatment of the discussions of the sophism ‘tantum unum est’ in the context of the 13th-century sophismatic discussion, see Ebbesen 1995.

¹⁰ The entire text is edited in Ebbesen and Braakhuis 1997.

¹¹ For this distinction with regard to the sophism under discussion, cf. also Ebbesen 1995: 190ff.

ing. The first of these is based on the view that *one*, like any other accidental term, like 'white' for example, is predicated denominatively of *being*.¹²

Finally, it is argued that the distinction is useless with regard to the sophism under discussion since the sophistical proposition is false, not only when *one* is taken as the principle of number but also when *one* is taken as convertible with *being*. This latter part of the argumentation is based on the view that the *significatio specialis* of a word presupposes its *significatio generalis*, the latter term being used to refer to the structural elements of language, such as whether a word is singular or plural, etc. It will become clear that this is a view shared by our author.

In the second section of the discussion, which is devoted to the question of truth or falsity, the author begins by presenting proof that the sophistical proposition is false. This proof is based on the thesis that a proposition is false when a higher or more extensive predicate is predicated with exclusion of a subject(term) that is less extensive; an example is the proposition 'only man is a living being'. It is argued that 'tantum unum est' is such a proposition, not only when *one* is taken as the principle of number, but also when it is taken in other senses. It is further argued that *one* taken in any of its senses is an accidental term, since it signifies unity which is a form resulting from the union or composition of form with matter. It may be true that *one* supposit materially for a being; nevertheless, since the imposition of *one* is formally based on unity, its signification will always be connected with unity.¹³

The counter-argument that is presented next holds that a distinction can be made between unity as essential unity and unity as accidental unity. Accidental unity is dependent on a thing that is already constituted in its specific being; essential unity, on the other hand, is given by the nature of the form, which also gives something its being. It is on the basis of essential unity that *one* is convertible with *being*.

12 For a discussion of predicating denominatively in relation to the sophism in question, see Ebbesen 1995: 181-84 and 187-89.

13 "'Unum', quocumque modo accipiatur, est terminus accidentalis; significat enim unitatem, que est forma derelicta ex unione forme cum materia, et talis forma est accidentalis. Sed <sciendum> quod hoc quod est 'unum' formaliter imponitur ab unitate, quamvis materialiter supponat ens. Cum igitur suum significatum nullo modo possit absolvi ab unitate ..."

Two counter-arguments are presented to reject this view. The first maintains that even if essential unity can be given by the nature of the form, that form, like matter, has only the status of potentiality in the composite being, and it is only the composite being that has/is really or actually being. Potential unity, however, given that it is only potential, cannot be convertible with (actual) *being*. Thus the sophistical proposition will also be false on the basis of potential unity. The second argument simply rejects the notion of essential unity and argues that unity, given that it is the principle of quantity, can only pertain to something which is a composite being of matter. Therefore actual unity can belong to an actual composite being only and will thus be an accidental form.

In this discussion, which has, in effect, an entirely ontological or metaphysical nature, it is interesting to note that we find such an outspoken view on the rôle played by (substantial) form and matter in the constitution of a composite being. This view, which as we will see, is supported by our author, seems remarkably similar to the view Thomas Aquinas held on this matter throughout his career. It is well known that Thomas Aquinas, like our author, regarded both (substantial) form and (quantitative) matter as necessary ingredients in the constitution of a composite being, and that it is only a composite being, composed of form and matter, that is a (real) being.¹⁴ It may be the case, then, that we have found in our text evidence for the intellectual milieu which formed the background to the development of the ontological views held by Thomas Aquinas.

The third section of the discussion is rather technical and considers the proofs and disproofs presented in the introduction.

The *responsio* or *determinatio* consists of no less than a discussion of several different ways that had been proposed to solve the sophism.

In the first of these proposals a distinction is made between *one* in the sense of convertible with *being* and *one* as meaning the principle of number; this is, in fact, the same distinction that was presented in the introduction as the common one used to solve the sophism and has already been discussed. Here the author presents a new argument in support of the distinction: it is argued

14 See e.g. his *De ente et essentia*, c. 2.

that *one* in the sense of the principle of number adds something to *being*, to wit the division or distinction of one being from any other being (*discretio*), whereas *one* in the sense of convertible with *being* does not do this. After what we have seen so far, it is not surprising that our author rejects this distinction by arguing that there is convertibility of *being* and *one* with respect to the *supposita*, i.e. the concrete instances or the actual beings to which both these terms refer. There is no convertibility, however, with regard to the proper *significata* of these terms, for the imposition of *one* is based formally on the nature of the discretion. In other words what makes *one* have signification at all is that it signifies the nature of discretion and ultimately the nature of quantity. Because, however, the nature of discretion is found in everything to which the term *being* refers, the range of reference of *one* matches exactly that of *being*, and thus there is convertibility of *being* and *one* with regard to the *supposita*. Through this distinction between the proper signification of a term or the presentation of a nature on the one hand, and its supposition or the reference or the actual beings referred to on the other, it is shown that even when *one* is taken as the principle of number it is convertible with *being*, at least as far as concerns the *supposita*. Thus it is shown that the distinction is useless.

The second proposal for a way to solve the sophism distinguishes between exclusion made with regard to the substantial form and exclusion made with regard to an accidental form, where the sophistical proposition in the first case is true and in the second case is false. This proposal is also rejected, because it is stated that such a distinction can only be valid with regard to a composite term consisting of a term indicating a substance and of an accidental term (such as e.g. '*homo albus*'). However, *one* is not such a term, and even if distinctions could be made with regard to *one*, our author would regard these as invalid. When someone is both pale and musical, it is impossible when referring to that person with the expression 'only pale' to exclude the musical reference, for in that case what is pale is musical, both these terms being used concretely.

The third proposal presented distinguishes between *one* as indicating essential unity, in which case the sophistical proposition is true, and *one* as indicating accidental unity, in which case the proposition is false. This proposal is also rejected. First, because,

according to our author, *one* always indicates accidental unity since it indicates a form that is dependent on something that is constituted already in its specific being. Secondly, because essential unity is only potential, whereas *one* indicates an actual unity. Thirdly, he argues that the distinction presented here is useless because the sophistical proposition can be proven to be true and false in both senses.

Here we see, then, that our author supports the rejection of the applicability of the distinction between essential and accidental unity to the solution of the sophism – a rejection which was already advanced in the section on the truth and falsity of the sophistical proposition – and that he supports the ontological reasons for that rejection. Thus, he thinks *one* always indicates an accidental unity, since it indicates a form that is dependent on something that is already constituted in its specific being. Furthermore, although he does not entirely reject the notion of an essential unity, he states expressly that such a unity is merely potential, which means that he agrees with the view that form and matter as principles of the constitution of the composite being have merely potential being, and that it is only the composite thing that has real or actual being. With his rejection of the view that unity, like being, is bestowed by (substantial) form, he rejects the Neoplatonic interpretation of the rôle that form, as the primordial source of being and unity, plays in the composition of form and matter,¹⁵ and instead appears to adhere to the Aristotelian view, which holds that being is the result of the composition of form and matter.

The solution rejected by the author here, is similar to the solution that Peter of Spain defends in his *Syncategoremata*.¹⁶ Peter of Spain also applies a distinction to the sophistical proposition ‘tantum unum est’: *one* is equivocal, concerning essential unity in one sense and accidental unity in the other. In his explanation of the essential unity, Peter too clearly maintains that the (substantial) form plays a double rôle; in his opinion, form not only grants being to a thing but at the same time separates and distinguishes that thing from all others that belong to the same species.

15 For this view on the double rôle of form in the sophistical discussions of the 13th century, cf. also Ebbesen 1995: 191.

16 See Peter of Spain, *Syncategoremata*, III, 11-17: 110 - 14.

Solutio. Prima duplex, quia hoc nomen 'unum' est equivocum, eoquod est quedam unitas que est essentialis, ut illa per quam res existit in esse speciali sive in esse specifico. Et hec unitas est per formam completivam dantem esse rei in separando et distinguendo ipsam rem ab omnibus aliis in sua specie, ut Sortes non solum est in specie hominis per suam formam completivam sed etiam per ipsam perficitur in suo esse proprio et separatur et distinguitur ab omnibus aliis hominibus. Et hec est unitas essentialis. Alia autem est unitas accidentalis, que est principium numeri. Unde sicut numerus accidit rebus que numerantur, similiter et unitas per quam numerantur et que est principium numeri, accidit eis. Quicquid enim numeratur, per hanc unitatem numeratur, quia numerus nichil aliud est nisi aggregatio unitatum. Numerus enim est multitudo ex unitatibus aggregata.¹⁷

Surprisingly enough Peter declares both forms of unity to be convertible with *being*, yet he goes on to state that the sophismatical proposition is true when taken in the sense of essential unity and false when taken in the sense of accidental unity.

Et utraque istarum unitatum convertitur cum 'ente'. Sed differunt in hoc quod prima est essentialis (ut dictum est) et secunda accidentalis; et etiam in hoc quod secunda est in prima ut accidens in subiecto; unde secunda accidit prime. Et sicut 'unitas' dicitur equivoce, similiter et unum. Dico ergo quod si accipiatur unitas essentialis sive unum essenziale, sic prima est vera. Si autem accipiatur unitas accidentalis sive unum accidentale, sic prima est falsa, quia dictio exclusiva adiuncta parti numerali destruit suum totum, ut 'tantum duo currunt; non ergo tria'; similiter 'tantum unum est; non ergo duo' vel 'non ergo multa'.¹⁸

In a further explanation, the (Neo)Platonic character of Peter's views becomes clear: according to Peter, an individual human being is separate and differs from any other being in virtue of its (substantial) form, namely its soul.¹⁹ It is apparent, therefore, that, in his view, one does not need to have a body to be separated

¹⁷ See *ibid.*, III, 12: 110 - 12.

¹⁸ See *ibid.*, III, 13: 112.

¹⁹ See *ibid.*, III, 15: 112: "...secundum quod 'unum' dicit unitatem essentialem, quoniam quicquid est, per suum completivum est, quod dat ei esse. Ut Sortes per suam formam completivam, que est anima ipsius, separatur et differt a qualibet alia re; et dat ipsi unitatem essentialem. Et sic est de omnibus aliis." Peter refers to a second solution, which he, however, regards as less successful than the first; see *ibid.*, III, 14: 112: "Alii autem dicunt quod prima est duplex (hec scilicet 'tantum unum est') eoquod potest fieri exclusio ratione suppositi (et sic est vera); vel potest fieri exclusio ratione accidentis sive forme (et sic est falsa). Et tunc sequitur 'non ergo multa sunt'. Sed primam solutionem credo esse meliorem." This solution is similar to the second one discussed by our author.

in this way; in other words, the body is not required in order to be an individual person.

The fourth proposal discussed by our author, and one which he declares from the outset to be a probable one, is the view that *one* always indicates accidental unity or unity which is the principle of number. Even so, according to this view, a distinction can be drawn, since accidental unity can be taken absolutely or respectively. When taken absolutely, it indicates a disposition of the subject, the subject being considered as something on its own. In this case the term indicating the disposition is a categorematic term, in fact, it is an adjective, like 'white'. When taken respectively, it indicates a disposition of the subject(term) in relation to the predicate(term); in this case the term that indicates the disposition is a syncategorematic term, namely a quantifier. This distinction is not only true for *one* but for all numerical terms.²⁰ When *one* is taken absolutely, the sophistical proposition is true, because in that case *one* and *many* do not conflict, *one* being a common noun like 'man'. When *one* is taken in the second sense, however, the proposition is false, since it means: only this one thing is.

The fifth proposal discussed by the author states that the sophistical proposition is false, whether *one* is taken as a quantifier or as an adjective. The reason given is that whichever way *one* is interpreted it runs counter to multiplicity, since *one* signifies precisely in the way of a singular term that cannot have a plural form, because that plural form implies multiplicity which would conflict with what is the proper signification (*res significata*) of *one*.²¹ In answer to further objections it is emphasized that *one* combined with an exclusive term ('tantum unum') differs from other nouns like 'man' and 'white' in combination with such a term, because whereas man and white have opposites that can participate in being under the same mode of signification, this is not the case for *one*.

... iste terminus 'homo' habet oppositum sibi consequens in modo significandi, quod idem oppositum potest participare idem predicatum, quod est 'esse', sub eodem modo significandi sub quo 'homo' participat, scilicet sub modo singularitatis, et tale oppositum est sicut 'asinus' vel 'capra' vel aliquid huiusmodi Sic autem

²⁰ For this distinction in relation to the sophism under discussion, see also Ebbesen 1995: 189.

²¹ "Hec vox 'unum' imposita fuit ad significandum per modum singularitatis nec potuit habere plurale, eo quod multitudo actualis per plurale importata omnino repugnabat rei significate per hoc quod est 'unum'."

non est de hoc quod est 'unum', et de hoc quod est 'multa', quod est eius oppositum, quia oppositum *unius*, scilicet *multa*, non potuit participare istud predicatum quod est 'esse', sub eodem modo significandi sub quo participabat li 'unum', immo sub alio, quia sub modo pluralitatis, 'unum' vero sub modo singularitatis.

Furthermore, it is emphasized that despite the fact that *being* and *one* are convertible – we could add: as far as their *supposita* are concerned – the inference from *being* combined with an exclusion ('tantum ens') to *one* combined with an exclusion ('tantum unum') is invalid, since the opposites of *being* and *one*, i.e. *non-being* and *many*, are not convertible.²²

Our author considers the last two proposals, the fourth and the fifth, to be probable and defensible. In my opinion these proposals, of which, as we have seen, the former states that the sophistical proposition is true when *one* is taken to signify unity as an adjective noun, whereas the latter states the proposition to be false even in that case, may be in agreement with each other according to our author, since in the fourth proposal the emphasis is on the supposition of the term *one*, while in the fifth proposal the emphasis is on the signification and the mode of signifying of that same term.

In the last part of the text, which consists of refutations of the arguments not supporting the author's views, some of the main elements of the author's view are touched upon again. Thus, it is repeated that *being* and *one* are convertible with regard to the *supposita*, but not with regard to their *significata*, since the essence and nature signified by *one* is inferior to what is signified by *being*. Furthermore it is repeated that *one*, particularly in combination with an exclusive term, has its own mode of signification, which is different from that of normal (common) nouns.

If we summarize the views of our author, we see that with respect to the convertibility of the terms *being* and *one* he distinguishes between the *supposita* and the *significata*: the terms are convertible with regard to their *supposita*, but not with regard to their *significata*. They are not convertible with regard to the *significata*, or with regard to essence and nature, because the *significatum* of *being* dif-

²² "Dicendum est ad hoc quod quamvis *unum* et *ens* convertantur, tamen ab uno ad alterum cum dictione exclusiva non tenet argumentum. Et ratio huius est quia opposita eorum non convertuntur."

fers from the essence and nature signified by *one*, this latter signification being the nature of discretion or unity, which necessarily belongs to the category of quantity and which therefore is inferior to what is signified by *being*. However, since the nature of discretion or accidental unity pertains to whatever the term *being* refers to, the terms *being* and *one* are always convertible with regard to their referents, the *supposita*. Based on this argument, our author rejects the distinction between *one* taken as convertible with *being* and *one* taken as the principle of number, because for him, *one*, even as the principle of number, is always convertible with *being* as far as their referents are concerned. He also regards the distinction between essential and accidental unity to be insufficient. Although he does not seem to reject the notion of essential unity altogether, such unity, in his opinion, can be no more than potential. With this he reemphasizes that *one* signifies accidental or quantitative unity, which he regards as the only real or actual unity. Although the author regards the sophistical proposition 'tantum unum est' to be false, he allows for its truth if *one* is taken as a categorematical adjective term, since then it says no more than that the referents of the term *being* match those of the adjectival term *one*. In his additional explanation of the meaning of the sophistical proposition, he emphasizes the special mode of signification of *one* as a mere singular compared to other terms.²³

Our author's rejection of the distinction between *one* as convertible with *being* and *one* as the principle of number did not mean that this distinction fell into disuse; not only did Thomas Aquinas use it extensively,²⁴ but Henry of Ghent interestingly also applied it in his little-studied *Synkategoremata* to provide a solution to the sophism under discussion here:

²³ For a comparison of the view expressed in the Sophism and that by Kilwardby in his *Sentences* commentary, and how this affects the attribution of the text to Kilwardby, see the Appendix, below.

²⁴ See *STh.*1, 11, 1 and 2, and also *In Metaph.* IV, 2, 559-60 and *De Pot.*IX, 7, but also already *In 1 Sent.*, d.24, qu. 1, a. 3. Ebbesen 1995: 192 suggests that Thomas, since he accepts the distinction with so few questions asked, may not have been quite abreast of developments in the arts faculty. It is doubtful that this was the case, not only because Thomas does raise some tough questions about this distinction in texts other than the *Summa Theologiae*, but mainly because in this kind of problem there are various ontological views at stake.

Regula est: quotienscumque dictio exclusiva additur termino habenti in se suppositum et accidens, duplex est locutio ex eo quod potest facere exclusionem suam circa ipsum ratione suppositi vel ratione accidentis, sive ratione forme vel materie, vel ratione forme substantialis vel accidentalis; quod idem est.

Et per hoc solvitur hoc sophisma TANTUM UNUM EST.

Probatio: unum est; et nichil est quod non sit unum; ergo tantum unum est.

Contra: tantum unum est; non ergo multa sunt. Quod falsum est.

Solutio: dicendum quod prima est duplex ex eo quod iste terminus 'unum' significat idem quod: *aliquid sub unitate*, et ita includit in se accidens et subiectum. Et sic potest fieri ab ipso exclusio ratione forme substantialis; et sic est vera, ut probatur. Et est sensus: 'tantum unum est', idest: *tantum aliquid sub unitate est*. Et tunc non sequitur quod multa non sunt, quia quod est sub unitate per se cum alio sumptum simul potest esse sub multitudine. Vel potest fieri exclusio ratione forme accidentalis, que est unitas; et tunc excludit eius oppositum, quod est multitudo; et sic est falsa, ut improbat. Et est sensus: 'tantum unum est', idest: *tantum unitas habet esse in re et non multitudo*.²⁵

In view of the continued use of the distinction between *one* as convertible with *being* and *one* as the principle of number, it may be useful to briefly consider the ontological discussion on the convertibility of being and one in order to provide some background to our author's views.²⁶ The consideration that follows below will be confined to the discussion by Albert the Great, because he explicitly enters into debate with the sophists.²⁷

In his Commentary on Ps.-Dionysius' *De divinis nominibus*, Albert the Great discusses the relationship between being and one, true and good. In dealing with the question whether being is first with regard to the other qualifications,²⁸ he remarks that there are terms that are convertible with regard to the *suppositum*, the nature, and the mode, like synonyms. In addition, there are terms that are convertible with respect to the *suppositum*, but not with regard to the nature; these terms are *being* and *true* and *good*, because *true* and *good* add something to *being*, namely a mode that consists in an affirmation or, effectively, in a relation. Finally, there are terms that are convertible with regard to the *suppositum* and the nature, but not with regard to the mode, for example *be-*

²⁵ Ms Brugge Stadbibliotheek 510, f. 230vb. For Henry's *Synkategoremata*, probably dating from ca. 1260, see Braakhuis 1979, pt. I: 340-73.

²⁶ For the background to the sophistical discussion, see Ebbesen 1995.

²⁷ I thank mr. J. Remmé, who is preparing a thesis on the views of Albert on unity, for pointing me to the relevant texts.

²⁸ See *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, c. 5, 20. The work dates from 1249-50.

ing and *one*. *One* must add a mode to *being*, because otherwise *one* would be synonymous with *being* and the combination of *one* and *being* would constitute a *nugatio*: a meaningless repetition. The mode added by *one* to *being* is a negative mode, namely indivision. Thus, although *one* does not add a nature to being, it differs from being nevertheless, because of the mode it adds:

Ad primum vero dicendum, quod quaedam convertuntur secundum suppositum et secundum naturam et secundum modum, ut quae sunt synonyma, ut mucro et ensis, quaedam vero secundum suppositum, sed non secundum naturam, sicut ens cum vero et bono, quia de quibuscumque praedicatur ens, praedicatur bonum et verum et e converso. Sed tamen bonum et verum addunt modum quendam, qui consistit in affirmatione, supra ens, scilicet respectum quendam Quaedam vero convertuntur secundum suppositum et secundum naturam, sed non secundum modum, sicut unum et ens, quia de quibuscumque dicitur unum et ens et e converso, tamen unum addit modum quendam supra ens. Alioquin essent ens et unum synonyma et haberent eandem expositionem, et esset nugatio, quando unum determinatur per alterum, et hoc totum falsum est. Modus tamen, quem addit, non consistit in affirmatione, sed tantum in negatione; unum enim est, quod est indivisum in se et divisum ab aliis Et ideo nullam naturam addit supra ens, sed tamen ratione illius modi est posterius ente.²⁹

In order to clarify this, Albert refers to the double activity of the (substantial) form: it gives being and limits (the potentiality of) matter. Because the activity of limiting comes after that of giving being, it tends towards the nature of an accident, thus resulting in *one* that is the principle of number. However, as far as the nature of being is retained in the nature of *one*, *one* is convertible with *being*.³⁰ We see, then, that Albert states explicitly that *being* and *one* are convertible with regard to the *supposita* and the nature and that these terms differ only in negative mode. Furthermore, he seems to make some sort of distinction between *one* taken as convertible with *being* and *one* taken as the principle of number referring to the double activity of the form.

²⁹ See *ibid.*: 314, 14-45.

³⁰ *Ibid.*: 314, 46-57: "Quod sic patet: forma enim et est forma et est terminus potentialitatis materiae, et in quantum quidem est forma, dat esse, in quantum vero est terminus, terminat distinguendo ab aliis. Horum autem actuum prior est dare esse, et ideo ens quod relinquitur ex tali actu, est prius uno, quod relinquitur ex secundo actu, et in quantum ille actus est consequens, vergit in naturam accidentis, quia omne quod consequitur esse rei, est accidens; et sic est 'unum', quod est 'principium numeri'. Ex parte vero altera, qua est in ipso natura entis, supra quam nihil addit positive, est unum, quod convertitur cum ente."

Albert returns to this last point later on in the same work, when he discusses the generality of *one*.³¹ Here, although the gist of the argument is similar to that we have already seen, there are some differences. For one thing, it is stated that *being* and *one* are convertible with regard to the *supposita*, but it is not stated explicitly that they are also convertible with respect to the nature, although this seems to be understood. The mode that is added to being by *one* is said to be based on an aspect (*ratio*); interestingly enough, it is characterized as a *modus significandi* (in the earlier passage it could at least be understood as a type of mode of being). Next, after a discussion of the double activity of the form, which is similar to that found in the earlier passage, Albert states explicitly that the *one* that is convertible with *being* is the same as the *one* that is the principle of number:

Dicendum, quod ens et unum convertuntur secundum supposita; hoc est, quia quicquid est ens, est etiam unum. Sed unum addit supra ens secundum rationem, et ratio illa est secundum modum significandi, quia aliter ista non possunt habere rationes. Modus autem significandi, quem addit unum supra ens, fundatur in negatione; importat enim unum aliquid indivisum in se et divisum ab aliis, quod non importatur per ens. Sed huiusmodi negatio consequitur ex actu formae, in quantum est terminus. Habet enim forma duos actus; eadem enim est quae dat esse et terminat materiam, et secundum quod dat esse, facit ens, secundum autem quod terminat, facit indivisum in se et divisum ab aliis, et sic facit unum. Et quia terminare est posterior actus et dare esse principalior formae, ideo unum consequitur esse et sic accipit naturam accidentis, quia omne quod est post esse, est accidens, ut dicit Boethius. Et ex hac parte efficitur principium numeri, quia et idem est unum, quod convertitur cum ente et quod est principium numeri, et ideo numerus invenitur in omnibus entibus, ut dicit Avicenna.³²

This remark could be taken as an indication that Albert's view on this matter changed: whereas in the earlier passage he somehow distinguishes between one as convertible with being and one as principle of number, he now declares them to be the same. In my opinion, however, it is better to take the later remark as a clue to the correct interpretation of the earlier one. *One*, since it is convertible with *being* with regard to the *supposita* and the nature, differs only from *being* in a negative mode, namely indivision. Because of this mode that *one* adds to *being*, it is posterior to *being*,

³¹ See *ibid.*, XIII, 7.

³² See *ibid.*: 436, 8-29.

even though it still indicates the same things and the same nature as *being* does. An explanation for this lies in the double activity of the form, because form first gives being and in the second instance limits (the potentiality of) matter. Because the limitation of matter is subsequent to the giving of being, *one* tends towards or receives the nature of accident and thus becomes the principle of number. In this way it is the same *one* that is convertible with *being*, since it indicates the same *supposita* and the same nature as *being* does, and that forms the principle of number, because of its negative mode of signification which differentiates its signification from that of *being*. If this interpretation of Albert's view is correct, Albert holds in this work the convertibility of *being* and *one*, even when *one* is taken as the principle of number.

Not surprisingly, Albert also discusses the relationship between *being* and *one* in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*.³³ First he presents the general principles underlying his own view, which are in line with what we have seen so far, namely that *being* and *one* are the same or convertible both with regard to the *supposita* and with regard to the nature, and that they differ only in that *one* adds the negative mode of indivision. The explanation for this difference is said to lie in the double activity of the form:

Et similiter est de modis entis et unius. Ens enim est a forma; forma autem duo facit per suam essentiam et non per accidens: unum quidem, quia dat esse per hoc quod est actus, alterum autem est, quod terminat per hoc quod est terminus entis; terminat autem per hoc quod facit indivisum in se et ab aliis divisum. Indivisum autem in se est non-divisum et divisum ab aliis est per hoc quod est non-alia, et sic terminatio formae consistit in negatione, quae consequitur entitatem formae in eo quod est. Nomen ergo entis est naturae formae per hoc quod dat esse, et nomen unius est eiusdem naturae per hoc quod est terminus, nec addit super ens naturam, sed modum, qui consistit in negatione consequenti hanc affirmationem, qua dicitur hoc ens esse ens.³⁴

The interesting thing about this commentary is that in it Albert devotes an entire chapter to the discussion of the opposing view, i.e. that *being* and *one* do *not* signify the same nature. Albert attributes this view to the sophists and puts it on a par with that of Avicenna. Arguments put forward by Albert in support of this

³³ See Albertus, *Super Metaphysicam*, lib. 4, tr. 1, cc. 4 and 5. This work dates from 1263-67.

³⁴ See *ibid.*: 166, 2-15.

view include the *nugatio*-argument, and that *one* added to *being* is a denominative noun, and that *one* is the principle of number.³⁵ In his response, Albert repeats his own views, reemphasizing that *being* and *one* are the same with regard to the nature, that they differ only in mode, and that the negative mode suffices to bring about that they are not synonymous. He adds that *one* is, as a result, not a denominative noun, but only has the mode of a denominative, and that this is perhaps what Avicenna had meant.³⁶ In reply to the objection that *one* taken as the principle of number adds the accident of quantity to being, Albert states that, just as the term ‘principle’ is equivocal, so is the term ‘unity’: there is unity as the limitation of the substance or of being, and there is unity as an accident. He adds that *one* is convertible with *being* only when it indicates the former unity, and not when it indicates the latter unity:

Quod autem dicitur, quod unum est principium numeri, dupliciter accipi potest propter aequivocationem principii. Est enim principium connaturale ei cuius est principium, et reductum ad genus principii, et hoc est quasi principium intra, sicut punctus est principium continui et nunc temporis. Et est principium, quod est causa non intrans in genus causati, sicut substantia causa est accidentis et subiectum passionis. Et hoc modo duplex est unitas. Quarum una est terminus substantiae vel entis, et unum huiusmodi est entis terminativum, et hoc est causa unitatum, non de genere unitatum existens. Alia est unitas, quae est indivisibile sive indivisibilitas causata et abstracta ab hoc uno, et hoc est accidens, cuius collectio facit numerum, et hoc unum non est convertibile cum ente, sed primum.³⁷

³⁵ *Ibid.*: 166, 67-167, 14: “Et est digressio declarans solutionem rationum sophistarum inductarum ad hoc quod ens et unum non sint natura una et eadem. Dubitabit autem aliquis de inductis, an unum et ens consequuntur se ad invicem sicut unam et eandem rem et naturam significantia. Obicit enim contra hoc Avicenna dicens, quod si unum et ens significant eandem naturam, tunc ista nomina, unum et ens, sunt synonyma, et est *nugatio*, quando unum alteri additur Videtur igitur, quod unum iungatur enti per denominationem et informationem Unum ergo dicit aliquam formam enti additam, cum dicitur ‘unum ens’ Amplius, unum principium est numeri Cum igitur dicitur ‘unum ens’, addit unum quoddam accidens super ens.”

³⁶ *Ibid.*: 167, 33-43: “Et licet unum ponat modum suum, quem importat circa ens sicut circa suppositum suum, tamen modus ille non est alicuius formae alterius ab ente, sed modus negationis, qui sufficit grammatico. Et ideo non est denominativum, sed modum habens denominativi. Et hoc forte attendit Avicenna, cum dixit esse denominativum.”

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 167, 44-59:

Here, thus, in contrast to his earlier work, Albert defends the distinction between the two senses of *one*.

It would appear, then, that the view that *being* and *one* are convertible with regard to the *supposita* but not with regard to the nature signified, and that what is properly signified by *one* is the accident of quantity as the principle of number, is considered by Albert as a typically sophist view that can ultimately be traced back to Avicenna. Furthermore, we see that by rejecting this view, insofar as it claims that *one* signifies the principle of number and thus always brings with it the accident of quantity, Albert supports the distinction between *one* as convertible with being and *one* as the principle of number, a distinction that he had not made at the earlier point in his career.

If we examine the discussion found in our sophism against the background of Albert's discussions, we find that, with its emphasis on the fact that *one* signifies the nature of discretion as the principle of number and thus the accident of quantity, and with its rejection of the distinction between *one* as convertible with being and *one* as the principle of number, our sophism is more in line with Albert's earlier views (1240-1250) than with his later views (from ca. 1265 onwards). With this in mind, we might claim that our sophism represents an older view, a view that was both thought to have been influenced by Avicenna's views and that was considered to be an older view in the 1260s.³⁸ On the other hand,

38 For the point that this view was thought to stem from Avicenna, cf. the remarks by Albert referred to earlier; but cf. also the exposition by Thomas Aquinas of Avicenna's view, which looks remarkably similar to an exposition of our author's view, *In Metaph.* IV, 2, 556-57: "Sciendum est autem quod circa hoc Avicenna aliud sensit. Dixit enim quod unum et ens non significant substantiam rei, sed significant aliquid additum De uno autem hoc dicebat, quia aestimabat quod illud unum quod convertitur cum ente, sit idem quod illud unum quod est principium numeri. Unum autem quod est principium numeri necesse est significare quamdam naturam additam substantiae: alioquin cum numerus ex unitatibus constituatur, non esset numerus species quantitatis, quae est accidens substantiae superadditum. Dicebat autem quod hoc unum convertitur cum ente, non quia significat ipsam rei substantiam vel entis, sed quia significat accidens quod inhaeret omni enti, sicut risibile quod convertitur cum homine." One person in the 1260s who sees this view as an older view was Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, IX, 7: 285: "Et haec fuit positio Avicennae; quam quidem videntur secuti fuisse omnes antiqui doctores. Non enim intellexerunt per unum et multa nisi aliquod pertinens ad genus quantitatis discretiae."

the fact remains that our author presents the distinction between the two senses of *one* as the distinction on which the usual way of solving the sophism is based. This would mean that this distinction, which came to prominence under the influence of Averroes' views,³⁹ was already widely in use. Both these points seem to offer support for the date of composition that was suggested above for our work, ca. 1237-1245. The fact that our author rejects this distinction rather emphatically, gives us the impression that he is taking a stand against an increasingly popular view that he deems reprehensible on semantic and ontological grounds. A further point is that Albert regards the view that *being* and *one* are convertible only with regard to the *supposita* and that they are not the same with regard to the nature signified, as a typically sophist perspective. As such, with his emphasis on the distinction between *supposita* and *significata*, and his strong defense of the difference between the *significata* of *being* and *one*, our author appears to be a typical representative of the sophist view. However, in the sophistical discussions of the 13th century, (as far as they are known to us at least), the view in question seems less widespread than we would expect on the basis of Albert's testimony. Should we take this to mean that Albert, in voicing his opinion, had our particular sophisma(ta) in mind? We may never know, but what we do know is that our sophisma constitutes an interesting chapter in the history of the 13th-century discussions on the convertibility of being and one.

Appendix

It should be noted that our author's views do not seem to agree with the views on the convertibility of *being* and *one* found in Robert Kilwardby's *Quaestiones in Librum primum Sententiarum*, which was written after 1256 (cf. Kilwardby *Sent.*: 56*). In this work the distinction between essential and accidental unity is advanced in answer to the objection that *one*, as a member of the category of quantity, cannot be convertible with *being*. In addition, Kilwardby seems to defend the distinction between *one* in the sense of convertible with *being* and *one* in the sense of the princi-

³⁹ Cf. e.g. Ebbesen 1995: 191 (cf. also the reference to Averroes found in the text quoted in our Appendix).

ple of quantity (see *ibid.*: 142, l. 35-143, l. 59: "Item unum est de genere quantitatis. Ergo non potest circuire omnia genera sicut ens. Ergo non convertitur enti Ad secundum quod tam unitas quam multitudo quaedam est essentialis, quaedam accidentalis. Unum quod convertitur enti, communiter se habet ad utramque unitatem. Sed oppositio processit de unitate accidentali. Haec est enim principium numeri qui est discreta quantitas. Unde Averroes super IV 1. et X *Metaph.*: 'Unum quod significat numerum et est principium quantitatis, est accidens. Unum autem quod significat genus et est synonymum enti, significat unumquodque decem praedicamentorum multipliciter.'").

On the other hand, it should be noted that Kilwardby also states that *one*, as far as it is convertible with *being*, includes both types of unity. Furthermore, he says elsewhere that *being* and *one* are convertible with regard to the *supposita*, yet differ with regard to their imposition (see *ibid.*: 145, ll. 47 - 49: "Dicendum ergo quod ens et unum, verum et bonum sunt idem in re et convertibilia in suppositis, sed sunt rationes et intentiones diversae, quibus haec nomina imposita sunt et penes illas differunt."; cf. also p. 148, ll. 21 - 26). Finally he also claims that unity belongs to the category of quantity or is similar to it (see *ibid.*: 146, ll. 69 - 72: "Et ex ista descriptionum differentia elucet quaedam alia, scilicet quod unitas vel est de praedicamento quantitatis vel assimilatur ei, veritas vel est de praedicamento qualitatis vel ei assimilatur, bonitas de praedicamento relationis vel ei assimilatur.").

Thus, although there may indeed seem to be a difference between the views of our author and those put forward by Robert Kilwardby in the *Quaestiones*, this difference, in my opinion, is not great enough to be considered as evidence that our *Sophismata* should not be attributed to Kilwardby.

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Fragments of Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic in the Late Medieval Theory of Consequences: the Case of *consequentia ut nunc*

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Summary: The paper attempts to show how the customary medieval distinction between as-of-now and absolute consequences was borrowed by medieval logicians from a difficult passage in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* I 15. After discussion of some of the problems of modal logic raised by this controversial Aristotelian text, an attempt is made to highlight the persistence of the same problems in the framework of the 14th century theory of consequences.

Concluding his examination of the tradition of the *Topics*, Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen suggested that the role the *Topics* played in the creation of the theory of consequences had been previously overestimated by scholars.¹ In his opinion, late medieval doctrines of consequences were elaborated using material taken from Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* and Boethius' *De Hypotheticis Syllogismis*, while they were developed mostly in the context of the discussion of *sophismata*. No doubt, Green-Pedersen succeeds in showing that the kernel of the theory is already present in a number of texts devoted to *sophismata*, and I have very little if anything to add to this general explanation. In this paper I would like to explore the role played by Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* in the development of the important distinction between *consequentia simplex* and *consequentia ut nunc*. It can be shown that Aristotle's text is present in a significant number of discussions on consequences, not merely as a *fons remotus* – from which something is borrowed and yet so greatly trans-

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¹ See Green-Pedersen 1984. Green-Pedersen along with Stump (esp. 1989) were the first to engage in research on the sources of the late medieval theory of consequences.

formed that the debtor may be completely unaware of the debt – but rather as a perfectly identified source.

Several texts on consequences make the distinction between a consequence valid only as-of-now (*ut nunc*), i.e. at this time or at a certain time, and an absolutely valid consequence (*consequentia simplex*), i.e. one valid at any time. The first kind of consequence captured the interest of historians of logic because it reminded them of the modern notion of material implication. While today it is not widely held that these two notions are actually the same, the distinction makes an interesting subject of study in any case, because we can at least partially trace its history from its origins to its medieval use.

In the critical edition of Ockham's *Summa Logicae*² it is suggested that the distinction *simplex* / *ut nunc* is borrowed from a passage of the *Prior Analytics*:

(UN) Oportet autem accipere omni inesse non secundum tempus determinantes, ut nunc aut in hoc tempore, sed simpliciter; per huiusmodi enim propositiones et syllogismos facimus, quoniam secundum nunc sumpta propositione non erit syllogismus (I 15, 34b7-11).

The suggestion was that here, in the opposition between “*ut nunc*” and “*simpliciter*”, is the origins of our distinction, even though the “*ut nunc*” in the Aristotelian passage clearly means “e.g. now” and not “as-of-now”.³ Green-Pedersen eventually gave his approval to this suggestion, but only with some provisos:⁴ “Aristotle’s text cannot fully explain the medieval distinction, but it may have provided the inspiration for its development. Anyway there is apparently no other place in the source-books of the medievals which is more closely related to the distinction.”⁵

² Guill. Ockham *SL*, p. 587 n. 2.

³ For an English translation of this text see below. The expression *ut nunc* is a literal translation of the Greek *hoion nyn* which means ‘as e. g., now’. The shift in meaning of the expression *ut nunc* can be accounted for by a shift of context, as for example in customary phrases such as: “rebus se habentibus *ut nunc* se habent”.

⁴ In a first attempt to trace the origin of the *simplex* / *ut nunc* distinction, Green-Pedersen (1981a: 296) suggested that it goes back to Boethius’ distinction between natural and accidental consequences; Green-Pedersen 1981b: 65 considers with circumspection the alleged influence of Aristotle’s passage: “we cannot be sure of that as yet”. An attempt to identify *ut nunc* with Boethian accidental consequences certainly did occur, see Green-Pedersen 1984: 285 n. 66, n. 67.

⁵ Green-Pedersen 1984: 287.

(UN) immediately follows a text in which Aristotle endeavours to demonstrate the validity of certain modal syllogistic combinations by a non-standard kind of *reductio ad impossibile*. What he works out is a quite peculiar method for assuming possibilities – so peculiar that scholars have often considered it controversial and sometimes simply flawed. I would suggest, on the contrary, that there is much to be said for it. I would even venture to claim that at *APr.* I 15 Aristotle gets to the heart of his modal theory. Thus, even if this passage is ostensibly devoted to the proof of a small number of syllogisms and not to the demonstration of an ambitious philosophical thesis, it should be ranked alongside more celebrated related texts, such as the discussion of determinism in *De Interpretatione* 9 or the demonstration of the eternity of the world in *De Caelo* I 12.

In late medieval logic, the distinction *simpliciter / ut nunc* was used in various contexts and within different conceptual frameworks. As I have suggested, it could be that there remained only a very loose and remote connection with the text in which this distinction was originally made. Nevertheless, I shall try to show that within the context of the theory of consequences the *simplex / ut nunc* distinction was used to deal with many of the same problems Aristotle tried to solve when using this distinction. Yet, notwithstanding a degree of fidelity to the source, the evidence I can marshal so far does not point to a real understanding of the Aristotelian passage: if I am right, medieval and modern interpreters seem equally prone to misunderstand the Philosopher. In view of the importance of the passage and of its legacy, I have tried first of all to make sense of it. In the next few sections the reader will find an attempt to vindicate Aristotle's argument and to explain the modal theory the argument is predicated upon. Only after having accomplished this task will we be in a position to survey some of the medieval discussions on this topic.

A controversial proof in the *Prior Analytics*

At *APr.* I 15, 34a34ff. Aristotle sets out to validate mixed modal first figure syllogisms with an assertoric major premiss, a problematic minor premiss, and a problematic conclusion. The proof is prefaced in the text (34a5-33) by the discussion of certain laws of

modal logic, the most important of which – henceforth called the Principle of the Possible (PP) – says:

If B follows from A, then if A is possible, B is possible.

Connected to this principle we find the statement of three further laws:

(PN) *If B follows from A, then if A is necessary, B is necessary;*

(PI) *If B follows from A, then if B is impossible, A is impossible;*

(PF) *If B follows from A, then if A is false but not impossible, B is not impossible.*⁶

(PP), (PN), (PI), and (PF) are introduced in order to provide ways of determining the modal status of the consequent *B*, given the modal status of the antecedent *A*, or vice-versa. It is important to notice that ‘possible’, ‘necessary’, et al. serve here as semantic predicates and not as operators qualifying syllogistic sentences.

(PP) and its cognate principles are intimately related to what Aristotle (at *APr.* I 13, 32a18-20) calls the *definition* of possibility: something is possible if, being not necessary, it can be posited without implying any impossibility. (PF) brings to the surface an aspect of this definition which, though only implicit in its version at *APr.* I 13, is clearly stated in other related passages (cf. *Metaph.* IX 4, 1047b12-15; *Cael.* I 12, 281b23-25): positing something in order to see if it is possible does not entail taking it to be *true*, it only entails assuming it and seeing what follows. Here in *APr.* I 15, in particular, (PF) should legitimize the *upgrading* of the minor problematic premiss, i.e. its transformation into an assertoric premiss.⁷

Consider the first example of this kind of proof (34a34-b6). Aristotle wants to validate⁸

(1) $AaB; M_2BaC \vdash M_2AaC$.

The proof⁹ he proposes can be summarized as a *reductio ad impos-*

⁶ For the difficulties raised by (PP), see Hintikka 1973: 58ff.; Van Rijen 1989: 23. Actually, (PI) is not explicitly stated at *APr.* I 15, but see *Metaph.* XII 4, 1047b21; *Cael.* I 12, 281b15 and 282a1-3.

⁷ I borrow the term ‘upgrading’ from Flannery 1993, but use it in a different way. A defense of the interpretation of Aristotle’s suppositional method that I have only sketched here would start from a discussion of *APr.* I 29, 45b9-11 and *APo.* I 6, 75a20-27, which seem to lend plausibility to my suggestion.

⁸ As usual, M_1 means possibility that includes necessity, M_2 means possibility incompatible with necessity, and N means necessity.

⁹ For the sake of brevity, I shall refrain from discussing the many details of textual exegesis that separate my interpretation from the others I have examined. See

sibile plus the downgrading of the major premiss (i. e. its transformation into an M_2 premiss¹⁰) and the upgrading of the minor premiss. The syllogism through which the *reductio* is performed can be better understood if split into two parts, even though Aristotle treats them conjointly:

(2) NAOc; BaC ⊢ NAOB;

(2') NAIc; BaC ⊢ NAIb.

Since as yet neither (2) nor (2') have been proved valid in the *Analytics*, Aristotle must supply a further *reductio* proof of (2) and (2').¹¹ For the sake of brevity, I shall not go into the details of this second proof. I shall also drop (2') and concentrate on (2). It is easy to see that (2) is half of a *reductio* proof of (1), since its major premiss, NAOc, is one of the two sufficient denials of the conclusion of (1); its minor premiss, BaC, is the upgraded minor premiss of (1); and its conclusion, NAOB, contradicts the major premiss of (1).

Comparison with standard cases of *reductio ad impossibile* will help us to understand what changes when an M_2 premiss is upgraded. A *reductio* is generally performed by showing that the premisses of the syllogism to be validated cannot be held true where the conclusion is false. This is done by proving that the denial of the conclusion together with one of the premisses yield by means of a recognized syllogism the denial of the other premiss. The need to assume the

Flannery 1993 for a recent discussion. Even though it is not particularly clear, Colli 1955: 851ff. is by far the best and most charitable interpretation of this difficult text. It successfully defends several genuine Aristotelian lines of text from the 'razor' of other scholars.

10 The downgrading of AaB to M_2 AaB occurs at 34a41. The substitutability of M_2p for p is asserted at *APr*: I 9, 30a23-28. Among modern interpreters, only Colli (1955: 851ff.) sees the importance of this move in our argument. It should be added that downgrading may explain the puzzling fact that negative syllogisms do not conclude an M_2 sentence, but only an M_1 , according to a statement made at 33b29 and 34b27ff., and further at 35b33; 36b34; 39a11, where it is always implied that an assertoric negative sentence cannot be downgraded to the M_2 sentence corresponding to it. I hope to address this issue elsewhere, since here Colli's interpretation and mine part company.

11 This is done at lines 34b2-6. Again, Colli 1955: 858ff. gives the best explanation of this text. Other interpreters either delete it or take it as an alternative *reductio* proof of (1) which would be unsatisfactory in any case. Nevertheless, since a full exposition of Aristotle's proof of (2) and (2') would expose a confusion between a *de dicto* and a *de re* reading of modalities, Aristotle's proof of (1) cannot be claimed to be a complete success. As I shall try to show in what follows, however, if (2) and (2') are granted, Aristotle's proof of (1) is sound and ingenious.

truth of both the premisses of the original syllogism is what makes the upgrading move logically questionable, for, as we saw above, Aristotle claims (34b1; 26) that to upgrade an M_2 premiss does not amount to assuming its assertoric *as true*, but only to asserting it “as false”, that is, without any commitment to its truth.

Thus, let us reconsider (2) as a *reductio* syllogism. Under the hypothesis that AaB holds true, $NAoB$ is false; therefore, since $NAoB$ is the conclusion of (2), at least one of the premisses of (2), i.e. $NAoC$ or BaC , must be false. But which one? As an attempt to disprove $NAoC$, this piece of reasoning is useless, for BaC – the upgraded premiss of (2) – is (*de jure* if not *de facto*) false, and so sufficient to explain the falsehood of the conclusion.

Aristotle’s way out lies in the distinction between what is false but not impossible and what is impossible. Since (PF) warrants that the impossible does not follow from what is false but not impossible, upgrading an antecedent should never be held to be the cause of an impossible consequent. Aristotle seems to have in mind an ingenious strategy based on sound principles, but when he comes to the application of these general ideas to the proof of (1), he seems to get into trouble.

According to the standard interpretation of this argument, the impossibility on which Aristotle insists is the contradiction between the result of (2),¹² i.e. $NAoB$, and the major premiss of (1), i.e. AaB . Thus we may briefly represent the *reductio* argument as follows:

(3) $AaB; BaC; NAoC \vdash AaB \ \& \ NAoB$.

The standard interpretation of the argument lays the blame for the impossible contradictory result of (3) on $NAoC$, since AaB is true *ex hypothesi* and BaC , being false but not impossible, cannot be held responsible for an impossibility (in virtue of PF).

On the basis of this interpretation of the *reductio* argument, the charge is brought against Aristotle of basing this reasoning on a serious logical fallacy. In fact the impossibility of the total antecedent of (3) i.e.,

(4) *impossibly* ($AaB \ \& \ BaC \ \& \ NAoC$),

together with the assumption that AaB is the case and that BaC though false is not impossible, does not yield the desired impossibility of $NAoC$. In fact (4) may be a consequence of

¹² It should be said here that several interpreters correct the text at 34a39 and take AoB to be the conclusion of (2), see e. g. Flannery 1993: 202 n. 2, n. 12.

(5) *impossibly* (AaB & BaC);

or a consequence of

(6) *impossibly* (NAoC & BaC).

If (5) and (6) cannot be excluded, the impossible conclusion of (3) may depend on an ‘impossibility’ rather than on the impossibility of NAoC. Albrecht Becker, the first among modern interpreters to raise this objection, concluded that what Aristotle’s argument in fact proves is not (1), but the weaker¹³

(7) $BaC \rightarrow (AaB \ \& \ M_2BaC \rightarrow M_1AaC)$.

A presupposition that can plausibly be ascribed to Aristotle, however, would exculpate his argument from this charge. The presupposition is that modally qualified sentences (N, M₁, M₂ sentences) do not admit contingency, that is, that they are either necessarily true or necessarily false.¹⁴ This being granted, the proof of (1) is perfectly sound. In fact the conclusion of (2), i.e. NAoB, is an N sentence and therefore, under the hypothesis that AaB holds, it is not only false, but *impossible*. This means that from the truth of AaB we can infer the impossibility of the antecedent of (2), namely (6). By the same token, we can rule out any possible conflict between NAoC and BaC in (6). In fact, if NAoC is true, it is necessary, and so, if it conflicts with BaC, the latter is impossible, in contrast to the hypothesis that it is at worst false but not impossible. The only remaining alternative, therefore, is that (6) holds only if NAoC is impossible.¹⁵

Further controversies

The possibility of making sense of Aristotle’s uncommon suppositional method, albeit with the help of an unstated presupposition, suggests that interpreters may be too quick to accuse Aristotle of

¹³ See Becker 1933: 54. The formula (7) does not correspond literally to Becker’s statement, but it represents his point, and besides that corrects a misprint.

¹⁴ Among modern logicians, Von Wright and Hintikka take this feature as the most plausible characteristic of the notion of *logical* modality (the logic of logical modalities would then be at least as strong as the system S5). I do not know if there are hints in Aristotle’s text sufficient to decide whether or not he shared an analogous view; in any case, this issue cannot be explored here. Of course, my contention only becomes plausible if one accepts my interpretation of Aristotle’s non-standard *reductio* method.

¹⁵ For a different attempt to save Aristotle’s proof, see Mignucci 1972.

logical errors analogous to the one allegedly exposed by Becker. According to Lindsay Judson (1983: 230), for example, Aristotle makes the same mistake in his famous argument of *Cael.* I, 12. In order to test whether a sentence p is possible or not, according to the 'definition' of possibility of *APr.* I 13, Aristotle seems to assume that p is the case in the actual course of events without caring whether, in the circumstances of its realization, it happens to be the case that p is false. If such is the case, the contradictory of p being true, an impossibility will ensue and p will thereby fail the test of possibility. Judson dubs this error the *insulated realization manoeuvre* (IR). Mario Mignucci (1990) has argued that the attribution of an analogous mistake to Aristotle is not hermeneutically uncharitable on account of the occurrence of the same mistake in the chapter of *APr.* being examined here. We have seen, however, that Aristotle's method for testing possibilities does not require the realization of a candidate for possibility, but only the assertion of this candidate (no matter whether truly or falsely), without implying any impossibility. The pivotal reference to falsehood in contrast to impossibility is also explicitly stated along the same lines in the disputed passage from *Cael.* (281b23), and so, whatever the upshot of the argument there proposed, it is hardly credible that it is marred by such a blunder as the IR.

We find a different interpretation of Aristotle's suppositional method among interpreters who ascribe to him (among other modal paradigms) the so-called statistical interpretation of modalities. Hintikka, first among the advocates of this interpretation, admitted that Aristotle's testing method may concern the assertion or assumption of a possibility candidate rather than its realization, but then maintained that the Philosopher tends to conflate the two criteria (1973: 109). The statistical interpretation saves Aristotle from the shortcomings of the IR at the price of making him endorse a version of the so-called 'principle of plentitude'. According to the statistical model, in order for a sentence to be a genuine possibility, it must pass a test which can be considered an iterated realization manoeuvre: by iterating the realization of our would-be possibility throughout the whole chronological series, we must be able to find at least one temporal niche, so to speak, where our candidate turns out true.¹⁶ On this interpreta-

16 See Hintikka 1973: 110; Hintikka *et al.* 1977: 32.

tion, Aristotle's appeal to the falsehood of the possible is glossed over as an implicit appeal to its truth at a different time.¹⁷ In order to evaluate this interpretation, even if only with respect to the proof of (1), we must first consider what Aristotle says immediately after this proof.

Simpliciter / ut nunc and Aristotle's modal theory

Having completed his proof of (1), and before facing the proof of the analogous *Celarent* syllogism (34b19ff.), Aristotle makes a proviso which is intended to restrict the general validity of the theorem just demonstrated. This is (UN) which I have already quoted in Latin:

We should understand 'that which holds of all' with no qualification with respect to time, e.g. now or at this time, but absolutely; it is in fact from premisses of this latter kind that we make syllogisms. For there will be no syllogism if the premiss is taken as holding now (34b7-11).

The general claim is proved by two cross-counter-examples (34b11-18):

- (8) (a) every moving thing is a man at t ;
 (b) it is possible that every horse is moving;
 (c) it is necessary that no horse is a man.

- (9) (a) Every moving thing is an animal at t ;
 (b) it is possible that every man is moving;
 (c) it is necessary that every man is an animal.

(8) and (9) are intended to show, according to a customary method, the syllogistical sterility of the pair of premisses AaB at t and M_2BaC . Since an instance of this pair of premisses (i.e., [8a] and [8b]) is compatible with $NAeC$ (i.e., [8c]) and another instance (i.e., [9a] and [9b]) is compatible with $NAaC$ (i.e., [9c]), and since every possible syllogistic conclusion is either incompatible with $NAeC$ or incompatible with $NAaC$, we have no valid syllogism.

17 See Knuutila 1981b: 168-169, 235; 1993: ch 1.

These counter-examples raise a difficult question: how can we say that (8) and (9) are only a restriction and not a general rejection of (1)? Aristotle does not prove his claim, namely that (1) fails *because* (i.e. only when) its major premiss has a temporal character.

In my opinion, Aristotle's claim becomes more convincing once it is supposed that he is not warning against temporal restriction, but against temporal qualification, or, more precisely, against temporal indexing. If this is so, his choice of examples may be guided by deeply rooted insights (noticed by Hintikka) about the different logical behaviour of temporally indeterminate sentences as against temporally determinate ones. The difference can be clearly seen in *Cael.* I 12, where Aristotle distinguishes the 'hypothetically false' from the 'hypothetically impossible'. Given two incompatible sentences p and q , from

(*) *impossibly* ($p \& q$)

and p , we can infer only that q is false, but from (*) and p at t we can infer that (q at t) is impossible.¹⁸ To avoid an unnecessary multiplication of examples, let us simply state that according to Aristotle temporally determinate sentences involve a kind of determinism: they are either necessarily true or necessarily false.

With this distinction, we are in a position to see, and to explain, what is wrong in (8) and (9). In (8) Aristotle may well notice a phenomenon that we would explain (following the medievals) by saying that (8a) and the assertoric counterpart of (8b) are 'impossible', but he tries to explain it in the framework of *Cael.* I 12, i.e. not by resorting to the idea of impossibility, but by introducing temporal coincidence as responsible for the impossibility of the conclusion. I therefore take Aristotle to have followed this line of reasoning: the major premiss of (1) holds with reference to a time, say AaB at t . This means that, in order to make sense of the syllogism, the second premiss, M_2BaC , must also refer to the same time, and so this second premiss amounts to $M_1(BaC$ at t), which is no less deterministically settled than AaB at t .¹⁹ Giv-

¹⁸ For different interpretations of this distinction, see e. g. Judson 1983: 228-229; Williams 1965. Among the passages bearing on this distinction the most well known are *Int.* 9, 19a25-26 and *APr.* I 10, 30b38-40.

¹⁹ Of course, the determination of the time when the minor premiss of (1) gets upgraded spoils the upgrading method. In fact, since (BaC at t) is impossible if false, and necessary if true, it makes no sense to assume it as "false but not impos-

en the modal collapse determined by their temporal qualification, (8a) and (8b) along with (9a) and (9b) are equivalent to the premisses of two plain *Barbara* syllogisms, with the peculiarity that if a temporally determinate version of (8b) is false, it is impossible, and so can justify an impossible conclusion (recall [PI]); and that if (9a) and (9b) are true, they are necessary and so imply a necessary conclusion (recall [PN]).

This interpretation receives further support when we consider another alleged Aristotelian blunder exposed by Peter Geach (1981: 26) and by other scholars. Earlier in the chapter (34a21), Aristotle explicitly infers, contravening an elementary rule of propositional modal logic, the possibility of a conjunction of two sentences from the possibility of its conjuncts. This is hard to justify, but if, as I maintain, Aristotle thinks that the testing of a possibility never requires the verification of this possibility somewhere (in time, in a possible world or situation, etc.), it is difficult to imagine the meaning of a possible conjunction except as a simultaneous possession of possibilities. If, on the other hand, the possibility of this conjunction is intended as the possibility of a simultaneous *exercise* of possibilities, then the possibility of the conjunction *does* follow from the possibility of the conjuncts, because in this case the conjuncts are taken to refer to the same index of time, and therefore if they are incompatible, they cannot both be possible: one of them must be impossible, the other.

If I am right here, Aristotle's modal theory, though in no way familiar to the mind shaped by modern logical theory, is not so confused as it may seem; his general idea of possibility, as it emerges from *APr.* I 15, can be briefly recounted as follows.

Possibilities are tested in time, there is no temporal vacuum in which possibility candidates can be assumed. But their temporal assumption must refer to any time whatsoever; it cannot refer specifically to a given instant, because what happens at a given time is not irrelevant to evaluating what is possible at that time.

sible". Moreover, the downgrading of the major premiss of (1) (see above) is also impeded by its temporal determination. About my contention that by asserting BaC at *t* we are not upgrading M_2 BaC but M_1 (BaC at *t*), much more should be said than there is space for here. Elsewhere, I hope to provide further evidence by showing, through a detailed comparative examination, that the same line of argument occurs in *Cael.* I 12 and *Metaph.* IX 4.

This does not mean that we cannot distinguish, with respect to a fixed time, what is false at that time from what is impossible. Quite to the contrary, the most important difference between the interpretation outlined here and the statistical interpretation of modalities is that the latter cannot distinguish what is false from what is impossible within a single determinate time, whereas on my interpretation, at the same time t , and without any reference to what happens at other times, we can say for example that M_2p is necessary, p is either true or false, and that p at t (as well as $M_1[p$ at $t]$) is necessary or impossible.

The upshot of this discussion is that, in so far as it can account for possibilities which never get realized in time, Aristotle's theory differs substantially from the statistical interpretation. As a matter of fact, it is just in order to account for this kind of barren possibility that complexities such as the upgrading technique and the non-standard *reductio* method were invented by Aristotle.

Simpliciter / ut nunc and the statistical interpretation of modalities

The statistical interpretation cannot account for Aristotle's strategy in proving (1), nor can it accept the interpretation I have put on the limitation of its validity. In discussing the text before us, Hintikka understands upgrading in (1) as the realization of BaC at a time when it is actually the case. But at that very same time at which BaC is true, the truth of the major premiss of (1), AaB, must also be secured. In this way we have AaC as the conclusion of a plain *Barbara* syllogism, and as a consequence of AaC we get the desired MAaC. This is the alleged reason for Aristotle's requiring that the major premiss be taken *simpliciter* and not now or at a determinate time. But here *simpliciter* does not mean 'without temporal indexing', but 'without temporal restriction'.²⁰ This amounts to saying that the assertoric major premiss must hold always, which in turn means, given the statistical interpretation of modalities, that it is necessary. To accept this consequence one

²⁰ See Hintikka 1957: 81-83; but Hintikka 1973 is not consistent on this subject: at pp. 137, 138, 144, 166 n. 26, and 190 the *simpliciter* character of assertoric sentences stated in (UN) is taken as absence of temporal *restriction*, but at p. 158-159, (UN) is interpreted (correctly, in my opinion) as absence of temporal *qualification*.

should agree with Hintikka when he insists on Aristotle's tendency to obliterate the distinction between assertoric and apodeictic propositions.

An attempt to soften Hintikka's interpretation, following a hint found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, is Kevin Flannery's interpretation of the *simpliciter* clause as the requirement that the assertoric counterpart of the premiss MBaC in (Flannery's reading of) (1) be realized only in possible worlds where AaB is true. This means, as Flannery himself agrees, evaluating the major premiss AaB "as if it were necessary" (1993: 211).

The medieval legacy of *APr. I 15*: some Buridanian examples

To give a preliminary idea of the extent to which the nest of problems raised by *APr. I 15* held interest for medieval logicians, I shall quote four passages of John Buridan. They show how the triplet of propositions that constitute (8), though rearranged, became a stock example. With the exception of the first of the following passages, (8) is certainly taken out of its Aristotelian context, but it is used for making related points. Let us start then by noticing that Buridan rejects (1) (whether the minor premiss is M_2 or M_1). Here is a counter-example he offers:

Quia si omne currens est equus et omnis homo potest currere non sequitur quod omnis homo potest esse equus (Cons. IV 2, 137-139. My italics).

Elsewhere, in his treatise on consequences Buridan considers the same slightly modified version of (8) as a counter-example to the principle "ex possibili non sequitur impossibile" (namely [PP]):

Tamen contra hanc quintam conclusionem obicitur sophisticæ. Quia hic est bona consequentia syllogistica "omne currens est equus; omnis homo est currens; ergo omnis homo est equus" et tamen utraque premissarum est possibilis cum conclusio sit impossibilis.

Solutio. Neutra illarum præmissarum est totale antecedens ad dictam conclusionem. Immo antecedens est una copulativa ex illis duabus præmissis composita, scilicet hæc "omne currens est equus et omnis homo est currens" et hæc copulativa est impossibilis sicut conclusio (*Cons. I 8, 130-138, p. 35. My italics*).

In the same work, in order to exemplify the thesis that "in omni figura ex ambabus de possibili vel de contingenti compositis nihil sequitur" he rearranges (8) as follows:

Sed si ambae praemissae sint possibiles, non propter hoc oportet totale antecedens esse possibile; ideo nec sequitur quod consequens sit possibile. Verbi gratia, non sequitur: haec est possibilis (vel contingens) "*omne currens est equus*" et haec similiter "*omnis homo est currens*" ergo haec est possibilis (vel contingens) "*omnis homo est equus*" quoniam praemissae erant verae et conclusio falsa (*Cons.* IV 1, 85-90. My italics).

Perhaps, however, the most interesting use of (8) can be found in Buridan's commentary on Aristotle's *Cael.* I 12; I shall quote the passage where he refutes Aristotle's famous argument to the effect that if A exists always it is not capable of not existing.²¹ Here is Buridan's interpretation of the *modus arguendi* employed by Aristotle:

Consequenter queritur: *Utrum omne generabile generabitur.* Et arguitur quod sic sicut Aristoteles saepe in isto tractatu videtur arguere. Supponimus enim quod numquam ex possibili, quantumcumque falsum, sequitur impossibile; et ideo, si conclusio alicuius syllogismi est impossibilis, oportet alteram praemissarum esse impossibilem; et nisi ista concederentur syllogismus ad impossibile nullius esset utilitatis (*Quaest. super libris IV De Caelo et Mundo*, I Q. 25, p. 120, 17ff.).

And here is Buridan's refutation:

Ad primam dico quod ille modus arguendi non valet, quamvis Aristoteles videtur saepe uti eo in isto tractatu; nec ego scirem sustinere processum et rationes eius quantum ad hoc. Saepe enim contingit quod utraque praemissarum est possibilis et tamen conclusio est impossibilis propter impossibilitatem praemissarum. Verbi gratia, "*omne currens est homo*", "*omnis equus est currens*"; sequitur in primo modo primae figurae quod "*omnis equus est homo*"; et haec est impossibilis cum tamen utraque praemissarum esset possibilis. Et tamen bene concedendum est quod, consequentia existente bona, si consequens est impossibile oportet antecedens, ex quo sufficienter sequebatur illud consequens, esse impossibile. Sed neutra praemissarum est tale antecedens, imo copulativa composita ex ambobus praemissis est sufficiens antecedens. Et illa copulativa est impossibilis, scilicet ista copulativa "*omne currens est homo et omnis equus est currens*" quamvis quaelibet categorica secundum se esset possibilis (*ibid.*, p. 124, 20-36. My italics).

If we grant that Buridan is here aware of his source and not merely repeating a stock example committed to memory, the last quotation is of special interest, because (8), which as we have seen is part of Aristotle's warning against some logical pitfalls lurking behind his suppositional method, is here nicely twisted against the Philosopher. This calls to mind Mignucci's above-mentioned detection of the same persistent mistake in *Cael.* I 12 and in *APr.* I 15.

²¹ See Williams 1965: 101.

The third passage should be compared to Geach's contention about Aristotle's understanding of conjunction. The second example deals directly with (PP): its importance will be clear in a moment. All the uses of (8) are intimately related to controversial aspects of *APr*: I 15. Taken together, they show that, in reading their Aristotle, Becker, Judson, Mignucci, and Geach experienced perplexities already experienced by medieval logicians.

Consequentia simplex vs. consequentia ut nunc

In order to see how this discussion bears on late medieval texts on consequences, let us start by considering an anonymous text edited by Green-Pedersen which shows the theory of consequences *in statu nascendi*. Here we find some applications of the distinction *simplex / ut nunc*, as, for example, in the following case.

Ostendo quod haec consequentia non valet 'Antichristus est, ergo falsum est verum'. Quia antecedens est possibile, hoc enim est possibile 'Antichristus est', et consequens impossibile, scilicet 'verum est falsum'; et ex possibili non sequitur impossibile; ergo non sequitur 'falsum est verum' (Anon., "In omni consequentia bona", § 25, p. 16).

This is a *ratio* for a thesis the author wants to deny, and here is his answer:

Tunc ad rationes in oppositum: quando arguitur: ista consequentia non valet 'Antichristus est, ergo falsum est verum', quia antecedens potest esse verum sine consequente. Dicendum quod ista consequentia est bona loquendo de consequentia ut nunc. Et non valet 'antecedens potest esse verum sine consequente' loquendo de consequentia ut nunc, sed in consequentia simplici, ideo ratio probat bene [unde *ms. & ed.*] quod consequentia non est bona loquendo de consequentia simplici (*Ibid.*, § 28, pp. 17-18).

This author explains why the existence of the Antichrist implies only *ut nunc* that a false proposition is true by appealing to the rule "ex impossibili quodlibet sequitur". Walter Burleigh's *De consequentiis*, a text in many respects germane to our anonymous one, gives us a different clue:

Sciendum quod consequentia semper est bona quando tenet per medium verum. Sed consequentia ut nunc tenet per medium ut nunc verum, sicut ista 'si Antichristum esse est, falsum est verum' tenet per hoc medium 'Antichristum esse est falsum'. Sed consequentia simpliciter bona tenet per medium intrinsecum necessarium (W. Burleigh, *Cons.*, § 116, p. 141).

Consider the syllogism:

- (10) 'Antichristum esse' est verum
 (11) 'Antichristum esse' est falsum
 (12) verum est falsum

(10) is false but not impossible, (11) is a middle "ut nunc verum" (an intrinsic middle is a missing premiss), and (12) is an impossible sentence. Even if in this case we do not have a modal syllogism, the example partly fits Aristotle's case. In fact the anonymous text clearly states that the problem with the Antichrist argument is that it threatens (PP) ("ex possibili non sequitur impossibile; ergo non sequitur 'falsum est verum'").

Other treatises introduce *ut nunc* consequences in connection with the Antichrist example. There is an interesting passage in William of Sutton's influential treatise:

Est autem condicionalis duplex, quaedam ut nunc et quaedam simpliciter. Condicionalis simpliciter est cum consequens intelligitur in antecedente et simpliciter necessaria. Condicionalis ut nunc est ista quae tenet ut nunc, ut 'si Antichristus est, falsum est verum'; Contra: videtur quod ista condicionalis non valet, quia antecedens potest esse verum sine consequente. Hic dico quod ista condicionalis non valet: 'est consequentia bona ut nunc, ergo est consequentia bona'. Dico quod non sequitur, sed est fallacia consequentis.²²

The example is important insofar as it links the familiar Aristotelian use of the label *ut nunc*, as qualifying a syllogistic premiss, with its use as qualifying a conditional proposition or a consequence. But the link with Aristotle's text is not lost, as is witnessed by a commentary on Ockham's *Consequences* belonging to the first half of the 14th century and attributed in one manuscript to Thomas Bradwardine.²³

Alia divisio consequentiarum ponitur ab aliquibus, quae talis est: consequentiarum alia simplex alia ut nunc. Simplex est secundum illos quando impossibile

²² Ms Wien ÖNB, VPL 4698: 136v. Almost the same words in the *Consequentiae secundum usum Oxoniae* found in ms Vat. Pal. lat. 1049: 107vB-108rA. M. Bertagna and N. J. Green-Pedersen kindly lent me their transcriptions of the respective texts. On the texts, see Green-Pedersen 1985: 297, 300.

²³ Bradwardine(?), *Textus Consequentiarum*, § 6, p. 93. Green-Pedersen, the editor, has reservations about the attribution of the treatise to Bradwardine, on account of Bradwardine's acceptance of *consequentia ut nunc* in his authentic treatise on insolubles: see the editor's preface, p. 88. See further Boh 1991.

est antecedens esse verum consequente existente falso, et hoc retenta primaria vocabulorum significatione. Sed consequentiam ut nunc dicunt quando antecedens pro nunc non potest esse verum nisi consequens sit verum, potest tamen aliquando esse verum quando consequens non sit verum.

Sed ista divisio non valet, quod probatur sic: si esset talis aliqua consequentia, ex mere possibili sequitur impossibile, tale scilicet quod esset impossibile respectu cuiuscumque sui significati. Consequens falsum, ergo etc. Falsitas patet per Aristotelem: possibili posito in esse nullum sequitur impossibile, quia sicut ex vero nihil sequitur nisi verum, sic ex possibili etc. *Et hoc inferius manifestius ratione probatur, quia posito quod non currit nisi asinus, tunc sic 'omne currens est asinus; omnis homo est currens; ergo omnis homo est asinus'*. Pro nunc impossibile est antecedens esse verum nisi consequens sit verum, quia tenet per hanc propositionem veram 'omne currens est asinus', que vera est per casum. Sed antecedens est possibile et consequens impossibile. Sequitur ergo quod consequentia ut nunc non valet, quia simpliciter sequitur ex possibili impossibile, quod est contra Aristotelem (my italics).

In this passage there is an explicit citation of Aristotle's 'definition' of possibility, i. e. *APr. I 13, 32a19-20: possibili posito in esse nullum sequitur impossibile*. But when Bradwardine(?) says "et hoc inferius manifestius ratione probatur" he refers to a further Aristotelian passage, and from what he says directly afterwards we can conclude without a shadow of doubt that he has our very (UN) passage in mind. Once again, in fact, the case is proved by a rearrangement of example (8).

Pointing out the conflict between *ut nunc* consequences and (PP), as Bradwardine(?) did, did not automatically lead to the wholesale rejection of the notion of *consequentia ut nunc*. In fact, there are authors so favourably disposed towards this kind of consequence, that they prefer to impose a restriction on the validity of (PP) rather than expel this consequence from their system. This is, for example, the case with Ockham:

Alia regula est quod ex necessario non sequitur contingens.

Alia regula est quod ex possibili non sequitur impossibile.

Istae duae regulae intelligendae sunt de consequentia simplici, quia ex necessario non sequitur contingens consequentia simplici, nec ex possibili impossibile, tamen consequentia ut nunc bene poterit sequi; sicut bene sequitur 'omne ens est, ergo omnis homo est', et tamen antecedens est necessarium et consequens contingens. Similiter bene sequitur 'omne coloratum est homo, igitur omnis asinus est homo', et tamen antecedens est possibile et consequens impossibile, et consequentia solum est bona ut nunc.²⁴

²⁴ Guill. Ockham, *SL III-3*, c. 38, 73ff (p.730); see further: *SL III-3*, c. 2, 111-112 (p. 595); c. 10, 18-25 (p. 631).

Walter Burleigh shows the same point of view in his *De puritate artis logicae* (p. 62, l.1): “ex contingenti non sequitur impossibile in consequentia simpliciter”. The same can be said of the author of the *Liber consequentiarum* edited by Franz Schupp.²⁵ The conflict between *ut nunc* consequences and (PP) is not something that immediately springs to mind if one has no (at least habitual) knowledge of Aristotle’s text and its problems.

Let us briefly examine what some of the continental logicians thought about *consequentia ut nunc*. Buridan accepts without exception this class of inferences; but, as we saw, when he discusses the principle *ex possibili non sequitur impossibile* he takes (8) as a sophistical counter-example. Albert of Saxony says that some people rejected the *ut nunc* consequence in order to save (PP):

Contra illam consequentiam ut nunc aliqui arguunt volentes nullam consequentiam esse ut nunc, quia aliquotiens ut ipsi dicunt ex possibili sequeretur impossibile; et illa ratio erit una instantia contra sextam regulam ponendam et ibi solvetur (*Petrus Logica*, IV 1: 24rB).

This *instantia* is simply Aristotle’s (8):

Sed diceret aliquis hic ex possibili sequitur impossibile sic arguendo: ‘*omne currens est asinus, omnis homo est currens, igitur etc.*’. Consequens est impossibile, antecedens autem possibile. Patet, nam hec est possibilis ‘*omne currens est asinus*’, possibile est enim quod nihil currat nisi asinus. Similiter hec est possibilis: ‘*omnis homo est currens*’, sicut patet de se, ergo <etc.>.

Respondetur negando quod antecedens predictae consequentiae sit possibile, eo quod antecedens predictae consequentiae est una propositio copulativa composita ex maiore et minore et illa coniunctione copulativa ‘et’, ut ‘*omne currens est asinus et omnis homo est currens*’, modo hec copulativa est impossibilis; non quod aliqua eius pars sit impossibilis sed quod partes eius sunt impossibiles. Modo sicut prius dicebatur de propositionibus hypotheticis quod ad impossibilitatem copulative sufficit eius partes esse impossibiles (*ibid.*, IV 2: 24vB. My italics).

In a paper dealing with Marsilius of Inghen’s denial of *consequentia ut nunc*, Egbert Bos (1976: 68) referred to the quoted passage of Albert as an example of the difficulties raised by this kind of inference. It seems, however, that Marsilius’s denial was based more on general constraints on the definition of consequence than on the

²⁵ Anon., *Liber consequentiarum*, p. 114, l. 13.

conflict between *ut nunc* consequences and (PP). Marsilius²⁶ mentions no conflict, and glosses over, in due course, the difficulty raised by (8) in exactly the same manner as Buridan and Albert.

Thus, there are authors who impose a restriction on the validity of (PP) and there are authors who manage, by resorting to the notion of the ‘compossibility’ of a pair of premisses, to reconcile (PP) and *ut nunc* consequences. This different attitude depends, I submit, on the different interpretation of an enthymematic argument. Take Buridan, for example: in his classification, an *ut nunc* consequence is a material consequence. In this class he includes arguments with a tacit premiss which should be made explicit. After the completion of the argument, there is no question of a conflict with (PP). According to Ockham, on the other hand, enthymematic arguments are formal consequences and so it is by no means obvious that they *require* to be completed with the lacking premiss. Compossibility can work only after both premisses have been made fully explicit, so it is not surprising if it can work only within a Buridianian framework.

From what has been said it is clear that the *simpliciter* qualification was attached to a consequence in order to stress its necessary character. In medieval modal syllogistic, the *ut nunc* / *simpliciter* distinction was used in a large variety of controversial cases. After Albert the Great, it was customary, for example, to apply this distinction to the famous problem of the two mixed apodeictic assertoric *Barbaras*.²⁷ As far as I can tell, however, the fact that an assertoric premiss holds *simpliciter* was generally interpreted to mean that it obtains necessarily. So, the typical medieval interpretation of this notion fits very badly with that proposed in this paper. But the same does not hold for my reading of the *ut nunc* qualification. There are many texts, in fact, that support my interpretation. In these

26 I have used ms Vat. Lat. 3065; see f. 86vA for Marsilius’s denial of *ut nunc* consequences, and f. 87vA for his discussion of (PP). Ralph Strode (p. 7-8) is another author who almost explicitly denied *ut nunc* consequences, though he was not worried by the conflict with (PP), see Schupp 1988: 68.

27 See Knuuttila 1982; Normore 1991. From the discussion of mixed Barbara syllogisms our distinction became, during the 13th century, a tool for the discussion of the sophism “omnis homo de necessitate est animal”. An interesting example, which helps to chronicle the transition of contexts, is in the *Dialectica Monacensis* (De Rijk 1962-1967, II 2: 588, 3-9).

texts the label *ut nunc* is used in accordance with its Aristotelian meaning to signify a kind of necessity – the necessity, that is, of a temporally determinate sentence.²⁸ Ernest Moody (1953: 75ff.), who noted the pivotal distinction between temporally determinate and indeterminate sentences, resorted to this distinction in order to explain the nature of *ut nunc* consequences. But he then tried to get rid of this logically hybrid idea by making the medieval as-of-now consequence coincide with the modern material implication. The same path was followed, for example, by McDermott (1972: 293), who took the idea of *ut nunc* impossibility as “no more than a rather Pickwickian way of referring to what in twentieth century parlance is said to be ‘contingently false’”. This is not true, as more recent research has amply shown.²⁹

I am confident that a systematic study of the medieval creative misreading of Aristotle’s (UN) passage will prove worthwhile. Much research waits to be done before we can tell the whole story of the technical term *ut nunc*. I have culled passages where Aristotle’s influence looms large, but not all the uses I have come across can be traced to Aristotle’s text. In any event, I think we now have a key that can enable us to understand in which cases and to what extent Aristotle’s text is involved. The method I have tried to use, though only for a small portion of texts, consists in paying attention to the examples used and seeing whether (PP) is involved in some way.³⁰

²⁸ A case in point is the notion of an *ut nunc* contradiction used in 14th century Parisian theological debates in order to pinpoint the necessity (present irrevocability) of the past. See Friedman 1994: 109-110. This idea occasionally filtered into the theory of consequences, as in the case of Peter of Mantua, see the part of his *Logica* printed in Pozzi 1978: 292.

²⁹ See Knuuttila 1982: 349; Schupp 1988: 67; and Stump 1989: 266, all criticizing McCord Adams 1973; Bertagna 1989: 40. Moody himself (1967: 532), however, took a different stance.

³⁰ This is also testified by one of the earlier occurrences of the *ut nunc* qualification: in a passage of the *Ars Meliduna* (see de Rijk 1962-1967, II 1: 349), to which Pinborg called attention, the technical term *ut nunc* occurs in a classification of five kinds of equivalent term (*paria*). *Paria ut nunc* are defined in this passage: “quidem enim termini ex accidente sibi invicem parificantur, idest ex accidentali rerum eventu, ut ‘homo’ et ‘currens’, posito omne currens et solum esse hominem”. Here again, the example is reminiscent of Aristotle’s.

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II

Logic, Grammar, and Theology in the 11th and 12th Centuries

The Division of Philosophy and the Place of the Trivium from the 9th to the Mid-12th Centuries


IWAKUMA YUKIO

Summary: Into what parts should philosophy be divided? Where should dialectic and the other disciplines of the trivium be placed in the whole system of philosophy? And, in particular, was there any difference between *logica* and *dialectica*? The aim of this paper is to trace various opinions on these questions proposed from the 9th to the mid-12th centuries.¹

1. Traditions from Late Antiquity

The late-antique tradition on the division of philosophy was bequeathed to the Carolingian Renaissance mainly through three sources, viz. Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore. Martianus Capella discusses all the seven liberal arts, without giving any further division of philosophy. Cassiodorus gives in the beginning of the chapter on *dialectica* a division of philosophy (Schema 1).

Schema 1: *Cassiodorus II.3.4* (= *Isidore II.24.10-16*)




We may call this type of division ‘Peripatetic’, since in a group of manuscripts of the 9th century and later, this type of division is asserted to be Aristotelian, not Platonic.² Isidore in the beginning of

¹ On this subject we have three pioneering studies: Grabmann 1911 (Band II, ch. 2), Bischoff 1958, and Weisheipl 1965. I am indebted to C. Burnett, who corrected my English and gave me suggestions.

² See *Inst.* II.3.4 (p. 110), the group of manuscripts called D by the editor, Mynors, (see his Introduction pp. xxx-xxxix), adds the phrase: “philosophia dividitur secundum Aristotelem, Platoni vero non conveniunt.”

the chapter on *dialectica* (II.24.3-8) gives another division (Schema 2).

Schema 2: *Isidore II.24.3-8*



One may call this type of division ‘Platonic’.³ After giving the Platonic division, Isidore tacitly quotes Cassiodorus’ Peripatetic division as an alternative division of philosophy (II.24.9-16).

These two types of division recurred in a number of variations in later periods. The two divisions are, however, considerably different from each other. Two points deserve our special attention. (1) The Peripatetic division gives no place to the trivium. (2) In the Platonic division, *logica* is considered the genus of *dialectica* and *rhetorica*, (in other words, *logica* is not equivalent to *dialectica*), and grammar has no place at all. How can one reconcile the two divisions? What place is to be given to the whole trivium, and in particular to grammar? The solution of these problems was a task for later generations.

2. Alcuin and the Platonic Division (The 9th Century)

Alcuin in his *Dialectica* follows Isidore almost without change. However, he uses one trick to make (or rather to pretend to make) a single coherent division of philosophy out of the Peri-

³ This division of philosophy might well be called Stoic rather than Platonic. However, since Cicero (*Academica* 1.5.19-21) and Augustine (*De civitate dei* viii.4) ascribed the division to Plato, it is often called ‘Platonic’. It should be noted, however, that none of the medieval texts I have worked with calls this division Platonic.

patetic and Platonic ones. Isidore first develops the Platonic division of philosophy (II.24.3-7), making a remark that the *divina eloquia* is likewise divided into three parts: *de natura*, *de moribus*, and *de logica = theologia* (II.24.8); then he introduces the Peripatetic division as another independent one (II.24.9-16). Alcuin follows Isidore faithfully until the remark about the *divina eloquia* (952B-C), but then makes a slight diversion, falsely identifying the Greek word *theologia* with *inspectiva* (952C), one part of the Peripatetic division, at which point he briefly mentions the Peripatetic division as a division of *philosophia vera*, by which Alcuin probably means theological science in a wider sense. Thus, according to Alcuin, at least secular philosophy should be divided in the Platonic way, not the Peripatetic one. Rabanus Maurus, a student of Alcuin, faithfully follows his master in his *De universo* (416B-C). This trick of Alcuin's marks the beginning of a disregard for the Peripatetic division.

A dialogue on philosophy, which is published as a work of Notker Labeo,⁴ adopts the Platonic division with no mention of the Peripatetic one. The only difference from Schema 2 above is that in the subdivision of *physica* it adds *mechanica* and *medicina* to the usual subjects of the quadrivium.

The *Ars grammatica* of Clemens Scotus adopts only the Platonic division, as well, adding *astrologia* and *medicina* to the subdivisions of *physica* (III-XVI). It is worth noticing that this dialogue is written as an introduction to grammar, which has no place in the division as such. The author does attempt to give a position to grammar, but not very successfully. He repeats a passage neglected in the discussion up to this point in which Isidore says that *grammatica* is somehow connected to *rhetorica*.⁵ He proceeds (XVII) – again following Isidore (I.2) – by returning to the traditional division of seven liberal arts, which has but loose connection to the Platonic division of philosophy, and asserting that grammar is the first subject to be learnt. At any rate, to my knowledge this is the first attempt of a grammarian to find a proper position in philosophy for his subject.

4 Ed. Piper 1882. I have not had the opportunity to study this printed edition. I have worked with my own transcriptions of the manuscripts.

5 *Clementis Ars* XV.6: "coniuncta est grammatica arti rhetoricae. in grammatica enim scientiam recte loquendi discimus, in rhetorica vero percipimus qualiter ea quae didicimus proferamus." This is a reproduction of *Etymologiae* II.1.1.

I have discovered yet another dialogue, entitled *De partibus philosophiae*, in ms. Worcester Q.5.⁶ This text must have been written on the basis of Clemens' *Ars grammatica*, since they have many common passages. Although this text is much more abbreviated than Clemens', it shows a slightly more developed stage in respect to the position of grammar. Unfortunately the manuscript has been heavily damaged by damp and one third of each page is completely illegible. However, the readable part (the beginning of f. 73v) retains the phrase "ex hoc apparet grammaticam loice pertinere, quia grammatica et rhetorica ut prediximus coniunctae sunt", a phrase not found in Clemens. It is certain that the anonymous author develops the idea that *logica* contains grammar as well as dialectic and rhetoric. Since this text is among several grammatical works in the manuscript,⁷ this must also be an attempt by a grammarian to create a position in philosophy for his subject.

The idea of the anonymous Worcester author seems not to have been widely accepted. For example, a poem on the seven liberal arts,⁸ which I would date to around the early 11th century,⁹ says that rhetoric and dialectic are common in genus and that dialectic is prior in nature to grammar.¹⁰ Fulbert of Chartres (1976: 266), too, discusses the difference between dialectic and rhetoric, both belonging to *logica*, without mentioning grammar in his *Rithmus de distantia dialecticae et rhetoricae*.

3. Gerbert of Aurillac and the Revival of the Peripatetic Division (The 10th and 11th Centuries)

At the end of the 9th century Gerbert of Aurillac revived the Peripatetic division of philosophy, which had basically been neglected since Alcuin. Richer reports in his *Historia* (III.60) that Gerbert supports the following division of philosophy (Schema 3).


⁶ Due to lack of space, I refrain from quoting this and many other texts hitherto unedited. I will publish a collection of sources relevant to the present issue in a future issue of *CIMAGL*.

⁷ See the detailed description in Floyer's Catalogue (1903).

⁸ Ed. in *PL* 151, coll. 729-732. See Mews 1992: 31, and Mews 1994: 162-63.


⁹ Constant Mews (1994: 163) says: "It [i.e. the poem] was probably in circulation by the mid eleventh century".

¹⁰ *PL* 151, col. 731B: "Cuius (= rhetoricae) genere communis hinc est dialectica, / Quae natura prior extat etiam grammatica."

Schema 3: *Richer, Historia III.60*

This is substantially the same as the Peripatetic division reported by Cassiodorus and Isidore. Its direct source, however, is Boethius' first commentary on Porphyry (I.3). This is indicated by the Greek words shared by both – 'teoretice' and 'practice' – and above all by the somewhat awkward Latin coined by Boethius, 'intellectibilis'.

B. Bischoff (1958: 5, n. 2) has edited a short treatise entitled *De divisione philosophiae eiusdem*.¹¹ It proposes the following division of philosophy (Schema 4).¹²

Schema 4: *De divisione philosophiae eiusdem*

¹¹ According to Bischoff, this text is found in mss Bamberg, *Hist. nat.* I (s. IX), ff. 44r-45r; Besançon 184 (s. IX), f. 56v; München clm 14456 (s. IX), f. 68r; Valenciennes 404 (s. IX), f. 57 (I have not yet studied any of these manuscripts); and Bamberg, *Phil.* I (s. X), f. 51r. I have discovered two more manuscripts: Firenze, San Marco 113 (s. XII), f. 20v and San Marco 120 (s. XII), f. 26v. The word 'eiusdem' in

This treatise was in all probability written by a member of Gerbert's school, if not by Gerbert himself. As for the first two parts, this treatise runs parallel to Richer, in particular in their Greek terminology. It is true that Richer in his report ignores logic, which forms the third part of philosophy in this treatise. However, Gerbert's main source, Boethius' first commentary on Porphyry, mentions the ancient controversy over whether logic is a part or an instrument of philosophy (I-4); it is highly likely that Gerbert himself sided with the part theory, being aware that in his second commentary Boethius decides the controversy by claiming that logic is both a part and an instrument of philosophy (I-3). In addition, Richer mentions how important logic was in Gerbert's plan of education (III-46).

Richer omits logic in his report probably because the main topic there (III.55-61) is the debate between Gerbert and Otric on the relation between physics and mathematics. This issue deserves closer attention, because it arises from a discrepancy between the Platonic and Peripatetic divisions of philosophy. According to the Platonic tradition, *physica* is the genus of *mathematica*, viz. the quadrivium. According to the Peripatetic one, both *physica* and *mathematica* (or in Cassiodorus/Isidore's terminology, *naturalis* and *doctrinalis*) are species of *theoretice* (or *inspectiva*).

After the division of philosophy in Schema 3, Gerbert adds the phrase: "Rursusque mathematicam sub phisica non praeter rationem collocamus" (III.60). This must have been a concession to the Platonic division of philosophy. Against Otric's claim that there is a subaltern genus between *genus=phisica* and *species=mathe-*

the title given in ms Bamberg, Phil. 1, certainly means 'Marii Victorini'. This is clear because the Bamberg manuscript is written by one and the same scribe: throughout, and just before our text there is a copy of Isidore's *Etymologiae*, II.29-31, which has the incipit "De divisione definitionvm ex Marii Victorini libro abbreviata (f. 46r)" just as in Isidore's text, and the colophon "Explicit de divisione definitionvm ex Marii Victorini viri disertissimi feliciter (f. 51r)". Second, Richer (III.60) reports that Gerbert's division of philosophy was made *secundum Victorini* (*Vitruvii* ms) *atque Boethii*, perhaps confusing the translator and the commentator of Porphyry.

12 I follow the Greek terms used in ms Bamberg, Phil. 1.

matica, Gerbert answers that *physica* and *mathematica* are *coevae species*, not genus and species (III-61).¹³ Richer does not say, nor do I know, how Gerbert could collocate *mathematica* under *physica*, if they are *species coevae*. Nevertheless, Gerbert felt it necessary to add the concession. This fact proves how prevalent the Platonic division was in those days and how novel the revival of the Peripatetic by Gerbert appeared. This fact also supports my view that Gerbert considered *logica* to be the third part of philosophy as the Platonic division would have it.

A treatise very similar to the *De divisione philosophiae eiusdem* has been published by Grabmann (1911: 43, n. 1). This treatise gives definitions to each species of *mathematica*, all of which are left undefined in the other text. It also introduces a new subdivision of *practica* into *actualis* and *inspectiva*, the former being subdivided into *ethica*, *yconomica*, and *politica*, while the latter into *hystoria* and *spiritualis intelligentia*, which is subdivided into *tropologia*, *allegoria*, and *anagoge*. The author of this treatise was possibly Adalbero of Laon, since in the manuscript (München clm 330) this treatise is preceded by his letter to Fulco of Amiens. If this ascription is correct, it would support my tentative attribution of the previous text to Gerbert because Adalbero was his student.

Both Gerbert and Adalbero (or whoever may have been the authors of these texts) give a unique subdivision of *logica*, that into *dialektike*, *epideiktike*(!), and *sophistike*. I do not know any source for this idea except for Boethius' *In Topica Ciceronis* I (col. 1045B-C), although Greek words are not used there. At any rate, it is likely that for Gerbert the word *logica* is equivalent to *dialectica* (or 'logic' in the modern sense). By contrast, in the Platonic division, and accordingly in the texts discussed in § 2 above, *logica* has a meaning different from *dialectica*, the former being a genus, the latter a

¹³ Otric's attack says: "Miror ... quod physicae mathematicam ... subdividisti, cum inter utramque subalternum genus intelligi possit: physiologia." But Gerbert answers: "Sed dico physiologiam physicae genus non esse quemadmodum proponis." Which is the genus, *physiologia* or *physica*? I suspect that there is a scribal error here.

species. It is well known that Gerbert's educational curriculum was the first to cover all the extant logical works of Aristotle, of Porphyry, and above all of Boethius, rather than the second-hand works like Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore, which had been so popular before. It is noteworthy that Boethius never uses the term *dialectica*, but *logica* to mean logic in the modern sense.¹⁴ Presumably, Gerbert followed Boethius' terminology.

In some other texts from the *aetas Boethiana*, too, *logica* is used in its Boethian sense. For example *Quaestiones de minori commento Isagogarum*¹⁵ faithfully reproduces what Boethius says about the Peripatetic division of philosophy in his first Porphyry commentary. Another treatise uses the term *logica* almost as an equivalent to *dialectica* (*eam nunc dici dialecticam quae olim logica dicta est*).¹⁶

4. The *Glosule* and a New Concept of *Logica* (The Late 11th Century)

As we saw in § 2 above, the Worcester text seems to have tried to give *grammatica* a place in *logica*. In the late 11th century, another attempt was made in a much more influential text: the *Glosule*, a commentary on Priscian Maior.

The *Glosule* divides *logica* into *sermocinalis* and *dissertiva*, the latter being subdivided into *inventio* and *iudicium* (Gibson 1979: 249.50f.). Here the term *sermocinalis* is first introduced into the discussion, a word which was to become popular later on. The term *dissertiva* is obviously based on Boethius' division of *logica* or *ars disserendi* into *pars inveniendi* and *iudicandi* (*De dif. top.* 1173C).

¹⁴ I have checked all occurrences of 'logica' in the Boethian works with the aid of CETEDOC CD-Rom.

¹⁵ In mss Bibl. Vatican, Reg. lat. 1281, ff. 88v-91r; Paris BN, lat. 8672, ff. 88v-91r; Vatican, Pal. lat. 2508.

¹⁶ This treatise is edited in Piper 1882, pp. 623-645, as a work of the school of Notker Labeo. Although I have not had chance to study this book, I doubt the attribution to the school and tend to date it to the 10th century, on the basis of my own transcription of manuscripts: Sankt Gallen 820 and Bruxelles 10.615-10.729.

The *Glosule* then comments that *inventio* and *iudicium* belong to *dialectici* and *rhetorici*, while *sermocinalis* to *grammatici*, and *logica* is a genus of *grammatica* through *sermocinalis* (Gibson 1979: 250.1f.).

The *Note Dunelmenses*¹⁷ give a slightly different division of *logica* (Schema 5).

Schema 5: *Note Dunelmenses*

logica	{	sermocinalis	{	dialectica
(sermocini-		dissertiva	}	rhetorica
nalis)		sermocinalis simplex = grammatica		


Here the term *sermocinalis* is used to characterize the whole *logica*, not only *grammatica* as is the case in the *Glosule*. Almost the same division of *logica* is found in the *Tractatus glosarum Prisciani*, too (Gibson 1979: 254.74f.). Leaving aside this small difference, the tripartite division of *logica* into *grammatica*, *dialectica*, and *rhetorica* came to be widely adopted in one way or another in later texts, as we shall see in later sections.

All of these three grammatical works assert that all the three species of *logica* deal with the same thing, *sermo* or *vox*, but in different ways (Gibson: 249.27f., 252.14f.). The same view is expressed in William of Champeaux's *Introductiones* (Iwakuma 1993: 1.1). This must have been a widely accepted view of *logica* in the late 11th century. It is incorporated in the revised version of the Platonic division of philosophy contained in the Parisian version of Ps-Rabanus' commentary on Porphyry:¹⁸

¹⁷ F. 2ra-b: "Logicae supponitur per simplicem sermocinalem. Logica enim, id est sermocinalis scientia, alia sermocinalis dissertiva ut dialectica et rethorica, alia sermocinalis l2rbl simplex, id est non dissertiva, ut grammatica. Non habet enim argumenta propria quibus differat. Quodsi aliquando faciendum est, utitur alienis."

¹⁸ Of the three extant manuscripts, only the Paris manuscript, which contains many additions and revisions, mentions the division of philosophy described in Schema 6.

Schema 6: *Ps-Rabanus super Porphyrium* (Parisian version)



Although it is not mentioned in the other texts discussed in this section, the Platonic division of philosophy must have been presupposed in these discussion of *logica*.

The Migne edition of Ps-Bede's *De mundi caelestis terrestisque constitutione* contains an accretion which discusses the division of philosophy (col. 908).¹⁹ It asserts with some hesitation that *logica* in the narrower sense is *ratio disserendi* and comprises only *dialectica* and *rhetorica*, while in the broader sense *logica* is *scientia sermocinalis* and embraces the whole trivium. Presumably this text shows the transitional stage in which the new concept of *logica* was gradually accepted. This text is also interesting in that it makes a unique attempt to fuse Peripatetic elements in the main scheme of the Platonic division. For example, it divides *physica* into *intellectibilis*, *intelligibilis*, and *naturalis* (the Peripatetic terms), of which the last is divided into the quadrivium plus *astrologia* and *medicina*.

5. Divisions of *Logica* and/or *Dialectica* in Late 11th-Century Logical Works

By the late eleventh century, several divisions of *logica* and/or *dialectica* had been proposed. (1) Alcuin divides *dialectica* into *Isagogae*, *Categoriae*, *sylogismorum formulae*, *definitiones*, *Topica*, and *Perihermeniae*, viz. into each of the *logica vetus* texts (953A). (2) *Logica* is divided in the *Glosule* and other works into *grammatica* and *dialectica* plus *rhetorica*. (3) At the same time, the *Glosule* mentions the Boethian division of *logica* (or *ars disserendi* = *dialectica* plus *rhetorica*) into *inventio* and *iudicium*. The question of how to reconcile divisions (1)-(3) first arises around 1100.²⁰

¹⁹ This part, not contained in any extant manuscripts, was copied in the 16th century by Johannes Hervagius from an unidentified manuscript. See Charles Burnett's introduction to Pseudo-Bede, *De mundi celestis*: 11 & 6.

²⁰ We have seen that Gerbert proposed yet another division of *logica* into *dialectike*, *epideiktike*, and *sophistike*, but this division reappears only later (cf. § 7-8).

The most primitive stage of discussion is found in a group of commentaries on *logica vetus* literature. They all pay attention only to the question of how to reconcile divisions (1) and (3). For example, the anonymous author of a commentary on the *De syllogismis hypotheticis*²¹ reports that the following four theories were found in his day.

(i) *Dialectica* can be divided into *scientia inveniendi* and *iudicandi*, of which the latter contains the works on syllogisms. *Scientia inveniendi* is divided into that *cum discretione locorum* and *sine discretione locorum*, of which the former contains the *Topica*, and the latter all the other works like Porphyry, *Categories*, *Perihermeneias* etc. The anonymous author adheres to this theory.

(ii) *Dialectica* should be divided into three parts, viz. *scientia inveniendi* (= *Topica*), *iudicandi* (= works on syllogisms), and *neutra*; and all the other works are under the third part.

(iii) Alcuin's theory, viz. *dialectica* should be divided into *scientia inveniendi* (= *Topica*), *scientia iudicandi* (works on syllogisms), Porphyry, *Categories*, and so on.

(iv) *Dialectica* is divided into *scientia inveniendi* (= *Topica*) and *iudicandi* (= works on syllogisms), and other works are not principally under *dialectica*, but a kind of *appendicia* to *dialectica*.

All the theories agree that the *De differentiis topicis* is identical with *scientia inveniendi* and the *De syllogismis categoricis* and *hypotheticis* with *scientia iudicandi*. The point of dispute is what place is occupied by the other four texts, viz. the *Isagoge*, *Categoriae*, *Perihermeneias*, and *De divisione*.

A commentary on Porphyry²² deserves attention, too. The anonymous author first mentions the tripartite division of philosophy. The author asserts that philosophy had in the beginning only two parts, viz. *physica* and *ethica*, and *logica* was only invented later in order to have the skill to dispute correctly in the other two disciplines. *Physica* and *ethica* are characterized both in Peripatetic and Platonic ways, viz. as *speculativa/activa* and *naturalis/moralis* respectively. Thus the author seems to try to reconcile the Platonic

21 Passages in mss München clm 14458 (f. 59r), Orléans 266 (p. 79a), and München clm 14779 (f. 66v).

22 In ms München clm 14458. The relevant passage is on ff. 83vb-84rb.

and Peripatetic divisions of philosophy from a historical viewpoint.²³ As for the division of *dialectica*, the author adheres to theory (iv), vaguely mentioning those who adhere to other theories. He adds an important comment to theory (iv), viz. that *inventio* and *iudicium* are integral parts of *logica dissertiva*, not divisive parts, viz. species. Thus the author tries to reconcile the twofold division of *logica* (2) and (3), the question of which remained untouched before.

A contemporary commentary on *Categories*²⁴ develops a completely different theory: that the book of *Categories* is principally subordinate to *logica* in so far as it discusses *voce*s, while in so far as it discusses *res*, it is subordinate to *physica*. This surprising theory could be explained as an over-reaction to the vocalist assertion that the *Isagoge*, and therefore also the *Categories*, only discusses *voce*s, not *res*.

6. Vocalists on the Division of *Logica* and Philosophy.

The *Historica Francica* (3c) mentions a certain Arnulf of Laon as a codisciple of Roscelin of Compiègne in the school of John, who taught that dialectic was an *ars vocalis*.²⁵ Arnulf's teaching is preserved in a Pommersfelden manuscript, in which some clearly vocalistic texts use the name 'Arnulfus' in sentence examples (Iwakuma 1992 § 6).²⁶ One of the texts in which 'Arnulfus' is so

²³ This historical explanation itself derives from Isidore (II.24.4-7), who in his turn followed Augustine (*De civitate dei* viii.2-4). The reconciliation, however, of the Platonic and Peripatetic theories is characteristic of this commentary. It also tries to reconcile the Platonic and Aristotelian theories on universals. See Iwakuma 1996 § 8.

²⁴ In mss Vatican reg. lat. 230, Paris 13368, München clm 14458 ff. 95r-102r, and London, Royal 7.D.XXV.

²⁵ Mews (1992: 13) tentatively identified this John with the author of the *Glosule*.

²⁶ It is an important characteristic of vocalist texts that they tend to use real names of the master himself, of the master's master, or of students, instead of usual straw-names like 'Socrates' or 'Plato'. Examples. (1) In the case of the Pommersfelden manuscript, besides 'Arnulfus' (f. 21v and 34r), many other names are used like 'Balduinellus' (f. 25v), 'Iungomalius' (f. 32v), etc. (2) Gerland of Besançon uses among others his own name and 'Roscelinus' (see the Index to the edition) – this offers further evidence for my assertion (Iwakuma 1992 § 47) that Gerland was younger than, and a student of, Roscelin. (3) Abelard uses in his *Dialectica* his own name and some others (see the Index to the edition). (4) Ms München

used²⁷ develops the division of *ars litteralis* into *ratio disserendi* and *non ratio disserendi*, which could be understood to be substantially the same as the division in the *Glosule*. (The terms in italics are those in the *Glosule*).

$$\text{ars litteralis} \begin{cases} \text{ratio disserendi} \\ \text{ (= dissertiva)} \\ \text{ (= logica)} \end{cases} \begin{cases} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{scientia locorum et syllogismorum} \\ \text{ (= dialectica?)} \\ \text{non scientia loc. et syl. (= rhetorica?)} \end{array} \right. \\ \text{ (= sermocinalis, viz. grammatica)} \end{cases}$$

Gerland of Besançon says little about *logica*, but once he says (p. 86.4), “omnis logica, id est sermocinabilis vel disputabilis scientia”: the terms *sermocinabilis* and *disputabilis* must reflect the *Glosule*’s *sermocinalis* and *dissertiva*. We have no evidence of what Roscelin thought on this issue. However, seeing that his codisciple, Arnulf, and his student, Gerland, follow the *Glosule*, it is highly plausible that Roscelin himself held the same view.

The *Glosule* gives a twofold division of *dissertiva*, viz. into *inventio* and *iudicium* and into *dialectica* and *rhetorica*, without explaining the relation between them. Arnulf, on the other hand, argues that the former is not a division into parts or individuals, but into integral parts (*continuae*), the same theory that is held in the Porphyry commentary mentioned in § 5 above (cf. n. 22). Roscelin would disagree with this theory, since a source²⁸ shows that he placed the *Categories* under *scientia iudicandi*, a theory that contradicts all the

clm 14779 uses among others ‘Petrus’ three times (f. 53v, 55v, and 88v), and the second sentence is ‘Petrus vocor’! (I argue, then, that the glosses in the manuscript, the authenticity of which has long been debated, were written by Peter Abelard). (5) Ms Paris BN lat. 544, ff. 94-114 of which I believe to be vocalistic, contains two unfamiliar names on f. 94r and 98v. This practice is rather popular in grammar (thus ‘Priscianus scribo’ in the *De inst. gram.* XVII: 151.5), but never found, to my knowledge, in realist logical texts.

27 Com. on *De dif. top.*, on ff. 8v-26v + 28r-29v. The relevant passage is on ff. 8v-9r.

28 *Categories* commentary in ms Paris Arsenal 910, at. f. 147va: “Cui parti logicae supponatur liber iste, quaeritur, scilicet inventioni an iudicio. Dicunt quidam ut Roscelinus quod liber iste iudicandi scientiae supponitur, quia liber iste tendit ad Perihermenias et Perihermenias tendunt ad Analytica, qui liber est Resolutorius. M.p. dicit quod supponitur scientiae inveniendi. Sed nos dicimus quod neutri illarum magis quam utrique supponitur, sed aequae utrisque. Scire enim quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quae a quibus removeri, valet ad inventionem argumentorum et iudicium.”

theories (i)-(iv) studied above (§5). Roscelin's argument for this is that the *Categories* is for the sake of the *Perihermenias*, which is for the sake of the *Analytics*, viz. *scientia iudicandi*.²⁹ Since a similar idea is developed by Gerland of Besançon (p. 2.5f), Gerland presumably followed his master, although he says nothing explicitly on this issue.

All of these sources show that the tripartite division of *logica* into *grammatica*, *dialectica*, and *rhetorica* was widely accepted by vocalists as well as by realists around the turn of the 11th century. One of the few to reject the view was Peter Abelard. In his *Logica "Nostorum"* (506.18-23) he explicitly asserts that *logica* is the same as *dialectica*, while he accepts the Platonic division of philosophy into physics, ethics, and *logica*. He also says in his *Super Topica glossae* that grammatical and rhetorical questions belong to other sciences than *physica* and *ethica*, because we should keep grammar and rhetoric separate from philosophy (p. 290.5-7). Therefore, according to Abelard, grammar and rhetoric do not belong to philosophy, while they may be sciences. After a few lines he also says that grammatical and rhetorical questions do not pertain to the aforementioned sciences (viz. *physica*, *ethica*, *logica*), if we do not follow those who think that grammar and rhetoric are under *logica* (p. 290.11-13). It is certain, then, that Abelard knew well the new tripartite division of *logica* he was rejecting. Abelard also comments that the term Boethius uses is not *logica*, but *disserendi rationis scientia*, which can hardly apply to grammar, since grammar does not teach discussion at all (p. 290.13-16).³⁰

We have two versions of Abelard's litteral glosses on the *De dif. top.*, which he wrote in his youth.³¹ They show that Abelard had earlier made concessions to the new tripartite division of *logica*. According to the glosses, *logos* has a two-fold etymology, *ratio* and *sermo*, and if *logos* is interpreted as *sermo*, then *logica* would contain

²⁹ His argument is presumably based on Boethius' first commentary on Porphyry (13.16f.).

³⁰ The *ratio* in the edition (p. 290.14) and in the manuscript should be emended to *rationis*.


³¹ For the authenticity of the glosses found in ms München clm 14779, see n. 26. The relevant passage is on f. 87v. Ms Paris, BN, lat. 7094A, ff. 82-95, contains glosses on the *De syllogismis categoricis*, the *De divisione*, and the *De differentiis topicis* very similar to those in ms Munich clm 14779 or in ms Paris BN lat. 13368. I believe these glosses were written by Peter Abelard too. The relevant passage is on f. 92va.

grammar and rhetoric as well as dialectic, the very idea that is held by the *Note Dunelmenses* and the *Tractatus glosarum Prisciani*. In the end, however, Abelard sticks to the traditional characterization of *dialectica* as *scientia rationalis* and rejects the idea of *dialectica* as *scientia sermocinalis*.

7. Jocelin of Soissons' Division of *Logica*


In § 5 above we saw that the reconciliation of the three divisions of *logica/dialectica* so far proposed was first attempted around 1100. Soon thereafter it was noticed that there is yet another division (4) of *logica/dialectica* in Boethius' *Super Topica Ciceronis* (Schema 7).

Schema 7: Boethius, *In Topica Ciceronis* I (col. 1045B-C)



This fact was taken seriously for the first time by the school of Jocelin of Soissons. A text ascribed to Jocelin in the *Notulae De divisionibus secundum mag. Gosl.*,³³ develops a unique theory based on the above Boethian division. This theory is described in more detail in two other texts³⁴ found in the same manuscript (Schema 8).

Schema 8: ms Orléans 266, p. 171b



32 See also *De dif. top.*, PL 64, col. 1181D, where necessary arguments are ascribed to philosophers, probable ones to dialecticians and orators, and sophistical ones to sophists.

33 The relevant passage is ms Orléans, BM, 266, p. 149b.

34 Commentary on the *De syl. cat.* and on the *De dif. top.* The relevant passages are on p. 171b and pp. 230a-231b.

Jocelin follows the theory already proposed by some masters (see §§5-6) that *scientia inveniendi* and *iudicandi* are the integral parts of *logica*. As for the divisive parts (or species) of *logica*, Jocelin replaces the Boethian division (4) with the traditional one into *dialectica* and *rhetorica* only. Thus now, according to Jocelin, *logica* contains *philosophia* or *physica* as one of its species!

8. Peter Abelard on the Division of Philosophy

In his *Logica Ingredientibus* (p. 1.7-11) Peter Abelard gives the tripartite division of philosophy in the Platonic way, but using slightly different terminology: *speculativa*, *moralis*, and *rationalis*. He ascribes this division to Boethius, referring not to Boethius' words in his first Porphyry commentary as B. Geyer suggests, but to a passage of *In Topica Ciceronis* (1044C).

Abelard also makes a short comment that not all *scientiae* are philosophy (p. 1.5-7). This comment is expanded upon in his *Logica Nostrorum petitioni sociorum*, and it has to do with *scientia* as a genus of philosophy (p. 505.1). He divides *scientia* into *scientia agendi* and *discernendi*, and identifies the latter as *philosophia* (p. 506.4-5). In the course of the discussion on *scientia*, he uses the Peripatetic terminology '*practica*' and '*theorica*' to describe the two species of *scientia* (p. 505.21-22). Some later generations follow Abelard in introducing *scientia* in the discussion of philosophy (cf. § 10 & 12).

Finally, Abelard divides *scientia discernendi* or *philosophia* into *physica*, *ethica*, and *logica* in the traditional way, but as we have seen, for him *logica* is equivalent to *dialectica*, not a genus of *grammatica* and *rhetorica* (§6).

35 While the commentary on the *De dif. top.* ascribes necessary arguments to philosophy following Boethius (see n. 32 above), the commentary on the *De syl. cat.* mentions *physici* instead. The latter could not be a scribal error, since it adds: "ad physicos, id est ad quatuor reliquarum artium, id est arithmeticae, musicae, astronomiae, geometriae, opifices."

9. Hugh of St. Victor on the Division of Philosophy

In his *Didascalicon* (II-1 and III-1), written in the late 1120's,³⁶ Hugh of St. Victor proposes a new division of philosophy (Schema 9).

Schema 9: Hugo de Sancto Victore, *Didascalicon* II-1 & III-1



Hugh revives the Peripatetic division which had long been neglected. His schema is substantially the same as that possibly proposed by Gerbert of Aurillac (see Schema 4 in §3 above). What he adds to the latter are various characterizations of each species of philosophy that had appeared in the meantime (for example he characterizes *logica* as *sermocinalis*); a new species, *mechanica*; and the division of *probabilis* into *dialectica* and *rhetorica*.

Just like Jocelin of Soissons, Hugh asserts that *inventio* and *iudicium* are integral parts of *ars disserendi* (II-30). Unlike Jocelin, however, Hugh neglects the division of *dissertiva* into *collectiva*, *definitiva*, and *divisiva*.

36 On the dating, see Taylor 1961: 3.


10. William of Conches' Introduction of the Ciceronian Schema

William of Conches introduces a completely new idea into the discussion on the division of the seven liberal arts. In his glosses on Priscian (Jeauneau 1960, p. 245.3-9) and in his *De philosophia mundi* (IV.41), he takes up *eloquentia* as the genus of the the trivium. We may call this type of division Ciceronian, for his idea is based on what Cicero says in the beginning of his *De inventione* (I.1): that *sapientia* without *eloquentia* and *eloquentia* without *sapientia* are useless (see the *De philosophia mundi* praef.). For William, the trivium or *eloquentia* is an indispensable weapon for philosophy, but is itself not *philosophia*, which name applies only to the quadrivium (*De philosophia mundi* IV.41).

The introduction of *eloquentia* was clearly very novel. For in his glosses on Priscian (p. 245.21-22) William felt it necessary, in order to avoid critique (*ut contentio tollatur*), to mention *logica*, too, which since the *Glosule* had traditionally been the genus of the trivium. Further, William develops his own theory of the meaning of *logica*. According to him (p. 245.22-26), *logica* can equivocally mean *sermocinalis* and *rationativa*, since the Greek word *logos* can mean *sermo* and *ratio*; and *logica sermocinalis* contains the trivium, while *logica rationativa* contains *dialecticam*, *rhetoricam*, and *sophisticam*, but not *grammaticam*.

The Ciceronian schema seems to have had some vogue in the mid-12th century. The commentary "Totius eloquentiae" on Priscian (p. 236 'Quod genus') asserts the following division of sciences (Schema 10).

Schema 10: *The Commentary "Totius eloquentiae" on Priscian*




A similar division of sciences is found in the anonymous *Divisio scientiarum* (pp. 77-79). The difference is only that *dialectica* is replaced by *logica*, that *sapientia* is not identified with *philosophia*, and that *mathematica* is divided into the four arts of the quadrivium. Almost the same division of philosophy is also found in a text published by Grabmann (1911, pp. 36-40). The main difference is that it contains *mechanica* as a species of *sapientia*, just as in Hugh of St. Victor.³⁷ And here *sapientia* and *eloquentia* are overtly identified with *philosophia* and *logica*, respectively.

In schema 10 the subdivision of *sapientia* is the same as the original Peripatetic division of philosophy. Thus, the problem that the Peripatetic division lacks a spot for the trivium is solved here by introducing the Ciceronian framework. But, as a result, the trivium (viz. *eloquentia* or *logica*) has come to be excluded from *philosophia*, although it is a species of *scientia*.

11. Dominicus Gundissalinus on the Division of Philosophy

The same problem was solved in another way by Dominicus Gundissalinus. In his *De divisione philosophiae* he first says (p. 5.9-23) that some parts of the *scientia humana*, viz. the liberal arts, belong to *eloquentia*, some to *sapientia*; but they all are *philosophia*. And as for *philosophia*, he proposes (p. 12.10-19.2) the following division (Schema 11).

Schema 11: Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae*



³⁷ As for the relation between this text and Hugh's teaching, see the discussion by Grabmann 1911: 31-36.

He returns to the genuine Aristotelian bipartite division reported by Cassiodorus and Boethius in his first commentary on Porphyry, and incorporates the trivium under a species of *philosophia practica*, viz. *politica* or *civilis ratio*.

This type of schema did not originate with Gundissalinus. The same idea, at least concerning rhetoric, can be traced back to Thierry of Chartres. Thierry writes in his commentary on Cicero's *De inventione* (p. 50.27-39) that the genus of rhetorical art is *scientia civilis*, and this very passage, as well as many others, is repeated verbatim by Gundissalinus (p. 64.11-25).³⁸

12. Alberic of Paris on *Scientia* or *Philosophia*

Alberic of Paris wavers as to the division of philosophy. In one text he simply follows the division of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic, the last of which contains grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric.³⁹ In another text Alberic combines all the divisions so far proposed, without attempting to reconcile them (Schema 12).⁴⁰

Of the divisions mentioned here, the only one that we have not yet encountered is the idea that grammar, dialectic, and physics occur in both theoretical and practical variants. A similar idea is implied in the *Microcosmographia*.⁴¹ I do not know who proposed this idea first.


38 The priority of Thierry to Gundissalinus has been disputed, but the matter has now been resolved. See Fredborg's discussion in Thierry of Chartres, *The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries*: 15-20.

39 A Porphyry commentary in ms Berlin lat. fol. 624. The relevant passage is on ff. 73vb-74ra.

40 A *Perihermeneias* commentary in ms Berlin lat. fol. 624. The relevant passage is on f. 88ra-va.

41 "Unde sicut aliquis in arte aliqua bonus theoreticus est et pravus practicus, ut bonus rethor et pravus orator, bonus logicus, pravus dialecticus, bonus astrologus, astronomicus non bonus, ita ...", quoted in Williams 1934/35: 109, n. 12. I owe this information to Ch. Burnett.

Schema 12: Ms Berlin, lat. fol. 624, f. 88ra-va



13. Conclusions

Recapitulating our results one may summarize as follows.

The medievals inherited from Antiquity two main schemes of the division of philosophy, viz. the Platonic and the Peripatetic one. Each of these divisions had its supporters, who often modified the division to a certain extent. Some tried to reconcile the two traditions. But nobody succeeded in proposing a coherent theory that was widely accepted.

It was always the grammarians who proposed new divisions, since their subject had no place in either of these traditions. First, Clemens Scot, who sought – in vain – a proper place for grammar in the whole system of philosophy; secondly the author of the *Glossule*, who made grammar a species of *logica*; and lastly William of Conches, who introduced the Ciceronian scheme, a completely

new division. Each idea found some adherents, but none of them was to survive for long.

From the 9th to the mid-12th century, *logica* was almost always considered as the genus of *dialectica*. One of the few who denied this was Peter Abelard, for whom *logica* and *dialectica* were equivalent. As time went by, however, *dialectica* was gradually replaced by *logica* when referring to logic.⁴²

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⁴² For a general survey of the meanings of *logica* and *dialectica* through the Middle Ages, see Michaud-Quantin 1969.

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The “Promisimus”

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Summary: The paper examines the “Promisimus”, an unedited 12th-century grammatical text that has never been studied in its own right. After a discussion of the text’s possible place and date of origin, quotations from the text are used to highlight a number of the significant features of the “Promisimus”. These features include its use of both classical and medieval quotations, and of comparative linguistics, and the relationship between the “Promisimus” and later speculative grammar.

In 1950 the late Richard Hunt wrote his article on the grammars from the school of Ralph of Beauvais, who was active in the second half of the twelfth century and has left us a commentary on Donatus (ed. Kneepkens 1982) and glosses on Ovid and Lucan (ed. Kneepkens 1991). Since Hunt’s article appeared, one of the anonymous commentaries from this school, the large but fragmentary commentary on Priscian Major (I.1-VII.87, VIII.28-71) called “Promisimus”, has been studied for specific, partial points by De Rijk, Kneepkens, and Rosier. In this paper I shall discuss the “Promisimus” in its own right.

I am preparing a (partial) edition of the “Promisimus”, with the help of Hunt’s extensive (but not complete), partly handwritten transcription. In this paper I shall concentrate the discussion on the following points.

- 1) Was the “Promisimus” with any likelihood connected with Rheims and written in the 1170s?
- 2) In what way does the “Promisimus” mark the end of an era in its efforts to teach Latin by the help of an abundance of classical and medieval quotations (Hunt 1950: 29-32) and references to French?
- 3) Is the “Promisimus” in any sense more “pre-modistic” than e.g. Robert of Paris in its use of *modus significandi*?
- 4) If we agree with Maierù (1990: 73) that the triad *res, intellectus, vox* mentioned in key passages in the “Promisimus” represents *in nuce* the later doctrine of *modi essendi, intelligendi, significandi* in speculative grammar, is the appearance of this triad in the “Promisimus” a feature unique to it or is it

rather a sign of a certain conservatism in the “Promisimus”, i.e. an adherence to the older *Glosule* tradition?

I shall deal with these questions in the order above, and without undue repetition of earlier research, for which I refer to the pioneering studies by Richard W. Hunt, L. M. de Rijk, C. H. Kneepkens, and Irène Rosier listed in the bibliography.

1. Was the “Promisimus” Connected with Rheims?

Our commentary is outstanding among contemporary grammars in its abundant explicit references to such masters as Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers and the Porretani, William of Conches, Petrus Helias and his school, Manegaldus, as well as to theologians like Petrus Manducator (*alias* Comestor), Bishop Maurice of Paris and many others. This array of names would seem to indicate a thorough familiarity with the many Parisian schools. In fact, only the school of the Parvipontani is not explicitly referred to, which led Richard Hunt to the tentative suggestion (Hunt 1950: 18) that the anonymous master, directly dependent on Ralph of Beauvais, might himself belong to the school of the Petit Pont. Such an allegiance on the part of this pragmatic, lively commentator would be most welcome, since it would align him with both Adam of Balsham and Alexander Nequam, who belonged to that school, and who have both left us most interesting grammatical-lexical works detailing the practical uses of grammar – recently edited (Tony Hunt 1991), but formerly studied by Richard Hunt himself (R. Hunt 1984).

However, there are signs of affiliations with schools outside Paris too: a Master Stephen of Rheims is mentioned five times, (fol. 36vb, 41rb, 65va, 71vb, 73ra; Hunt 1950: 49-50), along with a tantalizing notice of an instrument of torture, shaped as a stag, “which is still there in the court of the bishop of Rheims”:

1a) EQUULEUS. Quidam dicunt quod sit diminutiuum uoce et non significatione et dicunt quod significat genus tormenti \uel/ quod sit tor[a]mentum ad modum equi factum, quod stabat in templo deorum, sicut ceruus adhuc est in curia Remensis episcopi. (fol.60rb ad Prisc.III.43, GL II: 114.20).

We can make sense of this reference to what can be seen by his contemporaries in Rheims in two ways. Either it belongs to the

kind of information our grammarian gathered from a wealth of sources with his keen eye for anecdotes and curiosa. Or, he or his students were acquainted with Rheims. Most annoyingly, there is a similar notice about a Parisian locality:

1b) unde etiam adhuc ‘Termes’ dicitur locus quidam Parisius, quia ibi fuerunt balnea. (fol.77va ad Prisc.VI.55, GL II: 240.7, Hunt 1950: 18).

Both references use the expression ‘adhuc’, as if the author endorses the truth of the existence of both the Roman Baths in Paris and the stag in the bishop’s court in Rheims. The only difference between the two remarks is that the stag is there to be seen in a very definite spot right inside the bishop’s own official building in Rheims, while the Roman Baths in Paris, the ‘Termes’, is (only) a name of a locality. Unless one offers a third explanation, namely that it is an extraneous gloss, which by scribal error has found its way into the text, I would say that there is slightly more in favour of an affiliation with the school of Rheims, famous in its day (Williams 1964) and noted for cultivating the study of the classical authors. Thus, Joseph of Exeter composed the Troian Epic, *Dares Phrygii Ilias*, around 1189 when he taught in Rheims (Joseph Iscanus I: 221). Twelfth-century grammar abounds in references to Paris – not so to Rheims and to master Stephen of Rheims.

This, however, does not lead us to the identity of the author, who reports the lectures of an anonymous master agreeing on most points – but not all (Hunt 1950: 45-48) – with the teaching of Ralph of Beauvais.¹

Hunt (1950: 18) dated the “Promisimus” to the last quarter of the twelfth century because it mentions Maurice who was bishop of Paris 1168-1196. This accords well with another curious reference – not mentioned by Hunt – which may be to the King of France, Louis VII, who ruled 1137-1180 and was the son of Louis VI le Gros (filius Grossi):

¹ Hunt (1950: 2) is hardly right that the last quire of the “Promisimus”, fol. 80-88 on book VIII, might be by a different author, since the manner of commenting and the explicit reliance on Ralph of Beauvais continues, cf. text 4a. De Rijk’s suggestion that the author was Robert Blund (De Rijk 1967: 255) has been shown to be wrong by Hunt (Hunt 1982: 12) and Kneepkens (Kneepkens 1987: I: 384).

1c) AD ALIQUID DICTUM. Hoc nomen a dialecticis dicitur relatiuum quod copulat proprietatem inherentem alicui respectu alterius proprietatis que inest alii respectu prioris, ut 'dominus' copulat dominium respectu seruitutis, que inest seruo; et iste relationes sese mutuo exigunt, unde unum dicitur in alio intelligi, et unum interemptum dicitur aliud interimere, id est si nulli conueniat unum nec reliquum. Falsum est.

Dicitur enim: "Filius Grossi regis regnat in Sicilia" et "iste est similis patri suo" et "uerum differt a falso". Ideo dicimus quod unum designatum per unum relatiuum potest esse, etsi non sit reliquum. (fol.50va ad Prisc. II.28, GL II: 60.19).

De Rijk preferred the period 1150-1175 (de Rijk 1967: 255), while I would venture the 1170s, after Maurice became bishop in 1168 but while Louis VII was still king (if Louis VII was indeed the one meant by this cryptic reference to "filius Grossi" in Sicily). The many explicit references to masters, including Petrus Manducator (who died 1179) and the Porretani (Hunt 1950: 44, 51-52) seem to me also to favour the 1170s. A later date would be difficult to maintain, since doctrinally the "Promisimus" sides with William of Conches and Petrus Helias, who wrote in the 1120s-1140s, and since it does not cover all the newest grammatical doctrines, which we e.g. find in Robert of Paris' syntactical *Summa* (Kneepkens 1987: I 143) from the 1160s. A certain conservatism in comparison to Robert may perhaps also be accounted for by the doctrinal dependence of the "Promisimus" on the humanist tradition of Ralph of Beauvais (cf. *Liber Tylan*: XVIII) and, even more so, by the different format of Robert's succinct, syntactical *Summa* and this lengthy and broadly designed, literal commentary on Priscian Maior.²

2. The Literary and French Examples

The second question, concerning the wealth of literary examples, hinges on the author's dependence on Ralph of Beauvais – himself keen on literature to such an extent that he was ridiculed as a *senex elementarius* by Peter of Blois (Hunt 1950: 12). To this hu-

² Hunt was worried over the reference, fol. 49va, to the German Emperors' signature as "Dei Gratia imperator et semper Augustus", mentioning the Emperor L.<?>. This would be Lotharius, 1125-1137. Could the L.<othar> be a scribal error for F.<riederichus>? The Emperor Friederich Barbarossa, who reigned 1152-1190, used the formula very often, while Lothar only twice, cf. Ottenbach/Hirsch 1957: 170.2; 191.27 (for the years 1136, 1137).

manist strain we should add an unusually broad set of references to French and to local pronunciation, which are also found to a lesser degree in William of Conches and the anonymous “Quoniam opificen” (cf. Fredborg 1990: 55), e.g.:

2a) ‘Eurardus’, ‘Ebrardus’, ‘Euerardus’ non est nomen Latinum sed barbarum, et de barbaris non curat regula Latina, fol.33ra (cf. “Quoniam Opificen” in Fredborg 1990: 55).

2b) GINNECEUM (= gynaeceum)..., unde Gallice dicitur “hec mulier vadit ‘in genes” id est in officium mulierum. (fol.52vb ad Prisc.II.46, GL II: 71.9).

2c) ‘fidicula’ diminiutium et istud tractum est a Gallico, uel econuerso, quia Gallicus dicit ‘viele’ et maxima affinitas est inter v et f. (fol.59ra ad Prisc.III.30, GL II: 105.15).

2d) CENSUALIS quod ad censum pertinet. Secundum hanc regulam dici debet: a ‘res’ ‘ralis’, unde M<agister> R<adulphus> Bel<uacensis> deridendo eos semper dicebat “hoc dicunt li rales (ralet *ms*)”. Dicimus quod e interpositum causa euphonie. (fol.63va ad Prisc.IV.23, GL II: 131.10).

2e) IN HIS ERGO. Quia hec indeclinabilia habent omnia casualia officia, ergo habent realem casum et non uocalem, quare dicuntur monoptota. Et hoc est: CASUS FIERI (significet *ms*) NON VOCIS. Vel secundum usum possumus dicere ‘nequam’ aptotum, id est nullius casus et relatiue monoptotum, secundum quod casus /fol.74vb/ dicitur terminatio discretiua alicuius casualis officii. ITAQUE. Quia declinantur sensu et non uoce apponimus articulos ad distinguenda casualia officia quibus Gallici habundant sed Teutonici egent. (fol.74va-b ad Prisc. V.71, GL II: 184.23).

Cf.: Sicut nominatiuo “hic magister”, ‘hic’ non ibi significationem uel consignificationem aliquam habet, sed tantum ex materia uocis discernit genus et casum et numerum et non in ui pronominis ponitur, sed improprie transfertur a sua significatione. Similiter in articulis Gallicis ubi dicitur puero: Ubi ponitur ‘li’, cuius casus? et respondetur “nominatiui!”, et Ubi dicitur ‘de’? et respondetur “genitiui!” et sic casus distinguit articulus Gallicus ex sola uocis materia (fol.49rb ad Prisc.II.24, GL II: 58.4).

2f) GRECI AUTEM. Non solum in huiusmodi constructione (viz. absolute ablatiue) solent ponere \participii/ (Grece *a.c.*) genitiuum, sed etiam uerbum infinitiui modi loco participii, quia infinitiuus est <cum> genitiuo quod in Gallico patet “causa legendi” ‘de lire’ est infinitiuus. (fol.75va ad Prisc.V.81, GL II: 191.7).

2g) TRACTAVERO pro tractabo. Nota quod subiunctiuus habet consignificationem temporis compositam ex preterito et futuro quod patet interpretatione Gallica “cum tractavero” cum “io auerai \futurum/ traitie \preteritum/”. (fol.75va ad Prisc.VI.1, GL II: 194.13. Cf Aelfric, Tony Hunt 1991: 112,115).

2h) QUE IN SPECIES. Quia Longobardis graue est pronuntiare ‘c’ ante ‘i’, ne uideretur per hoc nomen ‘species’ aliud dixisse, addit ID EST IN PARTES. Similiter quidam Blesi pronuntiant ‘intensio’ pro ‘intentio’, quia graue est eis pronuntiare ‘t’, et ideo fit error. (fol.46rb ad Prisc.II.15, GL II: 53.30).

As is clear from the few examples given here – I have deliberately omitted merely lexical elucidations of the type ‘calx’ = la chaux (fol. 69va) which are rather frequent – the “Promisimus” follows Priscian’s own fast and loose method of comparison between Greek and Latin. This is not the case only in lexical but also in grammatical phenomena, as the use of cases (genitive, example 2e) and moods (infinitive in certain constructions, 2f) shows. Though our author does not accept a general grammar for all languages (2a), it is clear that he considers certain phonetic features to be of a general nature (2c) and the general function of moods and cases to be valid in the comparative description of languages.

3. Modus significandi

Generally speaking, the 12th c. grammarian used the terminology *modus significandi* in the not-very-technical meaning of “a special way of signifying”. According to this usage you might, with Petrus Helias and Robert of Paris, distinguish the seven or eight parts of speech, or – in a non-technical fashion – indicate a special meaning added by a particular accident of some part of speech.³

An example of that is the discussion of the various tenses and cases in the “Promisimus”:

3a) TEMPUS ACCIDIT VERBO... Propter hoc Priscianus illius distinctionis reddit rationem dicens quoniam non distinguit tempora propter naturam et essentiam temporis, sed per modos significandi quos habet uerbum ad distinctionem humanarum accionum, quarum quedam sunt (inter *ms*) presentes, quedam preterite et alie future. Verbum enim habet tres modos significandi, quos habet uerbum ad significandum accionem modo ut presentem, modo ut preteritam, modo ut futuram. (fol.83va ad Prisc.VIII.39, GL II: 405.21).

AN C<O>EPERINT QUIDEM NECDUM TAMEN PERFECTA id est nominantes modum significandi quem (quam *ms*) habet uerbum ex eo quod significat ac-

³ *Modus significandi* used about wordclasses, cf. Petrus Helias: 182.40-43; 189.94-95; 881-882; Robert of Paris: 193.15-18; 233.8; 321.30. It has also been used for the specific meaning of a specific type of word by Petrus Hispanus, *Summa*: 19, cf. Rosier 1995: 137-139, and by Hugotio, teacher of Robert of Paris, cf. Pinborg 1967: 34-35; Kneepkens 1987 I: 310.

tionem uel passionem iam inchoatam et nondum ad finem perductam preteritum imperfectum, PRETERITUM VERO PERFECTUM nominantes tempus IN QUO RES PERFECTA, id est modus significandi quem habet uerbum ex eo quod significat actionem uel passionem inchoatam et ad finem ductam, PRETERITUM PLUSQUAMPERFECTUM nominamus tempus IN QUO RES OSTENDITUR IAM PRIDEM PERFECTA id est modus significandi quem habet uerbum ex eo quod significat actionem uel passionem multo ante preteritam. (fol.83vb ad Prisc. VIII.39, GL II: 405.21-406.1).

3b) CASUS EST...Que autem sit causa inuentionis dictionum in diuersis casibus non dicit actor nec ad plenum quid sit casus diffinit. Unde hoc supplendum esse existimo.

Causa igitur inuentionis dictionum in diuersis casibus fuit diuersus modus significandi rem. Quando<que> enim significamus rem ut que supponitur locutioni, id est ut agentem uel patientem, quandoque ut cuius est aliquid, scilicet ut ea a qua aliquid possidetur, et aliis pluribus modis, que omnes diuersitates si una uoce casuali designarentur fieret confusio. Propter talem confusionem uitandam inuenti sunt diuersi casus, ut diuersitas significandi rem distinguatur per casuum diuersitatem. Casus autem est proprietas uocis cadendi in alium casum uel cadendi ab alio casu in eadem dictione. Proprietas cadendi in alium casum nominatio conuenit, cadendi ab alio obliquis.

Potest autem et aliter casus diffiniri: Casus est proprietas contracta partim ex uariatione terminationis, partim ex modo significandi, id est ex officio casuali in casuali dictione per quam scilicet proprietatem cognoscitur utrum res ut agens designetur aut ut cuius est aliquid uel aliquo aliorum modorum, qui per diuersitatem casuum distinguuntur.

Ideo autem dico contracta ex uariatione terminationis et officii, quia nec sola terminatio sufficit ad casus discernendos, nec solum officium, cum sepe diuersi casus eandem habeant terminationem, ut 'muse' genitiui casus est et datiu. (fol.74rb ad Prisc.V.68, GL II: 183.20).

Within the individual cases, the case-functions may cover several *modi significandi*:

3c) MULTAS QUOQUE. Quia ablatiuus est numerale, sermocinale, materiale, sed modum attribuit prepositionibus sibi adiunctis, ut "†finis† est de numero illorum", ablatiuus ibi numerale est et modum significandi taliter attribuit prepositioni. Item "de Sorte loquor" sermocinaliter. Item "hoc est de ferro" materiale. Has et alias multas significationes \modos significandi/ habet ablatiuus et etiam alii casus. (fol.74vb ad Prisc.V.73, GL II: 186.4).

Nowhere did the 12th c. grammarians classify these *modi significandi* as either essential or accidental, as they typically are in pre-modistic texts like that of Jordanus (Jordanus: 76) and Ps-Kilwardby (passim).

The special features of the individual parts of speech, the *acci-*

dentia, are accounted for, systematically, in other ways, as either properties or as additional, secondary meanings (as the noun's number and gender, and the verb's tense, mood, number, and *forma*; Fredborg 1973: 32) or subdivided into vocal accidents distinguishable by the endings and non-vocal accidents, in the older *Glosule* tradition.

Ralph of Beauvais (*Glose*: 21.18-22) and his school preferred the older distinction and disliked William of Conches' terminology 'secondary meaning'. Moreover, Ralph of Beauvais and his school preferred the view that such accidents indicate variation in linguistic form as a linguistic property of that part of speech, since signification holds between a word and an extralinguistic thing, while grammatical accidents are functions and common properties particular to a part of speech:

3d) In gramatica dicitur numerus quedam proprietas dictionis appellantis res quibus inest numerus uel rem cui inest numeri principium...nota autem quod quidam dicunt numerum esse secundariam nominis significationem, ...sed nos hoc non dicimus. (fol.70va ad Prisc.V.46, GL II: 172.1).

cf.: Sed notandum quod quidam dicunt ea esse secundarias nominum significationes, et ita numerus non est proprietas, sed secundaria nominis significatio, alii uero proprietates nominum, quibus consentit M<agister>. (fol.48va ad Prisc.II.22, GL II: 57.8; cf. Hunt 1950: 35, Kneepkens 1995: 243).

3e) Aliter enim accipitur hoc nomen 'numerus' cum dicitur significare numerum dictio, aliter cum dicitur numerus accidere (accidit *ms*) nomini uel alii parti orationis. Cum enim <dictio> dicitur significare uel consignificare numerum, est sensus: Dictio significat unitatem uel alium numerum, scilicet pluralitatem. Dictio enim singularis uel pluralis numeri consignificat proprietatem non suam sed rem, ut dictio singularis numeri consignificat unitatem, sed non singularitatem.

Cum dicitur numerus accidere nomini, est sensus: Talis proprietas discernendi, scilicet utrum de una an de pluribus agatur per nomen, accidit nomini.

Similiter aliter accipitur 'tempus' cum dicitur tempus accidere uerbo, et aliter cum dicitur uerbum consignificare tempus. Cum dicitur "uerbum consignificat tempus" id est talem morulam, ut in uerbo manifestius dicetur. Cum dicitur "tempus accidit uerbo", [non] est sensus: Talis proprietas accidit uerbo. (fol.70va ad Prisc. V.46, GL II: 172.1).

Furthermore, Ralph of Beauvais stressed that the accidents of the parts of speech, mentioned in the definition of the parts of speech, are put there for syntactical considerations (Ralph, *Glose*: xxi-xxii, 19.4, p.65 note a; Hunt 1950: 15). The "Promisimus" follows Ralph, not so much in dividing the accidents into special *accidentia constructiva* – as did Robert of Paris when dealing with gen-

der, number, person, case, and tense (Robert of Paris: 280.10-12; 136.19; 141.28-29, cf. Kneepkens 1987: I 348-350) – as in establishing a list of accidents which could accommodate the different definitions of the wordclasses by Aristotle, Donatus, and Priscian:

3f) M<agister> Ra<dolphus>: Ratio hec est quod gramatici non omnes proprietates accidentales nominum \uel aliarum partium orationis/ inter accidentia earum ponere uoluerunt, sed illas tantum (tamen *ms*) quas iudicauerunt posse ualere ad earum constructionem et ad discernendum quomodo et qualiter ponenda sunt in locutione. Unde et quia diuerse iudicabant super hoc, diuerse accidentia enumerabant. Contingit aliquando quod uterque dissentientium bonam habet considerationem, sed alter altero meliorem.

Quod autem significare “sine tempore” non ualeat ad constructionem nominum discernendam patet, cum eodem modo significet omne nomen sine tempore (cf. P. Helias: 195.14). Sed “cum (in *a.c.*) tempore” ualet in uerbis, quia quod<dam> uerbum significat presens, aliud preteritum, aliud futurum.

Pretermisita est declinatio quia non ualet ad constructionem discernendam. Siue enim nomen cum alio nomine coniungatur quod sit eiusdem declinationis cum eo uel diuerse nihil refert. Sed in numero uel genere non sic. Etiam declinatio per casum discernitur.

Sed diceret aliquis: Figura et species non ualent ad constructionem discernendam, immo quia dictio composita quandoque ex ui unius componentium regit aliquem casum, quandoque uero ex ui alterius componentium alium, ut ‘do’ exigit datiuum, ‘circum’ uero accusatiuum, ‘circumdat’ quod est ex ambobus quandoque acusatiuum, ut “circumdat illum clamide”, quandoque datiuum, ut “circumdat illi clamidem” ... Similiter et de specie: ‘miseret’ construitur genitiuo et acusatiuo, ‘commisertum’ quod ex eo deriuatur similiter. (fol. 48vb ad Prisc.II.22, GL II: 57.8).

3g) ACCIDUNT IGITUR. In enumeratione accidentium nominis premitit speciem quia pertinet ad originem ipsius, secundo loco de genere quod secundum significationem consideratur, tercio de numero et non de figura quia dictiones in eodem numero exigunt coniungi et non in eadem figura; de figura uero ante casum quia pluribus conuenit figura quam casus, scilicet aduerbiis et uerbis. Sed hac ratione debuisset preponi numero quia uniuersalius est eo. Non! Quia licet figura aliquibus conueniat quibus non numerus, tamen paucis, et numerus magis ad constructionem discernendam ualet quam figura. (fol.49ra ad Prisc.II.22, GL II: 57.8).

3h) Genus autem in hoc loco dicitur quedam proprietas nominis, scilicet aptitudo discernendi sexum circa rem appellatam uel habendi similem constructionem cum discernentibus. Hec proprietas dicitur accidere nomini, quia preter principalem significationem nominis circa ipsum attenditur genus nec in eius diffinitione comprehenditur, et hoc accidens est ualde necessarium ad nominis constructionem cognoscendam. (fol.65va ad Prisc. V.1, GL II: 141.1).

Two things, then, are pivotal with regard to being counted as an accident of a part of speech. First of all an accident is a general

grammatical or semantic property to be found in most words belonging to that part of speech. Secondly, it has some particular syntactical value in the construction of a grammatically correct and clear sentence. That adjectives admit degrees of comparison (“long, longer, longest”) has sufficient syntactical value to be interesting as an accident to Donatus (*Ars Maior*, GL IV: 374.15), but covers too few of the words belonging to its wordclass in Priscian’s view (fol.48vb).

In rare cases, the syntactic construction runs counter to the general signification of that particular wordclass, e.g. in the accusative of direction ‘Romam’, meaning ‘to Rome’ which is construed as an adverb but signifies as a noun, while, conversely, “bini” meaning ‘in pairs’ has the signification of an adverb, but enters the sentence construed as a noun (fol. 51rb).

4. Res - intellectus - vox

How, then, you may well ask, can I – with Maierù – believe that the grammarian, *in casu* the author of the “Promisimus”, has in any way moved in the direction of what was to become Speculative Grammar? First of all, because whichever small moves the “Promisimus” makes, they are always intended to describe grammatical phenomena functionally, as we have seen in the treatment of the grammatical accidents of the parts of speech (cf. Rosier 1994: 85, Rosier/De Libera 1992: 130, 133).

Secondly, because the triad of terms *res - intellectus - vox* is not just mentioned once or at a few random places, it is used to structure and account for the definition of *vox*, *syllaba*, and *dictio* respectively (fol. 24ra, fol. 42rb, and 45va; cf. Hunt 1950: 7, 10, and 32; de Rijk 1967 p.112, 239; Fredborg 1973: 13, n.12). Richard Hunt was himself the first to draw attention to this speculative feature, calling it the germ of the later *modi essendi*, *modi intelligendi*, *modi significandi*. With the greater number of texts now available to us, it is clear that the grammarians from the second half of the century considered the linking of *res - intellectus - vox* crucial.

Even though the author of the “Promisimus” does not develop the part played by *intellectus* as rigorously as we find in the Porretan grammar (*Glosule Porretane super Priscianum Minorem*: 27-32) or indeed the “Ars Meliduna” (De Rijk 1967: 295); it is interesting to see how *intellectus* is used by both Ralph of Beauvais (*Glose*: 32.29)

and the “Promisimus” to explain some of the tricky, logical puzzles, as when we use the present tense in propositions:

4a) (fol.82va) PRESENS, PRETERITUM, FUTURUM....Queritur autem quod tempus consignificetur uerbo presenti. Quidam dicunt quod tempus illud in quo profertur, ut ‘lego’. Unde si ita est in re ut uerbo dicitur, uerum (uero *ms*) tunc dicitur; si falsum, falsum. Quod si ita est, nunquam aliquis ueraciter potest /fol.82vb/ dicere ‘dormio’ uel ‘taceo’ uel ‘bibō’ uel ‘non loquor’. (cf. P. Helias, *Summa*: 487.8-11).

[quod] Dicunt alii quod uerbum presens consignificat illud tempus in quo incipit proferri. Unde uere possumus dicere ‘taceo’ uel ‘bibō’ uel ‘non loquor’ et similia, quia etsi non tacebat quando [quando] dicit hoc, tamen tacebat quando incepit hoc dicere....(cf. P. Helias, *Summa*: 487.12-19).

Propter hoc sunt quidam qui dicunt quod uerbum presens consignificat tempus in quo res sua agitur... (cf. P. Helias *Summa*: 487.20-22).

Alii dicunt quod uerbum consignificat presens tempus ita quod nullum [in]determinate, sed sicut confusum. (cf. P. Helias, *Summa*: 487.23-24).

M<agister> P<etrus> H<elias> dicit quod uerbum non significat presens tempus [quod] sed [adhuc] <aliquid> in presenti tempore (tempus *ms*), ita tamen quod nec in hoc presenti nec in alio (= P. Helias, *Summa*: 487.25-28).

Alii dicunt quod uerbum consignificet tempus quod statim preteriit ante prolationem in quo ipsum profertur et hoc quare (queritur *ms*) non possit esse postea dicemus.

M<agister> R<adulphus> dicit quod omne uerbum siue sit presens siue preteritum siue futurum, consignificat illud tempus quod concipit intellectus ad quem manifestandum illa oratio profertur, in qua ipsum uerbum ponitur, ut si modo intellegam (intellecta *ms*) So<rtem> disputare, si mox ad hunc intellectum manifestandum proferam orationem habentem uerbum presens, illud uerbum significabit (-bat *ms*) illud presens in quo intellectum concepi. Ideo dixi “mox”, quod si modo concipere<m> presens So<rtem> legere et cras proferrem: “So<rtes> legit” uel aliquo interuallo facto, hoc uerbum ‘lego’ non consignificaret illud presens in quo illum intellectum concepimus, cum tamen intellectum ad memoriam reducerem.

Et dicitur uerbum hoc modo significare presens tempus, non quia (quam *ms*) consignificet tempus *quod presens* quando uerbum profertur, sed quia consignificat tempus *ut presens*, quia est presens quando illum intellectum concepimus, qui significatur per orationem in qua ponitur ipsum uerbum.

Et notandum quod uerbum positum in [in] diuersis propositionibus, ut in propositione sillogismi et assumptione et conclusione feruntur ad idem tempus ad quod fertur uerbum prime propositionis... In hoc omnes conueniunt, sed diuersas inde assignant rationes.

Quid<am> dicunt quod disputator disponit argumentationem in animo suo antequam eam proferat, et sic in uno intellectu illa argumentatio concipitur. Quod falsum est, quia argumentator quando<que> mendicat propositiones. Ideo dicimus quod ita instituerunt gramatici ut omnia uerba argumentationis ad idem tempus referantur (referuntur *ms*), quod notat aduersatio in sillogismo, in aliis argumentationibus hoc notat signum concludendi, scilicet ‘ergo’, et in consequentis (potentia scilicet *ms*) uerbum antecedentis et consequentis ad idem tempus applicatur, quia aliter esset false...

/fol.83ra/... Preterea nota quod sine omni interrogatione potest ueraciter dici "ego bibo" quia postquam (iterum *ms*) bibit aliquis potest concipere istum intellectum se bibere, ad quem (quam *ms*) manifestandum mox profertur hec oratio "ego bibo"; et hoc uerbum 'bibo' ibi consignificat presens tempus non quod illud sit presens, quia iam preterit, sed consignificat illud ut (non *ms*) presens.

Et non solum preteritum tempus significatur ut presens sed etiam futurum quandoque significatur ut presens, et "Ogigio cum victor Marte redisset" (Stat. *Theb.* VI.609) 'redisset' ibi consignificat futurum tempus quasi preteritum. (fol.82va-83ra ad Prisc. VIII.38, GL II: 405.8; cf. Ralph, *Glose.* 31.31-32.32)

4b) COMPARATIVUM...Causam inuentionis:... Intellectus quandoque concipit rem ut existentem, qualiter significatur albedo hoc nomine 'albedo', quandoque concipit ut adiacentem alicui qualiter significatur per 'album', quandoque concipit adiacentem et cum augmento indeterminato qualiter significatur <per> [ut] 'albior', quandoque ut adiacentem cum augmento determinato et maximo qualiter significatur <ur> per 'albissimus'. Quia ergo una et eadem res tot modis significatur, inuenerunt ergo uoces diuersas quibus rem significarent. (fol.54va ad Prisc. III.1, GL II p.83.1; cf. Ralph, *Glose.* 8.9-16).

The format of the analysis here is dialectical rather than purely grammatical, even if it must be noted that on the whole the author of the "Promisimus" is uninterested in the truth value of a grammatically correct sentence as such (Kneepkens 1987: I 56-57, 513). Furthermore, as we can see, our author copied a good part of the discussion from Ralph of Beauvais and Petrus Helias.

Petrus Helias himself had most of it from William of Conches (cf. Petrus Helias: 487 app.) However, if we check William of Conches here, we find that he rounded off this discussion of the present tense with the remark that he thought the discussion extraneous to grammar: "Positis igitur diuersorum sententiis et obiectionibus, eligat lector quod uoluerit; non enim multum pertinet hoc ad regulam huius artis." (Ms Paris BN 15130, fol.60rb).

However, Ralph of Beauvais is at work here too. Ralph, a student of Abelard, not only ridiculed the realists – as we have seen in text 2d above – but belonged to a group of anti-realists, who were partisans of a particular version of the "status-theory" (*Glose.* 21.7, cf. *Liber Tytan:* X), also adopted by the "Promisimus" (fol.49vb). Ralph further discusses the difference between "real present tense" and "locutionary present tense", where the level of reality corresponds to "*tempus quod presens*", the level of the *dictum propositionis* corresponds to "*tempus ut presens*" in the "Promisimus" (text 4a above).

Ralph, *Glose* 32.26-30: Fortasse uerbum itaque presentis temporis dicitur con-
significare presens tempus, non quod significet *tempus quod est presens*, dum uer-
bum profertur, sed quia significat tempus quod est *presens, dum concipitur* presens
intellectus qui per prolationem presentatur. [Italics mine].

Conclusion: The Conservatism of the “Promisimus”

As the above excerpts from the “Promisimus” show, even where the discussion is somewhat long-winded and repetitive, including lengthy quotations from our anonymous grammarian’s predecessors, there is plenty of speculative grammar in the “Promisimus”, even if it lacks a uniform terminological superstructure when dealing with Priscian. Tucked away in “pockets” of discussions, the author of the “Promisimus” addresses grammatical theories from quite diverse angles: a humanist one, generously quoting the classics; a comparative linguistic one when contrasting Latin with Greek and French; a theoretical one carefully restating the positions of predecessors and contemporaries; and, not least, a pedagogic one offering an unusually rich tapestry of lively examples and counterexamples from which the author’s students could select – exactly as Priscian had done himself.

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Fallaciae et théologie pendant la seconde moitié du XII^e siècle

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Résumé. Le but de ce travail peut se résumer aux quatre points suivants: 1.) Attirer l'attention sur les références explicites, dans la littérature théologique de la seconde moitié du XII^e siècle, aux *fallaciae* de la tradition latine des *Réfutations sophistiques* d'Aristote. 2.) Montrer, sur la base d'un usage théologique de la *fallacia compositionis et divisionis*, comment l'insertion de la terminologie des *fallaciae* en théologie s'est produite graduellement, souvent en développant des analyses logico-linguistiques déjà présentes auparavant dans la tradition théologique même et empruntées principalement à la *logica vetus*. 3.) Présenter un petit ensemble d'ouvrages singuliers, à la frontière entre les disciplines de la théologie et de la logique, lesquels, tout en traitant de sujets théologiques, suivent une structure manifestement tirée des traités logiques de *fallaciae*. 4.) Évoquer quelques pistes de recherche liées à la question de l'usage des *fallaciae* par les maîtres en *sacra pagina*.

1. Les *fallaciae* dans les sommes théologiques, de Pierre Lombard à Guillaume d'Auxerre

A partir de la moitié du XII^e siècle environ, dans les recueils de sentences et de questions, les sommes et les commentaires sur les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard, les maîtres en *sacra pagina* ont souvent recours, d'une manière plus ou moins explicite, à la terminologie des *fallaciae* de la tradition des *Réfutations sophistiques*.²

Martin Grabmann (1956: 120 s.) avait déjà remarqué que l'influence de la logique d'Aristote est manifeste dans le traitement de la *quaestio* et de la *disputatio* chez tous les maîtres en *sacra pagina* de la seconde moitié du XII^e siècle et des premières décennies du XIII^e. Plus précisément, il avait aussi remarqué que "le premier exemple de questions théologiques autonomes dans lesquelles on

1 Je tiens à remercier pour leur suggestions précieuses: Jean Jolivet, Sten Ebbesen, Yukio Iwakuma, Klaus Jacobi, Alfonso Maierù, Gino Roncaglia et Irène Rosier. Irène Rosier mérite un remerciement particulier pour avoir aussi corrigé et amélioré, autant que possible, mon français.

2 Je laisse pour le moment de côté le thème de la présence en théologie des *fallaciae* dans le sens des six facteurs qui empêchent la contradiction, selon un passage très connu du commentaire de Boèce du *De interpretatione*. Cf. de Rijk 1962: 24 ss. et Rosier 1988: 117 ss.

peut percevoir l'influence de la *logica nova*... en particulier des *Topiques* et des *Réfutations sophistiques*", sont les questions connues sous le nom d'Odon de Soissons ou d'Ourscamp³ – maître actif à Paris à partir du milieu des années 40 et, dans les années 60, chancelier de l'école de Notre Dame (Giusberti 1982: 113) – et que dans les *Sentences* de Pierre de Poitiers se trouvent "la plupart des espèces de raisonnements sophistiques traités dans les *Réfutations sophistiques*".⁴ Comme point de départ de mon enquête, j'ai d'abord effectué une recherche quantitative sur la fréquence des mentions explicites des *fallaciae* dans les ouvrages théologiques édités de cette époque. A partir des données recueillies, présentées en détail dans l'annexe n. 1, on peut déjà proposer quelques considérations préliminaires.

On peut tout d'abord s'apercevoir qu'il existe une grande variété de situations: dans certains ouvrages le recours aux *fallaciae* est fréquent – nous avons par exemple 62 occurrences du terme 'fallacia' dans le premier livre des *Sententiae* de Pierre de Poitiers, et 27 dans le premier livre de la *Summa aurea* de Guillaume d'Auxerre; dans d'autres cas, le recours aux *fallaciae* est rare ou absent, comme dans les *Regulae caelestis iuris* d'Alain de Lille, et, semble-t-il, dans les questions d'Etienne Langton, bien que ces deux auteurs utilisent les *fallaciae* dans d'autres ouvrages: Alain dans sa *Summa Quoniam homines*, Etienne dans son commentaire sur les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard. Dans l'état actuel de la recherche, je n'ai pas l'impression que l'on puisse dégager de cette diversité de situations un développement chronologique défini ou des traditions d'école différentes. La terminologie n'est pas non plus bien établie: souvent on trouve 'sophisma' au lieu de 'fallacia' – mais il faut tenir compte du fait que les abréviations pour ces deux mots sont très semblables⁵ –, ou bien un exemple de *fallacia* est placé dans un processus d'*instantia* – cas très fréquent chez Pierre de Poitiers.⁶ Les *fallaciae* les plus utilisées, avec des préférences chez l'un ou l'autre maître pour l'un ou l'autre type, sont la *fallacia aequivocationis* avec ses espèces différentes (*varia si-*

3 Grabmann 1956: 118; cf. Id. 1911: vol. II, c. I, par. 3; trad. it. p. 39 s.

4 Grabmann 1956: 121. Voir aussi de Rijk 1962: 163 ss.

5 Je remercie Yukio Iwakuma pour avoir attiré mon attention sur cette donnée.

6 A propos de l'usage de *instantiae* dans la *Summa Quoniam homines* d'Alain de Lille cf. de Libera 1987: 456 ss.

gnificatio, varia relatio et *varia demonstratio, univocatio*, à savoir *varia appellatio* ou *suppositio, varia consignificatio*); puis les *fallaciae amphiboliae, compositionis et divisionis, commutatio praedicamenti* (l'un des modes de la *fallacia figurae dictionis*), *secundum quid et simpliciter, consequentis* et *accidentis*. Plus bas, nous proposerons une hypothèse d'explication au fait que les autres *fallaciae* ne sont pas présentes en théologie.

Une donnée constante est le fait que le recours aux *fallaciae* se trouve particulièrement dans la partie des sommes, d'ordinaire le premier livre, qui est consacrée à la trinité et aux noms divins. Ces sections ont un caractère éminemment linguistique, dans le sens où les maîtres y définissent les caractéristiques du langage théologique par comparaison avec le langage profane. Il n'est donc pas étonnant de trouver ici la plupart des références aux *fallaciae*. Celles-ci y sont utilisées, combinées de différentes manières avec d'autres outils d'analyse textuelle tirés de la logique, de la grammaire et parfois de la rhétorique, pour résoudre les paralogismes théologiques les plus divers. On peut avoir une idée de l'ampleur des thèmes théologiques abordés au moyen des *fallaciae* en regardant l'annexe n. 2, qui donne à voir la structure des *Fallaciae in sacra pagina*, traité dont je parlerai dans la suite, ainsi que quelques exemples des questions qui y sont abordées.

Si l'on tient compte de l'aspect chronologique, il semblerait que les *fallaciae* soient introduites en théologie probablement déjà vers le milieu des années 50, avec Odon de Soissons, et certainement à partir de la fin des années 60, avec Alain de Lille et surtout Pierre de Poitiers. L'usage des *fallaciae* de la part des théologiens est donc contemporain de la floraison des traités logiques sur ce sujet (cf. Ebbesen 1993: 148 ss.), et en est probablement une conséquence; mais l'incertitude dans les datations empêche que l'on puisse tracer des relations de dépendance évidentes.

Il est à remarquer que les auteurs qui les premiers ont eu recours aux *fallaciae* dans des contextes théologiques – Odon de Soissons, Alain de Lille et Pierre de Poitiers – ont été aussi les premiers à se servir en théologie, de manière technique, des notions sémantiques de *suppositio* et de *consignificatio*.⁷ Dans leurs ouvrages

7 Voir par exemple Pierre de Poitiers, *Sent.*, pp. 202-223, où la distinction entre les quatre notions de *significatio, appellatio, suppositio* et *copulatio* est à la base d'une

ces notions paraissent soit à l'intérieur d'analyses basées sur l'application d'une *fallacia*, soit détachées de toute référence aux *fallaciae*. Or ces notions ont pour origine, en logique et en grammaire, plusieurs sources convergentes qu'il n'est pas utile de rappeler ici, mais elles ont certainement trouvé approfondissement et systématisation dans le cadre des analyses de la *fallacia aequivocationis* et de la *fallacia figurae dictionis*. Par un parallélisme intéressant avec ce qui se produit dans le domaine de la logique, en théologie aussi les notions de *suppositio* et *consignificatio* pourraient avoir gagné graduellement autonomie et signification à partir de contextes où elles ont été introduites dans le cadre de l'application d'une *fallacia*.

2. Continuité et nouveauté

2.1. Un cas d'application de la *fallacia compositionis et divisionis*

2.1.1. Pierre de Poitiers, Etienne Langton et Pierre Lombard

Dans plusieurs cas, il semble que le recours à une *fallacia* de la part d'un maître en *sacra pagina* se rattache à une tradition antérieure, mais celle-ci est développée dans le sens d'une plus grande technicité de l'analyse. Le recours à la *fallacia aequivocationis*, par exemple, se rattache d'un côté à la pratique théologique traditionnelle de la distinction des différents signifiés d'un terme, déjà théorisée par Augustin et Abélard (Valente 1995: 41), de l'autre au traitement de l'équivocité propre à la *logica vetus*, sur la base des *Categoriae* et du *De interpretatione* d'Aristote, ainsi que du commentaire de Boèce sur ce dernier (cf. Rosier 1988).

Mais ici nous nous arrêterons sur une application de la *fallacia compositionis et divisionis*, qui nous montre très bien comment l'influence des *Réfutations sophistiques* en théologie s'est produite en

analyse très détaillée des propositions théologiques concernant les relations entre les trois personnes de la trinité. Sur l'usage de ces notions en théologie cf. Ebbesen 1987: 410, 419 ss. et 424 ss.; de Libera 1987: 448 et 455; Rosier 1995: 144 ss.; Valente 1997a: 172 ss. Sur *consignificatio* en théologie cf. Rosier *ibid.*; Valente 1997a: 160 ss. et Ead. 1997b. Cf. aussi Odon de Soissons, *Quaest.*, p. 172.

plusieurs étapes successives et en continuité avec la tradition théologique précédente, déjà marquée par la *logica vetus*.⁸

La distinction entre sens composé et sens divisé est utilisée par les théologiens de la seconde moitié du XII^e siècle surtout pour résoudre des questions relatives à la prescience et à la puissance divines, à la nécessité ou à la contingence des événements, à la prédestination et à la liberté de Dieu et des hommes – questions qui ont celles-ci dès le début engagé les penseurs chrétiens dans des réflexions logico-théologiques importantes, touchant en particulier la logique modale (Normore 1982: 358 ss.). Pierre de Poitiers par exemple se réfère explicitement à la *fallacia compositionis et divisionis* pour interpréter la proposition “Impossibile est res aliter evenire quam sint prescite”. Cette proposition est vraie dans le sens composé, du moment qu’il est impossible qu’en même temps les choses se produisent d’une certaine manière et que Dieu les connaisse d’une manière différente; la proposition est au contraire fausse en sens divisé, puisque les choses, bien que connues d’une certaine façon par Dieu et ainsi produites, auraient aussi pu se produire d’une autre façon:

Sed facile est solvere predicta, assignata fallacia compositionis et divisionis in premissis propositionibus. Cum enim dicitur: Impossibile est res aliter evenire quam sint prescite, si per compositionem intelligatur, id est: impossibile est hec duo simul esse quod res ita eveniant, et aliter sint prescite, verum est. Si vero per divisionem: impossibile est res aliter evenire quam sint prescite, id est: res ita sunt prescite, et impossibile est eas aliter evenire, falsum est (Pierre de Poitiers, *Sent.* 13, p. 123).

Or Pierre Lombard, traitant de la même question, n’avait pas parlé pas de *fallacia compositionis et divisionis*, mais la terminologie qu’il avait utilisée était très proche. La proposition “non potest aliter fieri quam Deus praescivit” est vraie selon lui si on l’interprète *coniunctim, ut conditio sit implicita*, mais elle est fausse si on l’interprète *disiunctim*:

Ad quod dicimus illam locutionem multiplicem facere intelligentiam, scilicet ‘aliter potest fieri quam Deus praescivit’... Possunt enim haec coniunctim intelligi, ut conditio sit implicita, et disiunctim. Si enim ita intelligas: ‘Non potest aliter fieri

8 A propos du couple terminologique *sens composé / sens divisé* dans la logique et la grammaire médiévales, ainsi que de la *fallacia compositionis et divisionis*, voir Maierù 1972: 499-600; Riveiro 1975 et 76; Kretzmann 1981; Knuuttila 1984: 84-90, 165-175 et passim; Roncaglia 1996: 91-100.

quam Deus praescivit', id est non potest utrumque simul esse, scilicet quod Deus praesciverit ita fieri et aliter fiat, verum intelligis. Si autem per disiunctionem intelligas, ut dicas hoc aliter non posse evenire quam evenit, quo modo futurum Deus praescivit, falsum est. Hoc enim aliter potest evenire quam evenit, et tamen Deus hoc modo futurum praescivit.⁹

Pierre de Poitiers semble donc rattacher la solution proposée par Pierre Lombard à la *fallacia compositionis et divisionis*, en interprétant dans ce sens les expressions moins techniques utilisées par le maître des *Sentences*, *coniunctim* et *disiunctim*. Remarquons, sans nous y arrêter ici, que quelque chose de semblable se produit lorsque Pierre de Poitiers, et la plupart des maîtres en *sacra pagina* après lui, interprètent en termes de *consignificatio* l'idée d'un contenu de signifié secondaire transmis par un terme dans un contexte donné: cette idée est en effet déjà présente chez Pierre Lombard, mais celui-ci utilise, au lieu de *consignificare*, des expressions non techniques comme *intelligi dare* ou *demonstrare* (Valente 1997b: 42). Dans le commentaire sur les *Sentences* d'Etienne Langton, le fait que l'introduction de la *fallacia compositionis* soit une sorte d'approfondissement et de technicisation d'une solution déjà avancée par Pierre Lombard est explicitement thématiqué. Lorsqu'il commente le passage de Pierre Lombard qu'on vient de lire, en effet, Langton écrit:

"Ad quod dicimus" "Multiplicem". Id est potest dici, quod divisa falsa, composita vera. Et hoc est "coniunctim", id est secundum compositionem, "disiunctim", per divisionem (Etienne Langton, *Comm. Sent.*, I, XXXVIII, 2, n. 359).

Langton est encore plus explicite dans son commentaire du passage où Pierre Lombard (*Sent.* I, XXXVIII, 2; p. 279) résout par la même technique la question, liée à la précédente, de savoir si la prescience divine peut être fautive:

"Ad hoc". Sic argumentatur: Deus prescit istum lecturum. Sed potest esse, quia ille non legat. Ergo prescientia Dei potest falli. Responsio: Non valet. – Instantia: De-

9 Pierre Lombard, *Sent.*, I, XXXVIII, II, p. 279. Le couple terminologique *divisim* / *coniunctim* est également utilisée dans un contexte voisin dans les *Sentences* du maître Roland, cf. Boh 1985: 193. Dans la *Summa Sententiarum*, PL 176, coll. 62 et 63, au contraire, la même question est résolue de la même façon mais sans utiliser cette terminologie. Cf. aussi la question 'an numerus predestinatorum possit augeri', Pierre Lombard, *Sent.* I, XL, I, p. 284-5, et Pierre de Poitiers, *Sent.* I, 14, p. 142.

monstratis duobus contradictoriis contingentibus a potest esse tale, quale et b. Ergo potest esse simile b. Fallacia compositionis. Et hoc est quod magister dicit.¹⁰

2.1.2. *Le rôle de la logica vetus*

Mais bien que Pierre de Poitiers et Etienne Langton interprètent techniquement en termes de *fallacia compositionis et divisionis* les expressions *coniunctim / disiunctim* de Pierre Lombard, les analyses des trois maîtres pourraient toutefois être déterminées principalement et à l'origine par la tradition de la *logica vetus*, notamment par le traitement aristotélicien du problème des futurs contingents dans le chapitre 9 du *De interpretatione*, d'où est tiré le passage suivant:

Igitur esse quod est quando est, et non esse quod non est quando non est, necesse est; sed non quod est omne necesse est, nec quod non est necesse est non esse (non enim idem est omne quod est esse necessario quando est, et simpliciter esse ex necessitate); similiter autem et in eo quod non est. Et in contradictione eadem ratio est; esse quidem vel non esse omne necesse est et futurum esse vel non; non tamen dividenter dicere alterum necessario (Aristote, *De interpretatione* 9, 19a23 ss., trans. Boethii).

Les thèmes ici évoqués par Aristote sont approfondis et explicités par Boèce dans les deux éditions de son commentaire sur le *De interpretatione* (Boèce 1887: 121-126; 1880: 240-250), ainsi que dans le livre V du *De consolatione philosophiae*. Les analyses d'Aristote et Boèce d'une part et celles de nos maîtres d'autre part présentent un parallélisme évident, à ceci près que la conjonction des propositions théologiquement impossibles (*non potest esse... quod Deus praesciverit ita fieri et aliter fiat*) se substitue à la disjonction, chez Aristote, des prédications logiquement contradictoires (*esse quidem vel non esse omne necesse est*). Dans toutes ces analyses en effet on trouve soit la distinction entre nécessité absolue et nécessité conditionnée (chez Aristote *esse necessario quando est / simpliciter necesse esse*, chez Boèce 1880: 240 *necessitas cum condicione / simplex necessitas*), soit la distinction entre une modalité portant sur la disjonction ou conjonction entières (*coniunctim* chez Pierre Lom-

¹⁰ Etienne Langton, *Comm. Sent. I*, XXXVIII, 2, p. 52. Cf. aussi Id., *Comm. Sent. I*, XL, 1, p. 55: "Magister tamen salva pace sua dicit eam multiplicem ex compositione et divisione respiciens ad hoc, quod, si est predestinatus, ab eterno... Nos (ed. non) dicimus, quod simpliciter falsa est." Dans ce cas Pierre Lombard avait utilisé la terminologie *coniunctim/disiunctim intelligi* à propos d'une question relative à la prédestination des hommes, cf. Pierre Lombard, *Sent. I*, XL, 1; p. 285.

bard) et une modalité portant seulement sur l'un ou l'autre membre (*dividentem* chez Aristote, *divisim* chez Pierre Lombard). Ces deux distinctions seront reprises et traduites en termes plus techniques par les théologiens de la seconde moitié du XII^e siècle sur la base du traitement de la *fallacia compositionis et divisionis* qu'ils trouvent dans les *Réfutations sophistiques* et/ou dans les traités latins qui commentent et développent cet ouvrage d'Aristote; mais elles avaient probablement été déjà introduites en théologie sur la base de la *logica vetus*.

2.1.3. Pierre Abélard

La réponse donnée par Pierre Lombard à la question de savoir si il est possible que les choses se produisent d'une manière différente de celle que Dieu connaît est probablement à mettre en relation avec ce qui avait été écrit sur ce sujet par Pierre Abélard, soit dans ses ouvrages théologiques, soit dans la *Logica Ingredientibus* (cf. Knuuttila 1993: 94; Normore 1982: 363 s.). A ce propos on peut remarquer que si, dans ses ouvrages théologiques, Abélard n'évoque jamais les *Réfutations sophistiques*,¹¹ dans la *Logica Ingredientibus*, il met déjà en relation la question mentionnée ci-dessus avec cet ouvrage, bien qu'il le fasse d'une façon assez indirecte:

Cum dicitur: possibile est rem aliter evenire quam evenit, duo sunt sensus, sicut duo, cum dicitur: possibile est stantem sedere. Si enim ita dicimus, quod rem illam que stat, natura permittit sedere, verum est; si vero ita, quod natura permittit ita esse, ut dicit haec propositio: stans sedet, falsa est. Similiter si dicamus quod possibile est rem aliter modo evenire, quam evenit vel quam Deus adhuc in sua providentia habuerit, qui tantum eam evenire providit, verum est. Si vero ita dicamus quod possibile sit ita contingere, ut haec propositio dicit: res evenit aliter, quam evenit, vel aliter quam Deus providit, falsum est...¹²

11 Dans les ouvrages théologiques d'Abélard le terme 'elencus' fait défaut, 'fallacia' et 'sophisma' sont utilisés dans un sens non technique. On pourrait pourtant lire un écho des différents modes de la *fallacia compositionis et divisionis* et de la *fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter* dans *Theologia Summi boni*, CCCM XIII, p. 159.

12 Pierre Abélard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, p. 430. Cf. aussi id., *Dialectica*, p. 218: "Est autem verum (sc. possibile est rem aliter evenire quam Deus providit) hoc modo intellectum, cum illud '*aliter quam Deus providit*' determinatio est praedicati quod est '*possibile*', hoc modo: '*rem evenire est possibile aliter quam Deus providit*', quippe potentiam aliter proveniendi (providendi?) habet. Si vero ad subiectum determinatio ponatur, quod est '*evenire*', atque ita dicatur: '*rem evenire aliter quam Deus providit* (istud totum) est *possibile*', falsum est nec probari potest." Sur ce sujet cf. Weidemann 1993.

L'exemple 'stantem sedere' mentionné ici par Abélard est en effet une allusion manifeste aux *Réfutations sophistiques*, comme le montre bien un autre passage de la même *Logica Ingredientibus*:

Videntur autem (sc. modales) duobus modis exponi posse, veluti si dicam 'possibile est stantem sedere'. Ut enim docet Aristoteles in sophisticis elenchis, alius est sensus per divisionem, alius per compositionem; per compositionem vero est si stare et sedere simul in eodem subiecto coniungat, ac si dicamus possibile est stantem sedere manentem stantem, id est sedere simul et stare...¹³

Le contact entre les *Réfutations sophistiques* et la question 'an aliter potest fieri quam Deus praesciverit', s'est donc déjà produit avec Abélard, mais il faudra attendre Pierre de Poitiers pour qu'on puisse constater une véritable assimilation de la terminologie des *Réfutations sophistiques*.

2.1.4. Un'hypothèse et quelques conclusions

Nous pouvons, à ce point, suggérer une hypothèse qui expliquerait pourquoi certaines *fallaciae* furent largement utilisées en théologie, alors que d'autres, qui pourtant auraient pu être appliquées avec profit, en sont totalement absentes.¹⁴ Alors que, pour les premières, la tradition théologique antérieure fournissait aux maîtres en *sacra pagina* de la seconde moitié du XII^e siècle des analyses logico-linguistiques, qu'il suffisait alors simplement de traduire et d'affiner, ce ne fut pas le cas pour la *fallaciae accentus, secundum non causa ut causa* et *secundum petitionem principii*. Il resterait à vérifier cette hypothèse en étudiant systématiquement les contextes d'application de toutes les *fallaciae* utilisées en théologie. Tout ce qu'on a vu jusqu'ici ne réduit pas l'impact novateur que les arts du discours en général et la théorie des *fallaciae* en particulier exercent sur la réflexion théologique à partir d'Odon de Soissons, mais surtout de Pierre de Poitiers et d'Alain de Lille. En

¹³ Pierre Abélard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, p. 489; cf. Aristote, RS, Ar. Lat. 6, pp. 8 s. A propos de la connaissance des *Réfutations sophistiques* par Pierre Abélard cf. de Rijk, dans l'introduction à son édition de la *Dialectica*, pp. XVII ss., et Id. 1962: 59-61 et 109-112. Abélard cite les *Réfutations sophistiques* encore une fois dans sa *Logica Ingredientibus* (p. 400), mais la façon dont il le fait démontre qu'il a seulement eu un accès limité, probablement partiel à cet ouvrage: "memini tamen quendam me libellum vidisse et diligenter relegisse, qui sub nomine Aristotelis De sophisticis elenchis intitulatus erat."

¹⁴ Je remercie Sten Ebbesen pour avoir attiré mon attention sur cette donnée.

témoigne déjà le grand nombre de mentions explicites faites aux *fallaciae* par ces auteurs par opposition à l'absence, du moins explicite, de telles références chez Pierre Lombard, ou au caractère sporadique et limité des mêmes mentions chez Pierre Abélard. Ce que nous avons vu met plutôt en évidence la complexité de l'échange entre logique et théologie, et le fait qu'à l'intérieur de la tradition théologique se déroule tout au cours du XII^e siècle un courant de réflexion logico-linguistique partiellement autonome, à travers lequel l'apport de la *logica nova* s'engage graduellement et sous le signe de la continuité et du développement beaucoup plus que sous celui de la rupture.

2.2. Matériaux théologiques dans les *Fallaciae logiques*

2.2.1. *Alius et aliud dans la Summa Sophisticorum elencorum, chez Alain de Lille et chez Pierre de Poitiers*

Un autre élément de cet échange complexe est constitué par la présence de thématiques théologiques à l'intérieur des traités logiques qui réélaborent les matériaux des *Réfutations sophistiques*. Dans la *Summa Sophisticorum elencorum* et dans le *Tractatus de dissimilitudine argumentorum*, tous deux édités par de Rijk dans sa *Logica Modernorum*, et datés entre 1130 et 1160 (cf. Ebbesen 1993: 151), on peut trouver différents paralogismes théologiques comparables à ceux qui sont traités dans les sommes théologiques des années 60. Dans l'analyse des *paralogismi figurae dictionis de masculino in neutrum* de la *Summa Sophisticorum elencorum* (éd. de Rijk 1962: 331) nous pouvons lire par exemple le passage suivant (repris mot à mot dans le *Tractatus de dissimilitudine argumentorum*, éd. de Rijk 1962: 480):

Item de eodem: 'Pater non est ille qui est Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus; ergo Pater non est id quod est Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus'. Non sequitur, quia interpretatus sum masculinum neutrum. Cum enim dico: 'Pater non est ille qui est etc.', hoc nomen 'qui' denotat personam; cum vero dico 'ergo Pater non est id quod est etc.', hoc nomen 'quod' denotat substantiam, et ideo non sequitur. Idem de eodem: 'Alius est Pater et alius est Filius, et alius Spiritus Sanctus; ergo aliud est Pater et aliud est Filius etc.'. Interpretatus sum masculinum neutrum, quia cum dico: alius est Pater etc., denotatur persona; cum vero concludo: aliud est Pater etc., denotatur substantia. Et ideo non sequitur.

Alain de Lille écrivant à propos des noms concernant les trois personnes de la trinité, énonce en détail la règle qui est à la base de l'analyse de la *Summa Sophisticorum elencorum*, mais il le fait au moyen d'une argumentation à caractère grammatical, et sans aucune référence à la *fallacia figurae dictionis*. Il écrit entre autres:

Sed queritur si Pater est unum cum Filio in persona vel aliud? Et si est unus cum Filio in substantia, vel alius? Ad hoc dicimus quod huiusmodi locutiones sunt incongrue; quia huiusmodi adiectiva: unus, alius, idem, et consimilia in masculino et feminino faciunt in personam, in neutro in substantiam. ... Quia sicut in grammatica adiectivum in masculino et feminino facit discretionem sexus vel generis, et determinate vult ad rem generis non ad genus rei referri, unde desiderat substantivum cui innitatur, ut albus equus, alba mulier; in neutro vero ... confuse ponitur;... Sic in theologia huiusmodi adiectiva in masculino et feminino determinate ponuntur ut faciant persone distinctionem, et ita faciunt in persona<m> et redundant in rem generis, id est in persona<m> et non in genus rei id est in usiam. In neutro vero e converso.¹⁵

Pierre de Poitiers développe une argumentation semblable, où d'ailleurs sous la locution de *commutatio adiectivorum* perce peut-être une référence à la *fallacia figurae dictionis*:

... quamvis idem sit persona et essentia, quedam tamen sunt adiectiva persone que non essentie; nam neutra *aliud* et *idem* sunt adiectiva essentie, masculina vero *alius* et *idem* sunt adiectiva persone. Unde facta commutatione adiectivorum minus grammaticae dicitur.¹⁶

L'incertitude dans les datations nous empêche de déterminer si les *Summae* d'Alain de Lille et de Pierre de Poitiers précèdent ou non la *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, et, s'il y a eu une influence entre production théologique et ouvrages logiques à ce niveau, dans quel sens elle s'est produite. D'une part, on pourrait penser que l'auteur de la *Summa Sophisticorum elencorum* a tiré de textes théologiques les matériaux qu'il insère dans son ouvrage. D'autre part, l'insertion de thématiques théologiques dans des traités lo-

¹⁵ Alain de Lille, *Summa Quoniam homines*, p. 182. J'ai corrigé le texte de l'édition sur la base d'une suggestion de Sten Ebbesen, pour laquelle je le remercie également.

¹⁶ Pierre de Poitiers, *Sent.*, p. 18. L'on remarque que chez Pierre de Poitiers au lieu du terme '*substantia*', connoté dans un sens grammatical, se trouve le terme, plus proprement théologique, de '*essentia*'. Cf. Odon de Soissons (?), ed. Pitra, p. 77: "Hoc autem nomen '*essentia*' proprie convenit divinitati, et non hoc '*substantia*,' scilicet substari alicui non habet" (*sic ed.*).

giques qui se rattachent aux *Réfutations sophistiques* aura très probablement favorisé le recours aux *fallaciae* de la part des maîtres en *sacra pagina*. Si l'on tient compte du fait que les écrits de cette époque sont souvent le résultat d'une activité d'enseignement, et que donc leur rédaction peut s'être prolongée pendant plusieurs années, on pourrait aussi faire l'hypothèse que l'échange eut lieu en même temps dans les deux directions.

2.2.2. *Derechef, Abélard*

Mais dans ce cas aussi il faut noter l'existence d'une tradition préalable, à la fois logique et théologique, dans laquelle est abordé ce thème: de nouveau nous sommes ramenés à Abélard. En effet, le thème des différents types d'identité et de différence/altérité est centrale dans les ouvrages théologiques de celui-ci: dans la *Theologia Scholarium* par exemple on trouve à plusieurs endroits des considérations sur le fait que le Père est *alius* par rapport au Fils (*differentia secundum proprietates*), mais non *aliud* (*differentia substantialis*). On y lit entre autres:

...in una diuinitatis substantia pater et filius et spiritus sanctus uniuntur, cum unaquaqueque plenus ac perfectus sit deus, nec substantiali discrepent differentia, ut aliud sit hec persona quam illa. Sicut nec Socrates aliud est quam Plato, sed alius proprietatis suae singularitate, sic et pater a filio uel spiritu sancto uel ipse filius a spiritu sancto proprietate distinguitur, ut sit alius personaliter, non aliud substantialiter.¹⁷

Ce même thème est évoqué également dans les *Sententiae secundum magistrum Petrum*, ouvrage à caractère logique dû très probablement à Abélard (cf. van der Lecq 1987: 43-56), où l'on peut lire:

Sicut ergo identitatem rerum duobus modis accipimus, uno quidem secundum personam (ut 'idem est Marcus quam Tullius'), alio modo secundum naturam sive speciem seu quacumque similitudine (ut 'idem est Petrus quam Marcus', utpote homo vel animal sicut et ille), ita relatio, que semper secundum <res> fit, duobus modis accipitur scilicet secundum identitatem persone vel nature. Circa identitatem quidem persone relatio fit negative apud Sedulium ibi: "Non quia qui summus pater est, et filius hic est" (ac si diceret "non est eadem utriusque persona"); affirmative autem circa naturam relatio fit apud eundem ubi statim subditur: "sed quia quod summus pater est, et filius hic est" (ac si diceret "eiusdem nature hec est per-

¹⁷ Abélard, *Theologia Scholarium*, p. 461. Cf. aussi ibid., pp. 412 (passage cité par van der Lecq 1987: 50) et 476.

sona et illa”, hoc est “similis sive indifferens in natura divine substantie”). Ibi itaque ‘qui’ relativum nomen secundum eandem personam relative ponitur, hic ‘quod’ secundum naturam relative supponitur (*Sententiae secundum magistrum Petrum*, p. 116 s.).

Abélard apparaît aussi comme source explicitement mentionnée – et critiquée – par l’auteur de la *Summa Sophisticorum elencorum* à propos d’une question sur la connaissance divine des possibles non actualisés, question présentée dans le cadre de la discussion des *inopinabilia*:

<De inopinabili> ... Item. Sunt alia quibus utrinque ducimur ad inopinabile, utpote: ‘possibile est Socratem esse bonum, cum ipse sit malus, ita quod Deus potest scire illud vel non.’ Si concedatur quod possibile sit Socratem esse bonum, et Deus non potest scire illud, – ut magister Petrus faciebat (Cf. *Dialectica* II, pp. 217 ss. et *Logica Ingredientibus*, pp. 426 ss.) – potest inferri: ‘ergo aliquid potest esse quod Deus non potest scire; ergo Deus est impotens.’ Et etiam: ‘quidam stultus potest scire id quod Deus non potest scire’, scilicet Socratem esse bonum. Que quidem inopinabilia sunt. Item. Ex alia parte sequitur improbable, scilicet si concedatur quod possibile sit Socratem esse <bonum> et Deus potest scire illud. Potest enim concludi: ‘ergo Deus potest scire aliud quam scit, ergo plura quam scit’. Hoc autem inopinabile est quod Deus plura possit scire quam sciat, cum scientia Dei nequit augmentari vel diminui. Utrinque igitur secutum est improbable sive inopinabile. Et similiter fit in multis aliis (*Summa Sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 402).

Ainsi donc, tout comme il y a une tradition d’analyse logique déjà interne à la théologie, il y a aussi une tradition de thèmes théologiques abordés en logique. La question reste ouverte de déterminer si ces traditions se rencontrent ou se rejoignent, et le moment où elles le font. Certes les passages cités des ouvrages d’Abélard pourraient expliquer les textes cités de la *Summa sophisticorum elencorum* sans qu’il soit nécessaire de penser à une influence directe d’ouvrages théologiques plus tardifs.

Pour schématiser une situation en réalité complexe et dynamique, nous pourrions distinguer les trois moments suivants, qui vont se croiser et peut-être se rejoindre entre les années 50 et 60 du XII^e siècle:

1) Un courant de réflexions logico-linguistiques déjà interne à la tradition théologique, empruntées principalement à la *logica vetus*, mais dans lequel se produisent des embryons d’analyses de certains thèmes théologiques qui peuvent très bien se développer ultérieurement à l’aide de la terminologie des *Réfutations sophistiques*. Représentée éminemment d’un côté par Abélard et par les

ouvrages théologiques de son école, et de l'autre par Gilbert de Poitiers et ses élèves, cette lignée se poursuit dans la seconde moitié du siècle par l'intermédiaire de Pierre Lombard.

2) Une tendance à insérer des thèmes théologiques dans les ouvrages logiques, tendance déjà manifeste chez Abélard et ensuite reprise par les premiers maîtres en logique qui ont assimilé l'apport de la *logica nova*, au moins pour ce qui concerne les *Réfutations sophistiques*, comme l'auteur de la *Summa Sophisticorum elencorum*.

3) L'entrée des *fallaciae* dans les ouvrages théologiques avec Odon de Soissons, puis avec Alain de Lille et surtout Pierre de Poitiers. Elle se produit, au moins partiellement, en développant, à l'aide de termes techniques tirés des *fallaciae*, des analyses déjà esquissées auparavant sur la base de la seule *logica vetus*.

3. Entre didactique et spéculation: trois traités de '*fallaciae* théologiques'

Autours de dernières décennies du XII^e siècle, un quatrième élément va s'ajouter dans ce cadre: il s'agit d'un petit nombre d'ouvrages dont la structure est très proche de celle des *Fallaciae* logiques, lorsque dans les exemples les matériaux profanes ont été complètement remplacés par des textes théologiques. Je veux parler des *Fallaciae magistri Willelmi*, éditées par de Rijk dans sa LM et plus récemment par Iwakuma, des *Fallaciae in sacra pagina*, anonymes et inédites, et du *De tropis loquendi* de Pierre le Chantre.

Bien que singuliers, ces traités ne sont pas complètement isolés au sein de la littérature théologique de leur époque. A côté des commentaires sur les Saintes Écritures, des sommes (*Sententiarum* et *Quaestionum*) et des sermons, les trois genres littéraires théologiques les plus connus, strictement liés aux trois activités scolastiques – *lectio*, *disputatio* et *praedicatio* –, la période située au tournant des XII^e et XIII^e siècle présente en effet un certain nombre de traités théologiques difficiles à classer, et représentant des genres littéraires parfois uniques (cf. Valente 1997a: 46 ss.). Ces ouvrages, caractérisés par une finalité essentiellement pratique et didactique, ne manquent cependant pas d'originalité et manifestent, en quelques passages, une certaine profondeur spéculative. Ils ont en commun un intérêt très vif pour les problématiques du langage théologique, et ils sont articulés selon des structures très différentes, mais qui reflètent toutes cet intérêt dans un sens plus

ou moins technique: l'ordre alphabétique dans plusieurs *Distinctiones* bibliques, l'ordre des parties du discours dans le traité *De contradictionibus Sacrae Scripturae* de Guarnier de Rochefort (cf. éd. Baeumker, p. XXXIX), l'ordre des constituants logiques du discours, du plus simple au plus complexe, (impropriété dans les *dic-tiones*, dans les *constructiones*, dans l'*oratio* et dans le *modus dicendi*) dans le *De tropis* de Guillaume de Montibus (Göring 1992: 357; liste des mss. 354 ss.), l'ordre des arguments topiques tiré du *De differentiis topicis* II de Boèce dans les *Loci theologici*, également de Guillaume de Montibus (éd. Iwakuma). C'est évidemment dans ce contexte qu'il faut insérer les trois traités dont nous parlons.

3.1. *Les Fallaciae Magistri Willelmi*

Les *Fallaciae Magistri Willelmi*, conservées dans au moins deux mss.¹⁸ où elles sont à chaque fois associées aux *Loci theologici* de Guillaume de Montibus, sont très probablement à attribuer à ce même maître et semblent remonter aux années 1186-1200.¹⁹ Des trois ouvrages considérés ici, c'est le plus proche d'un traité de logique, et il suit très fidèlement la matière des *Réfutations sophistiques*. Par rapport aux traités logiques comme les *Fallaciae Londinenses* et *Parvipontanae*, les *Fallaciae Magistri Willelmi* se distinguent parce qu'elles sont explicitement adressées aux théologiens²⁰ et parce que les exemples sont constitués pour la plupart par des paralogismes portant sur un sujet théologique, souvent à caractère moral (ex. *Iste est bonus theologus, iste est theologus, ergo iste est bonus*, pour la *fallacia divisionis*). Pour le reste pourtant, elles sont bâties de la même façon que les traités logiques: chaque *fallacia* est d'abord définie et éventuellement divisée selon ses espèces, ensuite on donne une brève explication de la définition et enfin les exemples: un, tout au plus deux pour chaque espèce de *fallacia*, ceux-ci ne touchent jamais des thèmes d'une quelconque complexité théorique et ils ne sont jamais analysés en profondeur: ils sont simplement proposés et ont une valeur purement explicative. Le but des *Fallaciae magistri Willelmi* est simplement didactique:

18 London, British Museum, Royal MSS 9 E XII, ff. 227ra-229ra; Cambridge, Jesus College Q.B.17, ff. 9rb-12va.

19 Cf. Guillaume de Montibus, *Fallaciae*, éd. Y. Iwakuma, p. 4 et n. 16. Ebbesen 1993: 154 donne l'indication 1160-1200.

20 Cf. l'explicit, p. 28: "Hec rudibus theologis nostris ne fallantur de fallaciis proposuimus."

introduire une terminologie, décrire et expliquer des techniques d'analyse d'un texte.

3.2. *Les Fallaciae in sacra pagina (ou in theologia)*

Le cas des *Fallaciae in sacra pagina* est différent. Inédites, elles sont conservées dans au moins 7 manuscrits (Giusberti 1982: 97, n. 95). Jean Leclercq s'en occupa déjà en 1945, et elles furent ensuite étudiées par Franco Giusberti et par Francesco del Punta.²¹ Comme les *Fallaciae magistri Willelmi*, les *Fallaciae in sacra pagina* suivent les subdivisions des *Réfutations sophistiques*, mais elles le font avec une plus grande liberté: les *fallaciae accentus*, *non causa ut causa* et *petitio principii* font défaut – voir schéma dans l'annexe n. 2 – et ceci est dû au fait qu'elles ne jouent aucun rôle en théologie, selon l'opinion explicite de l'auteur.²² Par contre, d'autres subdivisions à caractère purement théologique sont ajoutées, ce qui est aussi explicitement souligné par l'auteur.²³

Mais la caractéristique la plus intéressante de cet ouvrage est que le rapport entre les parties descriptives et les exemples se modifie par rapport aux *Fallaciae* logiques et aux *fallaciae magistri Willelmi*. Le but de l'ouvrage n'est plus, ou n'est plus seulement, celui d'instruire les étudiants en *sacra pagina* sur les techniques d'analyse des textes, il est surtout de mettre en acte des pratiques de réfutation, comme l'indique le prologue:

(Fidem nostram) persequitur materialis gladius, manifestus hereticus et hostis domesticus. Contra duo ultima incommoda, hoc est contra cavillationes manifesti heretici et domestici hostis insidias, modum et artem repellendi earum versutiam suscipimus in tractatum (Ms. Paris, BN Franc. 19951, f. 33r, cf. Leclercq 1945: 44).

²¹ Que je remercie pour m'avoir fourni la transcription sur laquelle se basent les quelques remarques que je ferai ici.

²² Ms. Paris, BN Franc. 19951, f. 58r: "Sunt et alie fallacie que a Sacre Pagina sacrario excluduntur, ut fallacia accentus et non causa ut causa et petitio principii." Cf. aussi f. 54v: "Sed quoniam hec species (scil. figura dictionis ex simili vocum terminatione) nusquam occurrit in sacra pagina, ad aliam que commutatio predicamenti dicitur transeamus." L'auteur anonyme veut probablement ici affirmer qu'il n'a pas trouvé dans les ouvrages théologiques des références explicites à ces *fallaciae*, plutôt que soutenir que en théologie il n'existe absolument pas de questions telles qu'on puisse les aborder sur la base de celles-ci.

²³ Cf. *Fallaciae in sacra pagina*, ms. Paris, BN Franc. 19951, f. 55v: "Ampliat enim theologus naturam fallacie (scil. figure dictionis), assignans eam ubi fit progressus a persona ad personam, vel a statu ad statum, vel a tempore ad tempus, vel a loco ad locum."

En cohérence avec cette finalité plus pratique que didactique, les textes introduits à la place des exemples assument un rôle central, ils sont importants pour eux-mêmes. En témoigne d'abord leur très grand nombre: il y en a 7 rien que pour la *fallacia aequivocationis ex varia relatione*, et jusqu'à 14 pour la *fallacia compositionis et divisionis*. En atteste surtout le type de textes choisis: en effet, il ne s'agit plus de propositions quasi insignifiantes inventées *ad hoc* pour exemplifier la *fallacia* dont on parle, mais de questions âprement débattues dans les écoles en *sacra pagina*. Nous pouvons souvent trouver les mêmes questions dans les sommes théologiques de l'époque, comme la question mentionnée ci-dessus "an aliquid potest aliter evenire quam sit previsum a Deo".²⁴ L'auteur des *Fallaciae in sacra pagina* présente quelquefois plusieurs solutions possibles pour une même question, introduites comme d'habitude par "Alii dicunt...", "Aliter tamen potest dici...", ou bien il fait des digressions pour approfondir un sujet théologique qu'il juge important.²⁵ Dans d'autres cas, il suggère au lecteur/auditeur une *instantia* pour réfuter un argument (cf. ff. 35r, 35v, 39v, 42v, 42r). En définitive, on pourrait dire que cet ouvrage constitue un recueil de questions théologiques ordonnées, non selon la subdivision systématique des sujets traités, structure usuelle dans les sommes, mais selon la subdivision systématique des instruments utilisés pour résoudre les questions, subdivision modelée sur le schéma des *Fallaciae*.

3.3. *Le De tropis loquendi de Pierre le Chantre*

Dans le *De tropis loquendi* de Pierre le Chantre la tendance présente dans le *Fallaciae in sacra pagina* à limiter les parties descriptives pour mettre au centre de l'attention les problèmes posés par les textes est portée à l'extrême. Conservé dans 23 mss. (Giusberti 1982: 101 s.), et étudié lui aussi par Franco Giusberti, puis par Gillian Rosmary Evans (bibliographie dans Valente 1997a) et par moi-même, ce traité remonte aux années 1180-1197 (Valente 1997a: 27 ss.). Sa structure est clairement tirée de celle de la *fallacia aequivocationis* et, pour une petite partie, de la *fallacia ex amphibolia* (cf. annexe n. 3). Il ne se présente pas pourtant comme un

²⁴ F. 53 v. J'ai signalé dans le schéma de l'annexe n. 2 les correspondances avec les *Sentences* de Pierre de Poitiers.

²⁵ Cf. f. 39 v.: "Ad eius evidentiam notande sunt quinque notiones quas distinguit Augustinus circa tres personas...".

ouvrage de *fallaciae*, mais plutôt comme un traité dont le but est la résolution des contradictions présentes dans les Saintes Écritures à l'aide des tropes et notamment des *fallaciae* (cf. prologue, éd. Giusberti 1982: 105 s.). Le mode choisi par Pierre le Chantre pour se rapporter aux techniques d'analyse linguistique se caractérise par une très grande liberté: il suit bien le principe, explicitement énoncé, que les arts libéraux sont subordonnés à la *sacra pagina* et doivent être à son service (Valente 1997a: 113 ss.). Cette liberté se manifeste, entre autres, dans le fait que les articulations de la *fallacia aequivocationis*, qui fournissent la structure de base de l'ouvrage, sont enrichies par plusieurs sous-articulations d'origine grammaticale et rhétorique, et dans le fait que le nombre des exemples est extraordinairement grand. Il ne s'agit pas en effet d'exemples, mais de matériaux textuels dont la résolution constitue le but déclaré de l'ouvrage. On y trouve quelques questions débattues dans les sommes théologiques, mais la plupart des textes examinés sont des citations bibliques et patristiques qui posent des problèmes: ou elles sont en contradiction avec d'autres passages qui sont aussi des autorités, ou elles ne semblent pas orthodoxes du point de vue doctrinal, ou encore elles sont simplement ambiguës. Comme dans les *Fallaciae in sacra pagina*, où le cadre des *fallaciae* est utilisé pour structurer un ensemble de questions théologiques, dans le *De tropis loquendi*, le cadre de la *fallacia aequivocationis* est utilisé pour bâtir un traité d'exégèse biblique consacré à la concordance.

4. Perspectives de recherche

Le rapport entre littérature logique et théologique au cours de la seconde moitié du XII^e siècle et au delà, présente des problèmes difficiles à résoudre, problèmes qu'on peut tous ramener à une difficulté de base: celle d'évaluer la mesure de l'autonomie de la réflexion logico-linguistique en théologie par rapport aux arts, et parallèlement la mesure de l'influence réciproque entre les deux domaines. Si en effet, comme nous l'avons vu, les théologiens utilisent en abondance les *fallaciae*, par ailleurs ils en développent les notions techniques, ce qui pourrait avoir eu des retombées dans le domaine même de la logique. Nous ne toucherons ici que très brièvement quelques-uns des sujets de recherche possibles concernant le rôle des *fallaciae* en théologie au tournant des XII^e

et XIII^e siècle, et les contrecoups – en théologie et en logique – de cette rencontre.

D'abord, on y a déjà fait allusion, l'introduction et le développement en théologie de certaines notions sémantiques, en particulier celles de *suppositio* et *consignificatio*. Tirées par les maîtres en théologie, en part du moins (on connaît l'importance des sources grammaticales) des ouvrages logiques consacrées aux *fallaciae*, ces notions ont subi en théologie des transformations et des approfondissements importants: à côté de la *suppositio* les théologiens ont introduit la *copulatio* (Ebbesen 1987a: 413 s.); la *consignificatio* au sens d'un contenu sémantique secondaire est devenue *connotatio*, notion largement utilisée par les théologiens du début du XIII^e siècle mais ensuite critiquée et abandonnée par Thomas d'Aquin (Valente: 1997b: 47s.); là où au début on parlait de *fallacia aequivocationis* ou *univocationis* on discutera plus tard de l'équivocité, de l'univocité, puis de l'analogie à propos des termes dits de Dieu et des créatures (par exemple 'iustus') ou des termes trinitaires, comme 'persona' (Rosier 1995: 144, 146 et 154). Les *fallaciae* pourraient donc avoir fourni à la théologie des instruments techniques, qui, réélaborés et transformés ensuite à l'intérieur de la tradition théologique même, y ont joué un rôle important en étant aussi sujet d'un débat très vif. Dans un deuxième moment, lorsque les logiciens des XIII^e et XIV^e siècle utiliseront des notions telles que celles de *copulatio* et de *connotatio*, ils le feront en reprenant entre autres les développements réalisés par les théologiens du XII^e siècle, à partir de thèmes originellement empruntés aux *Fallaciae*.

Une autre question qui mériterait d'être étudiée, à propos des retombées en logique des élaborations des théologiens, est celle du rôle que la littérature théologique pourrait avoir joué dans l'évolution du genre des sophismes. En particulier, l'on pourrait étudier les lieux où les théologiens ont recours aux *fallaciae* ou à la pratique des *instantiae*, en tenant compte du fait que les trois termes *sophisma*, *fallacia* et *instantia* sont utilisés comme synonymes, et que, au moins à l'époque des *Quaestiones Victorinae* (I^e moitié du XII^e siècle), considérées comme un prototype du genre des sophismes (Kretzmann 1982: 241), la distinction entre sophismes théologiques et sophismes logiques ne semblait pas très pertinente. Dans certains cas, on peut trouver dans la littérature théologique du XII^e siècle des précédents pour des sophismes qui deviendront très communs ultérieurement, que leur sujet soit ma-

nifestement théologique comme *Tantum pater est* (cf. par ex. Pierre Lombard, I 4 1, p. 77 s.; I 21 1 et 2, pp. 174 s.; Ebbesen 1995: 180), ou qu'il soit de nature profane (cf. de Libera 1987: 456).

Le traitement des syncatégorèmes est lié à la question précédente: les théologiens du XII^e siècle ont très fréquemment recours à des distinctions détaillées des acceptions différentes des termes non-catégorématiques pour résoudre des paralogismes ou simplement des ambiguïtés dans des propositions théologiques (cf. Ebbesen 1995: 180). Des distinctions semblables se trouvent en logique dans les *Fallaciae Parvipontanae* et dans d'autres *Fallaciae*, traitées habituellement sous la *fallacia aequivocationis*. Mais les analyses des termes non-catégorématiques dans les années 70 et 80 du XII^e siècle sont beaucoup plus répandues dans la littérature théologique que dans la littérature logique: les *Liber distinctionum dictionum theologiarum* d'Alain de Lille, par exemple, ne contiennent pas moins de 61 termes non-catégorématiques, le *De tropis loquendi* de Pierre le Chantre 16 (*sicut, melius, de, tertio, hic, secundum, ut, preter, plus, pro, donec, ne, propter, ab, retro, infra*; cf. pour *secundum* Giusberti 1982: 94 s.), les *Fallaciae in sacra pagina* 7 (*in, secundum, per, ab, ex, omnis, totus*). De plus, les analyses des théologiens sont souvent très approfondies, en distinguant jusqu'à une dizaine d'acceptions différentes pour le même terme. Certes, dans la plupart des cas il s'agit de prépositions et d'adverbes, à savoir de syncatégorèmes dans le sens grammatical du terme (= 'parties du discours qui ne sont ni nom ni verbe'), mais parfois les théologiens abordent aussi les syncatégorèmes dans le sens que ce terme prendra en logique au XIII^e siècle (= termes ayant une signification indéterminée et exerçant une influence sur le signifié de la proposition entière):²⁶ la présence de l'analyse de *praeter* et des syncatégorèmes d'aspect (*incipit* et *desinit*) a été déjà remarquée dans la *Summa Quoniam homines* d'Alain de Lille (de Libera 1987: 455 s.), et l'édition partielle des questions d'Etienne Langton dans les CIMAGL 1985 (n. 46) a montré le grand nombre

26 Sur la distinction entre un sens grammatical et un sens logique du mot *syncatogorema* cf. Kretzmann 1982: 211 ss. La distinction est pourtant problématique: déjà Priscien en effet (Kretzmann 1982: 211, n. 3), et après aussi l'*Ars Burana* (de Rijk 1967b: 180), attribuent notamment aux dialecticiens la définition au sens grammatical, à condition que dans cette définition 'nom' et 'verbe' soient pris en un sens large, celui des dialecticiens; ils comprennent sous le nom les pronoms et les adverbes qui peuvent fonctionner comme sujets, sous le verbe les participes.

d'analyses de syncatégorèmes présentes dans cet ouvrage (*alius, et, idem, praeter, solus, tantum, unus*). Dans les *Fallaciae in sacra pagina*, 'omnis' et 'totus' sont analysés sous la rubrique *fallacia aequivocationis ex varia comprehensione <signi>*, bien séparés des prépositions et des adverbes, qui sont analysés sous la rubrique *fallacia aequivocationis ex vario officio* (voir schéma dans l'annexe n. 2).

Les questions qui viennent d'être mentionnées ne sont pas des cas isolés de sujets logiques analysés *in sacra pagina* au XII^e siècle, mais représentent plutôt la règle pour les ouvrages théologiques de cette époque. Il vaudrait donc la peine d'étudier de plus près cette littérature dans le cadre de la reconstruction de l'histoire des notions sémantiques, des syncatégorèmes et des sophismes, et plus généralement de la *logica modernorum*.

Annexe 1

Les fallaciae dans les sommes théologiques entre Pierre Lombard et Guillaume d'Auxerre. Quelques données.

– Dans les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard, qui remontent à la moitié des années 50 du XII^e siècle, on ne trouve aucune mention explicite des termes tirés des *Réfutations sophistiques* ou des *Fallaciae*. Néanmoins, cet ouvrage joue probablement dans la suite un certain rôle en favorisant le recours aux *fallaciae* de la part des théologiens.

– Dans les nombreux recueils de questions attribués à Odon de Soissons et à son école, la terminologie des *fallaciae* émerge clairement. Ces recueils remontent semble-t-il à la même époque que les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard, mais elles contiennent aussi des matériaux plus tardifs. En tout cas, ils témoignent, sur certains points, d'une tendance doctrinale en contraste manifeste avec celle de Pierre Lombard, et une des différences les plus éclatantes est justement le recours massif, de la part d'Odon, à la dialectique (Hödl 1958: 71). Dans l'édition partielle de Pitra j'ai trouvé 4 mentions explicites de *fallaciae*: *compositio et divisio*, p. 99 et 113; *commutatio praedicamenti*, p. 99; *fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*, p. 181.

– Dans la *Summa Quoniam homines* d'Alain de Lille (datée selon certains des années 60, selon d'autres des années 80, cfr. Nielsen 1982: 342-343), la terminologie des *fallaciae* se trouve explicitement 8 fois: *fallacia <aequivocationis> ex diversis consignificationibus*

(p. 228), *univocationis* (252 s.), *amphiboliae* (234), *divisionis et compositionis* (230, 234, 246 s.), et *commutatio praedica<men>ti* (156 et 265). De Libera 1987: 468, n. 64 considère qu'il est probable qu'Alain, en plus de connaître la littérature des *Fallaciae*, ait eu un accès direct aussi aux *Réfutations sophistiques* mêmes. En tout cas dans sa *Summa la logica nova* émerge clairement: cf. p. 127, "Ait enim aristotiles in posterioribus analiticis..."; et p. 282: "Unde Alexander in commento super librum *Elencorum...*". Dans les *Regulae caelestis iuris* du même auteur, datées des années 80, la thématique des *fallaciae* ne semble pas être explicitement présente.

– Dans les premiers deux livres des *Sentences* de Pierre de Poitiers (écrites entre 1168 et 1176, probablement avant 1170) 8 des 13 *fallaciae* sont mentionnées par leur nom technique – les passages sont édités dans De Rijk 1962: 167 ss.). Pourtant, si l'on considère aussi les cas où le terme 'fallacia' est utilisé sans indiquer une espèce de paralogisme, on arrive jusqu'à plus de 60 mentions seulement dans le premier livre. A celles-ci il faut ajouter les nombreux cas dans lesquels un exemple de *fallacia* est introduit comme *instantia*, selon une superposition terminologique qui a été remarquée également dans les ouvrages logiques (Iwakuma 1982: 3). Dans la plupart des cas la *fallacia* ou *instantia* qu'on veut utiliser est indiquée seulement par un exemple avec des prémisses et une conclusion à caractère profane en tous points semblables à celles des *fallaciae* ou *instantiae* des ouvrages logiques. Quelques fois pourtant l'exemple a un caractère théologique, cf. p. 45: "Item, potentia generandi est potentia Patris; nulla est potentia Patris que non sit potentia Filii, ergo est potentia Filii, ergo potentia generandi est in Filio. Fallacia ultimi: potentia peccandi erit potentia istius qui iam confirmabitur; ergo potentia peccandi erit in isto." D'autres fois Pierre de Poitiers propose deux exemples, l'un théologique et l'autre profane, cf. p. 15: "Ex quo manifestum est in predictis argumentationibus impedimentum esse fallaciam equivocationis. Instantia ad primam: idem appellatur hoc nomine *nomen* et hoc nomine *vox*; ergo vel iste due voces non sunt unum nomen, vel sunt una vox; vel ita: idem significatur hoc nomen *sciens* et hoc nomine *prescius*; ergo vel Deus potuit non esse sciens, vel non potuit non esse prescius."

– Dans l'édition du premier livre de la *Summa Qui producit ventos* de Prévostin (1190-1194) l'expression '*fallacia*' semble faire défaut, mais à sa place on trouve 7 fois l'expression '*sophisma*': *sophisma aequivocationis* (270, 287), *sophisma compositionis et divisionis* (p.

243), *sophisma secundum accidens* (263, 301, 290), *sophisma secundum quid et simpliciter* (292; cf. aussi Angelini 1972: 108).

– Etienne Langton (1150/55-1228) a recours aux *fallaciae* 6 fois dans son Commentaire sur les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard: *fallaciae compositionis et divisionis* (pp. 27, 52 ss., 60), *secundum accidens* (p. 47, ed. *falsa secundum accidens*) et *secundum consequens* (p. 61). Dans la *Summa quaestionum* en revanche (qui remonte aux années 80 et 90) les *fallaciae* semblent être moins présentes: dans les parties éditées dans CIMAGL 1985 on trouve seulement une fois la *fallacia accidentis* (p. 113; v. Ebbesen 1987a: 402).

– Dans le *Speculum Speculationum* d'Alexandre Nequam (1201-1213) nous trouvons au moins 10 occurrences de *fallaciae*: *aequivocatio* (pp. 102 s., 171, 173, 198, 222, 240), *amphibolia* (p. 31), *divisim de re* (187), *fallacia secundum consequens* (p. 220).

– Dans le premier livre de la *Summa aurea* (1215-1229) de Guillaume d'Auxerre les *fallaciae* sont mentionnées explicitement au moins 27 fois: *fallacia aequivocationis* (pp. 55, 132 [impl.], 168, 169 [impl.], 274), *fallacia univocationis* (pp. 49, 142, 169 [impl.]), *amphibolia* (183), *divisa/coniuncta* (197), *de re/de dicto* (208), *fallacia ex commutatione praedicamenti* (pp. 130, 136), *fallacia accidentis* (pp. 46, 73, 115, 131 x 2, 133, 162, 180, 194, 202), *fallacia secundum consequens* (pp. 52, 133, 142, 184, 194, 248, 386).

Annexe 2

Anon., *Fallaciae in sacra pagina*
ms. Paris, BN fr. 19951, ff. 33-62

Structure de l'ouvrage	Quelques exemples des textes analysés (le traité en a plusieurs pour chaque <i>fallacia</i> ou <i>species fallaciae</i>)
<p><i>Prologue</i></p> <p>I. Fallacia equivocationis</p> <p>1.1. ex varia demonstratione</p>	<p>Omnis pena est a Deo, sed hec pena est aliqua pena – demonstrata pena iniusta – ergo hec pena iniusta est a Deo</p> <p>Hoc est corpus meum...</p>

1.2. ex varia relatione	Deus genuit Deum, ergo Deum se vel alium Deum. Si genuit se Deum, ergo genuit se. Si genuit alium Deum, ergo alius Deus est ab eo quem genuit ipse Cf. Pierre de Poitiers, pp. 217 s.
1.3. ex varia significatione	Idem est Deo esse Deum et esse personam , sed Deus est tres persone; ergo persona est tres persone... Cf. Pierre de Poitiers, p. 13
1.4. ex varia consignificatione	Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt aliqua vel plura. Instantia: Thebe vel Athene sunt, sed, si sunt, ipsa sunt aliqua vel plura; ergo Thebe sunt aliqua.
1.5. ex varia comprehensione <signi> (omnis <i>et</i> totus)	Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, sed iste damnabitur; ergo Deus vult istum qui damnabitur salvum fieri... ergo resistitur eius voluntati ...
1.6. ex varia transumptione	Pater et Filius principium sunt Spiritus Sancti, idest spirantes Spiritum Sanctum Cf. Pierre de Poitiers, p. 243
1.7. ex varia suppositione vel appellatione termini communis	Filius est idem Patri. Ergo est eadem persona que est Pater Cf. Pierre de Poitiers, p. 18
1.8. ex vario officio (in, secundum, per, apud, ab, ex, ablativus)	Quicquid est in Deo Deus est, sed damnatio istius est in Deo; ergo ipsa Deus est
2. Fallacia amphibolie	Quicquid habet Filius habet a Patre, sed Filius habet essentiam , ergo habet eam a Patre Cf. Pierre de Poitiers, p. 164 s.

3. Fallacia compositionis et divisionis	Aliquid potest aliter evenire quam sit a Deo previsum... Instantia: aliquid est album et illud potest esse nigrum; ergo aliquid potest esse album et nigrum Cf. Pierre de Poitiers, p. 123
4. Fallacia figure dictionis	
4.1. ex simili vocum terminatione	Hec species nusquam occurrit in sacra scriptura
4.2. Commutatio predicamenti	
4.2.1. quid in quale	Si omnes resurgent, ergo qualescumque sunt resurgent
4.2.2. quid in quantum	In impari claritate par erit gaudium... ergo quantum gaudebit iste, tantum gaudebit ille.
4.2.3. quid in ubi	Quilibet est homo vel non homo, sed Christus est hic quia est ubique per essentiam; ergo est hic homo vel non homo
4.2.4. quid in aliquid (?), idest predicamentum substantie in predicamentum habitus	Quicquid potest Pater, potest Filius et Spiritus Sanctus et econverso, sed Pater potest generare, ergo Filius potest generare Cf. Pierre de Poitiers, p. 39 ss.
4.2.5. a persona ad personam	Quicumque viator habet liberum arbitrium nec confirmatum nec obstinatum, sed Christus aliquando fuit viator, ergo tunc habuit liberum arbitrium nec confirmatum nec obstinatum
4.2.6. a statu ad statum	Quilibet homo est mortalis, sed iste in patria erit homo; ergo tunc erit mortalis
4.2.7. a tempore ad tempus	Ubi maior lucta ibi maior corona, sed ante adventum Christi maior erat lucta; ergo ante adventum Christi erat maior corona
4.2.8. de loco ad locum	Hoc est iustum lege fori, ergo est iustum lege poli

5. Fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter	Hec pena est a Deo, sed hec pena est tantum iniusta; ergo hec pena tantum iniusta est a Deo
6. Fallacia secundum quod pene (ad ignorantiam elenchi referatur, ad quam etiam omnes fallacie reducuntur)	Hoc est aliquod sacramentum, ergo efficit quod figurat (omittitur quod est sacramentum nove legis)
7. Fallacia secundum accidens	Persona assumpsit naturam, sed divina natura est persona, ergo divina natura sumpsit humanam naturam, quod non conceditur... Alii autem concedunt eam
8. Fallacia secundum consequens	Si Iudas fuit predestinatus, ipse habiturus fuit gratiam in tempore, sed ipse habuit gratiam in tempore; ergo fuit predestinatus
9. Fallacia secundum plures interrogationes ut unam	Pater voluit Christum crucifigi a Iudeis, vel ab aliquo, vel ab aliquibus

Annexe 3

Structure du De tropis loquendi de Pierre le Chantre

(cf. Valente 1997a: 211 ss.)

1. Contrarietas in una dictione

1.1. simplici

1.1.1. ex varia significatione

1.1.1.1. proprie =1a, 1b

in propriis nominibus

in verbis

in nominibus appellativis

in adverbis, prepositionibus etc. =3

1.1.1.2. improprie

ex diversa demonstratione =1d

ex diversa relatione =1e

ex translatione =1c

iperbole, ironia, iocose dicta, falso dicta

1.1.2. ex varia consignificatione generis,

casus, numeri, temporis, modorum =2

1.1.3. ex vario modo

1.1.4. ex varia suppositione

1.1.5. ex causa dicendi:

secundum interiora et exteriora

secundum diversus status

secundum diversas intentiones

secundum diversos respectus =1f

1.2. in composita (= amphibolia)

2. in diversis <dictionibus> =4

Structure de la fallacia aequivocationis dans les Fallaciae

Londinenses (cf. de Rijk 1967b: 649-652)

1) Ex principali significatione dictionis:

a) ex diversa significatione dictionis ex diversis institutionibus

b) ex diversa significatione dictionis ex una institutione (actio et passio)

c) ex dictione posita proprie vel transumptive

d) ex diversa demonstratione

e) ex diversa relatione

f) ex diverso respectu

2) ex diversa consignificatione dictionis

(casus, numeri, generis, temporis, modi, persone).

3) de consignificationibus dictionis ex diversis adiunctis.

4) ex eo quod si aliqua dictio tenetur nominaliter, per se significat, si est alia pars orationis, nichil per se significat.

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Philosophy and Theology in Twelfth-Century Trinitarian Discussions

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Summary: Peter Abelard's theory of the identities and differences applied to beings and non-beings and Gilbert of Poitiers's conception of an individual person were new philosophical ideas developed in theological contexts. How much should those interested in medieval philosophy learn about medieval theology? It is argued that paying attention to the non-philosophical cognitive determinants of philosophical arguments is philosophically motivated. According to the suggested approach, philosophical studies of medieval philosophy should include systematic and evaluative discussions while the possibly relevant theological context may be treated as a merely historical factor.

1. Philosophy in Theological Context

In Western medieval theology, as distinct from the more Cappadocian Eastern tradition, the Augustinian conception of God's unity was so dominant that the doctrine of the trinitarian persons was relegated to the background, being reduced to abstract discussions about the relations between the divine properties. Théodore de Régnon sketched this picture in his *Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité* (1892-6), and it has been revived in slightly different ways by Vladimir Lossky and his neopalamic followers, by the proponents of 'the social theory of the Trinity', and by various conservative theologians who are critical of what they consider inadequate interpretations of the Christian revelation (see, e.g., Lossky 1957, Feenstra and Plantinga [eds.] 1989, Jenson 1982, Pannenberg 1988). This historical thesis about the nature of scholastic trinitarian theology is not necessarily critical, however: it has also been defended as a basically correct doctrinal orientation with the proviso that the primacy of the unity does not undermine the trinitarian aspect of God (see, e.g., Courth 1985: 155).

This picture, whether it is meant to be a critical incentive to new ways of thinking or a description of the orthodox theological tradition, is a misrepresentation of historical facts. For one thing, it is a misleading simplification of the great variety of conceptual models applied to inner-trinitarian questions in the Middle Ages. In addition it gives a one-sided picture of even the trinitarian theo-

gy of Augustine, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas, who are regarded as the main architects of the model of the primary essential unity and the secondary relational plurality.

This controversy between historians of theology involves different religious evaluations of allegedly historical developments and as such draws attention to a question which is relevant to the history of medieval philosophy. Medieval theology has been mainly studied from the point of view of systematic theology with a particular interest in the authoritative teaching of the church. The resulting accounts are selective, of course, and they can be selective in a manner which does not serve the needs of those who require theological background knowledge in order to deal with certain examples used in medieval logic and semantics. In fact it is not unusual for the historian of medieval philosophy to meet religious examples referring to the liturgy or, say, the doctrine of evangelic perfection, the immaculate conception, the angels, hell, grace, the atonement, and so on. In the Middle Ages, a great number of philosophically interesting and powerful ideas were first formulated in connection with the doctrines of God, the Trinity, and the Incarnation. If it is true that the handbooks or systematic studies of medieval theology are sometimes not very helpful for those occupied with philosophical studies of medieval thought, how much should they learn about theology in general and how deeply should they dig into medieval theological controversies?

A purist conception of the history of philosophy suggests that a philosophical history of medieval thought should concentrate on what is philosophical. I think that even if there were an imaginary spotlight on the past illuminating only philosophical thought, it would still be good to know from what directions these items came into the beam of the philosophical light. It belongs among the tasks of the history of philosophy to pay attention to the birth of ideas. This requirement may demand investigation of the relations between philosophy and other branches of cognitive activity. To be conscious of such historical connections can raise one's consciousness about the historical and contingent nature of one's own preconceptions as well, which is no bad thing for philosophers. (For recent discussions of this question, see Chapter 2 in Kusch 1995.)

It is not my purpose to defend any particular conception of philosophy, except that I have in mind such studies of the history of philosophy as are interested in the philosophical contents of the

objects of historical reconstruction. I am not concerned with ahistorical hermeneutic works or works concentrating merely on external historical or doxographical details. The simple-minded searchlight example is an attempt to show that even the adherents of a very purist approach should feel obliged to think about contextual aspects. My question is how much those interested in medieval philosophy should learn about medieval theology, not only by consulting handbooks but also by investigating historical texts and controversies. The recommendation sketched in this paper is roughly as follows. I think that while the historical and systematic reconstructions of medieval philosophical views must always be complementary in the philosophical history of medieval thought, the discussion of the theological context of such views and the content of reasoning based on religious authority should be merely historical in philosophical works. When this delineation is accepted, the question of how extensively one should treat the theological context can be answered differently in different cases. Considering this question can also add to one's consciousness of the contingent features of one's own conception of philosophy. I hope that the following examples from the works of Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers and their followers shed some light on this theme.

2. Abelard's Philosophical Ontology

In his letter to Abelard, Roscelin explained his ideas about the Trinity as follows. Different names do not signify one thing or another in the substance of the Holy Trinity, but signify only the substance itself. We do not therefore signify by the word 'person' anything other than by the word 'substance', even though we are accustomed out of a certain habit of speech to triple person, not substance, as the Greeks are habituated to triple substance. (The text is edited as an appendix in Reiners 1910. See p. 72.)

If this was his view, how was it possible that Roscelin was accused at the local synod of Soissons in 1092 of thinking that there are three Gods? Now, although Roscelin thought that there are no parts in the divine substance, he also maintained that the persons are three things (*tres res*). Anselm of Canterbury and some others took this to mean that the persons are so separate that they could be said to be three Gods. This view was based particularly on one premiss in Roscelin's dialectical arguments; he said that if there is

no difference between the persons, it is not possible that only one of them is incarnated. Roscelin was not the first to make this point, which connected the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, but he certainly stimulated twelfth century discussion of it.

Constant Mews has recently discussed the reception of Roscelin's view and some works of Roscelin's contemporaries on theology and grammar. These texts shed light on Roscelin's formulation, and show that his views were partially misunderstood by his critics (Mews 1992). Mews discusses an anonymous theological treatise in which it is argued that in God there is a trinity which cannot be understood by human beings. It does not consist in a trinity of substances, a trinity of parts of the substance, or a trinity of accidents of the substance. The persons can be called three things, but one cannot explain what these things are because they are neither substances nor anything attached to a substance. The author does not mention Augustinian relations in this connection, apparently because the nouns 'father' and 'son' in their ordinary use refer to beings which are in relation to something else. If this way of thinking is not far from Roscelin's view, his point could have been that there is one divine substance which all divine names refer to. In the natural world, plurality is caused by the plurality of substances or their parts or their attributes. As there are none of these pluralities in God and it is still assumed that some kind of plurality is expressed through the personal names with different meanings, it seems that there is no natural way to explain it. (See also the letter to Abelard, 76-7.)

The basic problem in medieval philosophical discussions of the Trinity is included in Roscelin's dialectical arguments. Since the standard Trinitarian personal names seem to refer to three different entities (or mutually exclusive relational properties), but there is only one simple and indivisible divine essence, how can the persons be said to be the essence and mutually different and three, or, as in the Incarnation, how could there be one person with two essences or natures?

Roscelin was interested in the idea that one could think about the Trinity as three separate spirits having the same will. This was not the view he explicitly defended, however, because it was heretical (Mews 1992). One might ask why the principle of unity should be an individual essence instead of a common will. Besides biblical monotheism, this position was strengthened by the fact

that one ultimate principle of reality was usually postulated in the philosophy of late antiquity. It is possible that many of the controversies about the Trinity could have been avoided if early Western theologians had accepted some kind of social unity model as the basis of their trinitarian doctrine. Perhaps no theologically important ideas would have been lost in that possible but unactualized history of Christianity. Abelard, however, would have found this remark totally misguided. He believed in the principle of sufficient reason according to which nothing holds true or is actual, without there being a proper reason why this obtains rather than something else. It seems that Abelard understood this principle in the ancient manner as being based on the assumption of the objective intelligibility of the world which is organized under the perfect first principle. Abelard's argument against the plurality of gods is that if there were several first principles, there would be no reason for any fixed number of them (*TSch.* III.12).

Abelard wanted to be a more orthodox theologian than his teacher Roscelin and he certainly attempted to avoid any hint of tritheism. Nevertheless, his theory of the persons being special types of properties was condemned at a council held in Soissons (1121) as a form of Sabellianism. It was argued that he did not treat the persons as sufficiently distinct. At Sens (1140) he was criticized for Arianist trinitarian subordinationism. This charge – which is incompatible with Sabellianism – was also brought against him at Soissons. (See Mews' introductions to the critical editions by Buytart and Mews in Peter Abelard 1987.) Abelard had no intention of deviating from the Catholic Creed. The line between Sabellianism and Arianism was, however, drawn in such a way that almost any explication of the doctrine of the Trinity could be suspected of one or the other. The situation was not resolved by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) where the standard of Trinitarian orthodoxy was settled for later medieval thinkers with the formulation that there are in one God three distinct persons each identical with the one divine substance or essence (Denzinger 1991: 804).

Abelard tried to explain certain features of the notions of divine essence and persons in his theological treatises by distinguishing between different uses of the terms 'same' and 'different' (*Theologia 'Summi Boni'* II.82-103; *Theologia Christiana* III.138-160; *Theologia 'Scholarium'* II.95-99). Many historians have analysed these passages which are said to include a remarkable attempt to

clarify the philosophical notions of identity and difference and to systematize the discussion of the trinitarian forms with their help. The distinctions are not quite the same in different works and the changes are related to the development of Abelard's philosophical ontology. Let us have a look at the succinct formulations in Abelard's last theological work.

According to Abelard, items are said to be the same in three ways: the same in essence and number, the same in property and definition, and the same by similarity. Those are essentially and numerically the same which are the same essence in such a way that they cannot be said to be numerically several things. In this way Socrates as a man is essentially the same as Socrates as an animal or as being able to laugh. Those are essentially different which have different essences or one of which forms part of the other. Essentially different things are numerically different when they do not share any common part. To be the same in property and by definition is to be the same in the strictest sense. Items which are essentially the same may differ in property and by definition, as matter and form in a bronze seal or the same sentence as a premiss and as a conclusion. Things are the same or different by resemblance when they are sufficiently similar or dissimilar to be counted as members of the same class or different classes (*TSch.* II.95-8, 112). In his earlier works, Abelard discussed separately the identities which are combined here. None of the types of identity and difference are meant to be merely mind-dependent.

According to Abelard, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the same in essence, but differ in property or by definition. The Father is by himself and begets the coeternal Son, the Son is eternally begotten, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. A typical feature of Abelard's theology is that the properties of power, wisdom, and charity are associated with different persons, though not exclusively. On the basis of his detailed theory of identities and differences, Abelard made use of a number of distinctions, such as *identitas essentiae* and *identitas proprietatis*, *idem qui* and *idem quod*, *identitas naturae* and *identitas personae*, and the Augustinian *alius* vs. *aliud*. (See, e.g., *Tchr.* IV.36-56; *TSch.* I.20; *Sent.*, ed. Minio-Paluello: 116-7; *Sent.*, ed. Buzzetti: 68.) These tools of analysis became very influential in later twelfth-century philosophical and theological thought (for an early application of the gender analysis to Trinitarian forms, see the anonymous *Summa*

Sophisticorum Elencorum in de Rijk 1962: 331; some further 12th-century and later-medieval examples are discussed in L. Valente's paper in this volume and in Knuuttila 1995). One can see some historical irony in the fact that later theologians (until our day) have used these distinctions while trying to make some sense of the trinitarian formulations of the Fourth Lateran Council.

Abelard thought that by considering the world, philosophers had to a certain extent discovered the reality of the Trinity. Finite things bear traces of God, and therefore one can find many analogies with the Trinity in the created world. Abelard presented a number of such analogies, believing that a correct analysis of the states of affairs in the world is of great help for partial understanding of the divine Trinity. In addition to the seal example already mentioned, Abelard was particularly interested in the notion of person in grammar, where one person is the first, the second, or the third, depending on whether one speaks, is spoken to, or is spoken about. (See, e.g., *TSch.* II.107-8.)

Abelard's attempt to understand trinitarian persons as power, wisdom, and charity was based on the view that the concept of the divine Trinity understood in this way is something which is known naturally. If it is granted that there is a perfect first principle, it must include these three properties (*TSum.* I.1-5). This is another application of the principle of sufficient reason, in this case applied to God's nature. If all people can know this, what about the mystery that allegedly exceeds our concepts? Abelard thought that what is mysterious is the fine structure. That is to say, we do not understand how the personal non-substances are real ways of being of one indivisible and simple being and why the difference between common and personal divine properties is what it is (*Tchr.* III.184-5, *TSch.* II.75-6).

It is clear that much of Abelard's work on the different ontological distinctions was theologically motivated. He also developed the view in his later theological works that the properties signified by predicates are not necessarily things though they are objective. This *status* theory of properties, besides the general theory of distinctions, is considered the most interesting philosophical idea of Abelard's ontology. (See, e.g., the different interpretations in Tweedale 1976 and Marenbon 1996.) Was it an idea that was demanded by Abelard's Trinitarian thought or was it a view which he developed as an answer to philosophical problems created by his

earlier theory of particular forms? In dealing with Abelard's philosophy of being, one is obliged to put questions of this kind and to study his theological discourses.

If an interpreter thinks that theoretical philosophy includes generally comprehensible reasoning about the conceptual tools of analysis and argument, about the conditions of knowledge and belief, about the general structures of being and so on, he or she can find it applied in Abelard's theological discourses. In order to see how it works there one should try to understand Abelard's theological goals and the content of his religious beliefs. One can gain a deeper understanding of Abelard's ontological theory by asking why it is as it is. The theory can be considered as an answer to an understandable philosophical question and studied as such or as a response to the heterogeneous conceptual context in which it was developed. A question pertaining to the second approach is: how was Abelard's philosophical ontology influenced by his theological attempt to clarify the doctrinal Trinitarian forms? It is easily understood why historical questions of this kind are relevant in certain connections, but answering them in a historically correct and illuminating way can be a demanding task.

3. Individuals and Persons in Gilbert's Ontology

Gilbert of Poitiers's philosophical ideas were also embedded in theological discussions and he also encountered problems with church authorities. In Gilbert's view, every created thing is what it is (*quod est*) by virtue of something which makes it so (*quo est*). It is not necessary to enter into the details of this influential approach here; it is sufficient to state that its original motivation seems to be related to certain questions pertaining to the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. (See, e.g., Marenbon 1988.) According to Gilbert, divine persons are divine by one and the same indivisible divinity and they are persons by the personal properties which are mutually different and incommunicable. What is the relationship between the God-making *quo est* and the person-making *quo estis*? In answering this question Gilbert was led to reconsider and develop the concepts of individuality and personality.

Abelard remarked that one cannot apply the Boethian definition of person as an individual substance of rational nature to the doctrine of God – there are three persons but not three sub-

stances in God (*Tchr.* III.179). Gilbert did not think any more than Abelard that the trinitarian persons were separate substances, but he was particularly interested in the notion of individuality included in Boethius's definition. Every *quo est*, whether simple or complex, is singular and numerically one, and it is this by which a singular being is what it is. If one *quo est* is generically or specifically like (*conformis*) another, they are not individuals. It is only a *quo est* which does not conform to any other in this way which is an individual and makes the corresponding *quod est* an individual (144.58-75). According to Gilbert, an individual form is always the whole entity and never a part of other individuals; for example, Plato's complex *quo est*, Platonitas, includes all those things Plato has been, is, or will be plus all those things he could be though they are never actualized (144.75-8, 274.75-95).

Gilbert's definition of an individual entity is, as far as I know, the first intensional concept of an individual being. It is associated with the idea of spelling out the meaning of modal notions with the help of the model of simultaneous alternative domains which started to be developed in the twelfth century and which itself had a theological background. It may be of some interest to realize that when this line of thought was elaborated further in later medieval philosophy, it always kept to the original view that one could speak about the same individual in alternative states of affairs – treating individuals as world-bound was probably something Leibniz first suggested (for further details, see Knuuttila 1993). Gilbert's interest in the notion of the individual was particularly motivated by his attempt to explain how one could speak about the Trinitarian persons. An individual cannot be included in another individual and, correspondingly, its complete concept cannot include any singular element which is simultaneously included in the concept of another individual (146.14-34, 272.27-33). As the triune God is an individual and the concepts of the persons are included in its concept, the persons are not individuals in the sense in which natural beings can be individual persons (147.41-148.81). The idea that persons cannot have any identical singular *quo est* in their complex *quo ests* belongs to the background of Gilbert's modal conception of an individual, which was also motivated by the Augustinian idea that God chooses actual history from a set of alternatives. If persons are supposed to have free will and if there are other sources of contingency in their his-

tory, then all possible variations in the histories of individual beings must be included as possibilities in their individual *quo ests*. The full extensional concept of the historical Plato is not an individual concept, because it is included in the modally qualified intensional concept which contains the simultaneous alternatives.

According to Nestorian christology as Gilbert understood it, there were two persons in Christ (234.47-9). Much of Gilbert's discussion of the notions of person and nature was related to his attempt to refute this heretical view. It is clear that two individual *quo ests* cannot form a personal union, though *quo ests* of different natures may belong to one composition. One of Gilbert's problems was that Christ as a human being seems not to be an individual any more than Christ as a theological person. In this connection he sometimes calls the divine person-making property an individual property without an explanation. (Cf. the discussion in Nielsen 1982: 163-89.)

Abelard's theory of identities and differences applied to beings and non-beings and Gilbert's conception of an individual person were new philosophical ideas developed in theological contexts. Their systematic significance is not restricted to the explication of various Trinitarian forms and they can be discussed as philosophical theories. Through a historical analysis of their original theological context, one can see how these modes of conceptualizing things were brought into the philosophical discussion. To explain it is not a trivial task – much historical work is still needed in both cases. It seems that the theological projects were philosophically fruitful in these two cases, because the authors realized that the meanings of the terms used in the Trinitarian forms cannot be understood even in an analogous or metaphorical way without a systematic analysis of the corresponding terms as applied to created things. Theological problems led them to pay attention to the conceptual presuppositions of certain received philosophical views and to question their validity.

4. Some Later Developments

The distinctions such as *idem qui - idem quod*, applied to the doctrine of the Trinity by Abelard, were often used in later twelfth-century thought. It is of some interest that in the first known treatise on obligations logic, the anonymous *Tractatus Emmeranus de*

impossibili positione (edited in de Rijk 1974: 117-23), the *positio impossibilis* disputations are divided into two groups depending on whether they concern a union or not. The treatise contains disputational rules for dealing with two kinds of impossible union, the one maintaining a union of essences without a union of persons and the other maintaining a union of persons without a union of essences. Essential terms are said to be those that can be said of a whole and of its parts (for example *lignum*) and personal terms are said to be those which can be said of a whole but not of its parts (for example *homo*).

According to the basic rules, if the *positum* expresses a merely essential union and if an essential term is predicated and conceded of one member of the union, it is to be conceded of the other member as well, but if a personal term is predicated of one, it is to be denied of the other. If the *positum* expresses a merely personal union and if a personal term is predicated and conceded of one member, it must be conceded of the other, but if an essential term is predicated of one, it must be denied of the other. An example of the the first case is that Socrates is united to the donkey Brunellus through a merely essential union. There is one essence and two personal entities. If 'Socrates is the same as (*idem quod*) Brunellus' is proposed, one should concede it, but 'Socrates is Brunellus' should be denied. If Socrates is united to Brunellus through a merely personal union, one should concede the statement 'Socrates is Brunellus' and deny the statement 'Socrates is the same as Brunellus'.

These rules are directly influenced by the theological doctrines that there is one essence and three persons in the Trinity and one person and two natures in the incarnate Word. The corresponding statements about created beings were called impossible. The obligational *positio impossibilis* analysis was much employed in later-medieval Trinitarian discussions, but the examples dealt with began to be doctrinal impossibilities. (For a more detailed discussion of the texts and the development of the *positio impossibilis* approach in theology, see Knuuttila 1995.) This interesting version of obligations logic was mainly used in theological discussions of the Trinity and as such it is an example of the historical influence of the twelfth-century approaches mentioned above. A better known example of later developments is the extensive investigation of the types of inner-trinitarian identities (essential, personal,

formal) and distinctions (real, formal, nominal). A detailed summary of the results of this enquiry is included in Peter of Ailly's rules for essential, personal, communal, and notional terms (*Sent.* I.5). I think that the suggestion about how to deal with philosophical and theological themes in twelfth-century treatises on the Trinity applies also to these later discussions.

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Logic and the Hypostatic Union: Two Late Twelfth-Century Responses to the Papal Condemnation of 1177

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Summary: Peter the Lombard developed an influential interpretation of the Incarnation, that in 1177 elicited a condemnation by Pope Alexander III. Nevertheless, after the condemnation the Lombard's view had its defenders. The present paper examines two of the Lombard's defenders on the subject who wrote around 1180: an anonymous student of Peter the Chanter and Stephen Langton. Both the anonymous student and Langton think it is possible to uphold Lombard's theory by employing current conceptual grammatical and logical tools in the explication of key Christological statements.

1. Alexander III's condemnations of 1170 and 1177

In 1170 Pope Alexander III wrote to William, Archbishop of Sens and papal legate in France. In his letter Alexander addressed a matter of grave importance to Christian theology, *viz.*, how to understand the humanity of the incarnate Christ. In particular, there was one interpretation which Alexander wanted to eradicate from the Parisian schools of theology, and this was the one propounded by "Peter, the former bishop of Paris", which is to say Peter the Lombard. As characteristic of the view Alexander focused on the saying "Christ as man is not something". In order to suppress this view William was ordered to gather the bishops under his jurisdiction and instruct them not only to condemn the doctrine but also to teach that Christ is man in the full sense of the word and consists of soul and body. Moreover, as Alexander stressed, especially the theological professors at Paris were to be taught the proper understanding of Christ's manhood.¹

Seven years later the comparatively mildly phrased letter of 1170 was superseded by a second and much harsher papal order. Obviously, the former letter had not had its desired effect, and in early 1177 William, who had by then moved to the archbishopric of Reims, received further instructions on the issue. Now the saying

¹ Denzinger-Schönmetzer 1967: no. 749. Cf. Nielsen 1982: 359 sqq.

that Christ is not something by being man, was branded as an out-right heresy (“*error*”), and William was to excommunicate on papal authority anybody upholding this understanding.² In contradistinction to this intolerable heresy Alexander once more stressed that just as Christ is truly God so he is truly man and subsists in soul and flesh.³ After this forceful condemnation the question was no longer open for debate, and the subject was not broached at the Third Lateran Council in 1179.⁴ The papal injunction of 1177 alone was quite sufficient to impress contemporary theologians.

2. Anonymus ex schola Cantoris

How did theologians belonging to the Lombard’s school react to this condemnation? Upholding a point of view which was officially condemned would, of course, not do – especially not for hopeful candidates for bishoprics. On the other hand, Alexander had been rather generous inasmuch as he had restricted the condemnation so as to affect only the single sentence “*Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid*”. Moreover, even to the most ardent supporter of the Lombard’s position it was by no means necessary to uphold this sentence. Provided a proper interpretation was supplied, a proposition like “*Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid*” was perfectly defensible in the class-rooms of this school.⁵

² Denzinger-Schönmetzer 1967: no. 750.

³ On a previous occasion I showed that Alexander III was substantially correct in attributing the condemned theory to the Lombard. This conclusion was reached through textual analysis of the Lombard’s exposition of the Incarnation as it is to be found in the third book of the *Sentences*, and not on the – often gossipy – testimony of contemporaries (Nielsen 1982: 243 sqq.) Recently, Marcia Colish (1994: 427 sqq.) objected to this interpretation. It is difficult to respond to Colish inasmuch as she does not address my evidence.

⁴ In spite of Walter of St. Victor’s testimony to the contrary, it seems unlikely that the Christology of Peter the Lombard and his followers was on the agenda for this meeting; cf. Nielsen 1982: 360-361, and the literature cited there.

⁵ It is somewhat ironic that Alexander III, who had been an early proponent of the condemned theory, had himself provided just such a “way-out” by saying that Christ as man is something in the sense that as man he is “*alicuius modi*” (Alexander III *Sententiae*: 193). This explanation was later repeated by, e.g., Petrus Pictaviensis (col. 1176C). Equally, the Lombard had allowed of the proposition provided that the ‘*secundum*’ be interpreted as an expression of the unity of the divine person, who remains essentially unchanged in the Incarnation; cf. Nielsen 1982: 239, 254, and 304.

Nonetheless, theologians of this persuasion did not opt for one of the easy and ready-made solutions but earnestly strove to adjust their expositions to the new doctrinal situation.

One Parisian theologian belonging to this group remains anonymous; in fact, he is known only through a relatively short text which has been preserved in only one manuscript where it is bound together with material from Peter the Chanter's school.⁶ In the text Peter the Chanter is cited once, as is Peter of Corbeil, who became bishop of Cambrai in 1177. Moreover, the author knows of Alexander's second condemnation inasmuch as he explicitly states that maintaining the infamous sentence is punishable by excommunication.⁷ Since Peter of Corbeil is still termed "magister" in the text, it seems reasonable to assume that the text was written quite soon after the second condemnation.⁸ This dating is further strengthened by the fact that the author is very keen to mark a division between two groups of scholars, who, nonetheless, appear to share the same general outlook. On one occasion, the first group is said to claim that in the Incarnation human nature makes Christ or the Word of God "humanatum", and that human nature does not cause or bring about a thing (*res*) in man. For this reason, in interpreting the statement "Christ as man is something" they stress that 'according' (*secundum*) should be interpreted to imply a concomitance and should never be taken in a causative sense.⁹ As compared to this interpretation the view of the second group is less restrictive, inasmuch as they believe themselves able to block offending interpretations solely by means of supposition theory. However, the fundamental agreement between the two groups is conscientiously brought out by the author who proceeds to stress that both groups agree that in this context 'aliquid' should never be taken in an essential or substantial meaning since this would imply that the incarnate Christ would be both divine and human substance.¹⁰

6 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Cod. lat. 3477, fols. 3ra-4rb. Henceforth quoted as "Anon. Cant." Edition in *CIMAGL* 66 (1996).

7 Anon. Cant., Propositio 1.

8 Anon. Cant., Propositio 11.

9 Anon. Cant., Propositio 1. The model for this interpretation is clearly the so-called "Habitus" theory as it appears in the Lombard's exposition; cf. Nielsen 1982: 253 sqq.

10 Anon. Cant., Propositio 1.

The second example of this bifurcation occurs with regard to the statement "Christ is God and man". The first group strongly objects to the conjunction being taken copulatively, whereas they would agree to what they call an "aggregative" reading. The second group, however, is ready to accept the copulative reading of the conjunction, again blocking undesired side-effects of this recognition by means of supposition theory. Obviously both groups agree to avoid the implication that Christ has identical ontological relationships to his divine and human natures.¹¹ In a third case, the division between the two groups is on a clearly minor point of doctrine. It relates to the expansion of infinite nouns, and in this case too the first group represents a less sophisticated stance as compared to members of the second group, who operate with a strong distinction between person on the one hand and essence or substance on the other.¹²

Consequently, two features stand out in the author's description of his immediate intellectual environment. First, there is a pronounced agreement on fundamentals between the two groups. Secondly, in their view of Christ's human nature both groups are strikingly close to the interpretation of the Incarnation which was cultivated by the Lombard and his early school.¹³ This strongly suggests that the anonymous author had close links to this school of thought, and that his text reflects how theologians of this persuasion attempted to bring their theory into concord with the papal condemnation in the years immediately after 1177.

3. Stephen Langton

In his "Quaestiones theologiae" Stephen Langton addresses the questions posed by the Incarnation on several occasions. This work, in which numerous questions appear in different stages of development, was in all probability never given its final form.¹⁴ Inasmuch as it was heavily utilised by the Danish theologian and later archbishop, Andrew Sunesen, who after having taught in the

11 Anon. Cant., Propositio 2.

12 Anon. Cant., Propositio 5.

13 Cf. Nielsen 1982: 279 sqq.

14 Cf. Quinto 1994: 90 sqq.

Parisian schools returned to Denmark in the early 1190s,¹⁵ it appears that Langton's questions were available in written form around 1190.¹⁶ This means that the work was the fruit of Langton's early teaching in Paris, which he is generally assumed to have commenced around 1180.¹⁷

In this context I shall look at three of Langton's questions dealing with Christology. The first question is entitled "De homine assumpto, et utrum Christus sit duo" and has been handed down in only one version.¹⁸ It forms an obvious parallel to the text by the anonymous author from the Chanter's school. In this question Langton reveals strong ties with the Lombard's school. At the same time the question makes it evident that significant changes had taken place as compared to the earlier Lombard school.¹⁹ The second and much shorter question "Utrum Christus sit filius adoptivus" is also extant in only one version. Its claim to interest lies primarily in the fact that it throws light on the way in which Langton utilises the tools of logic in answering one of the traditional questions of Christology. Finally, the third question deals with the thorny issue of Christ's ontological makeup in death. This had been one of the decidedly weak points in the theory of the Lombard's school, and one with which the mentor himself had been unable to come to grips.²⁰ In wrestling with this question Langton reveals some of the fundamental assumptions behind his assessment of the ontological status of Christ's human nature.

4. The teaching of theology in the 1180s

The texts provided by the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and by Langton share a number of distinctive features. In the first place, they appear to be closely associated with oral teaching taking place in the Parisian classrooms. Even if the text by the anonymous author from the Chanter's school has undergone editorial

¹⁵ See the introduction to Andreas Sunonis Filius *Hexaemeron*: 30 sqq.

¹⁶ Cf. Ebbesen 1987: 404.

¹⁷ Cf. Quinto 1994: 11-12.

¹⁸ Cf. Quinto 1994: 204.

¹⁹ Langton's association with the circle of Peter the Chanter is firmly established; see, e.g., Quinto 1994: 12-13, and the introduction in Petrus Lombardus *Sententiae*: 45* sqq.

²⁰ Cf. Nielsen 1982: 274 sqq., 313 sqq., and 351 sqq.

work it still has a number of clearly oral features. Thus the author consistently uses the first person plural when presenting either a solution to a problem or replying to some objection. Occasionally he may emphasise the personal aspect by including the personal pronoun in the first person plural.²¹ Moreover, in opening the discussion of some specific point the author sometimes directly addresses his audience and stipulates some temporal condition which they are asked to accept.²²

With Langton the oral features are even more pronounced.²³ For example, after having given the solution to one tricky line of argument Langton tells the student opponent that he can really make things difficult for his adversary if he continues the discussion by raising the question of whether the incarnate Christ is similar to himself.²⁴ At several points Langton's text slips into dialogue form with one person asking questions and, presumably, Langton answering.²⁵

This affinity to the class-room situation helps us form a picture of how the teaching of theology in the schools of Paris might have taken place in this period. The text provided by the anonymous scholar of the Chanter's school reveals that teaching on this part of Christology was centred around particular Christological "key-sentences". In the text they have not been spelled out but they are easily identifiable. In all there are eleven statements put up for debate,²⁶

- 1) Christus est unum et aliud
- 2) Christus est Deus et homo
- 3) Filius est homo, qui non est Pater
- 4) Deus incipit esse homo
- 5) Homo est non-homo

²¹ Anon. Cant., Propositiones 5 and 8.

²² Anon. Cant., Propositio 4 ("Item, simus in instanti incarnationis ..."); Propositio 6 ("Simus ergo in proximo instanti ante incarnationem ..."); Propositio 7 ("Contra. Simus ante incarnationem ...").

²³ This holds good for the question "De homine assumpto ...". The questions on Christ as adopted son and on Christ as man in death are far more polished literary products and bear few oral traces; for the latter see, e.g., "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 4 ("Simus in triduo ...").

²⁴ Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 3.

²⁵ Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", §§ 16, 18.

²⁶ In the edition these key-sentences have been added as headings and placed in square brackets.

- 6) Filius desinit esse non-homo
- 7) Iste homo est
- 8) Christus potuit assumere duo homines
- 9) Christus assumat corpus et animam
- 10) Deus potest assumere personam Petri
- 11) Utrum separatus a deitate homo assumptus sit alius homo quam prius

In Langton's question on the assumed man a far greater number of Christological key-sentences are involved. Due to the often truncated nature of the debate as it has been recorded, it is in several cases difficult to identify with precision how a particular sentence was phrased. Tentatively one might suggest a list like the following,²⁷

- 1) Utrum Christus sit duo
- 2) Pater est maior Filio
- 3) Filius Dei est maior se
- 4) Filius hominis est tantus quantus Filius Dei
- 5) Factus homo Christus factus est aliquid
- 6) Filius Dei fit substantia rationalis individua
- 7) Christus fit haec res, quae est aeterna
- 8) Christus homo loquitur
- 9) Homo assumptus est
- 10) Christus fecit se
- 11) Christus potuit assumere Petrum
- 12) Pater potest incarnari
- 13) Christus potuit assumere angelum
- 14) Christus potuit assumere aliam animam et aliud corpus
- 15) Species "homo" dicitur de Christo
- 16) Christus est duo
- 17) Christus creavit se
- 18) Filius Dei potuit assumere te
- 19) Christus potuit esse plures homines
- 20) Homo assumptus est Verbum Dei
- 21) Christus homo loquitur
- 22) Homo assumptus est Filius Dei
- 23) Homo assumptus est omnipotens

Furthermore, both texts disclose that oral teaching had a form which to a large extent must have resembled sophistical disputations. In the first place, the anonymous member of the

²⁷ In the edition the subdivisions of the text have been flagged by numerals added in square brackets.

Chanter's school uses the "positio impossibilis"²⁸ without for that reason feeling compelled either to introduce this device to his audience or to excuse his putting it to use in a theological context. In the same vein he alludes to and utilises a sophisma centred on the statement "Socrates in eo quod est animal, convenit Burnello",²⁹ which he finds well suited for illuminating his point. Equally, in his question on the assumed man Langton alludes to a sophismatical disputation on "Sortes loquitur de animali, de quo loquitur Plato, et de animali, de quo non loquitur Plato" as well as to the sophisma "Quicumque homo erit, est",³⁰ which he fits seamlessly into the discussion.

Secondly, the discussion as it unfolds in these texts bears a markedly grammatico-logical imprint inasmuch as it centres around the analysis of statements. To this end a large number of conceptual tools are employed of which the great majority have their origins in the faculty of arts. In general the strategy pursued in these text is comparatively straightforward: a Christological key-statement is broken down into its constituent parts, which are subsequently analysed with regard to grammatical congruence, semantical import, and logical properties such as intention and denotation.

28 In *Propositio 5* he says "Similiter pono per impossibile quod una essentia sit homo et asinus ...", and alludes to this again in *Propositio 7*. Similarly, in *Propositio 11* the question of whether the assumed man would be a new person if his union with divinity were dissolved, is characterised as something that should be understood "per impossibile". Cf. Martin 1992: 123 sqq.; and Knuuttila 1997. The "positio" of a union between a human being and a donkey is also known from the so-called "Tractatus Emmeranus de impossibili positione" (Anonymus Emmeranus: 120). Judging from the testimony of Praepositinus, in his *Summa "Qui producit ventos"*, it was allowed to reject a "positio" that could never obtain: "Quod ponitur, quod anima et caro ita unitae separentur a Verbo, dicitur, quod positio est impossibilis. Et tamen si recipiatur, respondetur" (Vat. lat. 1174, fol. 51ra, corrected against a preliminary edition of the third book of the "*Qui producit ventos*", which Prof. Stephen Brown, Boston College, most kindly made available to me.)

29 Anon. Cant., *Propositio 1*.

30 Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", §§ 1 and 14. Langton's more polished questions are purged of such remnants of oral teaching.

5. The basic issue

In their discussions of the questions posed by the Incarnation both the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and Langton place themselves directly in the tradition of the Lombard whose exposition in the third book of the *Sentences* determines their approach to the subject.

In expounding the mystery of the Incarnation the Lombard had distinguished between three schools of thought. As seen by the Lombard, the main problem common to these three theories, and for which they should be regarded as solutions, consists in deciding whether God can be said to have become something (*aliquid*) inasmuch as He became man in the Incarnation. With the Lombard this is tantamount to asking whether God or the Son of God became something that He had not been from eternity, *viz.*, man or soul and body, in the sense that soul and body became part of the divine person's being.³¹

The first theory presented by the Lombard is the so-called "Homo Assumptus" theory. According to this theory, a human being, consisting of soul and body, just like other men, was united with the Word of God, and thereby started to be the Word, just as he started to be God. This man, however, did not become God in the sense that he became divine nature, rather he became the divine person assuming human nature. Conversely, God became human substance, consisting of soul and body, even though there was no question of a change in nature. One of the salient features of this theory, in the Lombard's view, is its insistence that God really became something, as human substance or soul and body became the same person as the Word and God. Therefore, adherents of this theory maintain that the reciprocal predication of 'God' and 'man' and cognate predications are to be interpreted quite literally (*vere*).

Obviously, the Lombard does not favour this theory, and his main objection to it is that on this view God is something which is not eternal, and that, consequently, an incongruity arises between God and the divine substance, since a substance that differs from the divine would in this case be God.

The second theory as presented by the Lombard is the so-called "Subsistence" theory. According to this view Christ as incarnate

31 For the following, cf. Nielsen 1982: 246 sqq.

person consists of the two natures or the three substances, divinity, soul, and body. On this basis proponents of the theory maintain that the person who prior to the Incarnation was simple, after the Incarnation became a person composed of divinity and humanity, so that where, prior to the Incarnation, this person existed in merely one nature, after the Incarnation he subsisted in, as well as by virtue of, two natures. According to the Lombard, however, several adherents of this theory are reluctant to use the expression “*persona composita ex duabus naturis*” and prefer to say that the divine person became human substance consisting of soul and body and is composite insofar as he became a human “subsists”, whereas he remained simple insofar as he is the Word.³²

The third theory, the so-called “*Habitus*” theory, maintains, according to the Lombard, that the mode of the Incarnation is to be found in the “*habitus*” that arises when soul and body are united with the person and nature of the Word. For this reason God may be said to have become man “*secundum habitum*”, which is to say that the Word was clothed in soul and body. In agreement with this the adherents of this theory interpret the reciprocal predication of ‘God’ and ‘man’ in such a way that both the statement “*Deus est homo*” and the statement “*Homo est Deus*” signify that God relates to man habitually (*est habens*). Accordingly, adherents of the theory interpret the central Christological statements in such a fashion that they do not imply that there is an identity of being between the thing that is designated by the subject term and the object for which the predicate term stands. The ultimate foundation of this view is, evidently, a view of the ontological makeup of Christ according to which human nature does not enter into the being of the eternal person. As compared to the divine being of the Word human nature acquired at the Incarnation may be compared with an accidental determination. In other terms, this conception disallows that Christ or the divine person

32 The Lombard’s interpretation of the second theory is highly intricate and marked by ambiguity. The reason for this is that the second theory has its model in Gilbert of Poitiers and his followers, and the Lombard disregards Gilbert’s formal ontology as well as his modal conception of “*persona*”. In the final analysis the Lombard’s exposition is misleading inasmuch as it brings the second theory into at least partial concord with the “*Habitus*” theory with respect to the fundamental view that human nature does not contribute to the actual being or essence of the person; cf. Nielsen 1982: 256 sqq.

of the Word became man “essentialiter”. As a natural corollary of this, adherents of the theory are obliged to maintain that Christ’s human soul and body cannot be said to have come together so as to form a substance or an integral whole of which soul and body are parts.³³

6. The logical foundations

In dealing with the Christological key-statements put up for debate both the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and Langton base themselves on a limited number of presuppositions and rules.

Not surprisingly it is absolutely fundamental that propositions are predicative and consist of a subject term and a predicate term.³⁴ It is further held that, in general, the subject term is a noun, and that it has the function of denoting the actual thing for which the statement can be verified. The predicate term, on the other hand, is ordinarily an adjective or an adjectival expression that indicates a form, which is claimed to belong to the thing indicated by the subject term. Consequently, supposition or denotation is primarily linked to the subject term.³⁵

Nonetheless, this is merely how things often work. The situation is complicated by the fact that the two authors are willing to allow that even predicate terms may denote an external thing or have supposition. Whether one should look for something denoted by the predicate term is decided on an individual basis. The fact of the matter is that predicate terms are ambiguous. They may be interpreted in two ways; they can be read as either substantives or as

³³ Cf. Nielsen 1982: 264-265 and 313 sqq.

³⁴ Sentences which consist of a noun as subject term and a finite verb are analysed along the same lines. Thus Langton views verbs as indicating properties which are called “res verbi”. With regard to the statement that God creates, the objection is raised that the verb ‘creare’ implies a temporal effect by way of consignification and thus allows of “mixing” the temporal and the eternal. This Langton counters by maintaining that the temporal effect is not posited in the quality implied by the verb (“in re verbi”) but is extraneous to this property (“De homines assumpto ...”, § 7); cf. Langton, “Utrum Christus sit filius adoptivus”, § 4.

³⁵ Both the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and Langton use the technical term ‘copulare’ instead of ‘praedicare’; cf. Ebbesen 1987: 410 sqq. Equally, both authors employ the term ‘appellatio’ in its late twelfth-century meaning; see, e.g., Anon. Cant., Propositio 6; Langton, “De homine assumpto ...”, § 14; *id.*, “Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis”, § 1; and cf. Maierù 1972: 85 sqq.

adjectives. If a predicate term is interpreted in the substantival sense it is true to say that the term is supponing for something in the world of “*id quod*”s – to use the Boethian terminology. If, on the other hand, a predicate term is interpreted in the adjectival sense it holds good that the term points to a property which is either claimed or denied to be inherent in the thing pointed to by the subject term.³⁶

How does one decide whether a predicate term is to be taken in an adjectival or in a substantival sense? An obvious answer would of course be to look at the grammatical form of the word used as predicate term. This easy solution is, however, not the one endorsed by these authors. It would restrict the scope of analysis far too severely. To them it is not at all decisive whether, from a grammatical point of view, an actual predicate term is a substantive or an adjective. The reason for this is that grammatical form is considered to be only a surface phenomenon. If, in a particular sentence, a substantive is placed as predicate term, whereas from the point of view of meaning an adjective is required, one may “adjectivise” the predicate term. This will not change the sentence on the surface level but alter it significantly on the semantic level. Conversely, if an adjective is placed as predicate term whereas the proper meaning of the sentence requires a substantive, one may “substantivise” the predicate term. Consequently, the only criterion for deciding the proper sense of the predicate term is the context.

In debating the ontological constitution of Christ the authors focus on the key-sentence “*Christus est Deus et homo*”. In this instance, the substantives ‘*Deus*’ and ‘*homo*’ are placed as predicate terms, and if they are then taken at face value, according to the pupil of the Chanter, one would be entitled to infer “*Ergo Deus et homo sunt Christus*”. This inference is, however, illegitimate inasmuch as it would mean splitting Christ into two. For this reason, in the original sentence, it is required that ‘*Deus*’ and ‘*homo*’ be interpreted in an adjectival sense so that they indicate natures that are predicated of the one Christ.³⁷

³⁶ Langton extends this analysis so as to include the subject term as well; cf. below, section 9.

³⁷ Anon. Cant., *Propositio* 2; Langton, “*De homine assumpto ...*”, §§ 7, 16, 23; “*Utrum Christus sit filius adoptivus*”, § 9; “*Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis*”, § 4.

Another, and more complex, sentence illustrates the same point. Talking of the incarnate Christ one may, according to the anonymous pupil of the Chanter, say "Christus est simplex et compositum". If the terms 'simplex' and 'compositum' are read as adjectives then the statement should be rejected for the sole reason that it does not conform to the rules of grammar; it is incongruous. Equally, if the terms 'simplex' and 'compositum' are substantivised, the sentence should be denied inasmuch as it then implies that Christ is both a simple and a composite thing, for which these predicate terms would suppone. And this is simply false according to the author, inasmuch as the person of Christ is not both a divine and a human substance.³⁸ One may, on the other hand, view the two terms as substantives but this does not salvage the sentence, which again would imply that Christ is two things. As substantives, however, these terms may also be adjectivised, and, at long last, a sense is obtained in which the author is willing to grant the sentence. In this case the words 'simplex' and 'compositum' are attributed to Christ on account of the twin natures of deity and humanity, which are simple and composite respectively.³⁹

38 The anonymous pupil of the Chanter is quite explicit on this point. Early in his text the author claims that there is nothing out of the ordinary in maintaining that Christ's human nature does not result in a human substance or a human "quid", since the very same should be said of Christ's divinity. Later on, however, he unreservedly admits of the possibility of talking of Christ's divine nature as a "quid" inasmuch as the statement "Christus est hoc, et illud non est Pater" is rejected with the justification that the "hoc" points to the divine essence, which, of course, is common to both divine persons. As the divine substance may be demonstrated by way of a demonstrative pronoun in the neuter it is evident why a premiss like "Filius est haec substantia, quae non est Pater" does not warrant a conclusion such as "Ergo Filius est aliquid, quod non est Pater"; in the premiss 'substantia' points to the divine essence together with the Son's personal property, whereas in the conclusion the 'aliquid' denotes solely the divine substance which is common to all three divine persons (Anon. Cant., *Propositio 1*) Consequently, the reason why divinity does not result in a divine "quid", is quite different from the reason why Christ's human nature does not result in a human "quid". Whereas the simplicity of divinity prevents the divine persons from having each a proper and single substance, the lack of a human "quid" in Christ is due to the way in which Christ relates to human nature.

39 Anon. Cant., *Propositio 2*. Langton does not deal with this particular sentence.

7. "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid"

The Chanter pupil's reasons for rejecting the sentence "Christ is God and man" in the sense that Christ is both divine and human substance are further elucidated by his treatment of the sentence that Christ as man is something.

Adherents of competing theories, such as the "Homo Assumptus" and the "Subsistence" theories, would willingly accept that Christ is both divine and human substance. For this reason they should, according to the pupil of the Chanter, be ready to grant an argument such as the following,

Humanitas et deitas faciunt in Deo quid et quid,
ergo faciunt unum quid, vel unum quid et aliud quid.⁴⁰

In this sense they are obliged to recognise that Christ may be said to be two.⁴¹

In dealing with this touchstone question of the period the anonymous pupil of the Chanter is, as already mentioned, very careful to take exception to the interpretation cultivated in the early school of the Lombard. Thus, he flatly denies that Christ's humanity should be compared to an accidental property, just as he does not see any reason for distinguishing between various meanings of the word 'secundum' in the statement "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid".⁴²

On the other hand, this does not imply that he agrees with the arguments of the competing theories. On the contrary, address-

⁴⁰ Anon. Cant., Propositio 1.

⁴¹ Historically speaking, this is a highly inaccurate representation of the "Subsistence" theory since adherents of this view would not agree to a simple juxtaposition of Christ's divine and human substances. The reason for this refusal is not based on Christ's human nature or substance, but on the consideration that, because of its absolute simplicity, divinity should not be viewed on the level of substance in the sense of "id quod"; instead, it should be viewed as a form or an "id quo". Cf. Nielsen 1982: 354 sqq. In his *Summa "Qui producit ventos"*, Praepositinus, whose association with the Porretan school is well-known, puts this very succinctly by stating that though Christ is God and man, he is not two substances inasmuch as "humanitas ... substantia est subiecti, deitas quasi substantia subiecti" (Vat. lat. 1174, fol. 52vb).

⁴² Anon. Cant., Propositio 1 ("... quemadmodum grammatica et musica non faciunt in uno subiecto unum quale et aliud quale, sed faciunt unum quale et quale. Non tamen est prorsus simile ...").

ing the argument given above he observes that it violates the rules of supposition. In the antecedent the two 'quid's are intended to denote different things, but when applied to Christ they are clearly equivalent to the words 'Deus' and 'homo', which stand for only one thing. On this basis one might expect that the pupil of the Chanter would accept an inference such as

Humanitas facit quid, deitas facit quid,
ergo deitas et humanitas faciunt unum quid.⁴³

Nonetheless, he flatly rejects this inference, and, in agreement with the earlier Lombard school, he remarks that the statement that Christ as man is something is unacceptable if the word 'aliquid' is taken to denote an essence, which again means a substance or, in the Boethian terminology, an "id quod". If, however, the 'aliquid' is given a broad signification so as to designate both essences and forms, the statement is true.⁴⁴

Elaborating on this, the anonymous Chanter pupil proceeds to explain that irrespective of whether one talks of Christ's divinity or his humanity the terms 'God' or 'man' as predicated of Christ can only have simple supposition.⁴⁵ This means that in statements such as "Christus est aliquid secundum quod homo", "Christus humanitate est aliquid", and "Christus deitate est aliquid" the word 'aliquid' designates solely a nature or property which is claimed to belong to Christ. For this reason it is not permitted to "make a descent" to some concrete instance of this nature. Such an illegitimate instantiation may, as the author explains, take place in one of two ways: Either by the appending of a relative clause so that one says "Christus secundum quod homo est quid,

⁴³ Anon. Cant., Propositio I.

⁴⁴ Anon. Cant., Propositio I, "Notandum autem quod, sicut ipsi (*scil.*, the early proponents of the Lombard's school) dicunt, haec est falsa "Christus est aliquid secundum quod homo", si haec dictio 'aliquid' sumatur essentialiter, et non est alia essentia secundum quod homo. Sed secundum quod vera est, accipitur haec dictio 'aliquid,' secundum quod est terminus omnia continens et habet se tam ad essentias quam ad formas". Perhaps the discussion of the Christological 'aliquid' is a point of departure for the later inclusion of 'aliquid' among the transcendentals. To my knowledge, 'aliquid' was never numbered among the transcendentals in the twelfth century. I owe thanks to Gyula Klima, University of Notre Dame, for a stimulating discussion of this point.

⁴⁵ Cf. above, note 38.

quod non est Pater”, or by making a reference to the ‘aliquid’ by way of a pronoun as in the sentence “Christus deitate est aliquid, et humanitate est illud vel aliud”.⁴⁶ If, nevertheless, somebody should venture to do so, one is entitled to reject the resulting sentence as being simply “incongruous”.⁴⁷ In a later passage, however, the author describes this kind of mistake as a fallacious inference from terms posited in a natural sense to the same terms posited in a significative sense, which he simply terms ‘equivocation’.⁴⁸

To this line of reasoning the objection is raised that this interpretation of ‘aliquid’ seems to do away with Christ’s human substance altogether. Inasmuch as Christ must be divine substance it should be possible to state that Christ is this substance, *viz.*, the divine, and that as man Christ must be some different substance.⁴⁹ To this the anonymous Chanter pupil replies by rejecting the statement “Christus est hoc secundum quod homo” for the sole reason that by its very nature the demonstrative pronoun refers to a substance and thus cannot be taken as referring to Christ’s human nature. Moreover, in talking of Christ on the level of substance one should bear in mind that the word ‘substance’ may be used in one of two ways. It may be used as either a predicamental term, and in this case ‘substance’ has the same scope as ‘person’, for which reason it is true to say that Christ is a different substance

⁴⁶ Anon. Cant., Propositio 1, “Et ideo non debet fieri in eo descensus Similiter ad talem terminum non debet reddi relativum”. The Anon. Cant. does not employ the grammatical distinction between “relatio simplex” and “relatio personalis”, which would have been well suited for making this point; cf. Kneepkens 1976 and 1977.

⁴⁷ Apparently, the Anon. Cant. would endorse a very broad definition of “congruous speech” so as to cover not only grammatical completeness (see Anon. Cant., Propositio 2) but also logical soundness; cf. Ebbesen 1981: 91 sqq.

⁴⁸ Anon. Cant., Propositio 6, “... a terminis naturaliter positos ad eosdem positos significative facto sic processu semper incidit aequivocatio”. Inasmuch as the author links equivocation to variation in supposition it is not surprising to find that he maintains that a word such as ‘canis’ with its various significations is strictly speaking different nouns and different parts of speech, though materially it is only one (Anon. Cant., Propositio 8). A possible parallel to this denial of ordinary equivocation is the well-known saying of the so-called Melun school that no noun is equivocal; see Ebbesen 1992: 63.

⁴⁹ The run of the argument is complicated by the fact that a possible counter-argument to this line of reasoning is appended by means of a simple ‘item’. However, the author’s solution takes both arguments into account and, in effect, comes out in favour of the counter-argument.

from the Father. Or 'substance' may be taken as a general term covering all sorts of objects, and in this sense one should deny that Christ is a different substance from the Father.⁵⁰ Apparently, the author conceives of this line of demarcation as being signalled not only by semantics but also by purely grammatical differences. Thus it seems that, in general, masculine and feminine forms of nouns and pronouns indicate predicamental terms whereas the neuter form reveals that the general meaning is intended.⁵¹

The further objection is raised that in rejecting the inference from "Filius est homo, et ille non est Pater" to "Ergo Filius est aliquid, quod non est Pater" the anonymous Chanter pupil has sinned against the rules of grammar. According to current grammatical doctrine, relative pronouns⁵² are generally said to refer to the supposite of the corresponding noun, i.e. to the thing in its capacity to take on various properties. For this reason it seems incongruous that, when talking of the divine persons, we should be forced to abandon the ordinary rules of grammar in order to maintain that persons who share the same essence can be talked about as different supposites. One might have expected the anonymous Chanter pupil to reply to this line of reasoning by drawing a distinction between created persons and divine persons. This easy, but potentially dangerous, solution is, however, not the one adopted by the author. Instead, he focuses on the nouns 'father' and 'son'. By nature these words are, he claims, personal in a substantial sense, which is to say that they can only

50 In his discussion of whether God started to be man, the anonymous Chanter pupil draws a distinction with regard to the expression 'aliquid rationale', which can be taken to mean the thing talked about together with its various forms or the thing referred to without its formal principles (Anon. Cant., *Propositio* 4). In the present context it would seem that the author envisages a similar distinction. Thus as a complete thing with all its properties Christ is a substance that is different from the Father, who, of course, does not possess the personal property of the Son. However, with regard to basic being there is no difference between the Father and the Son or Christ because they are both God, and taking 'substance' in this sense one cannot say that Christ is a different substance from the Father. Cf. Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 6.

51 Cf. above note 38. An obvious parallel to this rule is found in the so-called "Tractatus Emmeranus de impossibili positione" (Anonymus Emmeranus: 121, ll. 5-9).

52 The discussion centers around the demonstrative pronoun 'ille', which in medieval parlance is classified as a relative pronoun.

designate persons. Other nouns such as ‘soldier’ or ‘bishop’ do not share this feature; they may designate persons but this is completely extraneous to their proper natures. For this reason, when referring to objects designated by substantially personal terms, relative pronouns are flexed so as to refer not to the neutral supposites but to the supposites together with their properties.⁵³

This particular feature of personal nouns and pronouns is further elaborated on by the anonymous pupil of the Chanter when analysing the sentence “Homo est non-homo”. The problem at hand is quite simple. Inasmuch as the divine essence qua the Son is man, and since the same essence qua the Father is non-man, one would seem entitled to infer that man is non-man. According to the anonymous pupil of the Chanter, however, this unfortunate contradiction can be dismantled if it is kept in mind that personal terms cannot stand for essences or substances. For this reason personal terms such as ‘iste homo’ and ‘iste non-homo’ cannot rightfully be applied to the divine essence but must necessarily denote persons.⁵⁴

8. Person and substance according to the anonymous pupil of the Chanter

It is evident that according to the Chanter pupil a strong distinction should be drawn between person and substance. Obviously, this holds good in the case of God. Equally, it is of central importance for reaching a proper understanding of Christ who as a person is not only divine but also human, even though on the level of substance or “quid” he is divine but not human substance. On the level of pure creatures the distinction appears to be of importance as well. It is reflected in grammar through the distinction between personal and essential nouns and pronouns.⁵⁵ On the level of semantics it calls for the distinction between substantives that are personal in a substantial or primary sense and substantives that are only secondarily personal.

⁵³ Anon. Cant., Propositio 3.

⁵⁴ Anon. Cant., Propositio 5. The same conception is central to Langton; cf. below, section 9.

⁵⁵ One might venture to assume that the author would regard the distinction between pronouns in masculine and feminine form, on the one hand, and pronouns in the neuter, on the other, as reflecting the difference between the personal and the essential.

When it comes to describing this distinction between person and substance the anonymous pupil of the Chanter is regrettably taciturn.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the author does broach the subject in discussing some of his Christological key-sentences. Firstly, he adduces that Christ might have assumed Peter without for that reason becoming Peter since Peter's personality would be absorbed by and disappear into Christ's personality.⁵⁷ Moreover, in a "positio de impossibili" it is asked, whether the dissolution of the union between the divine Word and Christ's human nature would cause the deserted human being to be the same or to become another. The author refrains from presenting a solution of his own to this question. Instead he adduces the opinion of Peter the Chanter whom he alleges to have believed that the human being would remain unchanged except for the fact that he would become a person upon being separated from the Son of God. Along the same lines Peter of Corbeil is reported to have stressed that being a person would be accidental for this particular human being. Due to the brevity of the report it is admittedly very difficult to say what lies at the bottom of this reasoning.⁵⁸

Related to this topic is the discussion of whether Christ would be two human beings if he assumed, e.g., two souls and two bodies. Since the two bodies might be of different sizes and colours it could be argued that this situation would allow of ascribing contradictory predicates to Christ. The solution to this problem the anonymous pupil of the Chanter finds in a simile. Thus he states that just as a word such as 'canis' is materially only one whereas its different meanings cause it to be different words and parts of

56 This is generally true of members of the Lombard's school; cf. Nielsen 1982: 324 sqq. According to the Chanter, drawing a strong distinction between person and essence or substance was one of the distinguishing marks of the so-called "nominales"; see the text adduced by Ebbesen and Iwakuma 1992: 185-186; cf. Ebbesen 1992: 70.

57 Anon. Cant., *Propositio* 10. This so-called "juridical" solution enjoyed a certain popularity in the late twelfth century; cf. Landgraf 1953: 94 sqq.; and Nielsen 1982: 318.

58 Anon. Cant., *Propositio* 11. One might venture to guess that the underlying conviction is that Christ's human nature or soul and body would come together to form a substance upon being separated from the Word of God, and that as united they would fulfill the requirements for constituting a human person. Deliberations along these lines are apparent in Langton's question "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis".

speech,⁵⁹ and just as the divine persons are the same essence without the persons thereby being confounded, so, on the given premises, Christ would be different human beings (*diversi*) without for that reason being different things (*diversa*).⁶⁰ At first glance, this explanation appears rather opaque. What the similes are intended to convey, however, is undoubtedly that, from the point of view of nature, one assumed set of soul and body would not be different from the other; they would be identical. They would, however, be distinguishable by way of their accidents (e.g., colour and size) and for this reason be “*diversi*”; this is presumably the reason for the author’s adducing the personal properties of the divine persons as elucidating parallels. What is less apparent, however, is how these different sets of soul and body could be carriers of accidental determinations inasmuch as, on the author’s view, Christ’s body and soul – or diverse sets of bodies and souls united to the divine person – do not form human “quid”s or substances. Unfortunately, the author does not elaborate on this and leaves the reader with the impression that, according to his theory, the human side of Christ differs significantly from ordinary human beings in its ontological constitution.⁶¹

9. Christ as person and substance according to Langton

Langton’s exposition of the Incarnation has several of its salient points in common with the interpretation provided by the anonymous pupil of the Chanter. At the same time Langton’s text makes it clear that the interpretation presented by the anonymous Chanter pupil had prompted adjustments and refinements.

In common with the anonymous pupil of the Chanter, Langton attempts to steer a middle course between the so-called “Subsis-

⁵⁹ Cf. above, note 48.

⁶⁰ Anon. Cant., *Propositio* 8.

⁶¹ The ease with which theologians of the Lombard’s school accepted that Christ’s human nature carries accidents without for that reason constituting a substance has several causes. In the first place, this would seem possible inasmuch as soul and body could still function as primary carriers of human accidents. Secondly, accidents without a supporting substance are well-known from the Eucharist where transubstantiation brings about that the accidents of bread and wine subsist without any foundation; cf. Petrus Lombardus *Sententiae*: 304.

tence" theory and the original "Habitus" theory. In opposition to the original "Subsistence" theory, however, formal ontology plays hardly any part in either author's interpretation. This is clearly brought out by Langton's exposition of the different unions in Christ. As Langton explains, Christ's death implied the dissolution of the union between Christ's uncreated and created natures, and for this reason during the "triduum" Christ was not man.⁶² Subsequently Langton explicates that the second person in the Trinity, the Son of God, was united to neither soul nor body during the three days of death whereas the divine nature retained its union with both soul and body. This union, Langton maintains, consisted in protecting Christ's body against corruption and in conferring power on Christ's soul so as to enable it to descend to the realm of the dead and liberate the righteous souls kept there.⁶³ Moreover, Langton is willing to concede that Christ's death meant not only the dissolution between the Word of God and soul and body but also the separation of soul and body.⁶⁴ Christ's human nature as a formal principle is given no part to play in Langton's exposition, and he consistently views human nature as being identical with soul and body in their mutual association.⁶⁵

62 Langton, "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 3.

63 Langton, "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 5.

64 Langton, "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 1. Admitting that some kind of union existed between Christ's soul and body is nothing out of the ordinary for members of the Lombard's school; cf. Nielsen 1982: 314 sqq.

65 Langton states that Christ could not be called a "res naturae creatae" if he joined a human soul to himself, whereas he would be a "res naturae creatae" if he united the nature of a human soul to himself ("Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 7). This does not militate against the proposed reading of Langton's ontology. What Langton has in mind in this passage is a completely different distinction from that between the soul as "id quod" and "id quo". In fact, at the close of § 4 in the question on Christ as man in death Langton explicates that if Christ joined a soul to himself he could be said to be a "soul" solely on the condition that he had united this soul as part of himself. In other words, from Langton's point of view it is the nature of the union between the Word of God and, e.g., a human soul which determines whether or not Christ assumed a soul or the nature of a soul. Furthermore, Langton seems to have experienced severe problems with the distinction between parts and their natures. Thus in the question on the assumed man Langton maintains that Christ could assume a soul though he could not assume the nature of soul since this would entail that Christ would become a soul; and this cannot be for the sole reason that a soul cannot be a person inasmuch as it is not incommunicable; "De homine assumpto ...", § 13; cf. *ibid.*, § 18.

Equally, Langton is in agreement with the anonymous pupil of the Chanter when it comes to answering the question of whether Christ could be several human beings if he assumed more than one set of soul and body.⁶⁶

Furthermore, Langton agrees with the anonymous pupil of the Chanter in his recognition that one may not use personal pronouns when speaking of Christ as man inasmuch as Christ's human nature is not a person but something that is united to Christ as divine person.⁶⁷

On the latter point, however, Langton seems very much to contradict himself inasmuch as, in one passage, he maintains that "tertia opinio veritas (*scil.*, the "Subsistence" theory) habet, quod supposito illo homine supponitur Filius Dei".⁶⁸ Nonetheless, in a later passage Langton claims that "... quia supposito isto homine non supponitur persona".⁶⁹ This contradiction is, however, only apparent and should be dissolved through a distinction between reading pronouns in either a substantival or an adjectival sense. This kind of solution Langton propounds at the end of the question on Christ as adopted son. Thus he states that, when talking of Christ as man, the statement "Istud fuit, et ab aeterno fuit verum istud esse" is ambiguous. If the 'istud' is read in an adjectival sense, the sentence should be affirmed. If, on the other hand, the 'istud' is taken in a substantival sense, then the sentence should be rejected inasmuch as it would imply that the thing to which the 'istud' points is an eternal thing.⁷⁰ The implication of this is that the 'istud' can be understood in the following two ways: either, in the adjectival sense, as "that thing which is that" so that

66 This problem is dealt with in Langton's "De homine assumpto ...", § 14, and is addressed again in § 19.

67 Langton, "... demonstrato Filio Dei nihil est dictu 'Iste homo est', quia supposito Filio Dei non supponitur homo, sicut nec eo demonstrato bene dicitur 'Ista essentia est.'" ("De homine assumpto ...", § 15); cf. "... sed per pronomen 'iste' non nisi persona (*scil.* demonstratur), et est personale, et esse istum est esse quem vel personam. Unde nihil est dictu demonstrato lapide 'Iste est', similiter nec 'Ista est'." (*ibid.*, § 4). For the rather telling 'bene' of the first quotation, cf. above, note 38.

68 Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 1.

69 Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 15. Langton admits that in this respect Christ as man is an exceptional case inasmuch as "Iste est" can be said of every other human being.

70 Langton, "Utrum Christus sit filius adoptivus", § 9.

'istud' is read as an apposition to an implied noun, which refers to some thing or person which is claimed to be eternal. Or it may be read in the substantival sense, i.e. as simply 'that thing', in which case the thing directly pointed to by 'istud' is said to be eternal. And, as a matter of course, this latter meaning is false since Christ's humanity is not eternal.⁷¹

This dual interpretation of personal pronouns is probably the reason why Langton refrains from confronting the statement that Christ as man is something.⁷² Since nothing would prevent Langton from imposing a dual reading on 'aliquid', he would be at liberty to admit that Christ became something, provided, of course, that 'aliquid' was not taken in a substantival sense. Thus Langton has dispensed with the solution provided by the anonymous pupil of the Chanter according to which 'aliquid' has simple supposition and does not allow of instantiation. And, without any risk of compromising the incarnate Christ as divine and eternal person, Langton is at liberty to use an expression such "iste homo, qui est Filius Dei" which could never obtain with the anonymous pupil of the Chanter.⁷³

71 This distinction also appears in Praepositinus' *Summa* "*Qui producit ventos*" in an argument used by theologians of the Lombard's school against the opposing theories, "Item, quaeritur ab illis, qui tenent primam vel mediam sententiam (*scil.*, the "Homo Assumptus" and the "Subsistence" theories), *utrum hoc sit concedendum* 'Christus incepit esse hoc'.

"Quod sic probatur. Christus est aliquid, quod non est Pater, et non semper fuit aliquid, quod non sit Pater. Ergo incipit vel incepit esse aliquid, quod non est Pater. Ergo hoc demonstrato homine Christo vel aliud. Sed non aliud. Ergo incipit vel incepit esse hoc.

"Solutio. Dialectici vario modo consueverunt respondere ad hanc propositionem 'Iste heri fuit hoc album' posito, quod modo sit albus, heri niger. Qui hanc dant, non recipiunt hanc 'Ipse incepit esse hic homo', immo ab aeterno fuit hic homo. Tamen non sequitur 'Ergo fuit homo' vel 'fuit aliquis homo', quia 'hic' substantive accipitur, et 'homo' est determinativum. Et est sensus 'Fuit hic, qui est homo'. Cum dicitur 'Fuit aliquis homo', esset sensus, quod tunc aliqua humanitas ei infuisset.

"Qui vero hanc negant 'Christus heri fuit hoc album', debent dare hanc 'Christus incepit esse hoc'. Et est sensus 'Christus incepit esse substantia constituta ex carne et anima', sed non incepit esse hic homo, quia 'hic' solam personam notat. Tamen incepit esse homo. Et hoc nobis magis placet." (Vat. lat. 1174, fol. 53ra, partially corrected against the preliminary edition mentioned above in note 28).

Much later the distinction surfaces in William of Auxerre's *Summa Aurea* where in an argument it is said, "... unde si hoc pronomen 'iste' teneatur adiective ita ut

This deviation from the course followed by the anonymous pupil of the Chanter does not, however, imply that Langton has abandoned the fundamental perspective characteristic of the Lombard's school. This transpires not least from Langton's analysis of self-referential statements of which the incarnate Christ is the subject.

This issue, which is of importance for the interpretation of Scripture, Langton addresses as he focuses on the saying of Christ "Ego exivi a Patre" (John 16.28). As Christ does not wish to trick his disciples, one may, according to Langton, further stipulate that Christ does not speak in a figurative sense. This raises the question of what the 'ego' actually refers to. On the one hand, it is evident that the Son of God does not have corporeal organs with which he could utter human sound. On the other hand, it is quite evident that the Christ of the Gospels makes use of human language and talks about himself. In solving this problem Langton introduces a distinction. When applied to the incarnate Christ and taken in its straightforward meaning a statement such as "Aliquis proprie loquitur" should be denied as false. Obviously, 'aliquis' would have to refer to Christ as divine person, but being able to utter human speech does not follow from being divine.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, the state-

'homo' sit terminus subiectus, et per pronomem fiat demonstratio personae, incongrua est ista 'Iste homo est'. Sed si haec dictio 'iste' teneatur substantive, credo quod recipienda, dummodo iste terminus 'homo' teneatur adiective. Similiter supposito hoc pronomine 'iste' personaliter, nihil est dictu 'Iste est' demonstrato filio hominis. Tantum enim valet 'iste' quantum 'haec persona'. Unde incongrua est haec demonstratio sicut haec demonstrata divina natura vel essentia" (Guillelmi Altissiodorensis *Summa Aurea*: 44); the punctuation has been slightly changed. For the "Iste est" said of Christ as man, cf. above, note 67.

72 Langton only touches on this issue in "De homine assumpto ...", § 5.

73 Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 21. Another difference between the two authors is to be found in the fact that Langton substituted the so-called "juridical" conception of person for a modal explanation. Thus he maintains that the characterising feature of persons is that they cannot form part of a whole and for this reason are incommunicable; cf. Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", §§ 11, 13, 18; "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 4. Langton probably took over this criterion from Gilbert of Poitiers and his followers (cf. Nielsen 1982: 179 sqq.), and he seems to have experienced difficulties with fitting it into his conceptual framework; cf. above, note 65.

74 Applying a dual reading of 'aliquis' in order to salvage the sentence is apparently not an option for Langton, and this is presumably dictated by Langton's conviction that the masculine form necessitates a strictly personal reading; cf. above, note 51.

ment "Filius Dei loquitur" may be admitted inasmuch as it can be expanded so as to read "Filius Dei loquitur, quia iste homo quo Filius Dei loquitur". But this sentence cannot be true in a proper sense; it is true only in a figurative sense. In the same way self-referential statements, like the one quoted from the Gospel of John, Langton maintains, may be accepted as true only in a figurative sense. Langton explains that the figure of speech involved is a kind of personification or dramatical masking ("prosopopoeia") inasmuch as the Son of God talks about himself through the assumed human nature. In accordance with this, Langton is even willing to accept a statement such as "Filius Dei proprie loquitur", since "Iste homo, qui est Filius Dei, proprie loquitur". For the correct interpretation of this, it is, however, requisite that 'proprie' be linked to 'loquitur' and not to the subject term. Interpreted, this means that the incarnate Christ is fully capable of uttering proper human speech inasmuch as he assumed a genuinely or truly human body and soul. Nonetheless, Christ, who is a divine person, can only be the indirect subject for human activities such as speech inasmuch they follow from human nature with which he is united.⁷⁵

In full accord with this line of reasoning Langton further maintains that in a sentence such as "Idem creavit virginem creandus ex virgine" there is a significant difference in the way in which the two verbs relate to the thing pointed to by the subject term. Whereas 'creavit' properly belongs to Christ as person, i.e. to the Son of God, 'creandus' belongs to the person only in an improper or figurative sense, which is to say by way of the assumed human nature.⁷⁶ For this reason, Langton states, in making Christ the subject of a sentence it is of major importance whether this is done by way of a noun which belongs to him as the Son of God or through a noun derived from the assumed human nature.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 21. This interpretation is strictly opposed to the view characteristic of the "Subsistence" theory according to which Christ is the immediate subject for both divine and human acts inasmuch as Christ assumed human nature as part of his being and for this reason is both soul and body as well as the ensuing human substance; cf. Nielsen 1982: 341 sqq.

⁷⁶ Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 17.

⁷⁷ Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 22. This passage might be taken to indicate that Langton would be willing to recognise that the assumed human nature ("homo iste") may function as supposite independently of the divine assuming person. This would, however, be a serious misunderstanding. What is at stake is whether all statements about Christ should be considered to be proper or not.

10. Conclusion

As far as the interpretation of the Incarnation is concerned, a common goal for the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and Langton was to maintain and defend that particular conception of the Incarnation which had been developed in the Lombard's school. To both theologians accommodating the papal condemnation of 1177 was no small challenge. On the one hand, they were disinclined to modify their basic conception of the ontological makeup of the incarnate Christ; and, strictly speaking, the condemnation did not explicitly require them to do so. On the other hand, they were forced to modify the interpretation of several Christological key-sentences, which had originated with the early proponents of this theory. In order to accomplish this task both attempted to demonstrate that their understanding of the controverted Christological key-sentences was firmly founded on current grammatical and logical doctrine.

With the anonymous Chanter pupil the changes made to the interpretation of a sentence such as "Christus secundum homo est aliquid" were clearly minor. Thus he simply substituted the original explanation, in which 'secundum' and 'aliquid' were endowed with different meanings, with a much simpler one which relied on the well-known distinction between personal and simple supposition. In accordance with this, the Chanter pupil argued for a strong distinction between a substantival and an adjectival interpretation of nouns, which was shown to be of paramount importance for interpreting statements about Christ. Furthermore, this author advocated a sharp distinction between what is personal and what is substantial and attempted to show that this distinction is valid for substantives as well. Moreover, he employed this distinction in order to obtain a very strict interpretation of demonstrative and relative pronouns.

The success of the Chanter pupil in bringing his interpretation of Christological key-sentences into agreement with current grammatical and logical doctrine was, however, not without its costs. Among the most damaging drawbacks to his exposition was undoubtedly that, on his premises, it would be indefensible to refer to Christ as man by way of a personal pronoun. Equally, all sentences had to be censured in which a relative clause was appended to a noun which accrued to Christ on the basis of his human nature.

Judging from Langton's discussion of this matter it appears that this limitation caused some embarrassment to theologians of the Lombard's persuasion. And Langton's most significant contribution to the further defence of this particular view of the Incarnation was his extending the distinction between a substantival and an adjectival reading of nouns so as to include pronouns and complex expressions containing a pronoun. On the other hand, as it clearly transpires from Langton's discussion of Christ as subject of sentences containing nouns or verbs which pertain to Christ's human nature, this amelioration did not signal any significant change to the basic view characteristic of the Lombard's school.

Seen from the perspective of theology it is undoubtedly true to say that neither the anonymous pupil of the Chanter nor Stephen Langton made major contributions to the understanding of the Incarnation. Their expositions clearly reveal that discussion on this point of theology had developed into a battle between firmly entrenched parties with neither side making much headway. To many theologians this situation was utterly frustrating, and somebody like Peter the Chanter ended up despising such discussions as no more than expressions of human curiosity.⁷⁸ Even to somebody like Praepositinus, who mastered the full weaponry of scholastic disputation, the finer logical points could at times seem quite futile.⁷⁹ Nonetheless, scholars such as the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and Stephen Langton exercised considerable influence on later generations, inasmuch as subsequent theologians continued to take their arguments into account and find adequate replies. To what degree this kind of "theological" logic influenced also the development of logic proper is a field of study still waiting to be cultivated.

78 Cf. the gloss from the Chanter's commentary on the Pauline Epistles as quoted in Landgraf 1953: 133, note 79.

79 In the passage following immediately after the text quoted above, note 71, Praepositinus underscores that one does not have to enter into discussions revolving around the substantival and adjectival readings of pronouns and complex expressions containing a pronoun, since such a line of argument is clearly fallacious.

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Hugh of St.-Cher's Use of Stephen Langton

RICCARDO QUINTO*

Summary. This paper compares the doctrine of the fear of God as it is found in Stephen Langton's *Quaestiones theologiae* and *Epistle Commentary* and Hugh of St.-Cher's *Sentence Commentary* and *Postilla super bibliam*. It shows that Hugh probably used Langton's biblical commentary, while he may have known Langton's theological positions through William of Auxerre's *Summa Auvea*. Besides this Hugh used sources not available to Langton or to William, like positions from the *De fide orth.* by John Damascene, which he could find in Alexander of Hales' *Gloss on the Sentences* or in the *Quaestiones theologiae* of ms. Douai, B. M., 434.

Historians¹ have been struck by the similarity of the careers of Stephen Langton († 1228) and Hugh of St.-Cher, O.P. († 1263). Each of them composed a continuous commentary on almost all the biblical books, commented on Peter the Lombard's *Sentences* and Peter Comestor's *Historia scholastica*, payed great attention to the text of the biblical books² by creating biblical concordances, disputed theological *quaestiones*, and preached. Each of them was an important figure in ecclesiastical government, and each died as a cardinal. Each of them, finally, executed his literary production according to the three exercises of *lectio*, *disputatio*, and *praedicatio* which had been proposed as the parts of the theological enterprise by Peter the Chanter († 1197).³ The parallels between the careers and literary works of these two mediaeval "prelates" have led historians to suppose a direct influence of the elder (Stephen) on the younger (Hugh),⁴ while the fact that only a fraction of their literary production has been edited has hindered modern scholars from a systematic study of the similarities and differences between them.

* I owe special thanks to Dr. Russell Friedman for his labour to make my text readable English.

1 E.g. Smalley 1985: 143; Dahan 1985: 131.

2 Cf. Smalley 1983: 267.

3 Cf. *Verbum abbreviatum*, I (PL 205, 25). Cf. Quinto 1989: 89-90.

4 See below, footnotes 26 and 27.

We will start with a general comparison of the works of our authors and in so doing we will call to mind once again the triadic division of mediaeval theology proposed by the Chanter, using this to help guide us through this sometimes obscure *silva magna*. Let us look at the following schema, based on Kaeppli's repertoire of Dominican writers and on my own inquiry into Stephen's literary production:⁵

Stephen Langton, Arch. of Canterbury, Card. tit. S. Chrisogoni († 1228)

Hugh of St.-Cher OP, Card. tit. S. Sabinae († 1263)

Lectio

– Commentary on Lombard's *Sentences* (ed. Landgraf 1952; c. 1200-1220)

– Commentary on Lombard's *Sentences* (uned.; c. 1231-1232)

– Commentary on Comestor's *Historia scholastica* (in progress - M. J. Clark⁶)

– Commentary on Comestor's *Historia scholastica* (in progress - A. I. Lehtinen)

– Commentary on most of the books of the Bible. No sure attribution for the Psalms and the Gospels.

– *Postilla in uniuersum uetus et nouum testamentum* (edited: 8 vols. *in-folio*⁷)

For Paul's Epistles, commentary through Lombard's *Magna Glossatura*⁸
Edited:

Ruth (Lacombe-Smalley 1930: 86-126)
Chronicles (*I-II Paralipomena*) (Saltman 1978)

– Reordination of biblical books and their subdivision in chapters - Collection of variant readings are attested in commentaries and in the *Quaestiones*

– *Correctorium bibliae*⁹

– Pastoral concordances¹⁰ of biblical texts and glosses:

– Verbal concordances of the scriptures¹¹

– *Summa de diuersis*¹² (partial ed. Quinto forthcoming, Appendix 1)

– *Distinctiones*¹³

– *Interpretatio nominum hebraicorum*¹⁴

– “*De uitando consortio, consilio, colloquio et exemplo malorum*” (doubtful)¹⁵

– “*Summa magistri Stephani de Langedon Archiepiscopi de uiciis et uirtutibus*” (ms. Cardiff, Central Public Library, 3833, ff. 150^{ra}- 164^{ra}; doubtful¹⁶; ed. in progress - B. Tarbuck)

Disputatio– *Summa quaestionum theologiae*

Partly in ms. Douai 434 (among others) Partial ed. (Ebbesen-Mortensen 1985; Quinto 1992)

– *Quaestiones uariae*Chiefly in ms. Douai 434¹⁷Partial ed. (Stegmüller¹⁸, Torrell 1977)*Tractatus super missam* (enormously diffused - old and modern editions¹⁹)**Praedicatio**– Sermons (part. ed.: *PL* 190: 407-424; Roberts 1980²¹)– Sermons²⁰**Works issued in connection with ecclesiastical duties**

– Epistles (ed. Major 1950)

– Epistles

– *Constitutiones Oxonienses*²²– *Declarationes*²³– Hymns and didactic poems
aliaque plura ...

5 Cf. Kaeppli-Panella 1970-1993, ii: 269-281 (nos 1983-1994), with the additions to be found in vol. iv: 124-126; Landgraf 1973: 175-177; Quinto 1994: 30-166.

6 For an updated list of mss, see Quinto 1994: 35.

7 About eds., see Kaeppli-Panella 1970-1993, ii: 275. Please note that "Hugh" (for explanation of the quotation marks, see the last paragraph of this article) very probably wrote a double postill on each book of the Bible. According to Beryl Smalley (1979: 250), his "*Postilla super Totam Bibliam* survives in two versions, a longer and a shorter. The longer is printed in early editions". As a matter of fact, this is not completely true, at least for the commentary on the Apocalypse, whose two versions exist in print: in this case, the shorter one ("*Aser pinguis*") is that printed in the *Postill* editions, while the longer ("*Vidit Iacob*") was printed among the works of Thomas Aquinas (e. g. Fiaccadori, Parma. 1852-72: xxiii, 325-511; Vivès, Paris. 1871-80: xxxi, 469-661; xxxii, 1-86). Cf. Lerner 1985: 164 and note 21.

8 Extracts can be read in Balduccelli 1951: 209-225; Quinto 1992: 113-119.

9 See Kaeppli-Panella 1970-1993, ii: 273.

10 Cf. Quinto 1995a: 121-122 (and note 8); Quinto 1996: 293-294.

11 Cf. Rouse & Rouse 1974; Rouse & Rouse 1984.

12 Cf. Quinto 1994: 77-90; Quinto 1996: 302-361 and Quinto forthcoming.

13 A list of these *Distinctiones* can be found in Quinto 1994: 62-71.

14 Cf. Quinto 1994: 33-34.

15 Text to be found in ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library 1954 (Bodley 631), ff. 1-183^r; cf. Quinto 1994: 35-36. List of the chapters in Quinto forthcoming, Appendix 2.2.

16 Cf. Quinto forthcoming, note 60.

17 For a list of the questions, see Appendix III, below.

18 Cf. Hugo de S. Caro, *Questio de beneficiis ecclesiasticis*.

So, the short commentary on the Lombard by Stephen Langton, which Landgraf calls “the first *Sentence* commentary of early scholasticism”,²⁴ is edited, while the long commentary by Hugh is on the whole unedited. Although it is short, Langton’s *Sentences* commentary is not easily readable, and doesn’t seem to be a work of his youth. Its editor, Artur M. Landgraf, found it hard to date with any precision. Nevertheless, he thought that it could hardly have been written before the beginning of the thirteenth century nor after 1222 (when Peter of Corbeil died).²⁵ Since after 1213, or at least 1215, Langton appears to have been very busy with political and ecclesiastic duties, I would consider it reasonable to date the completion of this work to within the first fifteen years of the thirteenth century. In any case, this *Sentences* commentary contains numerous references to the other main theological works by Stephen, namely the *Quaestiones theologiae* and the Commentary on St. Paul. As for Hugh’s *Sentences* commentary, we know that it had at least two redactions, but it seems to have been finished in 1231-1232.

With regard to their Biblical commentaries, all who have compared Stephen’s and Hugh’s commentaries on the different biblical books, like Msgr. Landgraf for the Pauline epistles²⁶ and Avrom Saltman for *Chronicles*, maintain that Hugh’s commentaries are not much more than updated abridgments of those by Stephen, so that it is possible to claim, for instance, that “Hugh compiled his commentary on *Chronicles* with a manuscript of Langton at his side”.²⁷ I have gone through the whole of Stephen and Hugh’s edited commentaries on *Paralipomena* (*Chronicles*) and *Ruth*, and was able to slightly correct previous statements.²⁸

19 Cf. Kaeppli-Panella 1970-1993, ii: 276-280.

20 Cf. Schneyer 1969-1990, ii: 758-785; Kaeppli-Panella 1970-1993, ii: 280; iv: 125.

21 Cf. Roberts 1968; for a list of published sermons, see Quinto 1994: 31.

22 Cf. Quinto 1994: 41.

23 Cf. Kaeppli-Panella 1970-1993, ii: 280.

24 Landgraf 1939; Id. 1973: 169.

25 Landgraf 1952: XVIII.

26 Landgraf 1973: 170: “Le *Commentaire* paulinien d’Hugues de Saint-Cher [...] est entièrement imprégné du texte du *Commentaire* de Langton”.

27 Saltman 1978: 45.

28 Cf. Quinto forthcoming.

Further, while preparing this paper, I went through the *Epistles* commentaries of Stephen and Hugh, comparing the exegesis of three different passages: *Romans* 8, 15; *First Epistle of John* 4, 18 (which I transcribed in Copenhagen);²⁹ and the 13th chapter of the *First Epistle to the Corinthians* (using the Langton text edited by Balduccelli). In all these texts, I did not find the strict dependence of Hugh on Stephen which the claims of earlier scholars had led me to expect.

This is even more interesting given that it is based on examination of the *Epistles* commentaries. In fact, we have good reasons to think that the *Epistles* commentary is the work on which Stephen spent the most energy. It was disseminated widely, and despite its length it is preserved in quite a large number of manuscripts. This is probably because in this work Langton produced quite an effective tool, which overshadowed earlier *Epistles* commentaries. For proof of this claim, consider the following three facts.

First, compared to that written by Peter the Lombard, Langton's commentary covers all of the *Epistles*, i.e. not only the letters by St. Paul, but also the Catholic Epistles.

Second, Langton's commentary includes all the information provided by Peter, because it does not comment directly on the New Testament text, but through the *Magna glossatura* of Peter himself, explaining all of its lemmas.

Third, Langton's commentary makes use of the result of the most up-to-date theological debate, since it refers to the main points discussed in his *Quaestiones theologiae. As disputator* Stephen had gathered together many different biblical passages, arranged them topically, and tried to discover a theological position which could tie them all together. In the *Epistles* commentary, on the other hand, Langton makes use of the solutions defended in the disputation, but he arranges them as a commentary on and clarification of the text. The views held throughout the commentary correspond well to those expressed in the *Quaestiones*; in fact, among Langton's works, this one seems to be the best one to consult on specific points of doctrine. Nevertheless, despite being probably the best example of an *Epistle* commentary to be found "on the market", Langton's work was *not* chosen by Hugh as his model: in fact it was just one source among many. Let us examine

29 Quinto 1992: 113-119.

this claim by analyzing a particular theological position of our authors.

When I was a guest of IGL in 1992, I made a modest contribution to the rediscovery of Langton by publishing – with the help of the people in Copenhagen – three out of some 200 of Langton’s *Quaestiones*. Although this is only a small part of Langton’s work, the editions are based on all known manuscripts, and thus I was able to clear up some of the textual problems associated with this work of Langton. The three *Quaestiones* which I published deal with the problem of the fear of God. I now want to investigate whether Hugh of St.-Cher could have known this text of Langton’s.

In his *Quaestiones* Stephen Langton distinguishes six kinds of fear in an introductory first paragraph:³⁰

timor	{	naturalis humanus mundanus seruilis initialis filialis
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In the text of the Lombard, however, there are actually only four kinds:³¹

timor	{	humanus seruilis initialis filialis
-------	---	--

Although twelfth-century authors elaborated divisions of the concept of fear in various ways,³² Stephen’s position is quite original and distinctive. After the introduction in which Stephen defines the six different kinds of fear, he begins a discussion of the three kinds of fear which can be considered gifts of the Holy Ghost, i.e. *timor seruilis*, *initialis*, and *filialis*.

³⁰ *Ibid.*: 124-125.

³¹ Petrus Lombardus, *Sent.* III, d. 34, c. 4 (ii: 192-193).

³² Cf. Quinto 1995b: 46-52.

This way of dealing with the subject is typical of another work, namely the *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre, written probably in the early 1220s. Textual comparison can quite easily prove that Langton's *Quaestiones* are one of the direct sources of Auxerre's work. Very strict dependence on William's *Summa* can be found, in turn, in the *Summa* of the first Dominican master at Paris, Roland of Cremona, written about 1232.³³

As we have seen, Hugh of St.-Cher also wrote some *Quaestiones theologiae*, of which 38 are preserved, chiefly in ms. Douai 434, vols. I & II. Not one of these questions deals with fear. We must then turn to Hugh's *Sentences* commentary, where, in the commentary on distinction 34 of the third book, we find a long treatment of the problem of fear (and of some other gifts of the Holy Ghost). Here, we note a curious situation: we find again the "Langtonian" schema of the *Summa aurea*, and it can be proved that Hugh's commentary is effectively based on this work.³⁴ But, between the *declaratio terminorum* and the discussion of *timor seruilis*, *initialis* and *filialis* in Hugh's text there is an item without precedent in either Langton or in the *Summa aurea*, namely the suggestion of an alternative division of fear into six kinds:³⁵

timor	{	segnities
		uerecundia
		erubescencia
		admiratio
		stupor
		agonia

³³ Cf. lib. III, capp. CCC-CCCIX (ed. Cortesi 1962: 849-893). The dependence of Roland on Hugh, which was asserted by Landgraf (1973: 178), needs to be investigated further. On the relationship of literary dependence among Langton's *Quaestiones*, William's *Summa*, Hugh's *Commentary*, and the other works of early scholasticism quoted here, please see Appendix II at the end of this paper.

³⁴ I suspect a further source to be the *Summa Theologiae* of Prepositinus of Cremona († 1210). Cf. the text published in Quinto 1992: 108-112.

³⁵ Cf. the text in Appendix I to this article. Cf. Hugo, *Postilla in ad Rom.* 8, 15 (vii: 47').

This division of fear will have great influence in the thirteenth century. It originates from the treatise *De fide orthodoxa* by John Damascene (II, 15, PG 94, 932).³⁶ It will give a lot of trouble to scholastic theologians³⁷ – not least to Thomas Aquinas³⁸ – in their attempts to harmonize it with the previous division of fear into six (or four) kinds. The solution given by Hugh is not particularly nuanced,³⁹ since he simply tries to reduce the second division to the first, by means of identifying:

³⁶ John Damascene, *De fide orth.* cap. 29 (ed. Kotter 1973: 81; versio Burgundionis, ed. Buytaert 1955: 121-122) *verbatim* from Nemesii Emesen. *De nat. hom.*, cap. 20 (PG 40, 688-689; ed. Morani 1987: 81 [cap. 21]; tr. lat. Burgundionis, ed. Verbeke-Moncho 1975: 103, lin. 32-43 [cap. 20]). Damascene and Nemesius were translated independently into Latin, each one at least twice (*De fide orth.*: Cerbanus, then Burgundio; *De nat. hom.*: Alfanus of Salerno, then Burgundio; Nemesius and Damascene are concurrently quoted by Albert the Great and Aquinas with attribution to “Gregorius Nyssenus”, which probably originated in a corrupted ms. Cf. Quinto 1995b: 50). In the *Summa aurea* edition, the passage from John Damascene is quoted as supporting the division of fear into *naturalis, humanus, mundanus, servilis, initialis, filialis*, but it clearly has nothing to do with it (cf. *Summa aurea*, III, 31, 1 [vol. 3-2: 602, *adp. fontium*]).

³⁷ E.g. Guiard of Laon, *Quaestio de timore* from ms. Douai 434, I, f. 14^b, art. IV (ed. Quinto 1995b: 78-79; probably to be dated before 1228); Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in Sent.* III, 34, n° 19 (ed. 1954: 415-416) and n° 44 (431-432) (this gloss is to be dated 1225-1227); *Summa Halesiana*, pars III, inq. I, tract. II, quaest. II, tit. III, cap. I (§ 665, Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, iv: 1051-1053), which here copies *ad verbum* from John of La Rochelle, *De donis*, ms. Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, 152 (Scaff. VIII), f. 133^b; Albert the Great, *De bono*, tract. III, quaest. V, art. 2 (ed. Colon. 1951: 201-202; 206); an influence of the Damascene passage is probably to be seen also in Albert’s *Postilla super Isaiam* XI, 3 (ed. Colon. 1952: 173-175); Bonaventura, *In III Sent.* d. 34, p. II, dub. 3 (iii: 769-770).

³⁸ Cf. *In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 3 co; *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 4, ag. 7 et ad 7^{um}; *S. th. I^a-II^{ae}*, q. 41, a. 4, with shorter references in *In III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 2 a. 1 b, ag. 6; *S. th. II^a-II^{ae}*, q. 19, a. 2, ag. 1. In *De ver.* q. 26, a. 4, ag. 3, Thomas quotes the *De nat. hom.* attributing it to Gregorius Nyssenus, just as Albert had done in *De bono*, tract. III, quaest. V, art. 2 (ed. Colon. 1951: 201⁸¹⁻⁸⁵; 206⁴⁵⁻⁴⁸). Cf. Quinto 1995b: 56-57.

³⁹ More congruous seems the solution of Hugh himself that we find in *Postilla in ad Rom.* 8, 15: “[...] dicunt quod Joan. Dam. loquitur de passionibus, et referuntur ad timorem naturalem” (vii: 47^v). Cf. *Summa Hales.* III, § 665: “Timor accipitur [...] uno modo ut solum nominet passionem [...] Secundum autem quod [...] est sexmembris diuisio Damasceni” (iv: 1052). Note that the solution was already in the *De donis* of John of La Rochelle.

<i>segnities, erubescencia</i>	with	<i>naturalis uel humanus uel seruilis timor</i>
<i>agonia</i>	with	<i>mundanus timor</i>
<i>uerecundia, stupor, admiratio</i>	with	<i>filiatis timor</i>

What is interesting here is not the subtlety of Hugh's solution, but his theological sources: the use of John Damascene cannot come from Langton's *quaestio* (probably composed before 1200). Nor is Damascene's division of fear to be found in William's *Summa aurea* (early 1220s); nor in Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono* (1225-1228); nor in Roland of Cremona's *Summa*; nor in the works of William of Auvergne (as far as I know them). On the other hand, it can be found in Alexander of Hales' *Glossa in Sententias*, written probably (for the third book) in the late 1220s, as well as in several of the 572 *Quaestiones theologiae* of ms. Douai 434 composed around 1228. Further, it is to be found in the *Summa Halesiana* and in the *De donis* of John of La Rochelle, which surely is a source for the discussion of fear in the Franciscan *Summa*.⁴⁰

Turning now to Hugh's discussion of fear as it is found in his commentary on *Epistles*, we note:

1. Hugh introduces his discussion of fear by commenting on the same verses with which Stephen introduced his own discussion.

2. Instead of copying Langton's discussion, Hugh borrows from his own *Commentary on the Sentences*.

3. In doing this, he also introduces the subdivision of fear which originates from John Damascene. In this way, Hugh creates a new model for the discussion of this problem, which will have great influence, at least until the time of Thomas Aquinas.

* * *

From this example, we can determine something of Hugh's attitude towards his theological sources. While depending on his model for the framework of his treatment, Hugh tries to bring

⁴⁰ See above, notes 37 and 39. In *Quaestio* 209 from ms. Douai, B. M., 434 (Anonymi *De timore naturali*; ed. Quinto 1995b: 84-86) Damascene's definition of fear is quoted from *De fide orth.* cap. 67 (versio Burgundionis, ed. Buytaert 1955: 265-266).

into his commentary updated theological information. The *Quaestiones theologiae* of Stephen Langton still remain an important background source;⁴¹ but as his principal source, Hugh makes use of more systematic reference works, such as William's *Summa aurea*, trying indeed to update it with more recent discussion, such as can be found in the *Quaestiones* literature.

We can conclude that by the late 1220s, the *Quaestiones theologiae* of Stephen Langton no longer represented the most effective tool for systematic theology. On the other hand, Stephen's commentaries on the *Bible*, and particularly those on the *Epistles*, still did. Thus, his commentaries were still consulted, while the *Quaestiones theologiae* were already overshadowed by more systematic – though less original – theological syntheses, such as William's *Summa aurea* and Prepositinus' *Summa theologiae*. We can further suggest that Stephen would have been satisfied with his own destiny: he shared the attitude of those theologians of the twelfth century, e.g. Peter the Chanter, who considered the *disputatio* as just a sort of training for biblical exegesis and preaching. Hugh of St.-Cher was a man of the new century, who probably could complete much of what Stephen had begun: thanks to the teamwork which was possible in Dominican houses, he could put his name to the verbal concordance of the Scriptures, the *Correctorium* of the Bible, and the continued exposition of the sacred text known as *Postilla*. This last work is firmly based on the best results of Langton's work, and so, because it had a wide manuscript circulation and eventually was printed, it has transmitted those results to the late- and the post-medieval periods, attesting to the continuity of the exegetical tradition. Moreover, we can see how the path of exegesis and that of systematic theology begin to part ways after this point in time, the latter being progressively more influenced by philosophy.

A point that is worth emphasizing here, is how Dominican teamwork can explain some of the characteristics of Hugh's works, particularly of the very long biblical *Postilla*. As Robert E. Lerner⁴² (and Beryl Smalley⁴³ before him) have noted, we should very probably put Hugh's name in quotation marks in front of some of "his" *Pos-*

41 This conclusion also applies to the case of prophecy as studied by Jean-Pierre Torrell, cf. Torrell 1977: 137-40 and 147.

42 Lerner 1985: 181-183.

43 Smalley 1983: xiii.

tills: what goes under “Hugh’s” name is the product of quite a large Dominican team, and the attitude of the “author” toward “his” sources can change radically from one part of the commentary to another. So, claims about Hugh’s dependence on Stephen for the content of his exegesis must be checked case by case, and we must be very careful, because – like the devil cast out by Jesus (Mk 5, 9) – our cardinal can say: “My name is Legion, for we are many...”.

Appendix I

Hugonis de Sancto Caro *Commentum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, l. III, dist. XXXIV⁴⁴

Timor naturalis bonus. Hic fuit in christo: quilibet enim naturaliter timet mortem. Humanus malus, quo timetur afflictio corporis. Mundanus malus, quo timetur amissio rerum. Seruilis bonus, quia eo caritas introducitur. Inicialis bonus, quia cum imperfecta caritate habetur. Filialis bonus siue castus siue amabilis: hic permanet in eternum quoad usum reuerentiae.

*Et quia de timore etcetera.*⁴⁵ Ad euentiam eorum que de timore dicenda sunt, notandum quod vi sunt species timoris, scilicet naturalis, humanus, mundanus, seruilis, inicialis, filialis, qui et sanctus et castus aliquando uocatur.⁴⁶

Naturalis timor est quo quilibet timet naturaliter nocium nature. Iste timor nec est bonus nec est malus, nec actus eius meritorius uel demeritorius, quia non subest libero arbitrio, et dicitur ‘naturalis’ non a natura instituta set destituta: est enim pena pro peccato priorum parentum inflicta et in nobis originaliter contracta.⁴⁷ Hoc timore timuit christus naturaliter mori, sicut dicit

⁴⁴ *Textum codicis* Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat. III 174 (2785), f. 159-161^v in *tabulis luce depictis legi, quas Fr. Bertrandus G. Guyot OP de Collegio editorum operum S. Thomae Aquinatis (Cryptaeferatae prope Romam locato) mihi benigne transmisit.*

⁴⁵ Petr. Lomb., *Sent.* III, 34, 4 (vol. ii: 192).

⁴⁶ Cf. Hugonis *Postillam in I Joh.* 4, 18 (vii: 354); *In Ps.* 18, 10 (ii: 42); *In Ps.* 127, 1 (ii: 329), ubi septem distinguuntur timores, quorum “septimus est timor reuerentiae”.

⁴⁷ naturaliter ... contracta: cf. Praepos., *Summa*, II, *de donis* (Quinto 1992: 112¹³⁶⁻¹³⁷).

Marcus xxiii:⁴⁸ Cepit Iesus pauere et tedere. Et oritur timor iste ex naturali, quo quilibet naturaliter sibi utile amat.

Timor humanus, quando<que> sumitur communiter, id est 'timor hominis', et sic complectitur omnem timorem – sic non est species; quandoque stricte, prout scilicet sonat in uicium, et sic accipitur hic. Est autem timor humanus per quem quis nimis timet pelli sue, id est plus debito. Et est hic timor uicium, id est malus habitus mentis. Et eius actus peccatum est: eius peccatum quandoque est mortale, quandoque ueniale. Iste timor nascitur ex nimio amore presentis uite, qui amor similiter malus est, et quandoque mortalis quandoque uenialis. Mortalis quando eque uel plus deo diligit quis uitam presentem, id est prius peccaret mortaliter quam perderet uitam suam; uenialis est quando plus iusto diligit uitam suam <tamen citra> deum, id est quando prius faceret ueniale peccatum quam permetteret se occidi, set non mortale. Igitur ex amore mortali timor mortalis, ex ueniali uenialis oritur.

Timor mundanus est quo quis nimis timet rebus suis, et nascitur similiter ex nimio amore rerum temporalium penitus eodem modo quo dictum est de humano.

Timor initialis est quo quis timet gehennam et offensam dei siue separationem a deo, unde habet quasi duos oculos, unum ad penam, alterum ad deum, et hic est principalior.

Timor seruilis est quo quis propter gehennam timet [159^{rb}] principaliter peccare, et propter hoc cauet a peccato.

Timor filialis est quo quis timet separationem a deo uel offensam dei principaliter.

Primus timor communis est omni homini et est a deo. II^{us} et tertius non est a spiritu sancto. III^{us} est a spiritu sancto set non cum spiritu sancto. V^{us} (initialis) et vi^{us} sunt a spiritu sancto et cum spiritu sancto.

Hic autem nomine 'spiritus' non tantum persona increata que est tertia in trinitate intelligitur, set etiam caritas intelligitur ex qua triplex timor, scilicet seruilis, in quantum cessare facit a peccato, initialis, filialis.

De primis tribus, cum non sint dona spiritus sancti, ad presens dimittimus, de aliis tribus aliquid dicturi.

48 Rectius Mc. 14, 33.

SET prius uidetur quod plures sint species timoris quam predictae vi. Dicit enim Damascenus⁴⁹ quod timor in sex diuiditur species, scilicet segnitiam, uerecundiam, erubescenciam, admirationem, stuporem, agoniam, et ponit descriptionem cuiuslibet: segnitias est timor future operationis; erubescencia timor est in expectatione conuitii, et dicit quod optima est hec passio; hec de futuro esse patet; uerecundia est timor in turpi actione, et de hac dicit: hec passio inseparabilis est ad salutem, quasi diceret, “sine uerecundia non potest esse salus”; admiratio est timor ex magna ymaginatione, stupor est timor ex inconsueta ymaginatione, agonia est timor per casum scilicet per⁵⁰ infortunium. Constat autem quod isti timores non sunt timores preassignati, nec sunt in illis uel econtrario. Ergo plures sunt timores quam vi.

Item Augustinus in enche<ridio>: “pudor est timor displicendi”, et constat quod hic timor nec in primis nec in secundis timoribus continetur, et ita uidetur quod viii genera timorum sint.

Item queritur quare erubescencia dicatur optima et uerecundia inseparabilis ad salutem potius quam alie.

Item spes et timor sunt quasi opposita, quia spes est de futuro bono, timor de futuro malo; set spes est unica uirtus in specie, ergo timor debet esse tantum unus.

Item Augustinus assignat tantum iii^{or} genera timorum, ut patet in littera, Beda autem tantum tria,⁵¹ et ita alter est superfluum, uel alter diminutus.⁵²

SOLUTIO. Ad primum dicimus quod vi sunt genera timoris tantum, que primo assignata sunt, quod probatur hoc modo. Timor est fuga mali, sicut dicit Augustinus, sicut amor appetitus boni; et sicut triplex bonum est, scilicet bonum delectabile, expediens et honestum, ita triplex est malum, scilicet tristabile, dampnosum et indecens. Item malum tristabile duplex est, scilicet temporale et eternum. Item tristabile temporale duplex est, scilicet naturale, quod omnibus naturaliter tristabile est ut mors, et innaturale [159^{va}], quod non omnibus inest set alicui. Igitur fuga mali trista-

49 *De fide orth.* cap. 29 (PG 94, 932; versio Burgundionis, ed. Buytaert 1955: 121-122). Cf. Hugonis *Postillam in ad Rom.* 8, 15 (vii: 47ⁿ).

50 per *coni.*: et *ms.* Cf. ed. Buytaert 1955: 122¹⁰.

51 Cf. Petr. Lomb., *Sent.* III, 34, 4, n. 2 (vol. ii: 193¹⁹⁻²²).

52 Cf. Bonavent. *In III Sent.* d. 34, p. II, dub. 3: “Attende quod hic quatuor distinguuntur timores, cum supra Beda dixerit, duos esse: ex hoc enim uidetur, quod Magister sit superfluum, vel Beda diminutus” (iii: 769).

bilis temporalis naturalis timor <naturalis, fuga mali tristabilis temporalis innaturalis timor> humanus est; fuga uero mali tristabilis eterni timor seruilis, et sic respectu mali tristabilis sumitur triplex timor. Item malum dampnosum aut est eternum – et fuga huius mali proprie timor est in malis – aut temporale, et fuga eius est timor mundanus. Et ita respectu mali dampnosi sumitur duplex timor. Respectu uero mali indecentis⁵³ sumitur timor reuerentie, qui est timor filialis: bonus enim filius fugit malum quia indecens est [...].

Ad id autem quod obicitur de diuisione Damasceni, dicendum est quod ille diuisiones sese inuicem comprehendunt, quia circa idem sunt: segnities enim non timet operationem nisi quia putat tristabile; erubescencia similiter timet conuitium quia tristabile; uerecundia similiter timet turpem actionem quia indecens, agonia casum vel infortunium quia dampnosum, et ita segnities <et> erubescencia reducuntur ad naturalem uel humanum uel seruillem timorem, uerecundia ad filialem, agonia ad mundanum; stupor uero <et> admiratio similiter ad filialem in quantum timor filialis reuerentia est nichil aliud quam resilitio in propriam paruitatem considerata magnitudine <dei>, et inde est stupor et admiratio, propter considerate rei magnitudinem proprie, et sic patet solutio ad primum. [... *ad secundum, tertium, quartum omittuntur* ...].

Ad ultimum dicimus quod Beda sub timore seruili comprehendit initialem. Hec de timore in communi sufficiunt.

Post hec dicendum est de speciebus timoris, et primo de seruili, circa quem tria principaliter queruntur: primum est utrum sit donum spiritus sancti, secundum qualiter differat ab aliis, tertium est de usu eius [...].

[160^{va}] Tertio queritur de timore initiali, circa quem tria principaliter queruntur: primo quare dicatur initialis, secundo de augmento eius, tertio utrum sit idem cum filiali.

[160^{vb}] Quarto queritur de timore filiali, de quo tria principaliter queruntur: primum est de unitate eius; secundum de differentia eius ad initialem timorem; tertium si perfectus timet penas eternas.

[161^{va}] *Sequitur de pietate.*

53 indecentis *coni.*: indeceptis *ms.*

Appendix II

The goal of this appendix is to marshal some evidence in support of the claim that Hugh may have known Langton's theological positions through William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea*, while William when writing his *Summa* used Langton's *Quaestiones* directly. I will also show that it is likely that William's *Summa aurea* is the direct source for both Hugh of St.-Cher's *Commentary* and Roland of Cremona's *Summa*. Consider:

1) Langton's *Quaestiones* have the earliest date of composition (cf. Quinto 1994: 132-136);

2) Langton's *Quaestiones* are the fruit of actual disputation (cf. Quinto 1994: 145-156), while the other texts mentioned are the result of redactional work based on written sources composed by other authors, who are often referred to merely as *quidam* (cf. e. g. Cortesi 1962: 855, § 27 = *Summa aurea* iii, ii: 603⁶⁶-604⁷²);

3) When we limit our discussion to the treatment of *timor filialis*, the text of William's *Summa* is closer to that of ms. K (Chartres, B. M., 430, ff. 76^{ra}-78^{va}) than to that of any other ms. of Langton's *Quaestiones* (Langton, Q. 96, ed. Quinto 1992: 124-153). For this reason, we can assume that William had at hand one ms. belonging to family e, which is represented by the surviving mss. K and D (Douai, B. M., 434, vol. ii, ff. 41^{va}-42^{va}; cf. Quinto 1992: 85, note 22); these mss. clearly belong to one family because they are the only two in which q. 97 does not follow q. 96. William's use of an e-ms. could also explain why *Summa aurea*, III, tr. 31, cc. I-V (ed. Ribaillier 1980-1987: iii,ii: 601-617) bears similarity to the *Quaestiones*, while chs. VI-VII (*ibid.*: 617-631) does not.


4) The text of Hugh presented above evidently depends on William's *Summa* and reproduces the "Langtonian" division of fear in six kinds;

5) The same can be said for Roland's *Summa* in which, in spite of having developed William's doctrine and sometimes having criticized his solutions, Roland depends on the *Summa aurea* for the organization of the whole treatise about fear (*Summa aurea* III, tr. 31 = Roland's *Summa*, chapters CCC-CCCIX);

6) The similarities between Roland and Hugh can be better explained, *for the parts here studied*, by assuming that both works depend on William's *Summa*, rather than by the hypothesis of a direct influence of Hugh on Roland (Landgraf 1973: 178; cf. Torrell 1977: 102-103, note 32. I do not exclude the possibility that a dif-

ferent situation obtains in other parts of their works). In fact, if Roland had relied on Hugh, we could not explain why he omitted a discussion of the six kinds of fear according to John Damascene, since he explored the problem of fear as passion at some length, devoting two extra paragraphs to *timor naturalis* (cf. Cortesi 1962: 851).

For these reasons, the literary relationship among the works which we are studying can be represented as follows:



Appendix III

Numbers of the questions in Hugh of St.-Cher's *Quaestiones variae* according to the catalogue established in Glorieux 1938.

Vol. I:

1	26	Questio de specie, modo et ordine
2	27	De iuramento
3	28	De fide (continues in q. 129)
4	31	De contrariis donorum sancti spiritus
5	35	De frui et uti
6	36	De peccato in spiritum sanctum
7	118	De diuisione peccatorum
8	129	(continuation of q. 28)
9	234	(De scandalo)
10	261	De matrimonio
11	263	De anima (ed. Lottin 1932)
12	264	De prescientia dei
13	268	De sacramentis in communi
14	269	De baptismo
15	270	De dotibus corporis
16	271	De dotibus animae
17	285	Utrum anima ita sit in toto corpore quod in qualibet eius parte
18	290	Utrum pater et filius diligant se spiritu sancto

Vol. II:

- 19 427 De fraterna correctione
 20 428 De penitentia
 21 429 Item de penitentia
 22 430 De confessione
 23 431 De restitutione
 24 432 Item de restitutione
 25 433 Item de restitutione
 26 470 De superbia
 27 471 De inani gloria
 28 472 De invidia
 29 473 De ira
 30 474 De avaritia
 31 475 De accidia
 32 476 De beneficiis (Utrum liceat simpliciter recipere vel retinere plura beneficia)
 33 477 De iudicio temerario
 34 478 De gula et luxuria
 35 479 De luxuria
 36 480 De raptu Pauli
 37 481 De prophetia (ed. Torrell 1977)
 38 — De caractere, in ms. Praha, Univ. knihovna, IV. D. 13, f. 110^v.

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Philosophical Learning on the Edges of Latin Christendom. Some Late Twelfth-Century Examples from Scandinavia, Poland, and Palestine

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Summary: By way of four examples of scholars from northern- and easternmost latinity (William of Tyre, Andrew Sunesen, Vincent Kadlubek, Theoderic the monk) it is argued that philosophical learning in the late twelfth century should be seen as a privilege of nobility and as an intellectual means of enhancing an already established social dominance, rather than as a necessary qualification for entering high ecclesiastical offices.

Introduction

Sometime in the late 1160s, the king of Jerusalem, Amaury, was taken ill and lay slightly feverish in a castle in Tyre. He was not in a very bad way though, and he was entertained by his trusted servant William, the archdeacon of Tyre. How can we be sure, the king wondered, that we will actually live a life in the flesh after this one? William was much taken aback by the king's doubts in such a central tenet of Christian belief, and hastened to quote the pertinent passages of the Holy Scripture. Yes, yes – I know those, the king replied, but suppose we were to convince a person who did not share our faith. How would we do that? William now realizes that he must argue dialectically rather than from authoritative texts, and asks the king to assume the position of a non-Christian. He then proceeds: "God is surely just, is he not?"; "Certainly". "And to be just is to give the right measure of good to the good and bad to the bad?"; "Yes". "But that is not what we see happening in this life"; "No"; "So there is bound to be a life after this one where the balance is reestablished?"; "Yes", the king replies with obvious relief.

When William told this story a decade later in his *Chronicle* (19,3) he no doubt put himself in the best possible light. By dialectical skills he had saved the king from grave doubts. In reality, the conversation may not have developed exactly like this, but the

story does, I think, provide us with a good example of how William cherished his own extensive education in philosophy and theology, an education which had kept him almost twenty years in France and Italy before returning to Palestine. And that is my topic in the present article. In the late twelfth century, how was the long French and Italian schooling viewed by those who came from far away, and who returned to their home-countries packed with books and learning in order to enter a key position within the local royal or ecclesiastical bureaucracy? How did they perceive and use their philosophical training? Why was this sophisticated learning accepted lock, stock, and barrel as the ideological framework for largely illiterate societies?

This line of questioning may be useful in several respects. The primary benefit, obviously, may lie in an increased understanding of the role of learning in those outskirt societies. Secondly, one may add a little to our picture of twelfth-century schools by quoting more pedestrian authors than the ubiquitously cited John of Salisbury and a few other famous names. There were other customers in the pre-university philosophical shops of France, and some of them came from the fringes of Latin Christendom.

My main characters are only four in number: two Scandinavians, one Pole, and one Palestinian. But even if we included more material, we would still be talking about very few people from the extreme northern and eastern regions who, in the latter half of the twelfth century, enjoyed a complete ten to twenty years of training in the trend-setting schools. I would estimate roughly that each of my protagonists represents about five to fifteen fellow countrymen in the said fifty years. I have chosen William of Tyre, Theoderic the monk, Vincent Kadlubek, and Andrew Sunesen simply because they left behind writings which mention philosophy and which reflect their firm grasp of the arts.¹

¹ Some contemporary colleagues with comparable education:

Palestine: Heraclius, patriarch of Jerusalem from 1180, studied theology and probably law in Bologna in the 1150s and/or 60s (Hiestand 1978: 359-62).

The Nordic countries (fundamental overviews of medieval Nordic scholars abroad are Jørgensen 1914 and Bagge 1984, but both concentrate on the much better documented later periods): Thorlákr Thórhallson, Bishop of Skálholt (Iceland) 1178-93, studied in Paris and Lincoln c. 1153-59 (Benediktsson 1976); Øystein Erlandsson, archbishop of Trondheim (Norway) 1161-88 probably spent some time

Out of the four, William of Tyre provides us with the best information, namely in his *Chronicle*, in which he often refers to himself, most spectacularly in the famous autobiographical chapter on his education (19,12).² He came from an influential family in Jerusalem, probably of bourgeois stock. He studied in France and Italy between appr. 1145 and 1165, and returned to become archdeacon, royal tutor, chancellor, and archbishop of Tyre, but he failed to achieve the coveted position of Patriarch of Jerusalem. He died in 1186, just in time to avoid seeing Jerusalem recaptured by the infidel. He was used several times as envoy to Constantinople and Rome, and for most of the time he was involved in state affairs at a high level.³

The same holds true for Andrew Sunesen and Vincent Kadlubek. Andrew sprang from one of the most prominent Danish families, probably the richest one in the country.⁴ His studies abroad cannot be fixed with the same certainty as William's, but we do know that he stayed in France, England, and Italy and that

in Paris (and Lincoln and Bologna?) around 1140, his successor Eirik Ivarsson, archbishop 1189-1205, certainly did some decades later (Johnsen 1943-46 & Gunnes 1996: 30-49); Gunner, bishop of Viborg (Denmark) 1222-52, studied in France at some point before 1208, perhaps as early as the 1170s. Andrew Sunesen's brother Peder (bishop of Roskilde, Denmark 1191[?]-1214) stayed in Paris for several years, at least during the early '80s; Andrew's predecessor Absalon, archbishop of Lund (Denmark) 1177-1201 had studied in France in the late '40s and early '50s (Munk Olsen 1996: 57) and Absalon's protégé, the historian Saxo Grammaticus is likely to have studied in Northern France in the late '70s and early '80s (Friis-Jensen 1987: 17); on the Danes in France in the 12th century see further Munk Olsen 1985 and Fenger 1989: 216-26.

Poland: Kadlubek's successor Iwo Odrowaz (bishop of Kraków 1218-29) studied in Bologna (?) and Paris (Breeze 1987: 111 and Zeissberg 1870: 22 & 56-57).

² The chapter is commented upon by Huygens 1962, Southern 1982: 130-31, and Southern 1996: 212-14.

³ For William's biography I rely on – apart from the *Chronicle* itself – Hiestand 1978 who has thoroughly studied charter and other evidence. I am grateful to prof. Hiestand for kindly elaborating some points for me, including a firm restatement of 1186 as the year of William's death (*pace* Edbury & Rowe 1988: 22) and an acceptance of the suggestion that William was most probably well situated in the Jerusalem bourgeoisie and that his self-advertised *paupertas voluntaria* (19,12) simply refers to his clerical status (but if it means more than that, then he must have been well-off before he began to study!).

⁴ For Andrew's biography see the introduction to the edition of *Hexaameron* (1985): 19-33 and the study by Hørby 1985; for his studies in Paris: Munk Olsen 1985.

he appears as Danish chancellor in 1195. The sojourn abroad must have taken place in the '80s and probably the early '90s. We also know that he taught in Paris, and in his long didactic poem, *Hexaemeron*, his learning is on display. It is a careful survey of Biblical exegesis and systematic theology. The kind of learning represented there is characteristic of Parisian schools around 1190, more specifically Stephen Langton's teaching. After having been chancellor for some years, Andrew was installed as Archbishop of Lund in 1201/2 (retired 1224, died 1228). Like William of Tyre he also rendered diplomatic services for the kingdom.

The profile of the Polish historian Vincent Kadlubek is somewhat more blurred.⁵ In 1189 he used the title "magister" in his signature on a local document, and the learning exhibited in his *Chronicle of Poland*, from around 1200, bears the unmistakable stamp of northern French schools of the 1170s and '80s.⁶ If we add Vincent's expertise in canon and civil law, one may picture his *cursus studiorum* to have been much like Andrew's and William's: northern France provided the arts and theology, Bologna law. His further advancement also followed a pattern similar to theirs: he became a member of the cathedral chapter in Kraków and served as chaplain and historian for the duke. In 1208 he became bishop of Kraków (retired 1218, d. 1223). The position of his family is not known directly, but it is agreed that – like his predecessors, colleagues, and successors – he must have belonged to the high nobility.⁷

My fourth and final figure is known as Theoderic the monk, although his real name was Tore and he was probably not a monk, but rather a regular canon at the Norwegian archiepiscopal see in Nidaros (Trondheim).⁸ He wrote a brief *Chronicle of Norway*, and he is almost certainly to be identified either with the later archbishop Tore (1206-14), or perhaps with Tore, the bishop of Hamar (1189/90-96). Both of these Tore's are known to have

5 Having no Polish, I realize how rash it is for me to deal with Vincent. For the older literature I rely on Zeissberg 1870; for the more recent on Bartel 1986, Markowski 1977, Breeze 1987, and Pabst 1994: vol. 2, 919-24. I am grateful to Knut Andreas Grimstad for giving me paraphrases of parts of the introduction to the Polish translation of Vincent's chronicle: Kürbis & Abgarowicz 1974.

6 Kürbis & Abgarowicz 1974: 16-18 & 69-70.

7 Kürbis & Abgarowicz 1974: 11-12.

8 The fundamental study of Theoderic is Johnsen 1939; some of the points made about his biography here will be elaborated in Mortensen forthcoming.

studied in Paris (St. Victor), and the chronicle also betrays familiarity with French libraries and learning. His sojourn in Paris is likely to have taken place in the 1170s, and he may also have studied elsewhere.

Ancient wisdom and modern masters

As should now be clear, none of the writings left behind by these authors belong to philosophy proper. Still it makes sense to briefly outline the image of philosophy found in those works. Theoderic and Vincent here fall into the same category: philosophy is first and foremost ancient pagan wisdom. In Theoderic's small *Chronicle* one finds quite a number of digressions, some of which deal with such problems as the age of the world, the ever decreasing size of human beings (ch. 18), and various themes belonging to moral philosophy (e.g. ch. 26). Moreover he likes to quote opinions of poets and philosophers. The term 'philosopher' is applied to figures such as Pliny, Lucan, and Chrysippos, and he tells us that Origen based a lot of his knowledge on books by philosophers. This view of philosophy as the wisdom found in the Latin *auctores* (and the Greek sources quoted by them) is implemented on a grander scale in Vincent's *Chronicle*, which takes the unusual form of a dialogue: one speaker narrates bits and pieces from Polish history, the other moralizes, gives illustrative examples from ancient literature etc. The work is loaded with direct and indirect quotations from Seneca, Cicero, and Boethius, and the dialogic and prosimetrical form of the *Chronicle* is also borrowed from the latter.

William of Tyre very rarely uses the term 'philosophy', but when he does so, he is speaking about contemporary masters and about theology (i.e. celestial philosophy, see the autobiographical ch., 19,2). Of course William's memory is also stocked with quotations from the *auctores*. Andrew Sunesen does not talk directly about philosophy, but he applies an up-to-date logical training in his versified *quaestiones*.⁹ In practice he focuses on the Christian use of philosophical techniques.

This range of connotations of 'philosophy' is not untypical of the period before the firm establishment of the Aristotelian three-fold partition of philosophy into moral, natural, and metaphysi-

⁹ Ebbesen 1986.

cal, i.e. before the thirteenth century. As described in a survey article by Luscombe (1992), one concept of philosophy is dominated by the powerful image of Boethius' Lady Philosophy. In addition, we have the pairs, Sapientia vs. Eloquentia and Philosophia vs. Theologia. But philosophy could equally well include everything from the trivium (dialectic, logic) to divine speculation itself. Most authors referred to philosophy with reverence, and, one could add that, more often than not, the concept included an element of ancient wisdom.

Furnished with such a copious stock of authorities in philosophy – consisting of ancient wisdom and modern methodology – William, Theoderic, Vincent, and Andrew all went home to wield archiepiscopal or similar powers. It is hardly viable to isolate the role of philosophy in their exercise of office. We have to take into consideration the entire educational package including arts, theology, and law, – keeping in mind that their philosophy instruction would have been confined mainly to the trivium. Thus prepared we can enter into the relations holding between education, career, and position in society.

Education of the elite

It is generally agreed that the massive growth of bureaucracy and written culture during the twelfth century created a new demand for training, especially in law. This can hardly be contested, but controversies have arisen about two important points, which, to my mind, are linked: (1) How should we account for the meticulous and time-consuming drilling in philosophy and theology which is less readily explained in terms of practical needs? This problem is often debated in relation to theories about the development of the sciences, but that aspect can safely be put aside here, because for now we are only worried about a few distant consumers of twelfth-century learning, not the producers of it. (2) In what sense were people making careers through the expanding systems of higher education?¹⁰

10 Some scholars have emphasized the rise of a new (bourgeois) class of people educated to meet the needs of growing bureaucracy; the classic statement of this "education-for-immediate-use" thesis was made by Classen 1966; Others have

Let us look at the second problem first. In the modern literature on the subject, with the partial exception of Andrew Sunesen one mostly reads that the persons in question went abroad to study in order to qualify for a job at the higher end of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.¹¹ This way of explaining things must have been prompted by our much better knowledge of social mobility in the university period, i.e. in the thirteenth and especially in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. But for the twelfth century I am convinced that one should avoid what could be called the “meritocratic fallacy”. This is at least the case for the outlying regions I am discussing here, but seems also to be true for Germany.¹² Hardly anyone reached the position of bishop or abbot before 1200 without belonging to the nobility or, in the case of the more urbanized crusader states, to the patrician bourgeoisie – in short to the elite. And the elite in twelfth-century Europe was not looking for jobs. It was looking for new ways to dominate society, and in northern and eastern Christendom the church was an important new structure to be run by the local elite. The link between education and position was a very loose one indeed, which is e.g. evident from the fact that one finds scores of bishops who had no higher education worth mentioning. Moreover, in clan societies such as those we are dealing with here, it is very unlikely that any-

been more sceptical of such a “utility” argument, e.g. Murray 1978: 317ff. who, drawing on Schulte 1922 stresses the dominance of nobles within the new studies; the link between nobility and education is also firmly documented by Jaeger 1985 for the eleventh and twelfth centuries in Germany; Köhn 1986: 206-21 has also opposed the idea of education for purely “practical” purposes (see there for further references to a vast debate). In the recent survey by Southern 1996 the problem is not attacked head-on but the utility of the new studies is often stressed and a social-mobility interpretation seems to be favoured, see especially pp. 142-45, 159-63, and 181-85. However, the elitist background for 12th-century learning does show, e.g. p. 50. The main strength of Southern’s treatment, to my mind, lies in his beautiful descriptions of how intimately linked the “ideological” and the “practical” sides were to contemporaries.

¹¹ E.g. Fenger 1989: 218, Edbury & Rowe 1988: 14-15, Markowski 1977: 271-72.

¹² The noble origin of Germans studying in France in the twelfth century is clearly brought out by the examples adduced by Ehlers 1986. Southern 1996: 208-12 is not really entitled to treat Otto of Freising as an aristocratic exception among students.

one chose to go abroad himself; it must have been a family decision.¹³

If we accept that higher education abroad was being orchestrated by the local elite, new possibilities open up for determining the function of time-consuming philosophical and theological studies. Nobles have plenty of time and money. It does not matter whether the training lasts five or fifteen years – in fact one gets the impression that it often lasted until the posts they were to have in any case became vacant.¹⁴ Thorough learning may in this way be described as a noble pastime, much like hunting where an expertise much beyond the “necessary” also developed. This is not to say that learning was not taken seriously, nor that canonists were uncalled for by the growing bureaucracy nor that men of the world with command of French and Latin were not needed in the general acculturation and internationalization of outlying regions, but by and large the system of, say, Danish government could run on much less than the erudition of Andrew Sunesen and his few kindred spirits.¹⁵

The literatissimi

Contemporaries saw the matter differently, especially, of course, those who considered themselves amongst the most learned like William, Theoderic, Andrew, and Vincent. They must have seen themselves as local gurus who, if anyone, could unveil deep and

¹³ As cautiously implied by Bagge 1984: 7-8 and suggested by Ehlers 1986: 104; cf. Hørby 1985: 15 on the planning done by Andrew Sunesen’s family (Andrew had six brothers of which one other was sent to Paris; the rest remained landowners and warriors).

¹⁴ It is reasonable to assume that e.g. both Gerald of Wales and Stephen Langton took up teaching in Paris when they were in a waiting position; Gerald in fact betrays as much in his autobiography when telling about his resolve to return to Paris after being passed over in an episcopal election; on Langton’s career and teaching before 1206 see Baldwin 1970: 25-31 and the references there. The (brief?) teaching career of Andrew in Paris could be explained in a similar manner (cf. Mortensen 1985: 166-67).

¹⁵ Some training in canon law was probably a must, but as the sources for the twelfth century allow no statistics and as we know of no formal exams or entry qualifications for high ecclesiastical offices, we can only argue on general grounds that this was so. Of the four people treated here, all except Theoderic display thorough training and active use of canon law in their writings.

hidden truths, whether in canon law, ancient wisdom, or modern theology. As bishops and archbishops they were in charge of small but locally significant libraries, consisting to a large degree of books they had used in the foreign schools, books they had brought copies of, books they had inspired others to compose or had even written themselves. They were in control of the best knowledge locally available, stored in the cathedral library and in their own memories. I do not think we go far astray if we say that they were perceived as privileged persons with access to the arcane.

In the fourth book of his *Chronicle*, Vincent puts a long speech into the mouth of his one-time employer, Kasimir the Just (1177-94). The duke elaborates on the theme of a ruler's proper *prudencia*. Part of his duty is to be informed by intellectuals:

Ideoque vir sapiens operae pretium habet, eorum non imprudenter experiri prudentiam, quibus penitiora consiliorum arcana comittat. [...] Scitis, quo pacto stipatur interim literatissimorum lateribus altrinsecus, quorum tam sobrietas, quam scientia paucis est incognita. Cum his, nunc Sanctorum Patrum exempla, nunc virorum gesta illustrium, vicaria relatione retractat. [...] Theologicis nonnumquam exercetur inquisitionibus, utramque partem quaestionis utrimque argutissimis urgens rationibus, rerum subtilium indagator sagacissimus.

Therefore a wise [ruler] prudently takes care to draw on the experience of those to whom he has assigned the more secret depths of council. [...] You are aware of the way he surrounds himself on all sides with very learned men who are renowned for their moderation as well as their knowledge. With such people he engages in various debates: now going through examples set by the holy fathers, now treating the deeds of famous men [...] Sometimes he is being trained in theological inquiry, and he shows himself to be a most keen investigator of subtle matters when arguing for both sides of a *quaestio* with well-supported points.¹⁶

In their own eyes these *literatissimi* were set apart from a much larger group of bishops, abbots, and lay nobles who, at best, could only boast a superficial learning. William's small portrait of his predecessor as archbishop of Tyre illustrates my point well:

[...] dominus videlicet Fredericus Aconensis episcopus, vir secundum carnem nobilis, corpore procerus admodum, natione Lotaringus, modice litteratus sed militaris supra modum.

16 *Chronica* 4, 5 (p.393).

[...] Lord Frederic, bishop of Acon, a man of noble extraction from Lotharingia, quite tall, not very learned, but truly a warrior.¹⁷

The *litteratissimi* must have experienced a certain self-gratifying feeling of exclusivity, and they knew that in the eyes of their immediate surroundings they were in a class of their own, acting as local authoritative encyclopedias. In fact, for all their differences, the works of our four authors have a certain encyclopedic quality to them, despite the fact that Andrew Sunesen's *Hexaemeron* and the William of Tyre's *Chronicon* are more polished products than the typical encyclopedia, keeping better to their respective genres and using sources and allusions in a more systematic way. Theoderic the monk and Vincent Kadlubek display encyclopedic ambitions more directly, but within a less rich context and more clumsily; the first by digressing at length on various philosophical and theological issues, the second mainly through an overwhelming Latin style covering the spectrum from historical narrative to philosophical aphorisms to tortuous Boethian poetics. The authors put their foreign learning at show locally. They had accumulated a capital of wisdom and heavenly insight on top of the social standing they already enjoyed. In fact these few persons embodied a guarantee that local habits complied with the order of the world as far as it could possibly be known.

Conclusion

More than a decade ago I had the privilege of participating in a research project on Andrew Sunesen, launched and directed by Sten Ebbesen at what was then called the Institute of Greek and Latin Medieval Philology. A group of scholars were put to work on different aspects of the subject, and many of us went around quoting a passage from the chronicler Arnold of Lübeck – a contemporary of Andrew's – in which he gives a flattering description of learned Danes returning from Paris. For me, at that time, Arnold's words simply served as a nice corroboration of something we already knew, i.e. that a few Danes, including Andrew, did go to Paris to study. Now, I am going to quote the paragraph again, but, in the light of the above, I hope with a difference.

17 *Chronicon* 19, 6.

Scientia quoque litterali non parum profecerunt, quia nobiliores terre filios suos non solum ad clerum promovendum, verum etiam secularibus rebus instituendos Parisius mittunt. Ubi litteratura simul et idiomae lingue terre illius imbuti, non solum in artibus, sed etiam in theologia multum invaluerunt. Siquidem propter naturalem lingue celeritatem non solum in argumentis dialecticis subtiles inveniuntur, sed etiam in negotiis ecclesiasticis tractandis boni decretiste sive legiste comprobantur.

They are also quite accomplished in the study of letters, because the nobler families of the country send their sons to Paris not only to promote the clergy, but also to have them instructed in secular matters. There they gain skills in literature and in the language spoken in that country, and they proceed to become very able in the arts as well as in theology. Indeed, as a result of their sharp wits, they emerge not only as subtle dialecticians, but as experts in canon or civil law they also enjoy respect in the handling of ecclesiastical affairs.¹⁸

Most aspects I have highlighted in this paper are actually present here: education abroad as a privilege of the elite, the family planning of careers, the equal praise of skills in the arts, theology, and law as well as the proficiency in languages, including French. All these qualities naturally enhanced the usefulness as well as the authority of such top academics in their home country. There is one thing that Arnold does not state explicitly, and which tends to escape us moderns so used to the ways of meritocracy: not only did these few well-educated heads grow personally and socially on their arcane knowledge won by no mean efforts, it also worked the other way round: the contents of their education were *ipso facto* legitimized and given authority by their social standing. Christian learning – with its pagan foundation – could only successfully enter new regions through the same channel as Christian sanctity had already done: through the highest echelons of society where authority was already focused.

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18 *Chronica Slavorum* III,5.

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III

Intentiones

“*Quam videndo intus dicimus*”:
Seeing and Saying in *De Trinitate* XV

MARY SIRRIDGE

Summary: I argue that Augustine’s theory of thought in *De Trinitate* XV is a theory of mental language and a theory of mental vision. Augustine is aware to some extent of the difficulty of maintaining both models, but has philosophically compelling reasons for doing so.

Verbum autem nostrum, illud quod non habet sonum neque cogitationem soni, sed eius rei quam videndo intus dicimus, et ideo nullius linguae est atque inde utcumque simile est in hoc aenigmate illi uerbo dei quod etiam deus est quoniam sic et hoc de nostra nascitur quemadmodum et illud de scientia patris natum est. (*De Trinitate* XV.xiv.24.32-34)

I want to argue that there is in *De Trinitate* XV a theory about the nature of thought which is a theory of inner, or mental language, not just some much vaguer theory about an “inner word,” and not just a theory about some proto-vocal *sermo entheticus* which lies between thinking and the action of speaking. The supposition that Augustine does not put forward such a theory rests, I think, at least in part on the fact that he so resolutely continues to present his account of thought in visual terms. But, as I shall argue, in *De Trinitate* XV Augustine is self-consciously arguing that thinking is both essentially linguistic and essentially visual. This is obvious both from the terminology and sequence of the discussion of Book XV and from parallels with Book XI, where the visual theory is developed.

What does Augustine mean when he says that thought is both inner vision and inner speaking? He is obviously not saying that thought has all the same literal features as the physical activity of seeing or the physical activity of speaking; he frequently emphasizes that thought is not *in* any particular language, and is not stretched out in time in the way that spoken language is (*De Trin.* IX.x.15.7). Nor, however, is he just saying that thinking is *somewhat like* speaking and seeing or that these activities generate apt metaphors for thinking. What is being asserted is that thought *has*

the same form as seeing or speaking respectively, i.e., that it *works* essentially like seeing or speaking, that thought is a formal and functional isomorph of seeing or speaking.¹

But what is it for thought to be a functional isomorph of speaking?² Surely, if Augustine held that thought has a compositional structure such that mental expressions with specific semantic assignments combine in specified mental syntactic patterns to make up mental propositions,³ the nature of the proposed isomorphism would be clear. But there are other considerations which will point to a linguistic theory of thought as well. Most importantly, if thought is linguistic in some way, then computational models can be used as an explanation or “map” of the process of reasoning, which will be understood as a process of connecting propositions by inferential rules or building propositions by applying proposition-forming operators to propositions. In addition, one hallmark of verbal systems is that the “expressions” of the system need not, and characteristically do not, resemble the perceived and understood realities they symbolize; thus, on the verbal model, there is no reason why we should not have thoughts of three green suns and the like, and have general concepts, or carry out and be able to think about abstract mathematical operations, even ones which are unimaginable because they are repeated infinitely. On the verbal approach, meaning will be explained as the connection be-

1 We can say, then, that seeing, or speaking, is being proposed *as a model* of thought, so long as we remember that this sort of model is intended as a formal and functional description with real commitments, and is not merely heuristic. I thus want to see Augustine as verging towards what Fodor (1987) calls “The Language of Thought hypothesis”—with the reservation that Augustine does not, as we will see, explicate for propositions “a constituent structure appropriate to the content they have.”

2 This question can be answered in terms of the characteristics of the representative elements: visual symbols have an analog relationship to their referents, and verbal symbols satisfy instead some set of digitalizing rules (cf. Goodman 1976: 127-173). A system can even be both visual and verbal, as Paivio (1986: 53-83) claims, that is, if the visual image process is used to form vocabulary items, while operations proceed linguistically. These sensible solutions do not seem to be what Augustine has in mind.

3 Panaccio (1995) requires for a true theory of mental language “the presence of a semantics articulated in terms of a syntax.” See also Panaccio 1992 for an account of William of Ockham’s theory of mental language. Note, however, that the internal speaking in the scriptural examples of *De Trinitate* XV.17 is propositional.

tween symbols and descriptions and definitions.⁴ The action-producing and action-guiding function of thought can be understood in terms of attitudes towards propositional content and a calculus of means and ends. And if thought is essentially some kind of speech, it is natural to think of it as running through its elements in temporal sequence. Error will be a matter of incorrectly combining the items of some basic “vocabulary” into statements or of incorrect inferential operations among these statements.

By contrast, explaining cognition as a sort of inward seeing seems to require that cognitive processes be understood as similar in structure to perception.⁵ Thus the *visiones* of the visual model need to be in some sense likenesses of their referents. The visual cannot really be said to have a syntax, though it has a certain order which we suppose to be imposed by a combination of the way the objects of apprehension are, and the parameters of our apprehensive abilities. Augustine’s theory of vision, borrowed from the Stoics, describes vision as an activity originating in the soul, which uses the senses to gather information, so that vision for Augustine includes such phenomena as attention and selection and interpretation; still, though the mind’s eye may rove around and shift focus, the elements of a given *visio* should, it seems, be present simultaneously to the mind. On the visual account, the model for error is misperception.

The respective advantages of the linguistic and visual models are fairly obvious, but the thesis that thinking is both inner seeing and inner speaking is not very promising on the face of it. At a minimum, it is plausible to suppose that thought is both inner seeing and inner speaking only if: (i) each model is plausible and the combination of both models is more plausible than either alone (If Augustine has no reason for his manoeuvre other than his enthusiasm both for the visual model dear to the hearts of Platonists and for a philosophically informed understanding of the “verbalism” of the Gospel of John, then philosophers of mind can safely ignore his efforts); (ii) only if certain differences between these

⁴ See Cummins 1989: 6 for a brief summary of the working and advantages of a theory which treats mental representation in terms of symbols.

⁵ Cummins (1989: 6 ff.) treats image theories of mental representation as a variant of a more general kind of theory, the “mind-stuff inFORMed” theory, which is exactly the sort of theory we find in *De Trinitate* XI and XV.

activities as we normally think of them disappear in the “inner realm” (if inner speech and inner vision are not different by virtue of the fact that speech is syntactically structured and vision not; if it is not true “within” that speaking is temporally sequential whereas vision is simultaneous; if internal verbal symbols do not lack resemblance to what they signify, whereas *visiones* have it; and if *visiones* can somehow be connected with intended meaning, and not just with the context of information); and (iii) only if the differences which disappear can be shown to be accidental to the external, material context, and thus to be inessential (so that, for example, inner speaking and inner speech still have exactly those characteristics which are required for a system to be essentially linguistic.)

I want to argue first that in chapters x-xiv of *De Trinitate* XV, Augustine is working *inter alia* to make his theory of thinking meet these requirements.⁶ He first adduces scriptural passages to show that “inward speaking” is done by, or amounts to, thinking. In the Gospel, we hear that “certain scribes said within themselves ‘This man blasphemes’”; “*Quid est enim, Dixerunt intra se*”, Augustine asks, “*nisi cogitando?*” (*De Trin.* XV.x.17.20-23). And, he adds, Jesus refers to this silent speaking of theirs as thought: “*Denique sequitur: Et cum vidisset Iesus cogitationes eorum dixit: ‘Ut quid cogitatis mala in cordibus vestris?’*” (*De Trin.* XV.x.17.23-25). Augustine then argues the other way around that thinking must sometimes be understood as inner speech; Luke reports the same incident, he says, as follows: “*Coeperunt cogitare scribae et pharisaei dicentes: ‘Quis est hic qui loquitur blasphemias?’*” to which again Jesus is described as having responded, “*Quid cogitatis in cordibus uestris?*” (*De Trin.* XV.X.17.25-30). To speak within oneself and in one’s heart, Augustine concludes, is “*cogitando dicere*” (*De Trin.* XV.x.17. 33-34). Finally, he argues that it does not follow from the aptness of the verbal account that our *cogitationes* are not also *visiones*: “*Foris enim cum per corpus haec fiunt aliud est locutio, aliud uisio; intus autem cum cogitamus utrumque unum est*” (*De Trin.* XV.x.18.52-

⁶ I will not discuss in this paper Augustine’s larger theological agenda in *De Trinitate* XV. See John Cavadini 1992: 103-124, who argues, correctly, I believe, that *De Trinitate* is not designed to produce rational illumination with respect to the Trinity, but rather to show the insolvency of such an approach. For an extended treatment of Augustine’s use of the expression “*in aenigmate*” see Van Fleteren 1992: 86-90.

54). I will not examine these arguments in detail. They are important here because they show that Augustine is aware that he needs to argue explicitly both for the linguistic theory of thought and for its compatibility with the visual theory.

I want to turn instead first to an examination of the way in which inner speech, the language of thought, is introduced in *De Trinitate* XV. The thought which is formed (*cogitatio quippe formata*) from the thing we know, says Augustine, is a “*verbum quod in corde dicimus*,” which belongs neither to Latin nor to Greek nor to any other language (*De Trin.* XV.x.19.76-78). The choice of “*formata*” is significant for two reasons. First, because Augustine thereby chooses the terminology which he has consistently used in presenting the visual theory in *De Trinitate* XI (*De Trin.* XI.ii.2.10-35; XV.ii.5.124-131). Secondly, because ‘*formata*’ contrasts sharply with ‘*articulata*’, which is a technical term sometimes designating vocal sounds that have a phonetic structure and can be analyzed alphabetically, and sometimes describing a vocal sound that is regularly attached to a meaning, and sometimes carrying both meanings, i.e., designating the fact that words are analyzable into discriminate smaller elements so as to be regularly attached to meanings.⁷ It is, then, the *vox articulata* which enters into the vocabulary of some actual language and is thereby assigned to some part of speech with its characteristic syntactic potentials. The significance of Augustine’s choice of “*formata*” thus seems to be that “inner words” are presented as having structure and “syntactic definition” in the way in which *visiones* do; they reflect another structure, in this case, the structure of the *nota*, which are consistently understood by Augustine as *visiones*. For Augustine, then, our *nota* constitute a sort of vision or structural representation of the intrinsic structure and order of reality. And in its turn the *cogitatio*, the “inner word,” inherits this same order and structure;⁸ the in-

7 ‘*articulata*’ can have two distinct meanings. For grammarians like Priscian, articulation is a matter of being connected with a meaning. For dialecticians, articulation is a matter of being analyzable into written or sound components, i.e., into *litterae*. But for many theorists being “lettered” is held to be the key to belonging to a system of linguistic items which are regularly correlated with meanings. Augustine seems to be using ‘*articulata*’ in this combined sense. Cf. Tabarroni 1989; Eco et al. 1989.

8 Thought reflects the structure of the *nota*, selectively, since we are not always thinking about everything we know.

ner word, Augustine says, “eiusmodi sit omnino cuiusmodi est illa scientia de qua nascitur” (*De Trin.* XV.x.19.75-76). Again, “What is in the knowledge is also in the word, and what is not in the knowledge is also not in the word” (XV.xi.20.49-52).⁹

Inner speech is thus in some sort of ideal language. In *De Trinitate* XV we learn very little that is positive about how this ideal language compares to and gives rise to external languages. This, I think, is partly because Augustine is so concerned to safeguard the non-conventional and non-material character of the ideal language of thought – which, after all is crucial to his theological enterprise – that he is unwilling to speak about it using syntactic terminology from grammatical theory. In addition, Augustine is enormously impressed by the metaphysical anomaly which is effected in speaking when thought becomes embodied in external language. As in the *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, Augustine here stresses the parallel between the exteriorization of internal speech into external speech with the Incarnation (*De Trin.* XV.xi.20.1-12). In consequence, I think, he is disinclined to think constructively either about the structural character of the language of thought or about the mechanics of the process of externalization.

I propose, then, that the issue of whether the “inner word” is syntactically structured is resolved by Augustine with a bold equation: “inner speech” (which of course lacks phonetic structure and presumably most features of surface syntax) has a “depth grammar” that is derived from the structure of reality of which it is a likeness, because it is also inner vision. The “inner language” of thought is thus understood by Augustine as a selective, second-order isomorphic representation of reality; in this sense it does resemble what it signifies. When we speak to others, this “depth grammar” is somehow embodied forth in the external *vox articulata*, which is defined in terms of the alphabet and syntactic rules of Latin, Greek, or whatever (*De Trin.* XV.x.19.64-72).

On the issue of whether inner speech is sequential or temporally ordered, Augustine must walk a kind of tightrope. On the one hand, Augustine is acutely aware that human thought, unlike di-

⁹ Cf. also *De Trin.* XV.xi.20.40-48, “Perueniendum est ergo ad illud verbum hominis ... quod omnia quibus significatur signa praecedat et gignitur de scientia quae manet in animo quando eadem scientia intus dicitur sicuti est. Simillima est enim visio cogitationis visioni scientiae.”

vine thought (*De Trin.* XV.xiv.23.25-31), is in some sense in time, even if it is not material. Our thoughts come and go; none is eternal because we can cease to think even of our own lives (*De Trin.* XV.xv.25.43-46); the various possibilities for thought are “quidam mentis nostrae quod hac atque hac uolubili quadam motione iactamus cum a nobis nunc hoc, nunc illud sicut inuentum fuerit uel occurrerit cogitatur” (*De Trin.* XV.xv.25.61-64). On the other hand, he is convinced that “inner speech” is not stretched out in time in the way that external speech is. True inner speech is different from even the mental image we have when we silently think through verbal utterances immediately prior to speaking them or run through “the numbers of syllables” or “the tunes of songs”; such thoughts inherit, to some extent at least, the temporal sequentiality of the corresponding actions. But neither the *nota* nor thought are corporeal in any sense, and so we must “pass beyond” this kind of sequentiality when considering the nature of such things. Briefly, I think that the balance which Augustine strikes here is this: thinking occurs in time, as does seeing, with its shifts of focus and attention. But at the moment when the mind’s attention arrives at some piece of knowledge, the elements of that knowledge are simultaneously grasped, so that thought grasps it in its entirety (*eius omnimodam similitudinem capiens*; *De Trin.* XV.xv.25.64-68), though its elements retain their order, just as when we see simultaneously the arch *and* Carthage *around it* when we see an arch in Carthage.¹⁰

Thus far, it is the verbal character of thought which has lost the most in the equation of inner seeing and inner speaking. But if we turn to *De Trinitate* XI, where Augustine discusses the visual model of thought, it becomes clear why the ultimate model for thought has to be essentially linguistic as well as visual. In short, to do the things Augustine wants to do with the “inner word,” he has got to have something like a full-fledged language of thought, though in

¹⁰ Similarly, the *sequence* of a logical theorem is neither inherently left-right nor before-after; both are the result of particular material conditions. Augustine stresses the structural parallel between the *species quae fit in sensu* and the *species quae fit in acie cogitantis*; both are *visiones*. Cf. *De Trin.* XI.ix.16.3-14. “quattuor species reperiuntur quasi graditum natae altera ex altera ... Ab specie quippe corporis quod cernitur exoritur ea quae fit in sensu cernentis, et ab hac ea quae fit in memoria, et ab hac ea quae fit in acie cogitantis... Visiones enim duae sunt, una sentientis, altera cogitantis.”

the discussion of Book XI, he often seems less aware of this than he should be.

In outer vision, there is an external object, "which we have sensed by seeing" (*corpus quod videndo sensimus*), by which the sense of the body is formed (*formata*) into a *visio* (*De Trin.* XI.ii.2.10-20). For Augustine, the process of vision is both active and passive. The whole process by which sense is directed to the object whose representation (*species*) informs it is effected by an "intention of the mind" (*animi intentio*; *De Trin.* XI.ii.2.32) or "will of the mind" (*voluntas animi*; *De Trin.* XI.ii.5.127-128). It is clearly in virtue of this *intentio animi* that the mind pays attention to one thing rather than another in the visual field, causes the eyes to focus on some things, shuts out the sight of others, etc. It is thus in virtue of this "intentionality" that vision is selective and directional; meaning on the perceptual level is a matter of being an intentional object, i.e., of being something to which the gaze of the sense power is directed and upon which it is focussed. Thus perceptual meaningfulness is embodied literally in physical directionality, though the *intentio* is in essence spiritual (*De Trin.* XI.ii.2.30-35).¹¹

In inner vision, there is again a "trinity": the representation (*species*) in memory by which the gaze (*acies*)¹² of the mind is formed into an inner *visio* which resembles the representation

11 On the level of memory, it is again the intention of the will which causes some things to be remembered, and others not to be remembered; "the will turns memory aside from sense when, intent (*intenta*) upon something else, it does not allow things which are present to cling to it." (*De Trin.* XI.viii.15.86-88). Memory figures prominently in the earlier discussion as the repository of cognitions which the mind takes up into thought; this "*memoria retinens speciem illam*" plays very little role in the Book XV discussion, where Augustine tends to speak simply of "*scientia quae manet in animo*" (*De Trin.* XV.xi.20.45-47). Moreover, thought itself is described as remembering in XI.7, but not in XV, where Augustine clearly means to use memory in a much more restricted sense, as in the discussion of reciting from memory (*De Trin.* XV.vii.13.92-107).

12 I have not found '*acies*' used precisely in this sense in Quintilian; but cf. *Institutio Oratoria* XI.ii. 10: "Nec dubium est quin plurimum in hac parte valeat mentis intentio et velut acies luminum a prospectu rerum, quas intuetur, non aversa." Both '*acies mentis*' and '*acies ingeniorum*' occur in Cicero (*De Oratore* II.160; 124), but Cicero's usage most often takes '*acies*' as a battle-line metaphor. For Augustine, it seems to have become a technical term designating literally the physical ray sent out by the soul in the process of vision, then metaphorically, the "gaze" of the mind itself directed to memory and to the *nota*.

(*intus similis visio*). It is again an “intention of the will” which turns the mental gaze to the representation which is stored in memory, effecting the transition of information into meaning. When the mind’s gaze is no longer informed by a given representation lodged in the memory, then what it represents is no longer being thought of, but the mind’s gaze is turned to something else, “quo rursus conversa fuerit ut alia cogitatio fiat” (*De Trin.* XI.iii.6.35-41). Just as it is the intention of the will (*intentio voluntatis*) which literally turns the physical gaze towards and away from corporeal objects, so it is an intention of the will which turns the gaze of the mind towards representations in memory or averts it from them; “iam porro ab eo quod in memoria est animi aciem uelle auertere nihil est aliud quam non inde cogitare” (*De Trin.* XI.viii.15.105-107).

Since Augustine presents thought as visual in the sense that it is a functional isomorph of vision, it is to be expected that his account will have problems precisely with respect to those cognitive functions for which there is no visual analogue.

Because the thought which arises from a representation in memory is really distinct from the memory it arises from, says Augustine, the thought can diverge from sense experience, even if a memory cannot. My mind can will to combine a shape which I have come to have in thought by virtue of seeing it (*illam figuram quam videndo cognovimus*) with a color gotten from another experience, so as to get, for example, a thought of a black swan (*De Trin.* XI.x.17.12-17), or a square or green sun (*De Trin.* XI.viii.13.29-32). In thought we can think many suns when we have seen only one; extend any body whatsoever to the size of the earth; divide the smallest bodies infinitely – for even if imagination cannot keep pace, reason can carry on a process, e.g., dividing, without ceasing (*De Trin.* XI.x.17.25-35). In sum, though we can remember only what the mind has drawn into memory from sense, in our thoughts these representations may be “multiplied and varied innumerably and without end” (*De Trin.* XI.iii.13.14-20). Moreover, if someone tells a story about things in his experience, even though I have no representations in my memory of these particular items as they are related to each other in his story, I can, it seems, understand his story.

In Book XI, Augustine seems to think that the visual-mnemonic theory can explain some of these phenomena. When faced with

the story about things with which I am unfamiliar, he says, I would indeed not be able to understand the story, were it not that I “remember singular things generally” (*De Trin.* XI.viii.14.51-54). About other problems he seems less optimistic; he seems to abandon the attempt to use the visual model to explain reason’s grasp of infinity or its operation of infinitely dividing the smallest quantities (*De Trin.* XI.x.17.30-35). Still, I think that Augustine may underestimate the seriousness of the problem presented by reason’s operations like dividing, extending, or multiplying. In the case of extending or dividing to infinity he seems to run together conceiving of infinitely divided reality and reason’s operation of dividing infinitely. He thus fails to see, I think, that it is precisely the synthetic operation of reason as such, and not just an operation which is infinitely iterated, which poses a problem for the visual-mnemonic theory.

Similarly, in *De Trinitate* XI, Augustine does not seem to appreciate the seriousness of the problem posed by thoughts about black swans and square suns; he seems to think that it suffices to show where the mind could come up with the components. But it is in the end not clear that there is a perceptual analogue to the arbitrary process of recombination. Granted, just as perception is an active process, thoroughly conditioned by will and intention, inner vision will have a similar admixture of will; it is will which “applies the gaze of thought to memory” and pulls it away, just as it is will which directs us to avert our eyes and hold our noses to shut out unwanted corporeal sensations. Suppose that’s so. Still, the mind’s synthesizing action of “staining” the swan’s shape with black color seems to be different in kind from the function of directing attention toward and away from visual objects and causing some of them – and not others – to be stored in memory.

As an aside, let us note that Augustine does understand the seriousness of the problem posed by the action-guiding and action-generating character of thought; he has already introduced the verbal model in Book IX to deal with it. Thus the visual-mnemonic model presented in Book XI has clear deficiencies; and at least in the case of infinitely repeated operations, and the action-guiding character of thought, Augustine is explicitly aware of these shortcomings.

In *De Trinitate* XV Augustine does not return to precisely the problems he poses for the visual model in Book XI. Still, it is sig-

nificant, I think, that in *De Trinitate* XV, Augustine uses the verbal theory to deal with the same sorts of deficiencies. In the course of explaining the gap between man's mind and the divine nature, Augustine gives a brief account of three human phenomena which have no counterpart in the divine nature: error, doubt, and lying. In each case he is concerned to explain what it is to which the mind gives assent, i.e., what "word" it can be that is in the mind in such cases, if the inner word arises "de sola scientia nostra" (*De Trin.* XV.xv.24.1-7). The phenomena of doubt and lying are particularly interesting for our purposes. In the case of doubt, he says, our "word" is not "about what we doubt", but "de ipsa dubitatione" (*De Trin.* XV.xv.24.7-12) Thus, even if p is false, I have a true "word" within, so long as what I believe is 'I am uncertain about p ', which is precisely what the cautious believer would assert, if asked whether p is true. The liar, who knowingly and willingly says something false, presents a different sort of problem. According to Augustine, the liar does have something true in mind; the "word" that the liar has in mind is the truth 'I am lying about p ', although what the liar intends to say to a hearer and does say, i.e., ' p ', is false (*De Trin.* XV.xv.24.12-17). I think that there is something very wrong with this brief treatment of doubt and lying, and that the problem has to do with the tacit persistence of the visual model. What I want to stress, though, is that Augustine's treatment of cases in which there is a mismatch between reality and thought or between thought and language is here couched in terms of propositions and propositional operators; in the case of doubt or lying, the "inner word" is not a simple expression, but a proposition *cum* epistemic or alethic operator. It is easy to see why Augustine forsakes the visual-mnemonic model when he sets out to deal with such cases.

In *De Trinitate* XV.xii, Augustine also uses the verbal model to give an account of intellectual operations. In answer to the sceptic who alleges that we can know nothing, Augustine argues that I can know that I live and that I know that I live, and that I know that I know that I live, and so on to infinity. I also know, he says, that the series is infinite and that I can neither actually comprehend nor count off such a series (*De Trin.* XV.xii.21.36-44). Such a recursive iteration of epistemic operators and descriptions of infinite series seem obviously to require the verbal model, as does grasping that the operation is infinitely iterated and explicating my cognitive re-

relationship to it. Augustine's discussion is, not surprisingly, in terms of *verba*, not *visiones*.

Finally, with respect to the influence of thought on action, we find in *De Trinitate* XV a cautious return to the doctrine of Book IX, that the inner word "is knowledge with love" (*De Trin.* IX.x.15.29-30). Not all of our words end in works," says Augustine, "but there is no work of ours which is not preceded by a word" (*De Trin.* XV.xi.20.68-70). Here, as in the *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, and in Book IX, "word" is being used explicitly to include the intention to act, the plan of action, the design to be executed. As Augustine sees it, projection and implementation of schemata and the calculus of means and ends seem to lend themselves more to being thought of as verbal, than as visual, and throughout his discussion of action-generating intentions Augustine uses verbal terminology.

It is clear enough, then, that if Augustine insists on using the visual model, he must at certain crucial junctures use the verbal model as well. (And that juncture comes pretty quickly, because it is not just the infinitely iterated operation which requires the verbal model, but most synthetic operations.) There is thus a very strong motivation, philosophically speaking, for Augustine to avail himself of the advantages of the verbal model so as to account for *ficta*, intellectual operations, propositional attitudes, and the action-guiding role of thought. He is unwilling to rely on that model entirely. Even if the verbal model were as apt as the visual model for explaining phenomena like attention, focus, and recognition – which it is not – still, as Augustine stresses repeatedly, the external linguistic symbol is only arbitrarily¹³ connected with what it signifies. It is apparently Augustine's view that linguistic symbols are *as such* no more than arbitrarily connected to their referents, and this functional characteristic of the verbal model is completely unacceptable to Augustine as an account of the connection between thought and reality. What is wanted instead is a linguistic-

13 We hear little in *De Trinitate* XV of the explicitly conventionalist account of the various languages which Augustine gives in *De Doctrina Christiana*, save an occasional reference to the inner word – the true word – being given external expression either in Latin or Greek (Cf. *De Trin.* XV.x.19.76-80). This is perhaps because Augustine here focuses on the act of speaking, in which the ontological disparity between thought and vocal sound is overcome.

like set of operations which employ a “vocabulary” and basic syntax formed directly from knowledge, itself understood on the visual model, by a process which is best described as “visual” in that it preserves an isomorphism between object and representation. Such verbal symbols are in fact also *visiones*.

There are plenty of medieval philosophers who take up Augustine’s theory of the *verbum* which is also a *visio*. It will be obvious from what I have been saying that I am much in sympathy with a second way of understanding *De Trinitate*, i.e. with finding there the impetus to a full-fledged theory of mental language and trying to work out its syntax and semantics by a process of idealization or abstraction from external languages. Moreover, though Augustine’s approach is, on the face of it, fairly far from the modist conception of a triad of essentially identical modes, I am not sure *how* far; a lot depends on what is made of the Augustinian notion of “sameness of form.” Whether Augustine has a workable theory or not is, of course, another matter; a lot hangs on this business of “sameness of form” in external and internal language, on whether Augustine can make out how it is that the inner word is essentially language while lacking many of the most prominent features of external language. But, of course, a theory does not need to be philosophically sound to be extremely influential.

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Some Aspects of the Notion of Intentional Existence at Paris, 1250-1320

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Summary: The notions of intention and intentionality play a role in both medieval and modern philosophy, but the relationship of modern to medieval discussions has remained obscure. By examining the use of the terms ‘intention’ and ‘intentional existence’ in a group of texts by such authors as Roger Bacon, John Pecham, Matthew of Aquasparta, and John Duns Scotus, it is shown that the terms had a variety of meanings in the Middle Ages. In particular intentions could be both extra- and intra-mental. The article concludes with a discussion of Peter Auriol, who restricted intentions to the purely mental realm.

Often, when an historian of medieval philosophy undertakes to explain the intricacies of the notion of “intentions” and “intentional existence” to non-medievalist philosophy colleagues, they are likely to assume that these ought to relate somehow to the modern philosophical notion of intentionality. Yet that has generally not been the assumption of medievalists, although, as Pinborg noticed, two Italian scholars, Preziosi and Vanni Rovighi, had associated this terminology in the texts of Pierre Auriol to that of Husserl.¹ Given the tradition of research into medieval treatments of intentions at the Institut for Græsk og Latin, it is appropriate to delve into this issue again. Of course, there is no single modern understanding of intentionality as elaborated, for instance, in the works of Brentano, Husserl, and Frege; for our purposes, it may suffice to consider a couple of accessible introductions to the topic that are relevant to an assessment of any medieval notions behind the nineteenth-century development of ‘intentionality’ as a technical term. In the introduction to an important collection of articles on Husserl and Intentionality, Hubert Dreyfus credits Føllesdal with having seen “what Husserl considered to be his greatest achievement:”

A general theory of the contents of intentional states which accounted for the directedness of all mental activity. As Føllesdal explains more fully ... the phe-

1 See especially: Preziosi 1950; idem 1968; Vanni-Rovighi 1960.

nomenological reduction is Husserl's way of describing the turning of attention away from both objects in the world and psychological activity to the mental contents which make possible the reference of each type of mental state to each type of object Husserl has finally begun to be recognized as the precursor of current interest in intentionality – the first to have a general theory of the role of mental representations in the philosophy of language and mind.²

These mental representations, as mental “contents,” are not on Husserl's view reducible to mental acts. As Husserl saw, “since numerically different mental states can have the same content, the content of the act cannot be identical with the specific occurring act but must be an abstraction of some sort.”³

The distinction between acts and their contents, at least, does seem to be very much at issue in the debates among Auriol, Hervaeus Natalis, and Radulphus Brito on the one hand and, on the other, between Ockham and Chatton.⁴ So at that level alone we should hesitate to label Husserl as “the first” without restriction. The second accessible source which we may consult is Føllesdal himself, who stresses Brentano's role in his “Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception:”

Brentano ... held that intentionality is characterized by a certain kind of directedness In his early writings Brentano simply said that the directedness is characterized by there being some object which is always there, which the act is directed toward. Brentano's phrase is that the object ‘intentionally inexists’ in our act One seems immediately faced with a dilemma: on the one hand one might try to emphasize the fact that there is always some object there, and then the problem is that if this is going to be the case, that object has to be a rather watered down kind of object. It is something that in a certain way exists only in our consciousness. This also was suggested by the phrase ‘intentional inexistence’ [However,] there are several letters from Brentano to various of his students in which he complains bitterly that people have taken him to hold that the intentional object is some kind of object in our mind Brentano ... goes on to insist that the object is a real full-fledged physical object. But of course that gives rise to other difficulties.⁵

Some difficulties were debated by medieval authors, to whom we may now turn. By the outset of the fourteenth century, theologians teaching at Paris recognized that the terms “intention” and

2 Dreyfus 1982: 2.

3 Dreyfus 1982: 3.

4 Pinborg 1974; developed in Tachau 1988: 148-53, 186-88.

5 Føllesdal 1982: 31-32.

“intentional being” had multifarious and hence ambiguous uses. So, for instance, at distinction 13 of book 2 of Lombard’s *Sentences*, addressing the question “whether luminosity (*lumen*),” which multiplies through such media as air or water “is the proper sensible species of the corporeal light [source] (*lux*)”, John Duns Scotus faced the usual task of explaining the ontology of transmitted luminosity in a transparent medium.⁶ The list of Parisian scholars from 1250-1320 who treated the nature of light at this juncture in their *Sentences* lectures would include, among others, Scotus’s confrères Bonaventure,⁷ Pierre Auriol,⁸ and Gerard Odonis;⁹ as well as the Dominican Durand of Saint-Pourçain.¹⁰ Scotus’s view was that luminosity has real but intentional being; and, to help his audience at Paris grasp the notion of *esse intentionale* at issue, Scotus set out the following uses of the term ‘*intentio*’:

It must be recognized that the noun ‘intention’ is equivocal. [Used] one way, an act of the will is called an ‘intention.’ In a second way, it [is used for] the formal reason (*ratio*) of a thing, [as when it is said that] the intention of a thing from which its genus is accepted, differs from the intention from which the thing’s [specific] difference (*differentia*) is accepted. In a third way, a concept is said [to be an intention]. In the fourth way, what ‘[in]tends’ (*ratio tendendi*) toward the object is called [an intention], as a similitude is said to be the ‘reason for tending’ (*ratio tendendi*) toward that thing of which it is a similitude.¹¹

6 Duns Scotus, *Rep. Sent.* 2.13, “Utrum lumen sit propria species sensibilis lucis corporalis,” in McCarthy 1976: 37-44. For the title of Scotus’s treatment of this topic in his *Ordinatio* (also edited by McCarthy), see below, note 18.

7 Bonaventura, *Sent.* 2.13.3 “De lucis effectu et irradiatione,” q.1, “Utrum lumen, quod exit a corpore luminoso, sit corpus,” vol.2: 323-26; q.2, “Utrum lumen sit forma substantialis an accidentalis,” vol. 2: 327-29.

8 Pierre Auriol, *Rep.* 2.13, “Utrum lux fuit prima die creata.”

9 Gerard Odonis, *Rep. Sent.* 2.13, ms. Klosterneuburg 291, fol. 117ra-118vb: “Circa materiam de qua agitur, in hac distinctione queruntur quattuor. Primum est utrum lumen vel lux multiplicet speciem suam in instanti vel in tempore; secundo utrum lux illa que fuit facta prima die multiplicaverit lumen suum; tertio, utrum lux sit substantia vel accidens.”

10 Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Sent.* 2.13 (ed. Venice: 1571), q.1, “Utrum lumen sit corpus,” fols. 154vb-155ra; q.2, “Utrum lumen habeat esse reale an intentionale in medio,” fol. 155rb-vb.

11 Duns Scotus, *Rep.* 2.13.un. (McCarthy 1976: 39); *Ord.* 2.13.un. (McCarthy 1976: 26): “Notandum est quod hoc nomen ‘intentio’ est equivocum. Uno modo dicitur actus voluntatis ‘intentio.’ Alio modo: ratio formalis in re, sicut intentio rei a qua accipitur genus differt ab intentione a qua accipitur differentia. Tertio modo

Although what is designated differs for each of these uses for “intention” that Scotus records, theoretically they are not entirely unrelated. The first labels the *voluntary* purpose for or aim of acting, the *sine qua non* element of moral or immoral choices of the will on twelfth- and thirteenth-century ethical and soteriological theories. We speak of such purposes when we say, for instance, that someone chooses an alternative *intentionally*, or that one acts wanting or *intending* to help or harm.¹² If the will’s intentions initially seem least relevant to the modern notion of intentionality, we might note that at least from Augustine on,¹³ Christian theologians took active *directedness* (which intentions guided) to be fundamental to the psychological faculty of the will. Other psychological faculties that apprehend or are cognitive, even if they are to some extent the passive recipients of what is in the world (*via*

dicitur conceptus. Quarto modo, dicitur ratio tendendi in obiectum, sicut similitudo dicitur ratio tendendi in illud cuius est. Et isto modo dicitur lumen ‘intentio’ vel ‘species’ lucis.”

Because (1) Scotus’s wording is very nearly the same in both his Parisian *Reportatio* of 1304-05 and the (earlier) *Ordinatio*, which presumably reflects his Oxford teaching ca. 1298-99; and (2) both versions have truncated sentences and arguments characteristic of *reportationes*, I have conflated these two versions of Scotus’s lectures (in the process emending McCarthy’s texts) for the sake of sense.

12 Luisa Valente suggested at our Symposium that the Parisian master, Peter the Chanter, has used ‘intention’ thus in his *De tropis loquendi*, Paris, lat. 14892, fol. 121rb-va: “*Secundum diversas quoque intentiones solvitur contrarietas. Legitur: ‘proprio filio suo non pepercit Deus sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum.’ Sed et Iudas tradidit Dicimus quod tam Pater tam Filius tam Iudas tam iudeus <tradiderunt> sed diversas habuerunt intentiones. Pater tradidit idest de dispensatione sue sapientie Filium passioni exposuit pro redemptione generis humani. Filius se ipsum tradidit quando voluntarie morti se ipsum exposuit optulit Item dicit auctoritas: ‘querunt animam meam ut auferant eam.’ Contra videtur: ‘non est qui requirat animam meam.’ Distingue diversas **raciones**: mali querunt et requirunt animam iusti libidine subversionis et malitie; boni querunt et requirunt zelo considerationis et reverentie ... Item legitur quod Paulus circumcidit Thimotheum quem perficit episcopum ... sed *hac intentione fecit ne* qui predicatur erat in Israel destructor videretur legis mosaice” (My emphases.) Where the Paris manuscript has the word ‘**raciones**,’ ms. Avranches Bib. mun. 28 has ‘**intentiones**’ according to Dr. Valente’s transcription of this text, which she has generously provided me.*

13 See, e.g., Augustine, *De Trinitate* 11.2.2.10-35: “Primum quippe illud corpus visibile longe alterius naturae est quam sensus oculorum quo sibimet incidente fit visio, ipsaque visio quae quid aliud quam sensus ex ea re quae sentitur informatus apparet? ... sensus ergo vel visio ... ad animantis naturam pertinent omnino aliam quam est illud corpus quod videndo sentimus, quo sensus non ita formatur

species), are nevertheless in other ways like the will in being as obviously *directed* toward apprehensible objects.¹⁴ Thus, on Scotus's catalog, there is an etymological connection between the first and the fourth uses for "intention," insofar as they both express what *tendit in*, that is, reaches or directs one towards an object.¹⁵

The example that Scotus gives for this fourth way in which "intention" is used, namely, a similitude, can, of course, be a *mental* likeness or image on his and other thirteenth- and fourteenth-century theories of knowledge (as I have shown elsewhere);¹⁶ in such instances, the similitude will also be a concept, and so be called an "intention" according to the third as well as fourth uses of the term. Here, however, at *Sentences* 2.13, by stating that the species of light in a medium are intentions in the fourth sense,

ut sensus sit sed ut visio sit Itemque illa *animi intentio quae in ea re quam videmus sensum tenet* atque utrumque coniungit non tantum ab ea re visibili natura differt quandoquidem iste animus, illud corpus est, sed ab ipso quoque sensu atque visione quoniam *solius animi est haec intentio*"; again, *De Trin.* 15.2.5.124-31: "Quae cum ita sint, tria haec quamvis diversa natura quemadmodum in quandam unitatem contemperentur meminerimus, id est species corporis quae videtur et imago eius impressa sensui quod est visio sensusve formatus et *voluntas animi quae rei sensibili sensum admovet, in eoque ipsam visionem tenet*" (my emphases). The first of these passages was surely familiar to Roger Bacon, who quotes an optical observation from the same chapter in his *Perspectiva*, 2.2.3, ed. Lindberg: 188, lin. 121-27. I am grateful to Prof. Mary Sirridge for drawing our attention to these passages at our Symposium.

14 As Scotus also suggests elsewhere, e.g., at *Rep.* 2.38.1: "Intendere enim dicit 'in aliud tendere;' hoc potest accipi generaliter sive ab alio habeat quod in illud tendat, sive a se movente se in illud potest etiam tendere in aliquid, sicut in obiectum praesens, vel ut in terminum distantem vel absentem. *Primo modo convenit omni potentiae respectu sui obiecti*; secundo modo magis proprie sumitur pro illo scilicet quod tendit in aliud (my emphasis)" I quote this passage from Verhulst 1975: 8.

15 As Verhulst 1975: 7, remarked: "Le mot [intention] est dérivé, comme il apparaît clairement, du verbe 'intendere,' lui-même un composé de 'tendere.' ... [Duns] Scot est encore parfaitement conscient de ses origines"

16 Tachau, 1988: 62-66, 215-16, 251.

17 Scotus, *Ord.* 2.13 (McCarthy 1976: 26), elaborates on the statement quoted above, note 11: "Notandum est quod ... intentio dicitur hic <i.e., quarto modo> 'illud per quod tamquam per principium formale in obiectum tendit sensus.' Et sicut quidquid est signum est res, secundum Augustinum *De Trinitate* et *De doctrina Christiana*, licet non e converso – et ideo in distinctione rei et signi, 'res' accipitur pro illa re quae non est signum (licet illa quae est signum sit etiam res) – ita in distinctione rei et intentionis ... tamen illa dicitur 'intentio' quae non est tantum res

Scotus explicitly refers to *extramental* similitudes¹⁷ – in this case, to the radiating light (*lumen*) in the transparent medium as the likeness of its *generating* source of light (*lux*).¹⁸

On such an understanding of light precisely as what generates and is generated, it is reasonable to treat luminosity as what is conceived – that is, a *conceptum* – by the agency of light. In other words, on this account, objects – not psychological faculties – generate the concepts which represent those objects to the mind. I take it that this is Scotus’s position, too, regarding “first intentions,” which he explicitly calls “concepts” made by the extramental “thing” independently of any “working or act of the intellect.”¹⁹

I stress this point because, to philosophers of the twentieth century, it seems at least odd if not altogether mistaken to refer to *concepts* as produced by objects, rather than by minds regarding objects (or their secondary qualities). Some fourteenth-century thinkers – notably, Pierre Auriol – would concur with this modern evaluation, but they were rare. After all, what was at stake was whether the world objectively *is* as our psychological faculties of sense and intellect perceive it. Since the eighteenth century, philosophers have largely been willing to accept that there is a

in quam sensum tendit, sed est ratio tendendi in alterum cuius est propria similitudo. Hoc modo dico quod lumen est proprie intentio sive species propria ipsius lucis sensibilis. Quod probatur: tum quia si non esset intentio, tunc suprapositum sensui prohiberet sensum ... et ita lumen suprapositum oculo impediret ipsum videre.” (My punctuation.)

18 Thus see, e.g., the title under which Scotus treats *Ord.* 2.13 (McCarthy 1976: 24): “Circa distinctionem 13 quero simul de luce et de lumine. Et quero primo, utrum lux *gignat* lumen tamquam propriam speciem sensibilem sui.” After standard principal arguments, Scotus sets out his division of the question: “Hic sunt tria videnda. Primo, quid sit lux; Secundo, quid sit lumen; tertio, qualiter lumen a luce gignatur.”

19 Scotus, *Ord.* 1.23.un. (ed. Balić: vol. V, 360): “Omnis enim conceptus est intentionis primae qui natus est fieri immediate a re, sine opere vel actu intellectus negotiantis, qualis est conceptus non tantum positivus sed etiam negativus.” Thus, while I am grateful to Dominik Perler for the new texts and information that he has brought to the investigation of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century discussions of intentions, I cannot concur in his suggestions that participants in those centuries’ disputes often approached the “problem of explaining how intentions come into existence” by asking “how are the intentions produced *by the intellect?*” in Perler 1994: 229 (emphasis mine) and p. 228. Nor do I agree that on Roger Bacon’s theory all “intentions are [precisely those] species formed by the intellect and existing in the intellect,” as Perler seems to say (1994: 238).

fundamental divide between the actual structure of the universe and our perceptions and/or ideas of it; but for Christian theologians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, there were important soteriological constraints motivating them to seek some way of establishing the veridical correspondence between extramental and intramental reality, the latter in important senses comprising *images representing* the former. What the perspectivist account of light's propagation offered, because it held that such species are *not* essentially products of the mind's operation, is a theoretical defense of the position that these images would exist even if there were no percipient creatures.²⁰ These are – in modern terms – objective features of the world.

Let us return to the notion of the generation of light. That a light source, such as the sun or stars, *generates* its likeness which then multiplies is more than a metaphor for many thirteenth-century authors who, following Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, and other perspectivists, explicated the causal agency of light upon the world in ways that harmonized Aristotelian and Neoplatonic physics and metaphysics (including those of Augustine).²¹ For Grosseteste, *lux* gives birth to *lumen*; so, for instance, Grosseteste states in his Commentary on the *Posterior analytics*:

Moreover, I think that a universal's unity in many particulars is similar to the unity of the light in the generating, begetting light source (*lux*) and the light generated and born. For the light that is in the sun generates from its substance light (*lumen*) in the air; and yet, it is not that something new is created in order for there to be light (*lux*) in the air, but rather the sun's light is multiplied and propagated. And

20 Despite the research of David Lindberg, and my earlier work extending it, the seminal significance of Bacon's integration of optical theory into the study of theology and philosophy has yet to be understood by many historians of philosophy, who – directly or indirectly following Étienne Gilson – mistakenly treat perspectivist theory as relatively peripheral to the supposed “central” story of the interaction of Augustinian and Aristotelian theories of the mind. Yet, Gilson's framing of the complexities of Latin readers' assimilation of the immense flood of new materials from the Arabic has long ago been superseded. I am therefore dismayed by the uses of my work in the recent study of L. Spruit (1994), whose historical research is debilitated by two assumptions stated at the outset of his book (his p. 1): first, his construal of the history of debates over “the nature and function of the mechanisms” [e.g. *species*] “that provide the human mind with data concerning physical reality” as “the history of a problem in *Peripatetic* cognitive psychology;” second, his consequent taking *intelligible* species as the crucial mechanism.

21 Tachau 1988; Lindberg 1976.

so there is one light in the sun and another light in the air; nevertheless they are not so different that there is not in some way an essential unity in the light that generates and the light that is generated. Otherwise the light that is generated would be created completely *de novo* and *ex nihilo*.²²

While Grosseteste's treatment of light in various works evidently propelled medieval theologians to the study of optics, the resultant discipline of *perspectiva* was developed and propelled by the work of Roger Bacon. Until recently, historians of thirteenth-century philosophy have usually missed altogether (1) the extent to which discussions of light – and the visual, psychological, and epistemological processes it made possible – were brought by exponents of the new, thirteenth-century science of *perspectiva* to levels of technicality beyond any available from classical or patristic authors; and (2) the extent to which the resulting scientific theories of light's agency were integrated into and diffused by many scholastic genres, including *Sentences* lectures. Thus, just as no Latin scholar discussing the mind's faculties after 1270 would ignore Aristotle's *De anima* and its Arabic commentators, so such a scholar teaching Parisian students in the 1270s would not have overlooked the views of Alhacen and other *perspectivi* when considering the nature of light.

Yet Roger Bacon's efforts to reconcile *all* his classical and Arabic

²² Grosseteste, *Comm. Post. anal.* 1.17 (ed. Rossi: 244-45, lin. 114-121): "Et puto quod unitas universalis in multis particularibus assimilatur unitati lucis in luce generante et generata sive gignente et genita. Lux enim que est in sole gignit ex sua substantia lumen in aere; nec est aliquid novum creatum ut sit lux in aere, sed lux solis est multiplicata et propagata. Alia itaque est lux in sole et alia in aere, non tamen sic penitus est alia quin aliquo modo sit unitas essentie in gignente et in genita luce; aliter enim lux genita esset totaliter de novo creata et ex nichilo. Ergo universale non est figmentum solum, sed est aliquid unum in multis." (The punctuation is mine. My translation modifies that of Marrone 1983: 182; I also amend Rossi at lin. 115, replacing his *lucem* with *lumen*, attested in the apparatus by two manuscripts.)

On the distinction between *lux* and *lumen* as one between generator (parent) and offspring, see most recently: Lindberg 1986: 15-20. Compare too Grosseteste's text here to his remarks in *De luce*, ed. Baur: 54, lin. 18-55, lin. 27. Also important is McEvoy 1974: 62-63, and 69-70 (where McEvoy draws attention to the parallels between Grosseteste's *De operibus solis*, 6 and passages from his *Comm. Post. anal.*, 1. 17). When distinguishing *lumen* from *lux* in *Rep.* 2.13 (McCarthy 1976: 39), Scotus alludes to a related Neoplatonic commonplace (derived from Ibn Gabirol's *Fons vitae*): "Secundo dico, supponendo quod lux dicitur ut est in fonte, lumen ut in medio" See Pecham, below, n. 43.

sources raised perhaps as many problems as it opened new and fruitful directions for speculative theology. The ontology of light was not the least of the difficult legacies of Bacon's eclecticism, and it sparked considerable debate among Franciscan theologians active in Paris from 1267-78. During these years, Roger Bacon, who had been a master in the university for nearly thirty years and a member of the Parisian Franciscan community for just over a decade, was elaborating his proposals for the reform of all Christian higher education in his various treatises – all of which gave pride of place to the scientific study of light and its effects.²³ Given his residence in the Parisian convent, it is hardly surprising that his confrères there were among the first theologians to absorb the theories of the newly developed science concerned with light into their thinking. Thus, we find the resonance of Grosseteste's and Roger Bacon's theory of the multiplication of species in the *Quodlibetal Questions* and *Sentences* lectures of such Franciscans as Guillaume de la Mare, Mattheus ab Aquasparta, and John Pecham. Guillaume de la Mare, studied (and taught ?) at Paris during the academic years 1268-69 and was perhaps *magister regens* at the convent during 1274-75.²⁴ Matthaëus ab Aquasparta, future head of the Order and eventual Cardinal, probably lectured on the Bible and Peter Lombard's *Sentences* during 1269-70 and 1270-71 (when Bacon was revising his *Opus maius*) and ruled as master of theology (i.e., was *magister regens*) at Paris in 1277-78 before being sent by the order to teach at Bologna.²⁵ John Pecham, future

²³ Against an older scholarly tradition that located Bacon at Oxford for much of his productive academic career, consensus is emerging among historians that most of his teaching and writing took place in Paris. Thus, he taught Arts at Paris from 1240 onwards, where he entered the Franciscan order ca. 1256. All of the works most pertinent for the present essay were composed at Paris, probably after Bacon's conversion to the Franciscan life. The *De multiplicatione specierum* should be dated to "the late 1250s or early 1260s," according to its most recent editor, Lindberg (1983: introduction to the text, pp. xxxii-xxxiii). The so-called *Opus maius*, nearly complete in 1267, was probably under revision in the 1270-71 academic year, given Bacon's reference (*Opus maius* 6, ed. Bridges: vol. II, 390), to the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in Feb. 1258 (1257, on the Gallican calendar used in Paris) as "thirteen years ago"; the *Opus minus* and *Opus tertium* were drafted ca. 1267.

²⁴ Kraml, "Introduction" to de la Mare, *Scriptum*, 1989: 13*; Doucet, "Introductio critica" to Aquasparta, *Qq. de gratia*: xvi.

²⁵ Doucet, "Introductio critica" to Aquasparta, *Qq. de gratia*: xi, xv-xviii.

Archbishop of Canterbury, served as *magister regens* from Spring 1270-spring 1271,²⁶ and soon thereafter produced the *Perspectiva communis*, the first perspectivist textbook thoroughly indebted to Roger Bacon.²⁷ The arguments advanced and authorities cited in these works can still be found in Scotus's treatment of light in *Sent.* 2.13. Moreover, not only does he clearly know the standard perspectivist treatments of the multiplication of light,²⁸ but, in the *Ordinatio* of book 1, Scotus also employs the vocabulary of generation when elaborating how *objects* generate their *images* in the intellect.²⁹

All of these authors take as givens that light *radiates*, i.e., travels or "multiplies," along geometrically explicable rays; that radiant light (*lumen*) requires a transparent medium (*diaphanum*); and that *lumen* is the "*species*" or "likeness" of its *generating* source of light (*lux*). These are claims that could be drawn from Grosseteste, as from the passage that I quoted above. Grosseteste's con-

26 Etzkorn, "Introduction," to Pecham, *Quodl.*: 21*; Brady, "Introductio critica," to Marston *Quodl.*: 9*-10*.

27 See Lindberg 1971: 66-83. As Lindberg notes, Pecham may have composed his *Perspectiva communis* while teaching theology at the papal curia in Viterbo or shortly thereafter. See, too, Paravicini-Bagliani 1975.

28 See, for instance, Duns Scotus, *Ord.* 2.13 (McCarthy 1976: 27), addressing the third article promised at his *divisio quaestionis* (above, note 18): "Et quantum ad tertium articulum qui declarat istum secundum modum <quo lumen gignitur a luce>, notandum quod secundum triplicem radium – <i.e., 1> rectum, <2> fractum, et <3> reflexum, secundum ipsum Alacen <i.e., Alhacen> in *Perspectiva* sua – gignitur lumen a luce. Rectus radius est qui diffunditur a luminoso in medio eiusdem diaphanitatis per rectum radium et continuatur corpori terminanti quantum durat virtus luminosi. Radius reflexus est qui, occurrente opaco antequam terminetur virtus activa luminosi, diffunditur in partem oppositam, non ex electione sed naturaliter Radius fractus est qui, occurrente medio alterius dyaphanitatis non tamen omnino opaco, multiplicatur in illo medio sed non secundum lineam rectam, sed incidit ibi angulus. Quando autem occurrit medium densius, frangitur radius ad perpendiculararem ... quando autem occurrit medium rarius, frangitur radius a perpendiculari propter oppositam causam. Dico tunc quod lumen multiplicatum secundum istos tres radios immediate gignitur a luce ipsa, et etiam immediate est species sensibilis ipsius lucis." The *Reportatio* omits nearly all of this explanation.

29 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* 1.3.3.1 (ed. Balić: vol. VI, 232): "Ad secundum, de praesentia, respondeo quod obiectum respectu potentiae primo habet praesentiam realem, videlicet approximationem talem ut possit gignere talem speciem in intellectu, quae est ratio formalis intellectionis; secundo, *per illam speciem genitam, quae est imago gignentis*, est obiectum praesens sub ratione cognoscibilis seu repraesentati." (My emphasis).

cern in that passage to exclude the production of entities *de novo* is a consequence of his view that the generation of light is that of the eternal creative instant at which light emanates from its source, the divine light, after which there is no further creation *ex nihilo*. This is the point of departure for John Pecham's first *Quodlibet*, q.7, where he inquires whether luminosity (*lumen*) (1) is in the continual process of being brought about or, rather (2) has some kind of "permanent" being.³⁰ Pecham notes that there are already three lines of response to this question. The first of these, which Pecham's editors do not identify, was attributed by Matthew of Aquasparta to Roger Bacon, in his early *De multiplicatione specierum*.³¹ On this view, "illumination is almost a 'simple alteration,' in that *lumen* is drawn out of the potential of the [transparent] medium."³² The second view, which can also be found in Roger Bacon's *oeuvre*,³³ as well as in Grosseteste, is that "what is luminous alters the 'part' [of the medium] next to it, and, having been altered, this second 'part' alters the next ['part'] and so on,

30 Pecham, *Quodl.* 1.7, "Utrum esse luminis sit in continuo fieri aut habeat esse manens" Etzkorn, 20: "Quaeritur de creatura pure corporali et hoc de caelesti et de terrestri et de media." Cf. Pecham, *Perspectiva communis*, pars 1, props. 6, 26-27, 51, (ed. Lindberg: 82, 108, 132).

31 For Aquasparta, see below, note 42; For Bacon, see *De mult. specierum*, 3.1 (ed. Lindberg: 180, lin. 37-46): "Quapropter cum medium sit principium materiale in quo et de cuius potentia per agens et generans educitur species, non poterit hec species habere aliam naturam corporalem a medio distinctam."

32 Pecham, *Quodl.* 1.7 (ed. Etzkorn: 21): "Hic est triplex modus dicendi. Quidam dicunt quod illuminatio est quasi quaedam alteratio simplex et quod lumen educitur de potentia medii, et isti necesse habent dicere quod lux habeat esse manens sicut et calor."

33 Bacon, *De mult. specierum*, 2.1 (ed. Lindberg: 90, lin. 10-17): "Et hec multiplicatio habet veritates multas Et prima est quod prima pars patientis transmutata et habens speciem in actu transmutat partem secundam, et secunda tertiam, et sic ulterius;" also 1.3 (ed. Lindberg: 44-46, lin. 27-30, 50-54); 1.4 (62-64, lin. 116-19): "Tertia conclusio est quod omne agens attingit aliquam partem patientis quam potest alterare, ita quod plus non alteret. Nam agens non proicit nec infundit aliquid in patiens, ut prius probatum est, sed ipsum per sui contactum transmutat;" 3.1 (ed. Lindberg: 180-82, lin. 68-75): "Dicendum est quod <<species>> non est idem numero in prima parte medii et secunda et aliis; nec illud quod est in parte prima exit eam, nec similiter quod est in secunda vadit ad tertiam, sed quelibet in suo quiescit loco. Et ideo non est aliquid quod moveatur ibi de loco ad locum, sed est continua generatio nove rei ..." Again, Bacon, *Perspectiva*, 1.9.4. (ed. Lindberg: 140, lin. 263-83). This modifies Grosseteste's view, *De luce* (ed. Baur: 55, lin. 1-35).

to the end of the [transparent medium].³⁴ The third position is that the very “rays [of light] themselves have a [per]manent, ‘fixed’ being (*esse manens et fixum*);” on this view, each ray in its entirety “moves with the motion of the sun,” their source. This view, which Pecham considers untenable, he attributes to the pseudo-Dionysius and to an obscure work of Augustine in which, Pecham notes, Augustine says that “luminosity is a *body* (*corpus*).”³⁵ Yet, Pecham insists, Augustine is speaking loosely when he states that *lumen* is a body, “for he calls ‘body’ everything that, either in itself or through something else, has dimension(s).”³⁶

When we pick up Matthew of Aquasparta’s *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (q.8), we find an echo of the position of Grosseteste and Bacon that “by natural necessity luminosity proceeds from a luminous [body].”³⁷ Indeed, Aquasparta insists, “every corporeal thing (*res corporalis*) is born to multiply, generate, and diffuse its *species* through the given corporeal medium circularly, [i.e.], alongside

34 Pecham, *Quodl.* 1.7 (ed. Etzkorn: 21): “Dicunt quod luminosum alterat partem <<medii>> sibi propinquam, et altera pars alterata alterat alteram usque in finem.”

35 Pecham, *Quodl.* 1.7 (ed. Etzkorn: 22): “Alii dicunt quod radii habent esse manens et fixum sed moventur cum motu solis, iuxta quod dicit Dionysius quod sol convellit secum radios suos. Et huic concordat quod dicit Augustinus lumen esse corpus, ut ipse dicit *De origine animae ad Vincentium*, libro II. – Sed istud non potest stare, quia secundum hoc duo corpora starent in eodem <loco>.” This passage bears comparison to Bonaventure, *Sent.* 2.13.3.1, vol. 2: 324: “Secunda vero positio est, quod lumen est *corpus*, et similiter radii, et processus ipsorum radiorum a sole est sicut ramorum a radice ... et tamen dicerentur semper rami ab illa radice exire, non quia de novo egrediantur, sed quia cum sua origine continuantur: sic dicunt et in solis radiis se habere. Cum enim Deus solem tanquam originem et principium luminis fecit, simul cum hoc ramificationem radiorum sibi dedit; et sol continue dicitur illos radios emittere, quia illi radii nunquam separantur a sua origine; sed *sicut sol movetur, sic radii circumferuntur, non novi generatur*; eosdem enim radios quos emisit a principio super terram, emittit etiam et nunc” (emphases mine). Bonaventure’s editors do not indicate the source of this opinion.

36 Pecham, *Quodl.* 1.7 (ed. Etzkorn: 22): “Augustinus autem large utitur nomine corporis, appellans corpus omne quod per se vel per aliud est dimensionatum, omne etiam quod maius est in toto quam in parte. Ergo impossibile est lumen esse corpus. Sed est lumen similitudo genita a luce sicut species coloris a corpore ... Beatus autem Dionysius loquitur metaphoricè. Dicitur enim sol evellere radios suos pro tanto quia non manent.” Cf. Bacon, *De mult. specierum*, 3.1 (ed. Lindberg: 178, lin. 3-25); *ibid.*, 4.3 (222, lin. 35-57); Bacon, *Perspectiva* 1.9.4. (ed. Lindberg: 140, lin. 264-77); Grosseteste, *De luce* as above, n. 22 and quoted in Lindberg 1986: 15-16 (at his n. 29). Whether the generation of spiritual light was *only* a metaphor remained controversial among thirteenth-century heirs to Neoplatonic sources.

every different position” [on its surface, one supposes].³⁸ Nevertheless, Aquasparta has already told the reader, there are “two modes of generation, namely a real [mode] ... as when a human being generates a human being; and an ‘intentional’ or some sort of ‘spiritual’ [mode], by which each and every thing (*res*) generates from itself its *species* or similitude, not a thing, as [for instance] when color generates its species and likeness.”³⁹ Aquasparta returns to this claim a few paragraphs later, this time specifying that “every *form* – whether corporeal or spiritual, real or intentional – has a ‘generative and diffusive’ force (*vim*), [and it has this force] either really, as [is the case for] corruptible and generable forms, or intentionally”⁴⁰

Thus, Matthew of Aquasparta, against Grosseteste and Bacon, argues in his *Qq. de gratia*, q. 8, 212: “Sexto, quia gratia dicitur lumen non proprie, sed metaphorice, sicut et quaelibet forma, secundum Boethium, lux est, et maxime spiritualis; transumitur autem non propter irradiationem et multiplicationem sive huiusmodi diffusionem, sed propter pulchritudinem, quia inter alias formas lux vel lumen magis decora est et magis decorat.”

37 Aquasparta, *Qq. de gratia*, 8 (ed. Doucet: 211-12): “... Iam patet responsio, quoniam non est simile de lumine corporali et spirituali Quarto, quia influxus luminis corporalis est naturalis et naturae necessitate lumen a luminoso procedit, et ideo luminis virtutem eandem virtutem multiplicativam et diffusivam; influxus autem gratiae est omnino gratuitus et voluntarius.” Compare Grosseteste, *De luce* (ed. Baur: 51, lin. 10-52, lin. 9); discussed in Lindberg, 1976: 97; Speer, 1996: 77; Roger Bacon, *De mult. specierum*, 1.1 (ed. Lindberg: 18): “Tertio sciendum est quod agens naturaliter facit eundem effectum primum, ut speciem, in quodcumque agat, ita quod uniformiter agit a parte sua; quia solum agens quod agit secundum libertatem voluntatis et per deliberationem potest agere difformiter a parte sua. Sed agens naturale non habet voluntatem nec deliberationem” On the multiplication of grace as “especially manifested by the multiplication of light,” cf. Bacon, *Opus maius*, 4 (ed. Bridges: vol. I, 216-17).

38 Aquasparta, *Qq. de gratia*, 8 (ed. Doucet: 213): “Quaelibet igitur res corporalis nata est multiplicare, gignere, et diffundere suam speciem per medium istud corporale circulariter secundum omnem differentiam positionis, ita quod primo obiectum generat suam speciem in partem aeris sibi propinquam et illa pars in aliam sibi propinquam” See Pecham, *Perspectiva communis*, 1, prop. 6-8, 27 (ed. Lindberg: 82-84, 109); Grosseteste, *De lineis* (ed. Baur: 64, lin. 1-8); Bacon, *De mult. specierum*, 2. (ed. Lindberg: 90-92); also n. 46, below.

39 Aquasparta, *Qq. de gratia*, 8 (ed. Doucet: 208): “Dicendum quod duplex est modus generationis, scilicet realis ... ut homo hominem; et intentionalis sive quodammodo spiritualis, quo unaquaeque res gignit de se suam speciem sive similitudinem, non rem, sicut color generat speciem et similitudinem.” See, too, Bonaventure, *Sent.* 2.13.3.1, Solutio, vol. 2: 325.

40 Aquasparta, *Qq. de gratia*, 8 (ed. Doucet: 214): “Omnis forma, et corporalis et

If, in this question, we encounter Aquasparta's views on the *propagation* of forms, we find the parallel account of the *reception* of what is propagated in the fourth of his *Quaestiones de anima separata*, where he claims:

For there are two [kinds of] reception: a real and an intentional one. Neither the soul nor the heavens receive [forces] by a 'real' reception, because that cannot [be brought about] without transmutation [which, of course, the heavens, being incorruptible, do not undergo]. But the soul does receive [influences] by an intentional and spiritual reception, for [the soul] has an apprehending and cognitive power (*vim*) – although the heavens do not.⁴¹

In these passages we seem to have a pretty clear contrast between the “real or corporeal” on the one hand, and “spiritual or intentional” on the other – but the spiritual or intentional object clearly has some kind of being, because it possesses some kind of power. (We might miss this point if we were not reading other discussions contemporary to Aquasparta's, or if we did not recognize behind his references to the ubiquitous “quidam” his quotations of Grosseteste, Bacon, and Pecham.)⁴² Matthew tells us this more explicitly when he explains how the *lumen*, as the species of light, are generated: “Species are not generated *ex nihilo*,” he begins (and here we recognize Grosseteste):

spiritualis, et realis et intentionalis, habet vim gignitivam et diffusivam: aut realiter, sicut formae corruptibiles et generabiles, aut intentionaliter” For Bacon the dichotomy is corporeality (or materiality) vs. spirituality (immateriality), as in *De mult. specierum* 3.2 (ed. Lindberg: 186-94).

41 Aquasparta, *Qq. de anima separ.* 4: 74: “Est enim duplex receptio: realis et intentionalis. Receptio reali nec anima recipit nec caelum, quia illa non est sine transmutatione; receptio vero intentionali et spirituali anima recipit, quia habet vim apprehensivam et cognoscitivam; caelum non recipit, quia non habet ...” Cf. Grosseteste, *De lineis* (ed. Baur: 60, lin. 24-29).

42 At several other points Aquasparta draws upon or disputes details of the Grossetestian/Baconian theory of the multiplication of species, and it appears that Bacon sometimes responded to him. Consider, for instance, Aquasparta, *Qq. de productione* (ed. Gál: 160): “dicendum – quantum ad praesens sufficit, quia quaestio est valde difficilis – quod *quidam* posuerunt speciem cuiuscunque rei educi de potentia medii, et species coloris et species lucis. Unde radius non est quid fluens vel diffusum ex corpore luminoso, sed potius virtute illius eductus de potentia medii. – Sed ista positio mihi nunquam placuit. Certum est enim quod nunquam posset ex aliquo aliquid educi seu generari nisi virtus agentis attingeret usque ad profundum patientis. Primo igitur oportet virtutem immitti ab agente in passum quam aliquid educatur; et tunc quaero de illa virtute: unde educitur? Si de potentia medii, erit abire in infinitum” To identify Aquasparta's “quidam,” his editor cor-

Nor are [species] generated from something materially, nor from something as from a seed, but from something *by way of origin*, as a ray is generated from the sun. [Species] are not generated from the potency of the medium, as some [i.e., Bacon] say When the Philosopher [Aristotle] says that form cannot generate by itself, he understands [thus] *real* forms having 'reified' (*ratum*) and 'fixed' being (*esse fixum*), not ... *intentional* forms having a being [that is] becoming (*fiens*) and emanating, as are the species or a ray.⁴³

Here one's attention may be drawn to the contrast between being "in fieri," and "fixed being," for this is terminology that reappears in fourteenth century texts, including Auriol's, when talking of "apparent" or "intentional" colors. The notion of species as having *esse fiens* captures another aspect of the perspectivist account that is more complex than I have suggested so far, but which the foregoing helps us to appreciate. For *perspectivists*, the multiplying *species* are not only what generate images, but they are also, as David Lindberg has stressed, *forces*.⁴⁴ This notion is among the

rectly guides us to Roger Bacon, *De mult. specierum*, 3.1 (quoted above, note 31); but see also *De mult. specierum* 1.3 (ed. Lindberg: 44): "Deinde manifestum est quod agens non creat speciem ex nichilo; neque accipit eam alicubi extra se et extra patiens, ut eam reponat in patiente, hoc enim ridiculosum esset. Quapropter improprie et male dicitur quod agens immittit aliquid in patiens et quod influit, nam tunc ab extra ingrederetur aliquid in ipsum patiens; quod non potest esse Et ideo oportet unam duarum viarum eligi, scilicet, quod per viam impressionis fiat species, aut quod per naturalem immutationem et eductionem de potentia materie patientis." A concomitant disagreement concerns whether a radiating *species*, upon striking a rough or unpolished surface, is destroyed and fades away (so Aquasparta, *Qq. de gratia*, 7 [ed. Doucet: 213]), or is deflected, i.e. is reflected or refracted (so Bacon, *De mult. specierum*, 2.1 [ed. Lindberg: 91-94, lin. 25-32, 40-47, 61-73]).

43 Aquasparta, *Qq. de anima separ.* 4: 74: "Decimum tertium argumentum concludit quod nulla res possit gignere suam similitudinem, et maxime quod ex specie species gigni non possit nec virtute propria nec virtute animae. Dico ergo ad argumentum quod non sequuntur illa inconvenientia. Primum enim non sequitur: dico enim quod species gignitur non ex nihilo nec ex aliquo materialiter nec ex aliquo seminaliter, sed ex aliquo originaliter, sicut radius de sole. Non de potentia medii, ut quidam dicunt, sed de ipsa sua essentia, ut dicit Augustinus Quod enim dicit Philosophus formam non posse per se generari, intelligit de formis realibus habentibus esse ratum et fixum, non de formis intentionalibus habentibus esse fiens et emanativum, sicut est species vel radius." Compare Pecham, *Quodl.* 1.7, "opinio auctoris," (ed. Etzkorn: 22).

44 Lindberg 1983: lvi, lxiii; again, Lindberg 1986: 19. Consider, e.g., Bacon, *De mult. specierum* 1.1, Lindberg: 2, 4: "'Virtus' vero et 'vis' sunt idem, sed dicunt solum complementum operationis – et hic loquor de potentia que elicit actionem, non de illa que expedit Aliter sumitur 'virtus' pro effectu primo virtutis iam dicte propter similitudinem eius ad hanc virtutem, et in essentia et in operatione Et

legacies of al-Kindi's cosmology, in which forces radiate from all entities to effectuate all the interactions of the universe. Of the many passages in which Grosseteste and Bacon elaborate this claim, two are especially explicit. The first, from Grosseteste's *De lineis, angulis, et figuris* is well-known to historians:

A natural agent multiplies its power from itself to the recipient, whether it acts on sense or on matter. This power is sometimes called species, sometimes a likeness, and it is the same whatever it may be called For <the agent> does not act by deliberation and choice, and therefore it acts in a single manner, whatever it encounters, whether sense or something insensitive.⁴⁵

Bacon's explanation in his *Opus maius* of the multiplication of species or power is merely a variation on Grosseteste's theme:

Every efficient [cause] acts through its own power (*virtus*), which it exercises on the adjacent matter, as the light (*lux*) of the sun exercises its power on the air (which power is the light [*lumen*] diffused through the whole world from the solar light [*lux*]). And this power is called 'likeness,' 'image,' and 'species' and is designated by many other names, and it is produced both by substance and by accident, whether spiritual or corporeal This species produces all the workings of the world, for it works on senses, on the intellect, and on all matter of the world for the generation of things. [Moreover], one and the same [effect] is brought about by the agent no matter what it works upon, since [the agent] does not possess deliberation⁴⁶

Thus, for instance, if we read Grosseteste's or Roger Bacon's discussions of the multiplication of *species* as the propagation of *vires* or *virtutes*, the synonyms they expressly presented, we find our-

hec virtus secunda habet multa nomina: vocatur enim 'similitudo' agentis et 'ymago' et 'species' et 'ydolum' et 'simulacrum' et 'fantasma' et 'forma' et 'intentio' et 'passio' et 'impressio' et 'umbra philosophorum' apud Auctores de aspectibus Et, ut in exemplo pateat hec species, dicimus lumen solis in aere esse speciem lucis solaris que est in corpore suo Lumen vero est illud quod est multiplicatum et generatum ab illa luce, quod fit in aere et in ceteris corporibus raris que vocantur 'media' quia mediantibus illis multiplicantur species." (My repunctuation).

⁴⁵ The translation is Lindberg's (1983: lv), of Grosseteste, *De lineis* (ed. Baur: 60, lin. 14-24).

⁴⁶ I modify the translation by Lindberg 1976: 113, of Roger Bacon, *Opus maius* 4.2.1 (ed. Bridges: vol. I, 111: "Omne enim efficiens agit per suam virtutem quam facit in materiam subjectam, ut lux solis facit suam virtutem in aere, quae est lumen diffusum per totum mundum a luce solari. Et haec virtus vocatur similitudo, et imago, et species, et multis nominibus, et hanc facit tam substantia quam accidens, et tam spiritualis quam corporalis. Et substantia plus quam accidens, et spiritualis plus quam corporalis. Et haec species facit omnem operationem huius mun-

selves reading the language which Newton also used to express “forces” at work in the universe.⁴⁷ Among the interpretive benefits of recognizing that the thirteenth-century perspectivist account purports to explain *inter alia* the universal radiation of forces, is that it may seem less problematic to us, for surely such forces have *some* extramental reality: they are not *nothing*.

Let us return, here, to thirteenth-century philosophers, and ask: what conceptual vocabulary did they have available to express the kind of reality *forces* have? If one wanted to claim that they only exist as mental constructs within psychological faculties of the soul, one could say that a *vis* or *virtus* has “spiritual” existence.⁴⁸ If one wished to distinguish the existence of force from objects in the world that we experience as solid, corporeal, material, one might deny that force is body (*corpus*), has “corporeal” existence, or “natural, sensible being.”⁴⁹ But is radiant light *only* force, or is it also material, somehow less “solid” than the windows through which it passes or the walls upon which it casts colors? It seems to me that the notion thus arose that there is an intermediary mode of existence, extramental but less “fixed” than body; for several late-thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century scholars, this notion seemed to be expressed in the notion of “intentional existence,” which they found, for instance, in Averroes’ *De anima* description of light as “not a body, but the presence of an intention in the transparent [medium].”⁵⁰ At first, Averroes’ description was taken to be equivalent to saying that species had “spiritual being” extra-

di: nam operatur in sensum, in intellectum, et in totam mundi materiam per rerum generationem. <Et> [quia] unum et idem fit ab agente in quodcumque operetur, quia non habet deliberationem; et ideo quicquid ei occurrat facit idem. Sed si in sensum et intellectum agat, fit species, ut omnes sciunt”

47 For the use of the Latin *vis* as a synonym for ‘force,’ see Westfall 1971: 323, 521-23, 535-47.

48 Consider, e.g., the language of Henry of Ghent, as quoted in Tachau 1988: 33, or Olivi, in *ibid.*: 41.

49 See, e.g., Bonaventura, *In Sent.*, 2.13.3.2, vol. 2: 328, who also treats ‘natural’ existence (*esse naturale*) as a synonym for ‘corporeal’ existence, which he explicitly contrasts with ‘spiritual’ being. This may be the source of Olivi’s treatment of perspectivist species as having either ‘sensible and natural being’ or ‘simple, spiritual, and intentional being;’ see Tachau 1988: 43-46.

50 Averroes, 2 *De anima* comm. 70 (p. 237): “Lux non est corpus, sed est praesentia intentionis in diaphano, cuius privatio dicitur obscuritas apud praesentiam corporis luminosi.” But see my discussion of Bacon, in Tachau 1988: 15.

mentally; thus, Albertus Magnus states that “luminosity is an intention having spiritual being in what is perspicuous,”⁵¹ Roger Bacon, too, read Averroes as having held that light was “spiritual” rather than “corporeal and material.”⁵² Yet Bacon could also lead one to a slightly different appraisal of intentionality, as when he remarks that, by comparison to the objects from which it multiplies, a species, “in the common usage of those concerned with nature, is sometimes called an ‘intention’ on account of the debility of its being with respect to that of the thing itself, to say that it is not truly a thing (*res*) ... but its likeness.”⁵³ This notion of “intentional” existence as a kind of *real*, albeit “diminished being” (*esse diminutum*) was to have a long future, as I suggested in my *Vision and Certitude*. It is employed by *perspectivists* – and their readers – to deal with some of the most obdurate ontological phenomena for which an account of vision had to provide an explanation, such as virtual images, colors in the rainbow, or colors cast upon a wall by rays of light passing through stained-glass windows. Thus, for example, Roger Bacon asked of the last of these whether the resulting colored beams falling upon an opposing wall were “really” colored? To this, Bacon answered:

If a weak[er] solar ray passes through such a window, no such color appears; and hence there is more the appearance than the existence of true color There are two causes of this appearance: one is the multitude of light (*lucis*) penetrating the glass [that is, how much penetrates], for in weak light it does not appear thus; and it is innate to light to reveal colors and make them appear to us. The other cause is

51 Wallace 1959: 141. See also Albertus Magnus, *Sent.* 2.13 (ed. Jammy: vol 15, 137): “Ad aliud, dicendum quod lux est forma aeris quae semper sit praesente illuminante, et multiplicat se in medio et immutat illud quando non est oppositio recta ad illuminans primum, sicut patet in radio transeunte per fenestram;” again, *ibid.*: “et hoc praecipue est in luce et coloribus, ut dicit Commentator super libros *De anima*, quia magis secundum esse spirituale sunt in medio quam alia sensibilia”

52 Tachau 1988: 15. See Bacon, *De mult. specierum*, 3.2 (ed. Lindberg: 188, lin. 17-30; but see too 192, lin. 88-98): “Et ideo quod translatio imponit Averrois *Libro de sensu et sensato* et super librum Aristotelis *De anima*, quod species rei corporalis habet esse immateriale et esse spirituale in medio; dicendum est quod omnino intelligendum est de esse insensibili, ad quod vulgus vel translator traxit hoc nomen ‘spirituale’ propter similitudinem rerum spiritualium ad insensibiles.”

53 Bacon, *De mult. specierum*, 1.1 (ed. Lindberg: 4, lin. 54-56): “Intentio vocatur in usu vulgi naturalium propter debilitatem sui esse respectu rei, dicentis quod non est vere res sed magis intentio rei, id est similitudo.”

the debility of the opaque color [of the opposing wall], and of its species, with respect to the strong color of the glass, and its species. So ... the species of the glass's colors can appear to the sense, even though those of the opaque [wall] do not appear.⁵⁴

I have written elsewhere about Pierre Auriol's denial of any *extramental* intentional existence; here I wish only to draw attention to two passages, where he is clearly continuing the discussion(s) we have signalled in the works of his earlier confrères. Auriol noted, for example, that:

Light (*lumen*) in the air and, similarly, the [sun's] ray, have truly real being rather than intentional being properly [speaking] One way of distinguishing intentional being is by opposition to real being (*esse reale*), and in this way of speaking *intentional being is nothing other than apparent being* [which is] not [really] existing. In this way, it is appropriate to say that a color in the rainbow has intentional being; similarly concerning the [apparent] doubling of a candle.⁵⁵

Now, Auriol thinks it indisputable that, under specifiable circumstances, such appearances occur ineluctably. To deny this, Auriol insists repeatedly, is tantamount to denying that illusions ever occur, and results in the "error of saying that all things exist which

54 Bacon, *De mult. specierum*, 1.3 (ed. Lindberg: 54, lin. 178-201): "In duobus peccat. Unum est quod supponit colorem fortem esse generatum a vitro, sicut apparet. Non enim est ita fortis sicut videtur, nam quando radius debilis solis transit per huiusmodi vitrum, non apparet color talis; et ideo magis est in apparentia quam in existentia coloris veri; et est sola species Huius autem apparentie causa duplex est: una est multitudo lucis penetrantis vitrum, nam in debili luce non apparet sic, lux enim nata est detegere colores et facere no<bi>s apparere; alia causa est debilitas coloris opaci respectu fortis coloris vitri et speciei eius respectu speciei coloris vitri. Et ideo non solum color vitri apparet sensui fortis et bene sensibilis respectu coloris opaci, sed species coloris vitri potest sensui apparere licet species coloris opaci non appareat. Dico igitur quod huiusmodi apparitio est species, et non est ita vivus color sicut apparet; et habet satis parum de esse" This example is discussed also by Scotus, *Rep.* 2.13 (McCarthy 1976: 40); *Ord.* 2.13 (McCarthy 1976: 29).

55 Auriol, *Rep. Paris.*, 2.13.un., ms. Firenze, A.III.120, fol. 66va-vb; Paris, lat. 15867, fol. 77rb-va: "Secunda propositio est quod lumen in aere et radius similiter habent esse vere reale et non proprie esse intentionale. Ubi considerandum quod 'esse intentionale' uno modo dividitur ex opposito contra 'esse reale,' et hoc modo 'esse intentionale' nihil aliud est quam 'esse apparens' non existens, quomodo convenit dici quod color in yride habet 'esse intentionale;' similiter duplicitas candelae que apparet alicui cancellatis oculis; similiter de circulo apparente in aqua mota per baculum."

appear [to exist].”⁵⁶ This error, moreover, is not avoided by positing *extramental* apparent or intentional entities, for to do so is merely to deny that they have *undiminished* being or “fixed” being, but not to deny their reality in the nature of things. As Auriol puts the point,

Those who ask concerning the colors of a rainbow ... an image which appears in a mirror, or a candle appearing somewhere other than its location, whether these have real being or only intentional being, *mean to ask* whether these have only *objective* and fictitious or apparent being, or whether they have real and fixed being externally in the nature of things, *independent of any apprehension*.⁵⁷

This is indeed the ultimate epistemological and (meta)physical issue at stake, and Auriol was bringing helpful clarification to the discussion. For Auriol, if there were no percipient beings at all,⁵⁸ such phenomena would not exist, for they are dependent upon apprehension for coming into any being whatsoever.⁵⁹

56 Auriol, *Scriptum*, 1.3.14 (ed. Buytaert: vol. II, 697, lin. 57-61): “Et universaliter qui negat multa habere esse intentionale et apparens tantummodo, et omnia quae videntur putat esse extra in rerum natura, negat omnem ludificationem et incidit in errore dicentium quod omnia sunt quae apparent.”

57 Auriol, *Scriptum*, 1.23 (Pinborg 1980: 133-34): “Preterea, sicut se habet suo modo intentio et esse intentionale in sensu, sic se habet in intellectu. Sed quaerentes de coloribus iridis, aut de coloribus qui sunt in collo columbae, aut de imagine quae apparet in speculo, aut de candela apparente extra situm, utrum habeant esse reale aut intentionale tantum, intendunt quaerere utrum habeant esse obiectivum tantum et fictivum seu apparens, aut habeant esse reale et fixum extra in rerum naturae absque omni apprehensione. Per quod patet quod esse intentionale non est aliud quam visio aut apparitio obiectiva. Ergo in intellectu erit aliud quam conceptus obiectivus?” (The preliminary edition in Perler 1994, omits several arguments, including this one.)

58 That is, if there were neither a creating, apprehending God nor any creatures.

59 See e.g. Auriol, *Scriptum*, 1.23, para. 64 (Perler 1994: 262): “Secundum hoc igitur patet quod intentiones non sunt ipsi actus intelligendi ... nec etiam obiectum cognitum ut fundat relationem ad actum intelligendi ... sed est ipsemet *conceptus obiectivus per intellectum formatus* claudens indistinguibiliter conceptionem *passivam* et rem quae concipitur per ipsam. Et idem est dictum ‘intentio’ quod ‘conceptus,’ et ‘intentio prima’ idem quod ‘conceptus primi ordinis’ *quos intellectus format* circa res non reflectendo se super suos conceptus. ‘Intentiones’ vero ‘secundae’ sunt ‘conceptus secundi ordinis’ quos intellectus fabricat reflectendo et redeundo super primos conceptus ...” (Emphases and punctuation mine.)

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Dénomination et Intentions:
Sur quelques doctrines médiévales
(XIIIe-XIVe siècle)
de la paronymie et de la connotation

ALAIN DE LIBERA

Summary: Denomination (= paronymy) is a key-word in late medieval philosophy. A number of late thirteenth-century authors in the “Averroist” tradition introduced the notion of denomination as well as that of intention into their account of intellection. Their theories underlie Suarez’ distinction between formal and objective concept, and less directly Descartes’ claim that an idea has both a formal and an objective reality. Another tradition (Bacon, Ockham ...), which found support in Avicenna, connected paronymy with connotation, and the latter eventually replaced paronymy as an analytical tool.

La notion de dénomination ou paronymie (*denominatio*) est un des “objets” théoriques à l’analyse desquels l’École de Copenhague a le plus contribué. Cet ensemble d’études, amorcé par J. Pinborg, poursuivi et développé par S. Ebbesen, a pris diverses directions:¹ les unes portant sur la notion comme telle, sur sa définition et sa fonction dans le champ de la sémantique médiévale;² les autres sur la place singulière qu’elle a occupée dans la genèse d’une des principales théories ontologiques et métaphysiques du Moyen Age, la théorie dite de l’“analogie de l’être” (*analogia entis*) – un thème qui a retrouvé son actualité avec les travaux d’E. J. Ashworth³ et C. Luna.⁴ D’autres, plus inchoatives, mais généralement fondées sur les matériaux rassemblés ou élaborés par Pinborg, ont mis en évidence certaines utilisations du concept ou du

1 Voir, notamment, les textes de J. Pinborg rassemblés par S. Ebbesen, dans Pinborg 1984.

2 Sur la “longue durée” et le sens médiéval de la question des paronymes, cf. Jolivet 1975. J. Jolivet a été le premier, en France, à utiliser les travaux de Pinborg.

3 Cf. Ashworth 1991 et 1992.

4 C. Luna, “Commentaire”, dans Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories* (fasc. III), p. 84-94 et 153-159 (avec une critique de la thèse de Hirschberger 1959, assimilant analogie et paronymie.)

terme *denominatio* dans des contextes plus inattendus, dont, particulièrement, celui de la psychologie intentionnelle. Je me concentrerai ici sur ce point. Je présuppose connue la théorie aristotélicienne de la paronymie⁵ et l'histoire de sa tradition interprétative dans le néoplatonisme grec (de Porphyre à Simplicius) et latin (Boèce), qui la reformule dans le langage conceptuel de la participation (μετέχειν).⁶ Je suppose également connue la mise en place de la notion d'attribution essentielle ou "synonymique" (συνωνύμως, *univoce*), et l'usage qu'Aristote fait de la paronymie, quand, en *Cat.*, 8, il définit les "choses qualifiées" comme "celles qui sont dénommées d'après des qualités ou qui en dépendent d'une autre façon", comme des choses "paronymes" ou susceptibles d'être "dites paronymiquement" (παρωνύμως, *denominative*). Enfin, je suppose également familiers les travaux de J. Pinborg et de S. Ebbesen, auxquels j'ai fait allusion en commençant, notamment l'article d'Ebbesen intitulé "Concrete Accidental Terms".⁷

De prime abord, tout semblerait devoir éloigner la paronymie, qui, apparemment, relève de l'analyse des mots et des choses, et la problématique des *intentiones*, qui relève de celle des concepts. Je me propose de montrer comment les deux se rencontrent, en suivant la manière dont la paronymie vient instrumenter une problématique où les *intentiones* sont directement impliquées: celle des universaux. J'examinerai ensuite brièvement comment la notion de connotation vient, chez Roger Bacon, concurrencer celle de paronymie dans un des contextes précis où elle est engagée par ses contemporains, et suggérerai, pour finir, qu'il y a la une amor-

5 Je rappelle simplement sa définition. d'après Aristote, *Catégories*, 1, 1a12-15; trad. Tricot, p. 2: "On appelle *paronymes* les choses qui, différant d'une autre par le "cas", reçoivent leur appellation d'après son nom: ainsi de grammairien vient grammairien, et de courageux. homme courageux."

6 Cf., pour le contexte, Simplicius, *Comment. Cat.*, 1, ad 1a1, trad. Ph. Hoffmann, dans Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories.*, p. 4, 10-21; Boèce, *In Cat.*, PL 64, col. 167D-168A, dont j'extraie ces deux énoncés: "Chaque fois qu'une chose participe d'une autre, cette participation lui fait acquérir du même coup et la chose et le nom: un homme qui participe de la justice reçoit de ce fait et la chose et le nom, car il est appelé *juste*" et "Il y a trois conditions pour que les mots dénommatifs (*denominativa vocabula*) soient constitués: d'abord que ce qu'ils nomment participe d'une chose, ensuite qu'il participe du nom de cette chose, enfin que le nom subisse une transformation."

7 Cf. Ebbesen 1988, et son texte satellite dans Ebbesen 1986.

ce du geste théorique accompli par Occam et ses successeurs: L'absorption du domaine de problèmes couvert par la paronymie dans celui de la connotation.

Paronymie et universaux

Une distinction bien connue de la *Métaphysique* d'Avicenne est celle de l'universel en tant qu'universel et de l'universel en tant que ce à quoi advient l'universalité.⁸ La notion de paronymie est utilisée au XIII^e siècle pour élaborer cette distinction dans le cadre de la discussion du statut ontologique de l'universel opposant réalistes et conceptualistes. Un des arguments favoris du réalisme "aristotélien" (affirmant la présence réelle des universaux dans les choses) repose, en effet, clairement sur la notion de dénomination. Il connaîtra une fortune exceptionnelle, puisqu'on le retrouve plusieurs décennies plus tard au cœur de la réfutation de Radulphus Brito par Pierre d'Auriole. Nous donnerons ici quelques éléments du dossier.

Un des premiers témoins de ce que j'appellerai l'"argument de la paronymie" (AP) est Siger de Brabant, qui le mentionne dans le *contra* de la question *Utrum universalia sint in particularibus* du *De aeternitate mundi* (chap. III; Bazán, p. 120-127), avant de le réfuter. Comme tous les "averroïstes", Siger est conceptualiste: il soutient, avec Aristote (*De an.*, II, 5, 417b23) et Thémistius (*In De an.*, III, 5; Verbeke, p. 130, 95-96; et *In De an.* I, 1; Verbeke, p. 8, 22-9, 23), que les universaux existent dans l'âme, non dans les choses extramentales. La thèse réaliste qu'il discute pose deux arguments: <a> les universaux sont des choses universelles, faute de quoi ils ne seraient pas prédiqués des particuliers, donc ils ne sont pas internes à l'âme; la chose qui est "subjectée à l'universalité" (*res subiecta universalitati*), par exemple l'homme ou la pierre, n'est pas dans l'âme. Le concept, ou plutôt l'"intention d'universalité", a son être dans ce qui "est dit et nommé paronymiquement *universel*". Donc, comme l'homme et la pierre sont dits 'universels', c'est en eux qu'est l'intention d'universalité. Or, de deux choses l'une: ou <1> L'un et l'autre, la chose et l'intention, sont dans l'âme, ou

⁸ Cf. Avicenne, *Philosophia prima*, V, 1, p. 228, notamment, p. 228, 24-26: "Ergo universale ex hoc quod est universale est quiddam, et ex hoc quod est quiddam cui accidit universalitas est quiddam aliud."

<2> ni l'un ni l'autre ne sont dans l'âme. Si donc ni l'homme ni la pierre, selon ce qu'ils sont (en tant que *res subiectae universalitati*) ne sont dans l'âme, ils ne le sont pas non plus en tant qu'universels.

Dans sa réponse, Siger de Brabant distingue <a> la chose qui est nommée paronymiquement 'universelle', qui n'est pas dans l'âme, et l'intention d'universalité, qui est dans l'âme – une distinction qui servira de base aux élaborations des "modistes". Pour illustrer cette distinction, il prend une comparaison avec l'intellection, que l'on retrouvera, précisément, dans toute la littérature ultérieure. Une chose peut être nommée paronymiquement à partir de quelque chose qui n'existe pas en elle. C'est ce qui se passe dans l'intellection. Quand on dit d'une chose qu'elle est 'intelligée', il y a paronymie. La chose est en effet dite 'intelligée' de manière paronymique, c'est-à-dire *à partir de l'intellection qu'il y a d'elle*, intellection qui n'est pas en elle, mais dans l'âme. Par analogie, on peut dire qu'une chose est dite 'universelle' de manière paronymique, c'est-à-dire *à partir de l'intellection abstraite et universelle qu'il y a d'elle*, intellection qui est dans l'âme et non pas dans la chose elle-même.

Cette réponse, peu développée chez Siger, l'est davantage chez Radulphus Brito. Dans la question 8 de ses *Questions sur Porphyre* (*Utrum universale quod est intentio sit in re extra sicut in subiecto vel in intellectu*), éditée par J. Pinborg, Radulphus fait face au même argument réaliste que Siger, l'argument AP.

Et arguitur quod sit in re extra sicut in subiecto, quia illud quod denominat alterum est in illo sicut in subiecto. Sed universale quod est intentio denominat rem extra. ideo etc.

La version A des *Quaestiones* donne la justification suivante:

Maior patet, quia albedo denominat hominem dicendo 'homo est albus', ideo albedo est in homine sicut in subiecto. Minor patet de se, quia universale denominat rem extra dicendo 'homo est species', 'animal est genus' et sic de aliis.⁹

Cet argument suppose l'assimilation de la dénomination et de la prédication *ut in subiecto*, une expression dérivée de la distinction

⁹ Cf. Pinborg 1980: 112. Le texte de la version B (*ibid.* p. 113) est différent: "Maior patet, quia illud quod est separatum in esse ab aliquo non potest denominare ipsum male enim diceretur 'homo est asinus'."

boécienne entre prédication essentielle (*praedicatio de subiecto* ou *praedicatio in eo quod quid est*) et prédication accidentelle (*praedicatio in subiecto* ou *praedicatio secundum accidens*), qui *via* Avicenne et sa distinction entre *praedicatio univoca* et *praedicatio denominativa* dans la *Logique du Shifâ*,¹⁰ renoue avec les deux modes de l'attribution plus ou moins clairement formalisés par Aristote dans les *Catégories*: *συνωνύμως* et *παρωνύμως*. Pour répondre à AP, Radulphus commence par placer l'universel dans le cadre général de sa théorie des intentions.

L'universel est une intention qui peut être prise à l'abstrait ou au concret qu'il s'agisse d'une première ou d'une seconde intention. L'universel *in abstracto pro prima intentione* est la "première connaissance de la chose selon son mode d'être propre"; au concret, c'est la chose "ainsi intelligée". L'universel qui est une seconde intention *in abstracto* est la *ratio intelligendi secunda* ou *cognitio secunda* de la chose, en tant qu'elle a d'être en plusieurs (*ut habet esse in pluribus*); au concret, c'est la chose "ainsi intelligée". Pour justifier que l'universel au concret dise à la fois une *res* et une *ratio intelligendi*, Radulphus introduit une règle générale, que l'on retrouvera sous diverses formes:

Accidentia concreta absoluta sic se habent ad sua subiecta quod dicunt ipsum accidens ut denominat subiectum. Ergo intentiones secundae in concreto dicunt formaliter rationem intelligendi ut denominat ipsam rem.¹¹

Sur cette base, il énonce ensuite sa thèse, qui tient en deux points:

(1) L'universel, pour ce qui est de la première et de la seconde intention *in abstracto* a son être dans l'intellect, car toute connaissance est dans l'intellect comme dans un sujet. Or l'universel *in abstracto* pour ce qui est de la première et de la seconde intention, est une *cognitio rei*. Donc, l'universel pris sur ce mode est dans l'intellect.

(2) L'universel *in concreto* en tant que *res intellecta*, pour ce qui est de la première et de la seconde intention, est extra-mental, quant à la chose, mais il est dans l'âme quant à la *ratio intelligendi*.

La paronymie intervient spécialement au niveau de l'analyse de la notion de *res intellecta*. Qui dit "chose intelligée" renvoie à deux éléments distincts: la chose elle-même en tant que cause efficien-

10 Cf. Avicenne, *Logica*, éd. de Venise, 1508, fo 3vb.

11 Cf. Pinborg 1980: 114.

te de l'intellection, et la *ratio intelligendi*, "qui dénomme la chose". Il ne faut donc pas dire que "la chose intelligée en tant qu'intelligée est dans l'âme". De même, en effet, que l'agent en tant qu'agent n'est pas dans le patient, la chose intelligée en tant qu'intelligée n'est pas dans l'intellect: ce qui est dans l'intellect, c'est l'*esse intellectum rei*. Or, l'*esse intellectum* c'est l'*esse activum in intellectu*, signifié sur le mode de la passion. Donc, de même que l'agent n'est pas dans le patient, la chose intelligée en tant qu'intelligée n'est pas dans l'intellect.

A l'argument réaliste fondé sur la paronymie, Radulphus répond en distinguant "ce qui dénomme une chose formellement" et "ce qui est prédiqué d'une chose dénomminativement, non formellement mais comme l'effet est prédiqué de sa cause". Dans le premier cas, ce qui dénomme est dans ce qui est dénommé comme dans un sujet; dans le second cas, non.

L'idée de dénomination formelle, ici introduite, se retrouve chez les "réalistes d'Oxford" édités par A. D. Conti.¹² C'est le cas, particulièrement, de John Sharpe, quand il analyse ce qu'il appelle la "prédication formelle *ex parte rei*" qui, selon lui, a lieu, quand, en plus de l'identité d'essence sujet-prédicat (qui caractérise la prédication essentielle *ex parte rei* où "la même entité ou essence est sujet et prédicat"), le prédicat ou ce qui est contenu (*importatum*) par le prédicat sous le mode formel est présent dans le sujet soit à titre de forme informant le sujet quidditativement, comme dans '*Homo est animal*' soit à titre de forme dénommant le sujet concrètement (*concretive*), comme dans '*Homo est albus*'. Chez Sharpe comme chez Radulphus, la dénomination formelle caractérise les termes comme '*album*'. A cet exemple canonique de la prédication dite *in quale* comme de la paronymie telle que l'élabore Aristote, Radulphus oppose l'exemple de '*percutiens*'. Son argument est simple: quand on dit '*Sor est percutiens*' l'action dénomme l'agent, *i.e.* Socrate; pourtant, elle n'est pas en lui comme dans un sujet, elle n'est qu'un "effet de Socrate". Donc, la règle qui fonde AP, et qui veut que "ce qui dénomme une autre chose soit en elle comme dans un sujet" n'est pas universelle: une action dénomme son agent (causalement) et pas seulement son sujet (formellement). La conclusion tombe: les intentions secondes dénomment la *res* extra-mentale non comme leur sujet, mais comme leur cause agente.

12 Cf. John Sharpe. *Quaestio super universalibus*: 3-145. Cf., également, Conti 1982.

Il ne suffit pas de poser, “comme le font certains”, que l’intention seconde dénomme la chose au sens où, quand on dit ‘*Homo est species*’ on dit que l’homme est “la *species* en tant qu’elle est dans l’intellect”. Car l’homme en tant qu’il est dans l’intellect “n’est rien d’autre que l’espèce ou la connaissance de l’homme”. Or la *cognitio hominis* n’est pas l’homme: les propositions ‘*Cognitio hominis est homo*’ et ‘*Cognitio prima hominis est cognitio secunda eiusdem*’ sont fausses. Quand on dit ‘*Homo est species*’, l’*esse cognitum* de l’homme est prédiqué paronymiquement de l’homme à la façon dont on dit ‘*paries videtur*’: la vision dénomme le mur, mais la vision n’est pas dans le mur comme dans un sujet, elle est dans l’œil. Elle dénomme le mur comme “L’objet et la cause qui cause la vision dans l’œil”.

Ce dernier argument rappelle un des trois opposés par Thomas d’Aquin aux averroïstes dans le *De unitate intellectus contra averroistas*: c’est parce qu’ils considèrent que l’*intentio intellecta* est dans le *phantasma* comme dans un sujet, telle la couleur dans un mur, que les averroïstes et Averroès lui-même, croyant démontrer que l’homme pense (*homo intelligit*), démontrent, en fait, qu’il est pensé.¹³

Dans la question 8 de ses *Quaestiones super Porphyrium*, éditée par J. Pinborg, Hugues d’Utrecht (de Traiecto), maître ès arts parisien légèrement postérieur à Radulphus, résume bien la doctrine de son prédécesseur: L’universel est dans l’intellect subjectivement, il est dans la “chose objectée” (*res obiecta*) causativement. Il formule également de manière limpide la distinction entre les deux types de dénomination mentionnés par Radulphus:

13 Cf. Thomas d’Aquin, *Contre Averroès*. (trad. A. de Libera), § 65, p. 138-140: “[...] dato quod una et eadem species numero esset forma intellectus possibilis et esset simul in fantasmatis: nec adhuc talis copulatio sufficeret ad hoc quod hic homo intelligeret. Manifestum est enim quod per speciem intelligibilem aliquid intelligitur, sed per potentiam intellectiuam aliquid intelligit; sicut etiam per speciem sensibilem aliquid sentitur, per potentiam autem sensitivam aliquid sentit. Vnde paries in quo est color, cuius species sensibilis in actu est in uisu, uidetur, non uidet; animal autem habens potentiam uisuiam, in qua est talis species, uidet. Talis autem est predicta copulatio intellectus possibilis ad hominem, in quo sunt fantasmata quorum species sunt in intellectu possibili, qualis est copulatio parietis in quo est color ad uisum in quo est species sui coloris. Sicut igitur paries non uidet, sed uidetur eius color, ita sequeretur quod homo non intelligeret, sed quod eius fantasmata intelligerentur ab intellectu possibili. Impossibile est ergo saluari quod hic homo intelligat, secundum positionem Auerrois.”

Item. Omne quod denominat alterum est in illo quod denominat vel ut in subiecto vel ut in causa. Sed universale denominat res obiectas et non est in eis ut in subiecto. Quare etc. Maior patet, quia nihil denominat alterum nisi tamquam subiectum vel causam. Minor declaratur. Universale enim denominat rem obiectam dicendo 'Sor est homo', 'homo est species'.¹⁴

La paronymie comme foyer de la discussion sur le statut des intentions

La transposition de la paronymie au niveau des intentions a eu un effet durable et inattendu: elle a servi d'horizon à la genèse et à l'élaboration de ce que j'appellerai la problématique du "statut de l'objectivité intentionnelle". Cette problématique a connu divers stades et développements, dont plusieurs aspects importants ont fait l'objet de publications de J. Pinborg,¹⁵ K. Tachau,¹⁶ R. Lambertini¹⁷ et D. Perler.¹⁸ Pour en saisir la nature et l'enjeu, il faut repartir du principe, énoncé par Radulphus Brito dans le sophisme *Sur les Secondes intentions* édité par J. Pinborg:¹⁹ toute espèce de connaissance *dénomme son objet* comme les *accidents abstraits dénomment leur sujet*, c'est-à-dire concrètement (*semper cognitio denominat suum obiectum, sicut accidentia abstracta denominant suum subiectum*).

En d'autres mots: (1) Radulphus fait un lien remarquable entre le problème de la signification des termes accidentels et celui du rapport entre une intention ou concept et la chose conçue. (2) Il introduit, en même temps, une distinction entre objet et sujet, qui a une importance considérable, en posant un rapport l'on peut schématiser ainsi:

intention: objet :: accident abstrait: sujet.

(3) Ce rapport est un rapport de paronymie (*denominatio*).

L'intervention de la paronymie dans les problématiques de statut intentionnel est une caractéristique de l'époque. On la retrouve, notamment, dans la reformulation que les *intentionistae* impo-

¹⁴ Cf. Pinborg 1980: 142.

¹⁵ Cf., principalement, Pinborg 1974.

¹⁶ Cf. Tachau 1988.

¹⁷ Cf. Lambertini 1992 (en appendice: "Questioni di Matteo da Gubbio su Porfirio. Un quadro sinottico", p. 319-323, et "Tre testi di Matteo da Gubbio sul concetto della specie", p. 324-351).

¹⁸ Cf. Perler 1994.

¹⁹ Cf. Pinborg 1975b: 141.

sent à la définition avicennienne de la logique, qui fait explicitement intervenir la “dénomination”: “La logique porte sur les intentions secondes *en tant qu’elles dénomment leurs objets*”.²⁰ Radulphus en tire la conclusion que la logique considère les intentions secondes prises non comme dispositions ou *habitus* intellectuels, mais comme connaissances des choses. Cette thèse, bien connue, préside à la répartition des rôles entre le logicien et la *naturalis* ou *realis*. Dans leur relation objectale ou objectuelle, les intentions secondes ne sont pas réelles, la logique ne les considère donc pas en tant que telles (*ideo de istis considerat non ut sunt realia*); leur réalité “mentale”, en tant qu’elles existent subjectivement (*subiective*) dans l’âme, concerne le physicien, non le logicien, qui ne s’intéresse à elles qu’en tant qu’elles “dénomment” un objet.²¹

La relation paronymique de l’intention à son objet n’est pas confinée aux seules intentions secondes, elle regarde l’ensemble des *cognitiones* ou *intentiones*. Cette thèse générale, est l’occasion d’un débat dont l’écho nous est parvenu, notamment, grâce à la critique de Radulphus Brito par Pierre d’Auriole. J. Pinborg en a donné les premiers éléments dans son édition d’*In I Sent.*, dist. 23, a. 2, de Pierre d’Auriole. S’y ajoutent plusieurs textes, sur lesquels R. Friedman a attiré mon attention.²²

Auriole reproche à Radulphus deux erreurs: (1) de soutenir que si “l’acte de l’intellect est formellement et dans l’abstrait une intention (première ou seconde)”, “l’objet” de cet acte “est seulement dit paronymiquement, et non formellement, intention (première ou seconde)”; (2) de soutenir que “la chose conçue est seulement dénommée à partir de l’acte d’intellection et n’en retire

20 La formule originale d’Avicenne est, comme on le sait: “Subiectum vero logicae [...] sunt intentiones intellectae secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus intellectis primo.” Cf. Avicenne, *Philosophia prima*, I, 2, p. 1, 10. Sur la réception latine d’Avicenne, cf. Maierù 1987.

21 Cf. Pinborg 1975a: 54.

22 Cf., notamment, Pierre d’Auriole, *Scriptum*, d. 27, p. 2, a. 2, Rome 1596, p. 622b et 625a (les textes ci-dessous sont de Friedman 1997, p. 430.407-10 et p. 436.594-605 respectivement). La thèse d’Auriole est: “Quod in actu intellectus emanat ipsa res cognita, et ponitur in quodam esse obiectivo.” Le quatrième argument contre cette thèse, inspiré de Radulphus Brito, soutient: “Illud quod non capit nisi solum denominari ab aliquo, non dicitur produci ab illo, alioquin Caesar, qui denominatur a pictura, produceretur ab ea; sed res cognita non capit ab intelligere aut videre nisi quod solum denominatur intellecta vel visa; igitur non dicitur emanare aliquid per intellectionem aut visionem.” Auriole répond: “Nec

pas plus un être intentionnel” que le “César qui est peint n’en retire de sa peinture”.

La critique d’Auriolo suppose une doctrine qui définit comme *denominatio* la relation entre la chose extramentale et son espèce intelligible ou l’acte de l’intellect qui la représente subjectivement dans l’âme à titre de qualité. C’est à peu de chose près celle de Siger et de Radulphus. Contre cette doctrine, Auriolo soutient que l’intention n’est pas réductible au seul acte de l’intellect et que la notion de dénomination ne capture pas la relation entre le concept et la chose conçue. Sa thèse est qu’il y a *intentio* quand l’intellect confère à une chose “un mode d’être spécifique” qu’il appelle *esse apparens* ou “être objectif”. Un des traits marquants de l’analyse d’Auriolo est qu’il s’appuie sur la thèse d’Averroès qui, selon lui, définit comme “concept objectif” l’*intentio intellecta* en tant que “continuée” à l’*intentio imaginata*, et pose que l’*intentio* n’est “rien d’autre que le concept formé objectivement par l’acte de l’intellect”. Un autre trait est qu’il pose que l’*esse in anima obiective* de la chose ne se réduit pas à une dénomination.

Sed Commentator intentiones vocat obiectivos conceptus: dicit enim in III *De anima* quod intentiones intellectae continuantur cum intentionibus imaginatis et sunt in eis quasi forma in materia et sicut color in pariete. Et hoc dicit, commento 18 et 43. Manifestum est autem quod loquitur de intentionibus obiectivis quae sunt intellectae et imaginatae, quia de illis semper experimur quod intellectus innitur imaginatae sicut color parieti, quod non est verum de actibus. Unde et, commento 18, dicit quod sensationes non sunt intentiones aliae ab intentionibus rerum existentium extra animam in materia. Ex quo patet quod intelligit per sensationes et intentiones rerum apparitiones obiectivas quae sunt realiter eadem cum hiis quae existunt extra. Ergo secundum modum loquendi philosophicum intentiones non sunt actus, sed aliquid obiectivum.²³

etiam obest quarta, quia non est verum quod res intellecta solum denominari capiat ab intellectione, sicut Caesar a pictura aut repraesentatum a repraesentatione quacumque, non enim parieti per picturam Caesar ipse fit praesens nec obicitur sibi, nec iudicat de eo, sicut res intellectui sunt praesentes. Et rursus multo aliter sunt res in anima quam Caesar in pictura, alioquin Philosophus V *Metaphysicae* non dixisset unum modum specialem essendi esse in anima; et iterum si non esset aliud rem esse in intellectu quam denominari, cum per speciem intellectus assimiletur rebus, et ita res denominentur a specie sicut Caesar a pictura, et multo amplius, pro eo quod est similitudo, expressior sequeretur quod non aliud esse haberet res dum actu intelligitur ab illo quod habet per speciem, etiam dum non intelligitur; et tamen omnis intelligens experitur rem sibi praesentem dum eam cogitat, non igitur tale esse est tantum denominari.”

23 Cf. Pierre d’Auriolo, In I *Sent.*, dist. 23, a. 2, éd. Pinborg 1980: 135.

Cette reprise de la doctrine d'Averroès dans le langage de l'objectivité intentionnelle est filtrée par l'exemple que lui opposait Thomas (celui de la couleur dans le mur); mais, plus décisif encore, elle renvoie (sans doute indirectement) aux thèses de Siger de Brabant et de l'Anonyme de Giele affirmant que l'intellect matériel a besoin du *phantasma* comme d'un *objet* – par quoi les averroïstes répliquaient à Thomas. Si l'on prête attention à l'ensemble des notations impliquées dans ce dispositif, on voit donc que la rencontre de la dénomination et de l'intentionnalité configure un espace de jeu théorique qui impose de réévaluer l'importance de l'averroïsme dans l'histoire de la psychologie intentionnelle. Pour s'en persuader, il faut revenir sur certains aspects de la théorie averroïste du fondement de l'*intentio intellecta*, que j'ai analysée sous le titre de "théorie des deux sujets".²⁴

La thèse centrale d'Averroès, sur laquelle s'appuie Pierre d'Auriose, est que la pensée, c'est-à-dire l'intelligible en acte, a toujours deux sujets (*subiecta*): l'un, l'intellect matériel, qui assure la subsistance réelle de l'intelligible, qui fait de l'intelligible une "forme existante" (*ens in mundo*); l'autre, le fantasme, qui en fait un concept représentatif, aléthique, c'est-à-dire *dévoilant* (*intellectus verus*).²⁵ Ce sont ces deux "sujets" que les averroïstes distinguent en réservant le titre de sujet proprement dit (*subiectum*) à l'intellect matériel et celui d'objet (*obiectum*) au fantasme.

Nunc autem Aristoteles videtur determinare primo huius quod intelligere non est proprium animae, sed animae et corpori; et modus per quem est commune corpori quoniam non est sine phantasmate. Hoc autem non est ut intelligere sit perfectio hominis, sed eget homine ut obiecto. Sic non est dicere intellectum intelligere, sed hominem, non ex hoc modo quo intelligere sit in materia, ut videre in

²⁴ Voir mon "Introduction" à Thomas d'Aquin, *Contre Averroès*...: 65-72.

²⁵ Cf. Averroès, *In De an. III*, comm. 5, éd. Crawford, p. 400: "Quoniam, quia formare per intellectum, sicut dicit Aristoteles, est sicut comprehendere per sensum, comprehendere autem per sensum perficitur per duo subiecta, quorum unum est subiectum per quod sensus fit verus (et est sensatum extra animam), aliud autem est subiectum per quod sensus est forma existens (et est prima perfectio sentientis), necesse est etiam ut intellecta in actu habeant duo subiecta, quorum unum est subiectum per quod sunt vera, scilicet forme que sunt ymagines vere, secundum autem est illud per quod intellecta sunt unum entium in mundo, et istud est intellectus materialis. Nulla enim differentia est in hoc inter sensum et intellectum, nisi quia subiectum sensus per quod est verus est extra animam, et subiectum intellectus per quod est verus est intra animam. Et hoc dictum Aristotele in hoc intellectu, ut videbitur post."

oculo, et per consequens non ut perfectio, sed ut separatum a materia. *Eget tamen materiali corpore ut obiecto, non ut subiecto suo*; et pro tanto est dicere hominem intelligere; tamen non est ita ut dicimus hominem sentire. Si dicas quod proprie homini <convenit intelligere>, non est probatum, et ideo hoc est negandum. [*Anonyme de Giele*. 75.]

Dicendum est igitur aliter secundum intentionem Philosophi, quod anima intellectiva in essendo est a corpore separata, non ei unita ut figura cerae, sicut sonant plura verba Aristotelis et eius ratio ostendit. Anima tamen intellectiva corpori est unita in operando, cum nihil intelligat sine corpore et phantasmate, in tantum quod sensibilia phantasmata non solum sunt necessaria ex principio accipienti intellectum et scientiam rerum, immo etiam iam habens scientiam considerare non potest sine quibusdam formis sensatis, retentis et imaginatis. Cuius signum est quod, laesa quadam parte corporis, ut organo imaginationis, homo prius sciens scientiam amittit, quod non contingeret nisi intellectus dependeret a corpore in intelligendo. Sunt igitur unum anima intellectiva et corpus in opere, quia in unum opus conveniunt; et *cum intellectus dependeat ex corpore quia dependet ex phantasmate in intelligendo, non dependet ex eo sicut ex subiecto in quo sit intelligere, sed sicut ex obiecto, cum phantasmata sint intellectui sicut sensibilia sensui*. [*Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones de anima intellectiva*: 85.]

Nous avons suggéré ailleurs que, ainsi réinterprétées, les expressions *ens in mundo* et *intellectus verus* correspondaient à la distinction postmédiévale entre *être formel* et *être objectif* des concepts.²⁶ La reformulation de la théorie averroïste par Pierre d'Auriol, confirme qu'elle est bien à la base de la notion de "concept objectif" que, via Suárez, on retrouve chez Descartes: en termes clairs, la théorie averroïste des deux sujets de *l'intentio intellecta*, l'un qui en fait une "chose mondaine" ou "étant véritable", l'autre qui en fait un être "vrai", c'est-à-dire représentatif d'une pluralité, est, selon moi, la première origine de la distinction entre être formel et être objectif des concepts (Suárez) ou des idées (Descartes). Il n'est donc pas indifférent de retrouver sur ce point la paronymie. La thèse complète de Suárez faisant du concept formel l'acte d'intellection et du concept objectif, l'objet connu et représenté par cet acte, rappelle les distinctions débattues depuis les premières générations d'"averroïstes" jusqu'à Pierre d'Auriol à travers Radulphus Brito. La continuité avec l'averroïsme apparaît aussi au niveau de la paronymie, puisque c'est par l'opposition du sujet et de l'objet, telle que la conçoit par exemple l'Anonyme de Giele, que Suárez explicite sa distinction (*Disputationes Metaphysicae*, II, 1, 1):

26 Cf. Libera 1996: 210-211.

Le concept objectif est dit concept par dénomination extrinsèque à partir du concept formel, et il est dit objectif au sens où il n'est pas la forme terminant intrinsèquement la conception, mais objet et matière vers laquelle se tourne la conception formelle.²⁷

La même continuité se retrouve sur un mode mineur chez Descartes, qui définissant l'idée comme une *res cogitata*, lui assigne deux types de réalité: (a) une "réalité formelle" en tant que mode de notre substance pensante et (b) une "réalité objective" en tant que représentative d'un objet. Il y a donc un fil qui, à travers la problématique de l'intention et de la dénomination élaborée par Radulphus Brito et Pierre d'Auriol, relie le cartésianisme à l'averroïsme.

Considérons, à présent, l'autre direction empruntée sur ce point par la psychologie médiévale.

Assimilation structurelle de la *denominatio* et de la *connotatio* dans le champ de la psychologie

Si la *denominatio* a joué un rôle inattendu dans la genèse et le déploiement de la problématique de l'intentionnalité, une notion bien distincte lui a fait concurrence, avant, pour finir, de l'absorber: la *connotatio*. L'émergence de la connotation dans ce domaine renvoie à un autre auteur auquel J. Pinborg et ses élèves ont consacré une série de publications: Roger Bacon. On peut résumer ainsi les apports révolutionnaires de Bacon, à partir du *De Signis* édité par K. Fredborg *et al.* en 1978: un son vocal (*vox*) connote son "espèce" intentionnelle (*species*) dans l'âme (*De signis*, § 16-18), une *vox* connote l'"espèce" d'une chose dans l'âme (§ 162-169), un concept ou l'espèce d'une chose connote la chose elle-même (§ 103 *sqq.*). J'ai tenté d'analyser ailleurs plus en détail ce recours à la connotation. Je me contenterai ici de quelques remarques.

²⁷ Francisco Suarez, *Disputationes Metafisicas*, vol. 1, p. 361: "... cum hominem concipimus, ille actus, quem in mente efficitur ad concipiendum hominem, vocatur conceptus formalis; homo autem cognitus et repraesentatus illo actu dicitur conceptus obiectivus, conceptus quidem per denominationem extrinsecam a conceptu formali, per quem obiectum eius concipi dicitur, et ideo recte dicitur obiectivus, quia non est conceptus ut forma intrinsece terminans conceptionem, sed ut obiectum et materia circa quam versatur formalis conceptio, et ad quam mentis acies directe tendit."

Bacon relie le problème de la connotation à une théorie générale du signe qui lui permet d'abandonner la paronymie comme instrument d'analyse de l'intentionnalité. Sa théorie repose sur une distinction entre signes naturels et signes conventionnels, qui a fait l'objet de maintes études depuis la publication du *De signis*. Ce qui nous intéresse ici, c'est que, avant le *Compendium studii theologiae* et de manière plus fouillée, le *De signis* fournit une théorie de la signification secondaire ou connotation qui connecte explicitement la signification *ad placitum* (= la signification dite "conventionnelle" au sens d'Aristote) et la signification naturelle prise au sens d'Augustin et des stoïciens – une première initiative qui va s'avérer fructueuse du point de vue de la psychologie intentionnelle. La typologie de la signification naturelle (SN) est, comme on le sait, tripartite:

- | | | | | |
|----|---|---------|---|--|
| 1. | { | Passé | { | Nécessaire: habere lactis copiam signum partus in muliere |
| | | | | Probable: Terram esse madidam signum pluviae praeteritae |
| | | Present | { | Nécessaire: cantum galli signum horae noctis |
| | | | | Probable: Esse matrem signum dilectionis. Esse errabundum multum de nocte signum latronis. |
| | | Futur | { | Nécessaire: aurora signum ortus solis |
| | | | | Probable: Rubedo in vespere signum serenitatis in crastino |
2. Imagines, picturae
3. { Vestigium signum animalis
- { Fumus signum ignis

Le fondement de ce dispositif est clairement énoncé au § 102 du *De signis*, où l'ensemble de la réflexion est placé sous le patronage de la notion baconienne d'*analogie*: il y a fonctionnement analo-

gique lorsqu'un mot "donne à comprendre une pluralité de choses auxquelles il n'a pas été imposé" ou, plus exactement "plusieurs choses parmi lesquelles une seule a reçu l'imposition". Autrement dit: dans la plupart des cas, un mot "qui a reçu une seule imposition sous un seul acte de signifier" se rapporte quand même à une pluralité de choses: ces choses auxquelles se rapporte la chose à laquelle il a été imposé. Simplement, le mécanisme psycho-sémiotique n'est pas identique: "le mot *signifie ad placitum* pour la chose à laquelle il est imposé", "mais il signifie naturellement et dans le premier mode du signe naturel les choses telles qu'elles sont comprises à travers son premier signifié". Intervient ici la notion non-aristotélicienne de signification naturelle que J. Pinborg a appelée *implied meaning*:²⁸ le mécanisme est en effet d'ordre inférentiel, les signifiés secondaires étant compris par une conséquence naturelle et nécessaire à travers le terme imposé et, plus précisément encore, "par la raison du signifié de ce terme". Le rapport de conséquence se laisse ainsi formuler: le conséquent naturel est compris dans l'antécédent par la raison de son signifié ou, ce qui revient au même, "un mot signifie de nombreuses choses auxquelles il n'est pas imposé, puisqu'il signifie toutes les choses avec lesquelles la chose ayant reçu l'imposition possède un rapport essentiel de par la force de son signifié". Bref, "en même temps que, parce que, tant que et lorsque le mot *homme* signifie ce à quoi il fut imposé, à savoir telle espèce d'animal, il signifie aussi l'animal et ce qui est capable de rire et toutes les autres choses avec lesquelles cette chose signifiée est dans un rapport essentiel de par la force du signifié."

Le phénomène décrit par Bacon dépasse la simple "signification par accompagnement" analysée par Avicenne et Ghazâlî. De fait, et c'est là que la connotation se substitue à la dénomination comme outil analytique de la psychologie, Bacon étend la signification SN:

- (1) à la relation du son vocal à sa propre "forme" (species) dans l'âme (articulation du mot parlé à son image acoustique);
- (2) à la relation du son vocal à la forme de son référent dans l'âme (association d'une image acoustique à une image mentale du référent);

²⁸ Cf. Pinborg 1981.

(3) à la relation de l'image mentale du référent au référent lui-même.

Il y a, toutefois, des différences entre les trois. Par exemple, la relation SN1 s'applique seule dans le cas de (2) (*De Signis*, § 165); en revanche, SN1, SN2 et SN3 s'appliquent toutes dans le cas de (1). Cette discrédance entre les deux fonctionnements s'explique aisément; elle n'en éclipse pas pour autant le phénomène central, qui est que tous les mots prononcés ont en commun, quel que soit leur fonctionnement, d'avoir une signification conventionnelle (*ad placitum*) et une signification naturelle au sens de SN1 – une thèse qui, tout en couvrant les mêmes problèmes qu'eux, va, à l'évidence, plus loin que les développements des intentionnistes sur les phénomènes de “dénomination” entre concepts et choses conçues. Je donne ici les deux principaux passages touchant les relations (1) et (2):

(1) Le mot prononcé est un signe de sa propre forme dans l'âme, mais seulement un signe naturel, et non pas un signe institué par l'âme [...] Et il est évident qu'il en est un signe naturel dans le triple genre du signe naturel. En effet, il infère nécessairement sa forme dans l'âme du locuteur, il est formé et configuré d'après elle, et il est l'effet de celle-ci (*De signis*, § 18).

(2) Un mot significatif *ad placitum* prononcé significativement infère nécessairement la forme de son référent dans l'âme et l'habitus <cognitif qui lui correspond> [...] Un son vocal signifiant une chose *ad placitum* est un signe naturel de la forme de cette chose existant dans l'âme, et cela dans le premier mode du signe naturel.²⁹ [...] Il importe que le mot signifie la forme et l'habitus non comme un signe donné par l'âme [...], puisqu'il ne les signifie ni naturellement [au sens d'Aristote] ni *ad placitum*, mais comme un signe naturel. Et il est impossible qu'il les signifie selon le deuxième ou le troisième mode du signe naturel, puisque le mot n'est pas configuré d'après la forme de cette chose, *mais d'après sa propre forme*, afin de pouvoir en être le signe, et puisqu'il n'est pas non plus un effet de la forme de cette chose. C'est pourquoi il importe qu'il en soit le signe uniquement dans le premier mode du signe naturel (*De signis*, § 165).

L'approche sémiotique qui fonde chez Bacon le recours à la *connotatio* suppose une réforme et une restructuration complètes de la sémantique et de la théorie de la signification (convention-

29 Cf., dans le même sens, Roger Bacon, *Compendium studii theol.*, éd. Maloney, § 60: “Sed quia species rei et habitus cognitivus de re sequuntur naturali consequentia ad rem et nomen [...] ideo vox rei imposita comparatur ad speciem et habitum sicut vox significativa naturaliter, et primo modo signi naturalis [...]”

nelle et naturelle) d'Aristote, qui servait de fondement tant aux averroïstes qu'aux tenants de la psychologie intentionnelle. Cette mise à l'écart ou, plutôt, cette refonte du "triangle sémantique" d'Aristote (*voces, intentiones, res*) par l'introduction d'un nouveau concept de la signification naturelle explique l'abandon de la paronymie comme outil analytique de l'intentionnalité. Cet abandon se trouve consommé, dans un autre horizon théorique, avec l'occamisme (dont les affinités, bien connues et limitées, avec la sémiotique de Roger Bacon ne seront pas évoquées ici)

Paronymie et connotation

Le changement de paradigme, qui s'amorce entre Siger de Brabant ou l'Anonyme de Giele, et Roger Bacon, révèle une tendance de fond qui s'accomplit au XIV^e siècle dans l'absorption des paronymes par les termes connotatifs, effectuée par Occam. Naturellement, il y a, à ce stade, une différence radicale: la nouveauté de l'occamisme est d'inscrire la paronymie *et* la connotation au niveau du langage mental, et non au seul niveau des *voces*.

Le phénomène a été parfaitement étudié par C. Panaccio: il est inutile d'y revenir ici.³⁰ Je me contenterai de rappeler ce qui me paraît essentiel à mon propos. Comme l'a montré Panaccio, le terme connotatif, y compris dans le langage mental, a deux significations: l'une première, qui est du même type que celle du terme dit "absolu", l'autre secondaire, qu'Occam appelle "connotation".³¹ L'exemple canonique du terme connotatif est 'blanc'.³² Contre l'intention expresse d'Aristote, Occam fait du terme 'blanc', un terme connotatif, qui ne signifie pas la qualité de manière absolue, mais deux séries de signifiés: les signifiés premiers, les choses

³⁰ Cf., pour une synthèse, Panaccio 1995.

³¹ La caractéristique du terme absolu est qu'il n'établit aucune différence entre ses signifiés, il les signifie tous à égalité et à titre premier. Selon l'heureuse formule de Panaccio, les signifiés d'un terme absolu *T* sont définis prédicativement: c'est l'ensemble des individus dont il est (a été, sera ou peut être vrai) de dire "ceci est *T*".

³² Aristote l'utilise en *Catégories*, 2, pour illustrer l'accident particulier "un certain blanc existe dans un sujet, savoir dans le corps, mais il n'est affirmé d'aucun sujet" (on ne dit pas: 'Le corps est ce blanc'), et en *Catégories*, 5, pour poser que, contrairement à "l'espèce et au genre qui signifient une substance de telle qualité", "le blanc ne signifie rien d'autre que la qualité", c'est-à-dire "signifie la qualité de manière absolue".

individuelles blanches, auxquels il s'applique et dont il peut tenir lieu dans une phrase, et les signifiés seconds, les blancheurs singulières, attribuées *dénotativement* aux choses individuelles blanches.

Par là, Occam résorbe le phénomène de la paronymie dans celui, plus général, de la connotation, qui s'applique à d'autres termes, par exemple aux termes relationnels (comme 'père'). Réduite à l'essentiel, la thèse occamista est donc que les termes paronymiques sont, *comme tous les connotatifs*, des termes concrets qui signifient directement (*in recto*) des substances singulières et qui signifient secondairement ("à l'oblique", *in obliquo*), c'est-à-dire connotent, les qualités singulières qu'ils permettent d'attribuer aux substances singulières.

Ce trait de la doctrine occamista de la connotation nous renvoie ainsi à un autre secteur couvert par les travaux de l'École de Copenhague: L'analyse du *Catcomplex* par S. Ebbesen. Il est clair en effet que, sur ce point, Occam adopte *et adapte* la théorie dite "avicennienne" des termes accidentels, décrite par Ebbesen dans sa monographie de 1988, à partir du résumé (infidèle) qu'en donne Radulphus Brito dans *Quaest. Top.*, III, 2:

Avicenna [...] voluit quod terminus concretus, ut 'album' significaret aggregatum ex subiecto et accidente, primo tamen subiectum et deinde formam, ita quod totum significet sub ratione subiecti.

Si l'on songe que, aux dires d'Ebbesen, cette théorie n'a pas eu de partisans "in the late 13th and early 14th centuries",³³ on voit que la reprise par Occam d'une thèse avicennienne conte la *doxa* "averroïste" prédominant dans les générations antérieures n'a pas qu'une signification anecdotique. Le débat Averroès-Avicenne est, en effet, une des structures portantes du débat philosophique du Moyen Age tardif – je renvoie sur ce point, entre dix autres, à l'analyse contrastée des ontologies avicennienne et averroïste de l'être et de l'essence chez Jacques de Viterbe, tout entière bâtie sur la question de savoir si *ens* est ou non un paronyme.³⁴

Enfin, puisqu'on a fait plus haut allusion aux théories réalistes de la prédication distinguant la prédication essentielle et deux types de prédication formelle *ex parte rei*, l'une quidditative,

³³ Cf. Ebbesen 1988: 118.

³⁴ Cf. Libera 1994.

l'autre paronymique, on notera que, sur ce terrain aussi, les nominalistes résorbent la paronymie dans la connotation. Il suffit ici d'évoquer le témoignage de Buridan (*Summulae*, II, 5, 2), qui reformule ainsi la distinction classique, *aviceniennes* des prédications essentielle et paronymique:

Il y a prédication essentielle entre deux termes quand aucun des deux n'ajoute à la signification de l'autre une connotation extérieure (*extranea*) à ce pour quoi les termes supposent. Il y a prédication non essentielles ou paronymique, quand un des termes ajoute à la signification de l'autre une connotation étrangère, comme 'blanc' qui suppose pour un homme et appelle (i.e. connote) la blancheur en tant qu'elle lui est ajoutée. D'où: la proposition 'L'homme est un animal' est essentielle, tandis que 'L'homme est blanc' ou 'L'homme est capable de rire' est paronymique.³⁵

Chez les nominalistes, la distinction entre "proposition quidditative" et "proposition dénominative", jadis introduite par Avicenne sous la forme de la distinction entre *praedicatio univoca* et *praedicatio denominativa*, est donc entièrement repensée grâce à la théorie de la connotation. Par là s'achève le rôle *analytique* de la paronymie, progressivement expulsée, comme concept opératoire de plein exercice, de tous les secteurs où elle dominait à la fin du XIII^e siècle.

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35 Johannes Buridanus, *Summulae. De praedicabilibus*, 2.5.2, éd. de Rijk, p. 44-45: "Vocamus autem essentialem praedicationem alicuius termini de aliquo alio termino cuius neuter terminus super significationem alterius addit aliquam connotationem extraneam circa ea pro quibus unum illorum terminorum supponit. [...] Praedicatio autem non essentialis sed denominativa vocatur cuius unus terminus super significationem alterius addit alienam connotationem, ut 'album' supponit pro homine et appellat albedinem sibi adiacentem. Unde haec praedicatio est essentialis 'homo est animal'; et haec est denominativa 'homo est albus' vel 'homo est risibilis'."

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Aquinas on the Mechanisms of Cognition: Sense and Phantasia

ELEONORE STUMP

Summary: Aquinas's account of sensory cognition has several puzzling features, of which perhaps the most perplexing is the role he assigns to phantasia. This paper examines the role played by the intentional reception of sensible species in Aquinas's account and argues that it consists in a physical alteration of a sense organ, resulting in the reception of a form without matter by the sense. On the view argued for here, phantasms work together with the received sensible species in order to render available to consciousness what otherwise would be only unconscious sensory data of the sort found, for example, in contemporary blindsight patients. Finally, sensory cognition is not to be identified with perception, on this interpretation, because perception includes a recognition of the thing perceived, and such recognition requires a first act of intellect, which apprehends the quiddity of a thing presented to the senses.

Introduction

Hannah and Tom are in the kitchen, talking; Hannah, momentarily distracted, stares intently out the kitchen window, which is outside the range of Tom's vision. "What are you looking at?", he says. "A cat," Hannah answers. In this unremarkable exchange, Hannah does something very remarkable. Intensive research is currently being done in an attempt to build machines that can do even the simplest part of what Hannah does so effortlessly here, but these attempts have not so far been successful. How does Hannah do it? The light reflecting from the cat strikes the glass of the kitchen window as well as Hannah's eyes, yet Hannah sees the cat, and the window does not. What is it about Hannah that enables her to use the light as she does?

Contemporary thinkers are very interested in questions like these, and they attempt to solve them by research into neurobiology, computer science, and psychology, among other disciplines. Aquinas was very interested in them, too. To explore them, he used astute and subtle observations, many of them not his own but derived from a long, largely Aristotelian tradition of thinking about human cognitive processes, together with theoretical infer-

ences about faculties postulated to explain these observations.¹ Here I will be less concerned with his observations and inferences, or the traditions behind them, than with the theory that is the end result of them. In this paper, I will be able to consider only a part of the process of cognition exemplified by Hannah's recognizing a cat; I will concentrate on just the activities of the senses and of the faculty Aquinas calls 'phantasia'.

Before we turn to Aquinas, it will be helpful to say a word about perception. What Aquinas has to say about sensation or sensory cognition is often taken as his account of perception, but whether this standard interpretation is right depends, in part, on what we take perception to be. In normal adult human beings, perception is a process that encompasses a great deal, ranging from the incoming visual data to the ultimate recognition of, say, a cat. Whether some parts of the usual process can be absent from perception, and how much can be absent before we feel queasy about calling what remains 'perception', has been the subject of some dispute.

Neurobiology has made us particularly aware of some of the problems in this connection. There is, for example, the phenomenon of blindsight. A patient with blindsight has no defects in his eyes and no neurological defects in the lowerlevel processing of visual data; but he is unable to gain conscious access to the processed visual data. He therefore claims, sincerely, to be blind. On the other hand, when asked just to guess whether a yardstick in his field of vision is vertical or horizontal, he has a very high percentage of correct "guesses". Shall we say that the blindsight patient perceives the yardstick? Here, although much of the patient's visual system is functioning properly, most of us would be inclined to answer 'no'.

But what shall we say about agnosia patients? These are patients who process visual data and have conscious access to that data but who cannot recognize what they perceive by means of the sense afflicted with agnosia. Although such patients can describe the objects they see and although they are familiar with such objects,

¹ Aquinas's views were themselves one pole around which subsequent storms of discussion swirled. For some examination of these discussions, see, for example, Marrone 1985; Tachau 1988; Tachau 1982. All references to Aquinas's works in what follows are to the Marietti editions.

they have a profound inability to categorize those objects. A visual agnosia patient can describe many of the properties of a cat in front of him; but if he is asked, after describing it, whether he sees a cat anywhere, he will answer in the negative. Shall we say that the agnosia patient perceives what is presented to the sense associated with the agnosia? Neurobiologists are accustomed to answer in the negative. In a recent neurobiology text, for example, agnosia is described as “the inability to perceive objects through otherwise normally functioning sensory channels” (Kandell 1991: 831).

Some philosophers who agree with such neurological assessments argue that in consequence perception must consist in the whole process culminating in the recognition of objects. On their view, to see an extramental object – say, a cat – is to see it *as a cat*; on this way of thinking about perception, all seeing is seeing as. If perception is to be thought of in this way, then, as we shall see, sensory cognition on Aquinas’s account should not be equated with perception. Rather, as I will argue, it consists just in the part of the process of perception which is still intact in agnosia patients; in the case of vision, this will be seeing, but without any seeing as.

Aquinas’s account of sensory powers

Aquinas thinks that there are five external senses – sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell – and that each is a “power (*virtus*) in a corporeal organ” (*In DA* II.xii.377).

Each of the senses has both a proper sensible and a common sensible. On Aquinas’s view, the proper sensible of each sense is what that sense takes in primarily and what cannot be taken in by another sense. The *common* sensibles are those that more than one sense can take in: movement, rest, number, shape, and size. Some of these – number, movement, and rest – can be discerned, at least sometimes in some conditions, by all five external senses; and some senses – sight and touch – are able to discern all the common sensibles in certain circumstances (*In DA* II.xiii.384–386).

Although what the senses take in is the proper and common sensibles, what is sensed by these means are extramental objects: “the senses when they are active are of singular things which are

outside the soul" (*In DA* II.xii.375).² So our senses contribute to cognition by putting us in epistemic contact with extra-mental material objects.

The senses participate in cognition by receiving a "sensible *species*" from the extramental thing presented to the senses. What exactly a sensible *species* is is not so easy to determine. It has been taken to be everything from a pictorial image of a material object to the sense impressions which some philosophers suppose to be the primary objects of sensory awareness.³

On Aquinas's view, a sensible *species* is the form of a matter-form composite. "A sensory power is receptive of *species* without matter," Aquinas says (*In DA* II.xxiv.555); and, in explaining the way in which a sensory power is acted on by what affects it, he remarks, "a sensory power receives form without matter" (*In DA* II.xxiv.553). By 'form', Aquinas generally means something like an essentially configurational state. In the case of a material object, the form of the object is the configurational state in which the matter of that object is arranged. The sensible *species* is the form, the configurational state, of what is sensed, which the sensory power receives. A sensible *species* is not itself what is sensed. Instead it is the means by which the senses sense extra-mental things.

Here, however, it seems as if a problem ought to arise for Aquinas. On his view, the sensory powers are powers of bodily organs, and the sensible *species* or form is received by those bodily organs. So the *species* or form is imposed on the matter of the sense organ. But the imposition of form on matter is the way in which change and generation occur on Aquinas's account. Since the *species* is a form of whatever it is that is being sensed, say, a stone, when that *species* is imposed on the eye, for example, it seems as if it ought to organize the matter of the eye as it organized the matter of the stone. In that case, imposing the form of the stone on

² See also *In DA* II.v.284, where Aquinas contrasts sense and intellect on this score, claiming that sense is of particular things while intellect has to do with universals.

³ To take just a few examples of the way in which '*species*' has been understood, Martin Tweedale says "the visual species can be viewed as a little colored image that is propagated through the air and comes to exist in the eye" (Tweedale 1990: 35-52). F.C. Copleston takes sensible *species* as sense-impressions; according to Aquinas, he says, "Our organs of sense are affected by external objects, and we receive sense impressions" (Copleston 1955: 181).

the eye would not bring it about that the eye senses the stone; rather the eye would become a stone or have some of the qualities of a stone.⁴

The solution to this problem lies in a distinction important for Aquinas's account of cognition. There are two ways a form can be received and a change occur. One way he calls "natural" or "material". The natural reception of a form in matter does make the newly resultant composite be whatever the form organizes it into. A form of a stone naturally or materially received in matter produces a stone or the qualities of a stone. Similarly, when the form of a quality such as sweet or red is received naturally, it makes the matter that receives it sweet or red. Aquinas says: "I call a change 'natural' insofar as a quality is received in its recipient according to the [kind of] being associated with the nature [of things] (*secundum esse naturae*), as when something is made cold or hot or moved with respect to place." (*In DA II.xiv.418*).

There is another way a form can be received, however. Aquinas often says that a form is received in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient, that is, in the way the recipient is able to receive it.⁵ In natural reception or change, the recipient of a form has the same disposition or potentiality as that from which the form comes, and that is why the form can be received in the same mode of being in the recipient as it had in that from which it gets the form. But sometimes,

... the material disposition for receiving [a form] on the part of the recipient is not similar to the material disposition on the part of the agent. And so [in such a case] the form is received in the recipient without matter, insofar as the recipient is assimilated to the agent as regards form, but not as regards matter. And in this mode [of reception] a sense receives the form without the matter, because the form has a different mode of being in the sense from that which it has in the thing being sensed. For in the thing being sensed it has natural being, but in the sense it has intentional and spiritual being. (*In DA II.xxiv.553*)

Elsewhere he says,

4 Some scholars explain Aquinas's theory of cognition in formulations that make it seem as if Aquinas would welcome the conclusion that the cognizer becomes the thing cognized. I discuss such formulations and the parts of Aquinas's theory of cognition that give rise to them in Stump 1997.

5 See, for example, *ST I.84.1*.

There are two kinds of change (*immutatio*): natural and spiritual. A change is natural insofar as the form of the agent is received in the recipient according to natural being, as when heat [is received] in what is made hot. But a change is spiritual insofar as the form of the agent is received in the recipient according to spiritual being, as when the form of a color is [received] in the pupil of the eye, which does not become colored as a result. For the operation of the senses, spiritual change is required, by means of which the intention⁶ of the sensible form comes to be in the [bodily] organ of the sense. Otherwise, if natural change were sufficient for sensing, all natural bodies would sense, when they were altered. (*ST*1.78.3)

This distinction of Aquinas's between two different ways of receiving a form is couched in language unfamiliar to us. What does he mean by these claims about natural and spiritual reception of forms? The notion of a natural reception of a form is perhaps not so hard to understand. He thinks of a material object as a composite of matter and form, and a form of that object is a configuration of it. When matter is configured in a certain way, say, with a configuration of a stone, the matter so configured is a stone or stone-like. What is harder to understand is the "spiritual", "intentional", or (as he says elsewhere) "immaterial" reception of a form. Here the configurational state of something such as a stone is preserved and transferred to something else – the eye, for example. But it is transferred in such a way that it does not make the eye a stone or stone-like. Although the configurational state is somehow really conveyed to and present in the eye, it does not reconfigure the matter of the eye in the way it configures the matter of the stone. How is this possible? If the eye really does accept a configurational state that makes some matter be a stone or have the qualities of a stone, why would that configurational state not also make the eye a stone or stone-like? On the other hand, if the eye does not become a stone or stonelike, in what sense does it contain a configurational state of a stone?

It helps to see here that, although Aquinas's terminology is unfamiliar to us, the phenomenon he wants to call attention to is not. Consider, for example, a street map. The map is effective in the use for which it was designed precisely because it is an instance of the spiritual reception of the forms of material objects. Configurational states of the city's streets are transferred to the paper of the map, but they are transferred in such a way that the

⁶ Aquinas tends to use 'immaterial', 'intentional', and 'spiritual' roughly synonymously to refer to this kind of change or reception of form.

paper which receives those configurational states is not configured by them in the way that the matter of the streets is. Because the configurational states of the streets are successfully transferred to the paper of the map, the map enables its user to find her way around the city's streets. But because the configurational states are received "spiritually" in the paper, the map can be carried in the car. If the forms of the city streets were received in the matter of the map's paper with natural reception (supposing that to be even possible), they would make that matter itself city streets. In that case, we would have a re-production (literally speaking) of the city's streets, but we would not have a map. So a map seems like a good example of the spiritual or immaterial reception of forms, and so does anything else in which configurational states are preserved in some sort of encoded fashion. Blueprints of a building, for instance, are another example in which configurational states are transferred and preserved without making the matter that receives the forms the building.

Furthermore, we could have the spiritual reception of forms even in cases in which there is not the sort of one-to-one correspondence found in street maps or blueprints for buildings. Consider, for example, the way a configurational state of a protein is preserved in the code of DNA. There each amino acid constituting the protein is represented by a particular triplet of nucleic acids in DNA. Those who know the code of DNA can know the constitution of a protein just by reading the ordered triplets of nucleic acids in a certain stretch of DNA. The configuration of the DNA contains the configuration of the amino acids of the protein, but it contains the protein's form in a spiritual way, as Aquinas would put it, because although the form of the protein is in the DNA, it is not in the DNA in such a way as to configure the DNA into the protein. What Aquinas refers to as the spiritual reception of an immaterial form, then, is what we are more likely to call encoded information.

One other point about the reception of forms in the process of sensing is worth making here. The claim that the senses receive the sensible *species* with spiritual or intentional or immaterial reception does not by itself make clear whether or not that reception consists of a material change in the sense. The intellect receives *species* with spiritual reception, but that spiritual reception is not itself a matter of changes in something material, because in-

tellec does not operate in a bodily organ, according to Aquinas. On the other hand, as my examples above point out, it is perfectly possible to have the spiritual reception of an immaterial form that consists in certain changes in matter, such as the lines printed on the street map.

Scholars have disputed the point,⁷ but, in my view, the texts are decisively in favor of the conclusion that for the senses the spiritual reception of sensible *species* is a change in the matter of the bodily organ of the sense. Although it seems odd or even paradoxical to describe some changes in matter as the spiritual or immaterial reception of a form, it is a mistake, I think, to suppose that there is anything ghostly about such reception of forms. For example, Aquinas says: “A sense is a power in a corporeal organ Everything is received in something in the mode of [the recipient] And so it must be that a sense receives corporeally and materially the similitude of the thing which is sensed” (*In DA* II.xii.377). In another place, he says: “Sense and imagination are powers attached to corporeal organs, and so similitudes of things are received in them materially, that is, with material conditions, although apart from matter” (*QDVII.5. ad 2*).

In yet another passage, he seems to be trying to ward off just the mistaken interpretation at issue here. He says,

Because Aristotle said that a sense is receptive of *species* without matter ... someone could believe that a sense is not a power in a body (as the intellect is not). And, therefore, to rule this out, Aristotle assigns an organ to [each] sense. And he says that ... the primary organ of a sense is something in which there is such a power – i.e., a power receptive of *species* without matter. (*In DA* II.xxiv.555)

If the senses did undergo the spiritual reception of an immaterial form without a material change in a bodily organ, Aquinas is saying here, the senses would have been assimilated to the intellect, which differs from the senses, in his view, in virtue of not making use of a bodily organ.

Finally, Aquinas himself supposes that the medium between the object sensed and the sensory power – such as air, in the case of vision – also receives the sensible *species* with spiritual reception;⁸

⁷ See, for example, Cohen 1982; Haldane 1983; and Hoffman 1990.

⁸ *In DA* II.xiv.418, where he says that there is a spiritual change when a *species* is received in a sensory organ or *in the medium* by means of the intentional mode of reception and not by means of the natural mode of reception.

and since the medium is entirely material and has no soul of any sort, the only way it can receive anything is by a change affecting its matter. It is therefore clearly possible on his view for the spiritual reception of an immaterial form to consist in the alteration of matter.

For all these reasons, I am inclined to interpret Aquinas as thinking that the sensible *species* is an immaterial form received with immaterial or spiritual reception, but that this reception is a matter of material change in an organ of the body. The reception is “spiritual” or “immaterial” in the sense that the way in which the matter of DNA contains the configuration for, say, hemoglobin is not the usual, material way in which matter receives form; it does not turn the matter of the DNA into hemoglobin. Aquinas’s “spiritual” reception of forms is thus like the coding of maps or blueprints. This is also the way we ourselves think sensation occurs, encoded information being received in virtue of material change in a corporeal sense organ.

Since this process – the intentional reception of the immaterial sensible *species* with material changes – is common to both the medium and sense organs, it clearly is not itself sufficient for any cognitive process to occur. Before going on to consider what else is necessary, it will be helpful to consider briefly one more part of Aquinas’s account of sensible *species*, namely, the way in which a *species* is a similitude of the thing sensed.

Aquinas often characterizes sensible *species* (as well as intelligible *species* and phantasms) as similitudes. The Latin ‘*similitudo*’ is commonly translated ‘likeness’, and some readers have supposed that a similitude pictorially resembles the thing of which it is a similitude. But this is at best a very misleading impression. Some similitudes may be pictorial in character, but not all are. ‘*Similitudo*’ is cognate with ‘*similis*’, the Latin for ‘similar’; and things are similar insofar as they share qualities – or, as Aquinas would say, forms. And so, on his view: “similitude is grounded in an agreement in or sharing of forms. Consequently, there are many kinds of similitude, corresponding to the many ways of sharing forms” (STI.4.3).⁹

⁹ See also *QDV* 8.8 (“there is a similitude between two things insofar as there is agreement in form”).

Aquinas makes many distinctions among kinds of similitude, but the one most relevant to our purposes is this:

the similitude of two things to one another can be grounded in two [different] ways. In one way, insofar as there is sharing of a nature, and such a similitude is not needed between a cognizer and what is cognized. In another way, according to representation, and this [sort of] similitude is needed on the part of the cognizer with respect to what is cognized. (*QDV* 2.3.ad 9)

He makes a similar point in a different place; there he says,

A similitude of one thing to another is found [to occur] in two [different] ways. In one way, according to the [kind of] being associated with the nature [of things], as the similitude of the heat of fire is in the thing heated by the fire. In another way, as regards cognition, as the similitude of fire is in sight or touch. (*SCG* II.46.1234)

So similitude encompasses many kinds of agreement in form. Pictures or pictorial resemblances will count as similitudes, but so will DNA, insofar as it shares forms with the proteins it codes for. For that matter, heat in the thing heated also is a similitude, since it is a form shared by both the heating agent and the thing heated. When the form of one thing is received in another with natural reception, then there is the similitude grounded in an agreement of nature, as in the example of fire's heating something. But in cognition the similitude is based on the intentional reception in the cognizer of the form of the thing cognized. The cognizer and the object of his cognition share a form, but the similitude in this case is a representation – and representations need not be pictorial in nature. It is therefore a mistake to take '*similitudo*' as necessarily indicating a pictorial resemblance.

Nothing in Aquinas's account of the role of similitudes in sensation keeps him from holding that human beings cognize things in extramental reality directly and immediately. Similitudes are only the means by which cognition occurs and are not themselves the objects of cognition:

To cognize things by means of their similitudes existing in the cognizer is to cognize those things as they are in themselves, or in their own natures. (*ST* I.12.9)

Phantasms

The next step in the process of sensory cognition, after the reception of *species* by the sensory powers, has to do with phantasms. Aquinas's views about phantasms are a perplexing part of his account of cognition since, at first glance anyway, phantasms seem entirely superfluous as regards the cognition of extramental reality. Aquinas holds that there is no cognition of individual material objects without phantasms. And yet why are sensible and intelligible *species* (the intellect's analogue to sensible *species*) not together sufficient to produce the cognition of some object presented to a sense? As far as that goes, why are sensible *species* by themselves not enough to bring about such cognition?

Aquinas, however, claims that all cognition requires phantasms. He says, for example,

If the active intellect were related to the possible intellect as an active object is related to a power ... it would follow that we would immediately understand all things But, as it is, the active intellect is related not as an [active] object, but rather as what actualizes [cognitive] objects. What is required for this – besides the presence of the active intellect – is the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensory powers, and practice at this sort of operation (ST I.79.4.ad 3)

In another place he says: "In the course of [this] present life, in which our intellect is joined to a body that is not impassible, it is impossible for our intellect actually to understand anything except by turning to the phantasms." (ST I.84.7).

Like sensible *species*, phantasms are similitudes of particular things (ST I.79.4.ad 4; see also I.84.7.ad 2); and like sensible *species* they exist in corporeal organs (ST I.85.1.ad 3). In fact, they seem to be just similitudes of the same extramental things as the sensible *species* are. Furthermore, the form which is the sensible *species* is preserved in the phantasm, and the agent intellect abstracts that form from the phantasm in order to make possible intellectual functioning. Aquinas says, for example,

The *species* of a thing, insofar as it is in the phantasms, is not actually intelligible, because the *species* is one with the intellect in actuality not in this way [that is, not in the way the *species* is in the phantasms], but rather insofar as the *species* is abstracted from the phantasms. (SCG II.59.1365)

Finally, the cognitive power that is phantasia is dependent on sensory powers. Aquinas says,

There is a close relationship between phantasia and sense, because phantasia cannot arise without sense, and it occurs only in those [creatures] that have sense – that is, in animals. Furthermore, there is phantasia only of those things of which there is sense, that is, of those things which are the objects of sense (*sentiantur*). (*In DA* III.vi.657)

But, Aquinas remarks, reporting Aristotle's position approvingly, "phantasia is not sense" (*In DA* III.v.641).

So, initially at least, it seems as if the phantasms are virtually identical to the sensible *species*. But what, then, is the difference between the sensible *species* of sensory powers and the phantasms of phantasia?

An important clue is given by what Aquinas takes to be the etymology of 'phantasia'. According to Aquinas, "the name 'phantasia' is taken from vision or from appearing" (*In DA* III.iv.632). And a little later he explains, "The Greek '*phos*' is equivalent to 'light', and from there they get '*phanos*', which is appearance or illumination, and phantasia" (*In DA* III.vi.668).

Furthermore, he associates phantasia with something's appearing to us. For example, he says, "As [a creature] engaged in sensing is moved by sensible [*species*], so in the process of phantasia [a creature] is moved by certain appearances, which are called 'phantasms'" (*In DA* III.vi.656). And elsewhere he cites Aristotle approvingly to the same effect. "Aristotle holds that animals that have phantasia are those to whom something appears in accordance with phantasia, even when they are not actually sensing" (*In DA* III.v.644).

When a cognizer has such appearances without being engaged in the process of sensing, Aquinas sometimes speaks of the cognitive power in question as imagination, rather than phantasia, although he seems to regard the power of imagination as a part of or even identical to the power that is phantasia. And another important clue to his view of phantasia comes from what he says about the process of imagining. For example, he says, "The experience (*passio*) of phantasia is in us when we wish, because it is in our power to form something as if it were appearing before our eyes, such as gold mountains, or whatever we wish." (*In DA* III.iv.633). Here, then, Aquinas describes a person who is having

images of gold mountains in her mind as having an experience produced by the power of phantasia. Phantasia is also the cognitive power responsible for producing the images of dreams, in his view. You can see that phantasia is distinct from sense, he says, because a sleeper phantasizes, but she does not do so because she's actually or even potentially sensing something (*In DA* III.v.641).

On his view, the process of imagination, which is operative in sleep and which we can engage in at will while awake, is a case of being moved by phantasms when we are not concurrently sensing something. Phantasia proper, as distinct from imagination, produces the analogous sort of experience when our senses are simultaneously receiving the *species* of things that are outside the mind and presented to the senses. He relates the processes of phantasia and imagination in this way:

Every motion of phantasia which arises from the motion of the proper sensibles [of the sensory powers] is for the most part true [that is, is received in the cognitive power in the way in which it is in the thing sensed]. I say this with regard to cases in which the sensible is present, when the motion of phantasia is simultaneous with the motion of the senses. But when the motion of phantasia occurs in the absence of [the motion of] the senses, then it is possible to be deceived even as regards proper sensibles. For sometimes absent things are imagined as white, although they are black. (*In DA* III.vi.664-665)

Finally, Aquinas sometimes talks about our, as it were, seeing things in the phantasms. He says, for example, "When someone wants to understand something, he forms for himself phantasms, by way of examples, in which he, as it were, looks at (*inspiciat*) what he is concerned to understand" (*ST* I.84.7). Similarly, in the course of discussing the difference between phantasia and opinion, Aquinas says, "when something appears to us in accordance with phantasia, we are as if we were regarding something in a picture..." (*In DA* III.iv.634).

With these "as if" and "as it were" locutions, Aquinas, I think, is trying to capture a feature of perception that is hard for us to characterize, too, namely, its conscious character. He certainly does not mean to imply that we literally look at phantasms. The sense of sight, of course, could not literally see an immaterial phantasm, and Aquinas explicitly repudiates the view that phantasms are the objects of intellect's cognition. In arguing against Averroes's claim that there is only one intellect for the whole human species, for example, Aquinas remarks, "it cannot be said

that my act of understanding differs from your act of understanding in virtue of the fact that our phantasms are different, because a phantasm is not something that is itself actually intellectually cognized..." (DSC q.un., a.9 corpus).

Given all these things that Aquinas says about phantasms and phantasia, I think we should take phantasia as the cognitive power that makes things appear to us or that gives us access to the sensory data taken in by the senses;¹⁰ that is, phantasia is the power that produces the conscious experience which is a component of ordinary sensing.¹¹ This way of interpreting the role of phantasms in cognition also helps to clarify the difference between phantasms and sensible *species* in Aquinas's account. On Aquinas's view, sensible *species* are not the objects of our cognition. What he says about phantasia strongly suggests that sensible *species* are not available for consciousness either and that this fact is one of the main differences between sensible *species* and phantasms.

Furthermore, we can employ the power of phantasia at will, Aquinas thinks, to imagine things; in imagination, our mental experience includes the conscious appearances of things that are not present to our senses. The difference between phantasia proper and imagination is just a matter of whether or not the cognitive power is operating simultaneously with the sensory powers and in conjunction with them. So it seems reasonable to assume that phantasia proper produces in us the same sort of conscious experiences that imagination does, only this time conscious experience of the extramental reality being sensed.

On this way of understanding phantasia, the extramental things currently making a causal impact on the senses are consciously experienced by us because phantasia has further processed the sen-

¹⁰ Joseph Owens puts a roughly similar point this way: "Species is taken here in the philosophical meaning of 'form'. These impressed forms determine the imagination to produce an image or representation of the thing [sensed], an image in which the thing itself is held before the percipient's internal gaze" (Owens 1992: 125).

¹¹ Aristotle's understanding of phantasia has been the subject of considerable recent discussion; see, for example, Sheppard 1991, and the literature cited in Sheppard's article. Some of the suggestions made regarding Aristotle's understanding of phantasia border on the interpretation I give regarding Aquinas's notion of phantasia. In presenting Neoplatonist readings of Aristotelian phantasia, which she thinks mirror certain contemporary controversies, Sheppard discusses phantasia's "role in interpreting the data of perception" (171) and phantasia's connection with mental images.

sible *species* of those things into phantasms. Without the phantasms, the sensible *species* alone would not produce conscious experience of what is being sensed.

The person who had only sensible *species* but no phantasia would thus be like a blindsight patient. A blindsight patient is receiving visual input through his senses, and it is input which is to some extent and in some mode available to him in forming judgments about the external world – that the yardstick is horizontal, for example. But the blindsight patient reports sincerely of himself that he is blind, because the visual input is not accessible to his consciousness. Using Aquinas's terminology, we can say that the visual sense of the blindsight patient is functioning normally, but that phantasia is not operating in him at all. He has the sensible *species* of objects presented to his eyes, but no phantasms of them.

When we combine the actions of the senses and the phantasia, have we then got Aquinas's account of what we would call perception? Or, to put the same question a slightly different way, is Aquinas's notion of sensory cognition equivalent to our notion of perception? The answer to questions of this sort depends at least in part, as I said above, on what we take perception to be. If we accept the understanding of perception underlying the neurobiological description of agnosia as "the inability to perceive objects through otherwise normally functioning sensory channels", then we would have to deny that on Aquinas's account the functioning of the sensory powers together with the phantasia give us perception.

It is true that, on the interpretation argued for here, phantasms give us conscious experience of extramental objects and conscious access to sensory data about such objects. But a person who had only so much and no more of the cognitive processes Aquinas describes would be in the position of an agnosia patient who is agnostic for all senses. Even though he might be able to describe some of the properties of what he is sensing, the only answer he could give to any question of the form "*What* are you sensing?" would have to be "I do not know." If the agnosia patient cannot properly be said to perceive, although he has "normally functioning sensory channels" as well as conscious access to the data from those channels, then a person whose cognitive processes included only what is contained below the level of the intellect in Aquinas's account could not be said to perceive either.

That is because recognizing *what* one is perceiving depends on

an act of intellect. In the example with which I began, Hannah's answer to the question "What are you looking at?" is "A cat". For Hannah to see what is presented to her vision as a cat requires what Aquinas calls the first operation of the intellect, namely, determining the quiddity or *whatness* of a thing.¹² Neither the senses alone nor the senses combined with phantasia can determine *what* it is that is being perceived. Doing so is the function of the intellect. *A fortiori*, the senses and phantasia together are not sufficient for perceptual judgments, such as "That is a cat", since a judgment of that sort requires what Aquinas calls compounding and dividing,¹³ and that activity is the second operation of the intellect.

Nothing in what I have said entails that on Aquinas's account there ever actually is seeing without seeing as, for normal adult human beings. In the normal condition, for Aquinas, the senses and the phantasia function together with the intellect. I mean to point out only that on his view the cognitive process is analyzed into different subsystems. The actions of some of those subsystems, namely, sensory powers and phantasia, are sufficient for seeing without being sufficient for seeing as. By the same token, I do not mean to imply that for Aquinas cognition consists in a *temporal* sequence in which we first see and then see as. If there indeed is a temporal sequence of some sort, in most normal cases it is of such short duration as to be imperceptible; from a subjective point of view, an object is perceived – seen as a cat, for example – as soon as it is presented to the senses, if the perceiver's cognitive faculties are working properly.

Conclusion

So, when Tom says to Hannah, "what are you looking at?" and Hannah answers, "a cat", the process Hannah undergoes to recognize the cat works like this, on Aquinas's view. First, the form of the cat is received into the air as encoded information; or, as Aquinas puts

12 Some confusion can be raised by Aquinas's notion of the first operation of the intellect because it sometimes looks identical to what Aquinas sees as the final product of intellect in the acquisition of *scientia*, namely, an understanding of the definition of something. For an excellent presentation of the problem and its solution, see Kretzmann 1992.

13 For a good discussion of medieval accounts of compounding and dividing, see Kretzmann 1981.

it, the sensible *species* is received spiritually by the medium. This encoded information, the spiritually received sensible *species*, is then transmitted through the air to Hannah's eyes, which undergo some material change in consequence. Then the sensible *species* impresses itself on an internal bodily organ in the brain which has the power of phantasia and produces phantasms, conscious awareness of sensory data without categorization – seeing without seeing as. The intellect then processes the encoded information in the phantasm; and this further action on the part of the intellect results in Hannah's seeing the object presented to her vision as a cat.

Insofar as we think of perception as seeing as, then our notion of perception is equivalent to Aquinas's sensory cognition plus the first operation of the intellect. The senses and the phantasia together enable Hannah to get sensory data about the cat. But she does not get the concept *cat* from that data until the first operation of the intellect is completed. So Aquinas divides the process of recognizing a cat into different stages, with different subsystems operating at each stage. That he is right to do so is confirmed by the fact that our recognition of a cat can be interrupted at roughly the junctures he picks out in the processing. The blind-sight patient has sensible *species* but no phantasms. The visually agnostic patient has sensible *species* and phantasms; but because he is visually agnostic, he cannot move from the *species* and phantasms to the recognition of what he sees as a *cat*. So although he can describe the cat according to the way she visually appears to him, if we ask him what he is describing, he will say, "I do not know"; and if we ask him whether he sees a cat, he will answer, "no". Although Aquinas's account is complicated, then, its complication seems to reflect accurately the complexity of our cognitive processes¹⁴ as we currently understand them.¹⁵

14 I disagree strongly, therefore, with Anthony Kenny, who says things of this sort about Aquinas's views of cognition: "The various accounts which Aquinas gives of the physical processes of sense-perception are almost always mistaken, and need not detain us For explanation of the nature of sense-perception we have to look to the experimental psychologists, whose investigations have superannuated the naive and mistaken accounts which Aquinas gives of the physical processes involved" (1993: 34). My evaluation of Aquinas's account of cognition differs so widely from Kenny's in large part because we interpret that account in such different ways.

15 This paper has benefited from comments and questions by participants at the 1996 Copenhagen Conference on Medieval Philosophy and by faculty and stu-

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dents in the philosophy department at the University of Bonn. I also owe a debt of thanks to Robert Pasnau for sharing with me the typescript of his *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge UP, 1997); while I disagree with many of Pasnau's views, I learned from his arguments and expositions. Finally, I am very grateful to Norman Kretzmann, whose many comments on an earlier draft of this paper were invaluable.

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Grammar and Mental Language in the Pseudo-Kilwardby

CLAUDE PANACCIO

Summary: In his commentary on the *Priscianus Maior*, the author known as the Pseudo-Kilwardby proposed inner speech as the proper object for scientific grammar. It is shown here that this *sermo in mente* is something quite different from William of Ockham's later *oratio mentalis*: it is a mental representation of words and not of things in general. The Pseudo-Kilwardby, in effect, delineates a purely intellectual level of linguistic representation, with a universal deep structure richly furnished. This doctrinal development is situated in its context, against the background of the increasing popularity of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* at the mid thirteenth-century university.

In the 1975 volume of the *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Age grec et latin*, Margareta Fredborg, Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, Lauge Nielsen, and Jan Pinborg edited a rich selection of passages from a long commentary on *Priscianus Maior* probably written in the 1250s or 1260s. The treatise had once been ascribed to the influential English Dominican Robert Kilwardby, but Osmund Lewry in his introductory essay on the authorship raised doubts about this attribution and, whoever he is, the author has since come to be known as 'the Pseudo-Kilwardby' (hereafter: Ps-K.).

Ps-K. turned out to be an exciting thinker on many accounts, and a keen analyst too. He has, in particular, fascinating things to say on mental speech, and that is what I will be interested in here.

In his "Introduction to the text" in the *Cahiers*, Jan Pinborg drew attention to the salient idea of a *sermo in mente* which is found in Ps-K.'s treatise. But he judged this idea to be "somewhat ambiguous" (pp. 6+-7+). The *sermo in mente*, in its intellectual form, is asserted by Ps-K. both to be common to all and to constitute the proper object of grammar as a theoretical science. Since this *sermo in mente* is supposed to abstract from particular languages, Pinborg reasoned, it should be identified with the "conceptual contents of the mind", Aristotle's *passiones animae*. But this, he goes on, "makes it somewhat difficult to see exactly which kind of problems the grammarian is supposed to solve": how, after all, can the primary object of grammar be utterly independent from the vari-

ety of particular languages and “the actual choice of vocal forms”? (p. 7+).

What I will be doing in the first part of this paper is to search for a philosophically acceptable solution to Pinborg’s difficulty on the basis of Ps-K.’s edited texts. And in the second part, I will endeavour to provide a historical setting for this rather special theory of the *sermo in mente*, showing its place and significance in the array of medieval doctrines about mental language.

1. Levels of linguistic representation

1.1. A first – and crucial – element of the solution to Pinborg’s riddle is that the *sermo in mente* which, in Ps-K.’s view, is the proper object of grammar as a science is simply not to be identified with language independent conceptual contents, as Pinborg thought. Concepts, in the Aristotelian tradition, are intellectual similitudes of external things. But mental discourse, in Ps-K.’s sense, is basically *a mental representation of spoken discourse*. His *sermo in mente*, in this regard, is utterly different from Augustine’s *verbum mentis* or William of Ockham’s later *oratio mentalis*.¹

To see this, let us take a close look at the two main passages in the edited selection of texts, where Ps-K. gets quite explicit about mental discourse. The first one is toward the beginning of the treatise, in the section numbered 1.2.1 by the editors, about whether there can be an authentic science of the *sermo* (pp. 9-11). Having recalled, along the traditional Boethian line, that there are three different ways for discourse to exist: in writing, in pronunciation, and in the mind, the author goes on to specify that only the latter can be a proper object for science:

Tertio modo [= *sermo in mente*] habet esse intelligibile, et sic habet universale et est idem apud omnes et ens necessarium, et sic est subiectum scientiae, non primo modo vel secundo (p. 10).

Pinborg’s puzzlement is quite understandable. Ps-K., here, does posit the mental *sermo* as being “the same for all”. And this, according to the *Perihermeneias* tradition, is a salient character of mental concepts seen as intellectual similitudes of external things.

¹ I concur on this with others who have recently written on Ps-K.’s conception of grammar. See: Fredborg 1981, Marmo 1994, Rosier 1994, Sirridge 1995.

It is very tempting, then, to identify this mental *sermo* with pure conceptual representation. If this is done, though, one is at a loss to see how mental discourse can still be an appropriate object of *grammar*, since grammar, in Ps-K.'s own view, typically bears on syntactical and phonological features of words.

If we are to make good sense of the doctrine, the way out of this predicament is surely to resist the temptation to identify the *sermones in mente* with the whole range of concepts of external things. What Ps-K. must mean, I take it, is that there are in the mind certain linguistic representations – representations of linguistic units, that is – which are universal in the sense, primarily, of abstracting from particular utterances of words.

This intelligible *sermo in mente* is not to be conflated, to be sure, with the concrete representation of a particular word that a speaker forms within her imagination when she wants to utter the word. The latter is always linked with a particular utterance – the one the speaker is about to produce – while the former, by contrast, abstracts from particular tokenings of words, syllables, or letters. This is a distinction Ps-K. is explicit about:

Notandum etiam quod sermo est in mente duplex: uno modo per abstractionem a particularibus sermonibus significativis vel non significativis in se (quod dico propter litteras et syllabas quae non significant in se) et sic est subiectum scientiae, quia per hunc modum est universale, et ratio cognoscendi sermones particulares, qui sunt extra. Alio modo est sermo in mente per affectum et imaginationem, et sic est principium vocis sensibilis exterioris [...] (p. 10).

But the intelligible mental discourse and the concretely imagined word, however distinct from each other, have an important feature in common for Ps-K.: they both are representations of “particular words which are outside” (*sermones particulares qui sunt extra*).

This becomes very clear in the second main passage on mental language, in section 2.1 of the treatise (pp. 56-59). The author, at that point, is discussing how conventional words receive their meaning. He resorts, in this context, to his previous distinction between two modes of linguistic representation within the mind. But he now formulates it in slightly different terms:

[...] notandum quod vox habet esse in anima secundum duplicem modum: uno modo sicut in substantia cognoscente per abstractionem sicut alia cognoscibilia; sicut enim mediante sensu habet anima cognitionem de rebus, sic habet *cognitionem*

de vocibus, et hoc est verum tam de proferente quam audiente. Habet enim vox esse in anima ut in principio efficiente; vox enim est percussio aeris ab anima, ut scribitur secundo *De anima*; et tunc habet esse in ea per appetitum et imaginationem (p. 57; the italics are mine).

It is straightforward in these lines that the first brand of what the author now calls ‘*vox in anima*’ is an intellectual abstract representation of certain spoken units: it is a *cognitio de vocibus*, not *de rebus*. And this must hold *mutatis mutandis* for the corresponding variety of *sermo in mente* he had previously proposed as the object of scientific grammar. Ps-K.’s point is that we can have general intellectual knowledge of spoken words, just as we have general knowledge of all other sensible things: by abstracting from singular instances.

It must be noted, though, that the new distinction, as it appears in section 2.1, does not amount exactly to the same as the previous one: Ps-K. now uses *vox in anima* instead of *sermo in mente*. The relevant terminological contrast between *vox* and *sermo* is basically the same here as in Abelard, for example: the *vox* is the vocal sound, while the *sermo* is the significative word (the sound taken along with its meaning).² Ps-K. transfers this duality into the mind. Describing how signification is imposed upon conventional words, he explains that when a signifiable content is present to his mind, a speaker can think – intellectually – of a spoken sound by which this content will be signified. Considered in itself, the signifiable content – which Ps-K. calls the *intentio significabilis* – is a language independent concept, an abstract intelligible similitude of certain external things. The *intentio vocis*, by contrast – which is certainly the same as the *vox in anima* – is a mental representation of a spoken sound. And the association of an *intentio significabilis* with an intellectual *intentio vocis* precisely yields as its result the intellectual brand of *sermo in mente* which can be the proper object of scientific knowledge:

Ex his igitur plane patet quod apud animam est sermo intranee dispositus, quo quidem et ad cuius similitudinem fit prolatus. Apud animam igitur statim cum habet intentionem significabilem fit praeexcogitatio vocis, qua talem intentionem

² See Abelard, *Logica ‘Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum’*, pp. 522 *sq.* In the late thirteenth century, Radulphus Brito, for example, still draws the same distinction: “[...] qui sermo non solum est vox nec solum significatum sed aggregatum ex voce et significato [...]” (*Quaestiones super Priscianum Minorem*, quest. 2, p. 94).

sive intelligentiam debeat vel oporteat significari, et *illi intentioni vocis applicatur intentio significabilis* sicut finis ei quod est ad finem [...] Et igitur vox exterior sensibilis habet quadruplicem comparisonem: unam ad intentionem vocis interioris ad cuius similitudinem figuratur, aliam ad intellectum seu similitudinem rei, tertiam *ad ipsum sermonem interiorem complementem tam speciem significabilem quam vocis intentionem*, quartam ad rem extra quae per vocem significatur intellectu movente (p. 59; italics mine).

The intelligible *sermo interior* achieves the association of the intellectual representation of some external things with that of certain spoken sounds. Insofar as it includes this second component, it truly constitutes a mental representation of external discourse, the *sermo prolatus*, which is produced, in Ps-K.'s own terms, as a similitude of it: “[...] *sermo intranee dispositus, [...] ad cuius similitudinem fit prolatus*”.

1.2. This is not enough, though, for a complete resolution of Pinborg's original problem. The question still remains as to how far exactly this internal *sermo* should be linked with particular languages. As we have seen, Ps-K. considers the *sermo in mente* to be “the same for all”. But, on the other hand, he does associate, along with the *Perihermeneias* tradition, “not being the same for all” with the diversity of conventional languages:

Non enim voces sunt eadem apud omnes, ut dicit Philosophus, et de se planum est. Non enim eisdem nominibus nominatur res eadem Latine, Graece et Hebraice, et similiter Latine et vulgariter [...] (p. 57).

It seems to follow that if mental discourse is the same for all, then it is prior to the diversity of languages, just like concepts of external things are. How could that be? How could the *sermo in mente* incorporate a representation of spoken words, yet be common to all?

Admittedly, Ps-K.'s theory of the mental construction of words is not spelled out in an entirely satisfactory way and there can be “some question”, as Mary Sirridge has recently put it, “about whether it is consistent”.³ But a nice way out is hinted at by certain passages of the text. What Ps-K. is committed to, I take it, is a new distinction *within the intellect* between two levels of linguistic representation: first, a deep level where the most important syntactical

3 Sirridge 1995: 118.

and semantical features of words are represented (along with universal laws governing pronunciation in general); and second, a more superficial level – but still within the intellect – where accidental phonological or graphic features are implemented. Both these levels, in this interpretation, would be prior to – and underlie – the formation of the concrete non-intellectual linguistic representation per *affectum* (or *appetitum*) *et imaginationem*; the deeper one would correspond to features of language that are taken to be “the same for all” by Ps-K.

Such a line is suggested, for example, by the following development, where the author reflects on what, in language, is the same for all and what, by contrast, can vary from one conventional language to another, and where he draws, accordingly, a corresponding distinction between two sorts of grammatical principles:

[...] dicendum quod principiorum grammaticae quaedam sunt de esse, quaedam de bene esse. De esse sunt litterae, elementa, syllabae, dictiones, orationes et modi pronuntiandi substantiales elementorum, ut cum omnis vocalis per se sonat, consonans cum alio, et quod omnis vox postposita plus sonat se ipsa praeposita, et similiter modi significandi et consignificandi generales, et *haec sunt necessaria et eadem apud omnes*. Alia sunt principia de bene esse tantum, sicut sunt figurae elementorum et nominationes et accidentales potestates, et alia accidentia quae sumuntur a parte vocis cuiusmodi sunt terminatio in -a vel in -us. *Et haec non sunt necessaria nec eadem apud omnes* (pp. 28-29; italics mine).

The distinction here is between the descriptive and the normative basis of grammar. The former is provided by elements and laws which are “necessary and the same for all”. This includes, on the one hand, certain basic phonological units and principles which are deemed universal by Ps-K. and, on the other hand, what he calls the *modi significandi et consignificandi generales*, which correspond to universal syntactical and semantical features.⁴ The normative side of grammar, by contrast, has to do with superficial features which vary from one language to another, such as the special phonological shape of particular words, whether they terminate with -a or -us for example.

Since both sorts of features are within the range of grammar as a science, they must both be abstractly representable to the intellect, according to Ps-K.’s own conception of what a science is. And

4 For a discussion of the medieval notion of *modi significandi generales* (by contrast with *accidentales*), see the paper by C.H. Kneepkens in the present volume.

this, in turn, strongly suggests a corresponding duality within every speaker's intellectual representation of her own language and discourse. Ps-K. gets very close indeed to what Chomsky (1966) took to be the main tenant of "Cartesian linguistics": the distinction between deep and surface structure in the mental representation of language.

The following process is what is suggested. The mental association of a particular conceptual content with the intellectual representation of a sound is done in two stages within the speaker's intellect. First, he must associate the content he wants to convey, with certain "general" modes of signification; he must determine, for example, whether the required phrase should be a noun, a verb, an adverb, a whole sentence, or whatever else is admitted among basic grammatical types, whether it should be in the singular or in the plural, negative or affirmative, and so on. The result of this first stage will be a very abstract representation of the required external phrase. Only in the second stage will the words be given a particular phonological form and be attributed, for example, a determinate declension. It is true that Ps-K. explicitly admits the universality of some general phonological principles (as seen in the last quotation above), but it would surely be implausible to have these play a role at the first stage of the mental formation of words. From the sort of examples given in the text, it is apparent that these universal phonological laws are to be thought of as a set of general constraints on the combination of some basic linguistic sounds. But which ones among these constraints are to be relevant in any particular case obviously depends on prior choices which are variable from one group of speakers to another.

The need for such a duality between deep and surface structure in mental intellectual discourse is confirmed by yet another interesting passage, in section 2.1.13 of the treatise, where Ps-K. wonders about something he calls the *forma dictionis*: What is it that gives a word its intelligible form? He introduces there a distinction again between two ways in which a significative word can be considered:

Dicendum quod vox significativa potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo in quantum vox et secundum suam substantiam, et sic eius forma est *modus proferendi*. Alio modo in quantum est significativa, et sic potest dici quod eius forma est *significatio*, non substantialis sed accidentalis (p. 80; the italics are mine).

When a word is looked at as a mere sound, what we are interested in is its phonological form, the *modus proferendi*. But it can also be considered as a meaningful unit and the relevant form, then, is purely semantical: it is the *significatio* itself, described by Ps-K. as an accidental form given to the sound from outside, something we would now call a function. It seems natural to extrapolate from this that in the mental generation of words, these two forms – semantical and phonological – are implemented at distinct stages.

Conventions, in this picture, come in at the level of surface structure. For in Ps-K.'s eyes, the association of a conceptual content with general semantical and syntactical features leaves no freedom of manoeuvre yet: these features are utterly determined by the intelligible content the speaker wants to convey and by the intellectual mode under which this content is thought of, the *modus intelligendi*.⁵ And consequently, there will be no differentiation between languages at the deep level of mental discourse. Whether a certain concept should be expressed by a noun, a verb, or an adverb, for example, is not a matter of free choice for speakers or groups of speakers. Convention, as Ps-K. sees it, serves only to regularize, within a given community, the vocalization of this intellectual *sermo* into particular sounds recognizable by the members of the community. The constraints from signification still leave open a plurality of possibilities among available sounds: one given sound may be used to express widely different concepts;⁶ and that is where conventions are needed.

To sum up, Ps-K.'s theory of the generation of speech, as I propose to reconstruct it, displays the following levels of mental representation:

- a) *conceptual similitudes of external things*; those are the “signifiable intentions”, the old Aristotelian *noemata*; in Ps-K.'s view, they involve modes of intellection (*modi intelligendi*) as well as pure intelligible objects; in principle, they are language independent, but those among them which happen to be abstract similitudes of spoken sounds (*intentiones vocis*) do play a special role in language formation;

5 See *Commentary...*, pp. 104-105 (e.g. p. 105: “modus significandi respondet modo intelligendi”).

6 See *Commentary...*, p. 80: “Et quia eiusdem secundum substantiam possunt esse plures perfectiones accidentales, ideo possunt eiusdem vocis secundum substantiam et modum proferendi esse plures significationes [...]”.

- b) *abstract intellectual representations of external words*; they constitute the intelligible *sermo in mente* which is the proper object of grammar as a theoretical science; each unit, at that level, is the result of intellectually associating an *intentio significabilis* with an *intentio vocis*; although it is not entirely explicit in the text, I proposed that Ps-K. needs to subdivide this intellectual internal speech into:
- b1) a deep level, where the intended conceptual content is linked with “general modes of signification and consignification”; and
- b2) a more superficial phonological level, where abstract representations of the accidental “modes of pronunciation” are intellectually implemented;
- c) *concrete imagined representations of the words to be produced*; this is the aspect of the *sermo in mente* which exists *per affectum et imaginationem*; it is causally linked with the external production of singular speech tokens.

When Ps-K. writes, toward the beginning of his treatise (quoted above), that the intelligible speech in the mind is “the same for all”, I surmise that it is the *b1* level he is then talking about, the *b2* surface structure obviously being variable from one language to another.

The sole alternate possibility I can think of would be to simply do away with the *b2* level and to suppose that all language dependent phonological features are implemented within the concrete imagination, at the *c* level. But this, it seems to me, would unduly impoverish, in Ps-K.’s own eyes, the intellectual component of language, and hence of grammar.

2. Historical setting

2.1. There existed, by the time of Ps-K., a very old tradition of referring to the mental representation of external words *within the imagination*. Aristotle, in *De Anima* II (420b32), had linked the capacity to produce significant spoken sounds with the presence of some imagined representations in the mind of the speakers, and later commentators, such as Ammonius or Boethius, came to speak of “lexical imagination” in this regard (λεκτική φαντασία,

imaginatio proferendi).⁷ Avicenna's *Isagoge* – which was available in Latin by the thirteenth century – has a striking passage about the imagined words (*verba imaginata*) being indispensable in practice for human thinking.⁸ And Ps-K. himself refers to the second book of Averroes's commentary on the *De Anima* for the idea of a mental discourse which is per *affectum et imaginationem*.⁹

Augustine also mentioned on different occasions in his *De Trinitate* the mental images of linguistic sounds, which he sharply distinguished from the *verbum mentis* proper, the latter being utterly language independent in his view.¹⁰ Anselm, in the *Monologion*, gave these Augustinian ideas a form which was to become canonical in thirteenth century theology. He listed, in effect, three ways in which a person can “talk” about something (“*rem unam tripliciter loqui possumus*”): one is the use of external audible speech, while the other two precisely correspond to Augustine's duality between mental representation of linguistic signs and mental representation of things themselves.¹¹ Anselm was quoted by name and commented upon on this by such authors as Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great.¹² His ternary scheme eventually became common stock in the second half of the thirteenth century. It is in the context of explaining this very distinction, for example, that Thomas Aquinas speaks of “the imagination of the word” (*imaginatio vocis*),¹³ and others of a *verbum imaginabile*.¹⁴

7 See Ammonius, *In Aristotelis De interpretatione* 23, 1; Boethius, *In Librum Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias. Secunda editio* I, 1, p. 6.

8 See Avicenna, *Logyca*, 3rb: “[...] cogitatio quasi locutio est inter ipsum hominem et cogitatum suum verbis imaginatis [...]”.

9 *Commentary...*, p. 10. See (in the Latin version): Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in libris De Anima* 90: “[...] vox est sonus qui fit cum ymaginatione et voluntate [...] primum enim movens in voce est anima ymaginativa et conspiciibilis”. In a later passage, Ps-K. simply associates the idea of a mental representation of words per *appetitum et imaginationem*, with *De Anima*, book II, without mentioning Averroes (*Commentary...*, p. 57).

10 See, for instance, Augustine, *De Trinitate* IX, 15 and XV, 19.

11 See Anselm, *Monologion* 10.

12 See Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'Antequam esset frater'* 9, 1, 1, and *Summa theologica* I, 419; or Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae* I, 1, tract. 8, quest. 35, chap. 3, art. 1.

13 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, 34, art. 1.

14 See for example: Richard of Middleton, *In I Sent.* 27, art. 2, quest. 1; John of Paris, *In I Sent.* 27, quest. 2; or John Duns Scotus, *Reportata Parisiensi* I, 27, quest. 2, n. 8.

2.2. But what sets Ps-K.'s theory apart from this double tradition – both Aristotelian and Augustinian – is that he postulates a more fundamental level of linguistic representation not only within the imagination – something he admits, of course – but also *within the intellect itself*. And it is noticeable that he is led to posit such an intellectual level of linguistic representation precisely in order to locate the object of grammar as a theoretical science.

Ps-K.'s theory on this is not completely original, for all that. It is closely related, for example, to what we find in an anonymous thirteenth-century *Tractatus de grammatica* once ascribed to Robert Grosseteste: the intellect, there, is said to be the medium in which representations of things (*species rerum*) are associated with representations of spoken sounds (*species vocum*).¹⁵ A similar doctrine had been sketched by Albert the Great in his *Summa de creaturis*, written at Paris in 1246.¹⁶ Wondering how spoken sounds receive their conventional meaning, Albert was led to borrow the idea of an internal *sermo* from John Damascene's authoritative *De fide orthodoxa*.¹⁷ There is a part of reason, Albert explained, whose function is to generate and organize speech within the mind. Some call it the "interpretive faculty" (*potentia interpretativa*); and it is through the exercise of this very faculty that determinate significations are assigned to spoken sounds. Prior to Albert, Alexander of Hales had already referred to the intellectual representation of the spoken word. He called it the *verbum intelligibile vocis*.¹⁸

Alexander, however, was content to merely mention this intellectual level of linguistic representation and he paid it no more tribute. And Albert's passage, while quite close in certain respects to those of Ps-K. we examined above, nevertheless remains much sketchier. Albert was not very explicit, in particular, as to how exactly the postulated interpretive faculty was to be located with respect to intellect and imagination.

¹⁵ See Anonymus, *Tractatus de grammatica*, 6, p. 32.

¹⁶ See Albert the Great, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 25, art. 2. Rosier 1994 also discusses this particular passage and provides a French translation of it (pp. 303-315).

¹⁷ Albert's reference here is to John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, 21-22 (chap. 35-36 in the Latin version of the work by Burgundio of Pisa); the same passage is quoted by Ps-K. (*Commentary...* 2.1, p. 58). Damascene also mentions the internal discourse (*λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*) in *De fide orthodoxa* I, 13.

¹⁸ See Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'Antequam esset frater'* I, quest. 9, 5; and *Summa theologica* I, 419.

The general picture, then, is the following. The idea of a mental representation of spoken sounds had become quite common among Parisian academics by the middle of the thirteenth century, whether they called it *species vocis* as Roger Bacon did,¹⁹ or *cogitatio vocis* with Bonaventure,²⁰ or *intentio vocis* as in Ps-K. himself. A few authors, such as Alexander of Hales, occasionally proposed to locate such mental representations of spoken sounds not only within the imagination, but within the intellect as well. This idea is precisely what we find further theorized in Ps-K.'s *Commentary*, in relation to the theme of the *sermo in mente*, the author's doctrinal motivation being to include grammar among the theoretical sciences. To satisfy the requirements of his times for this – those of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* – he thought that a universal and intelligible object was needed for such a science: something less precarious than spoken or imagined tokens of words, but ultimately linked, nevertheless, with the generation of language.

Although many authors of the period, including Ps-K. himself, credit the theme of the internal discourse to John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa*,²¹ the Greek theologian can hardly be seen as the main doctrinal source for this idea of a specifically *intellectual* level of linguistic representation. The passages on mental speech that were regularly quoted from Damascene's compilation were far from explicit with regard to this particular point.²² Aquinas, for one, identified Damascene's *logos endiathetos* with the *imagined* – and not the *intellectual* – representation of the external words, the *imaginatio vocis*,²³ and nothing in John's text directly contradicts this reading. The postulation of a purely intellectual deep structure for language was facilitated by Damascene, but it was not

19 See Roger Bacon, *De signis* 16-18 and 166. Albert the Great attributes the expression '*species vocis*' to the *magistri*; see *In I Sent.* 27, art. 7: "Magistri distinguunt etiam triplex verbum, scilicet rei, vocis et speciei vocis".

20 See Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* 27, pars II, quest. 4, p. 489.

21 See for example: John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima* 72; Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in I Sent.* 10, n. 6; Albert the Great, *Summa de creaturis* II, quest. 25, art. 2; *In I Sent.* 27, art. 7; *Summa theologiae* I, 1, tract. 7, quest. 30, chap. 1 and tract. 8, quest. 35, chap. 3, art. 1; Peter of Spain, *Scientia libri de anima* 11, chap. 10.

22 These passages were inevitably from *De fide orthodoxa* I, 13 on the one hand, or II, 21-22 (35-36 in the Latin version) on the other hand.

23 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, quest. 79, art. 10, ad 3. Aquinas also quotes Damascene on inner speech in *In I Sent.* 27, quest. 2, art. 1 (where he closely follows Albert).

inherited from him. It was, I surmise, the result of Aristotle's requirements for science being applied to the field of grammar at mid-thirteenth century universities, especially Paris.

2.3. Ps-K.'s search for a range of universal, but properly linguistic, objects seems to pave the way for the modistic conception of grammar as a science of linguistic universals. Some of Ps-K.'s developments regarding the *sermo in mente*, in fact, are repeated *verbatim* in John of Denmark's modistic *Summa grammatica*, apparently written around 1280.²⁴

In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, at any rate, reference continued to be made from time to time to the intellectual representations of linguistic units. When John Duns Scotus, for one, puts forward the *enunciatio in mente* as the proper object of Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias*, he is alluding, I take it, to something very much like Ps-K.'s *sermo in mente*.²⁵ And so is the Dominican William Crathorn, in the 1320s, when he boldly proposes – against Ockham – to identify discursive thought in its entirety with the mental manipulation of 'intelligible similitudes' of external words.²⁶ There is a recognizable line of thought here, running roughly from Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great to Crathorn in the 1320s, with Ps-K.'s *Commentary* as a salient landmark on the way.

This view of mental discourse as intellectual representation of external words eventually collided with a different conception of inner speech as made up by conceptual representations of things, as in Ockham. There is no direct contradiction between these two notions, of course. Ps-K., after all, did admit of language independent conceptual similitudes of external things – which he called the "signifiable intentions" – and those are precisely what Ockham's *oratio mentalis* is composed of. But the contentious question that eventually arose was that of the proper object of *logic*, as the science of discursive thinking. Given that mental reasoning is seen as a sequential combining process (along the Aristotelian line),

²⁴ On the relation between John of Denmark and Ps-K., see in particular Sirridge 1995.

²⁵ See John Duns Scotus, *Primum Librum Perihermeneias Quaestiones*, quest. 1: "Quid sit subiectum libri Perihermeneias".

²⁶ See William Crathorn, *Quästionen zum ersten Sentenzenbuch*, quest. 2, esp. pp. 154-65.

what sort of elements does it play with? Mental representations of words or concepts of things? Richard Campsall and Walter Burley, for example, took part in a lively discussion on this very point in the first decade of the fourteenth century.²⁷ And so did Hugh Lawton, Crathorn, and Robert Holkot in the 1320s and early 1330s.²⁸ As a result of these debates, the linguistic conception of mental symbols (as represented by Ps-K.'s *sermo in mente*) was somewhat pushed aside and the purely conceptual train of thought was confirmed as the proper object for the science of logic, in the guise of Ockham's non-linguistic – but grammatically structured – *oratio mentalis*.

How can the *sermo in mente* be the proper object of grammar as a science, if it is “common to all”? Such was the problem raised by Jan Pinborg in his introduction to the partial edition of Ps-K.'s *Commentary* in the *Cahiers*. The solution to the riddle, as we have seen, starts with the recognition that Ps-K.'s internal discourse is something quite different from William of Ockham's later *oratio mentalis*. Both are syntactically and semantically structured, it is true, but contrary to Ockham, Ps-K. wanted to delineate a mental level of *linguistic* representation, a *cognitio de vocibus* not *de rebus*. His *sermo in mente*, insofar as it is the object of grammar, is an abstract representation of “particular words which are outside”. It is proposed as a legitimate object for scientific knowledge, precisely because it abstracts from singular tokens of speech utterance. In this sense it is universal, without having to be identified directly with pure concepts of non-linguistic things. Its specificity, rather, is to associate such “signifiable” concepts with the mental representations of certain sounds. What Ps-K. was looking for thus turns out to be something like our modern notion of a linguistic type. And this he did with an eye toward providing an appropriate range of combinable units for grammar to study. He resorted, in the endeavour, to an *intellectual* level of linguistic representation, which he clearly distinguished from the almost physical anticipation of concrete speech *per affectum et imaginationem*; and he en-

27 See Panaccio (forthcoming).

28 See Gelber 1984, Panaccio 1996.

dowed it with a special mode of existence: that of intelligible being (*esse intelligibile*).

Whether in Ps-K. himself or in some of his contemporaries who hit on similar ideas, such as Albert the Great, this development can be seen as an attempt to show how grammar can satisfy Aristotle's main requirement in the *Posterior Analytics*: the object of a science must be something *necessary*. In the mid-thirteenth century, the University of Paris was in the process of spreading Aristotelian canons for science all across the board. Ps-K. interpreted these canons as requiring the postulation of special *intelligible* objects for grammar: specifically linguistic objects ultimately graspable by pure intellection.

A striking result of this approach was to suggest the existence of a very rich deep linguistic structure common to all languages. Ps-K., as I have striven to show, is committed to the acceptance of a distinction, within the very domain of intelligible objects, between representations of words from the sole point of view of their basic semantical and syntactical functions, and representations of significative words with their phonological particularities. For Ps-K., only the latter would involve conventions. The "general modes of signification and consignification" which correspond to the former are linguistic universals in the Chomskyan sense: they are the same across all human languages. Ps-K.'s acceptance of the Aristotelian requirement for science results in the delineation of a specific domain for a universal brand of grammar. This is the trend that will be exploited further on by the Modistic grammarians of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century.

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Peter Auriol on Intentions and Essential Predication

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Summary: For Peter Auriol, in an essential predication, e.g. Socrates is a human being, the very same thing grasped by different concepts is predicated of itself. This paper attempts to clarify Auriol's theory of essential predication, by examining it against the background both of how he thinks that singular extra-mental objects relate to the universal concepts our minds form of them, and of his theory of first intentions more generally.

In the course of lecturing on the second book of the *Sentences* at Paris, probably in 1317-18, while discussing universals and essential predication, Peter Auriol makes the claim that when I say 'Socrates is a human being', I am merely predicating one and the same thing, i.e. Socrates, of itself. That is to say, what is posited in the subject and predicate terms of an essential predication are one and the same thing.¹ Auriol goes on to explain this position by saying that:

... speaking about the thing (*re*) with respect to (*in ordine ad*) the intellect, which cognizes the same thing by different concepts when it takes Socrates as Socrates and as a human being – because it is the nature of every singular thing to make one more concept of itself, and the one is more widely known than the other, [and] through the more widely known concept (*quem*) [the singular thing] makes more clear (*declarat*) the less widely known concept (*illum*) – [speaking] in this way the same thing [grasped] by a known concept is predicated of itself [grasped] by an unknown concept, for one and the same thing is [grasped] by each of these concepts.²

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1 Peter Auriol, *Rep. in Secundum*, d. 9, q. 2, a. 1, p. 105bF-106aA: "... dico quod non praedicatur alia res quam Sorteitas cum dicitur 'Sortes est homo'. Ad inconveniens quod adducitur, quod idem praedicaretur de se, dico quantum ad rem, ita est, vere enim secundum rem eadem est res quae ponitur in subiecto et quae ponitur in praedicatione."

2 *Ibid.*, p. 105bF-106aA: "Sed loquendo de re in ordine ad intellectum, qui cognoscit eandem rem alio et alio conceptu cum accipit Sortem ut Sortem et ut

What is involved in propositions like ‘Socrates is a human being’ or ‘a human being is an animal’, for Auriol, is the repetition of the very same singular thing grasped by different concepts. There is a real identity of subject and predicate – both are Socrates – but there is a conceptual difference, the more universal predicate concept elucidating the less universal subject concept.

In what follows, I want to begin to answer the question: “what does Auriol mean when he says that ‘Socrates’ and ‘human being’ are the same thing grasped by different concepts?” Another way to put this question is: “for Auriol, how does a singular thing relate to the universal concepts our minds form of it and how do these universal concepts relate to each other?” To answer these questions, I will first investigate the way that Auriol thinks that universal concepts are grounded on extra-mental things. In 1913, Raymond Dreiling, in *Der Konzeptualismus in der Universalienlehre des Petrus Aureoli*, argued that, for Auriol, universals are purely intellectual fabrications with no direct ground in extra-mental reality.³ According to Dreiling, for Auriol universal concepts arise from the more or less exact qualitative resemblance that we perceive exists between individuals of the same species, genus, etc. Yet, as we have seen in the quotation above, Auriol claims that “it is the **nature** (*nata est*) of every singular thing to make one more concept of itself”, and this at least suggests a different interpretation than Dreiling’s. In fact, I will show that, for Auriol, there is a direct extra-mental ground for our universal concepts: there is, e.g., a characteristic innate to each and every member of the same genus that upon intellectual acquaintance leads us to form the concept of that genus. After examining Auriol’s ideas on the formation of

hominem – quaelibet enim res singularis nata est facere de se alium conceptum, et unum notioem altero, per quem declarat illum – et sic eadem res sub conceptu noto praedicatur de se sub conceptu ignoto, est enim res omnino una sub unoquoque conceptu”

³ See Dreiling 1913: 85-149, e.g. p. 144: “Da die Einheit der Art ... nur in der qualitativen Ähnlichkeit der partikulären Dinge besteht, bezeichnet der Artbegriff weder das allgemeine noch indifferente noch partikuläre Wesen der partikulären Dinge, sondern nur deren qualitative Ähnlichkeit.” Dreiling’s misinterpretation seems to stem from not knowing Auriol’s distinction between concepts that differ according to *rationes* and concepts that differ according to *modi concipiendi* – precisely the distinction for Auriol between concepts that differ on account of a direct extra-mental basis and concepts that differ purely on account of differing psychological states (see below).

universal concepts, I will show the role that Auriol's theory of concepts or – what is the same for him – intellectual intentions plays in his theory of essential predication.

Contraction, Explication, and *rationes*: The Formation of Universal Concepts

A ramification of Auriol's view in the quotation above, a ramification that he explicitly accepts elsewhere, is that the more widely known genus concept (e.g., animal) is predicated of and elucidates the less widely known species concept (e.g., human being), and yet both concepts grasp one thing (e.g., Socrates).⁴ The way that the intellect forms less universal concepts from more universal ones is called by Auriol 'contraction'. Contraction begins with the most universal concept of all, the concept of being; from the concept of being less and less universal concepts are formed in a series of steps: from the concept of being to the concept of the most general genera to mediate genera and, eventually, to the most special species.⁵ Thus, the contraction from the concept of being to the concept of each and every most special species is a Porphyrian tree. What Auriol adds to the tree is a description both of the particular mental processes that take place in the contraction of one universal concept to another, and of the way an extramental singular acts as a basis for all of these concepts.

4 Auriol, *Scriptum*, d. 2, Sec. 11, n. 91, p. 597, ll. 29-45: "Est autem considerandum, cum perseitas reducat ad identitatem, – omnis namque praedicatio per se est ratione alicuius identitatis praedicati cum subiecto – quod secundum modos praedicandi per se oportet distingui modos identitatis. In primo ergo modo dicendi est identitas rei eiusdem repetitae sub alietate conceptus, ut cum dicitur: 'Sortes est homo'. Sortes enim non est aliud secundum rem quam animalitas et rationalitas, quae sunt quidditas eius, sicut Commentator dicit VII *Metaphysicae*, commento 20. Et in talibus quae sic idem sunt necesse est alterum extremorum vel utrumque immiscere operationem intellectus, et non esse penitus extra in natura; alterum quidem quia, licet Sortes sit extra, homo tamen qui praedicatur de eo non est extra; utrumque autem ut cum dicitur: 'Homo est animal'; nec enim homo qui praedicationem suscipit, nec animal quod praedicatur sunt extra. Nam de substantia, sola prima est extra intellectum, secunda vero in solo intellectu secundum Philosophum, quamvis alia fuerit opinio Platonis."

At least two redactions of Auriol's lectures on the first book of the *Sentences* survive; the relationship between them is still unclear. The work printed in 1596 and of which Buytaert edited the Prologue and first 8 distinctions in the 1950s is known

Contraction is the relation holding between two or more concepts. At the foundation, then, of Auriol's description of the formation of universal concepts is a distinction he draws between two different ways that concepts can relate to one another. <1> Concepts can differ according to their *rationes*, and this is a difference that depends on some aspect or characteristic of the extra-mental object of intellection. <2> Two concepts of the same *ratio*, however, can differ because that *ratio* is conceived more explicitly or more clearly in one concept than in another; this is a purely psychological difference, having no foundation in the extra-mental object. On the basis of these two different types of relations between concepts, Auriol gives the following description of the contraction of genus to species:

... one type of contraction comes about by the addition of a *ratio*, another type comes about through the explication of a *ratio* that had previously been implicit. Here one should note that both of these types of contraction are at work in the contraction of a genus to a species. The reason for this is that a genus indicates all of its species potentially and indeterminately, but only (*tamen*) as a part [of each of them]: e.g., animal indicates indeterminately all its species, but only by way of the sensible part (*tamen per modum partis quia per modum sensibilis*) [of each of those species] Therefore insofar as a genus indicates all its species implicitly, it is contracted by explication; but insofar as it indicates its species as a part [of them], it is contracted through the addition of a different *ratio*.⁶

as the *Scriptum*. The lesser known work goes under the name of *Reportatio in Primum Sententiarum*. All quotations from Auriol's *Rep. in Primum* below are from Stephen Brown's 1995 edition of the part of d. 2 that contains Auriol's reflections on the concept of being. As part of that article Brown gives the most recent overview of the problems associated with the double redaction of the first book of Auriol's *Sentences* commentary (pp. 200-207). Lauge Nielsen, Chris Schabel, and I are preparing an edition of the entire *Rep. in Primum*.

5 The best description of Auriol's ideas on the contraction and the explication of concepts are to be found in Brown 1964 (esp.: 353-64), Brown 1965 (esp.: 135-50).

6 *Rep. in Primum*, d. 2, pt. 2a, q. 1 in Brown 1995: 235-36: "... contractio quaedam est per additionem alterius rationis, quaedam est per explicationem eiusdem rationis prius tamen implicitae. Ubi nota quod in contractione generis ad speciem concurrunt ista duplex contractio. Cuius ratio est quod genus dicit in potentia et indeterminate omnes species sed tamen partialiter, sicut animal dicit indeterminate omnes species, tamen per modum partis quia per modum sensibilis Ratione igitur qua genus dicit implicite omnes species, ut sic, contrahitur per explicationem; in quantum vero dicit species per modum partis, ut sic, contrahitur per additionem rationis alterius."

A genus relates to its species in two ways according to Auriol. On the one hand a genus is a quidditative part of each and every one of its species: all species of animal are sensible. Insofar as the genus is a part of its species, the contraction of the one to the other comes about simply because we conceive the very same *ratio* – in the case of animal, sensibility – more clearly than we did before. For Auriol, we understand the *ratio* of the genus more clearly when we conceive it instantiated in a particular species within the range of the genus than when it is conceived in its own right. What Auriol seems to have in mind here is that when we think about ‘animal’ or ‘sensibility’ in the abstract we do not grasp clearly what these terms mean; we understand much better what it is to be an animal when we think about particular examples like dog, cow, and human being; these examples help clarify what it means to be sensible or an animal, without necessarily requiring us to deal with the specific difference, i.e. what it is that makes dog different from cow, and both of them different from human being. Now, Auriol tells us that this type of contraction depends only on the intellectual act, it has no basis in extra-mental reality.⁷ Thus, it is clear why Auriol calls this type of contraction **explication**: the extra-mental contribution to the content of the concept is the same at both the level of the genus and of the species, but the mind in a sense focuses on that same content so that it is understood more clearly at the level of the species.

On the other hand, a genus is **only** a part of each and every species in its range, and it must be supplemented by something that is quidditatively external to it: the specific difference. ‘Human being’ is not simply ‘animal’ conceived more clearly, it is ‘rational animal’. The *ratio* of the genus is not the total *ratio* of the species: the species is constituted from two *rationes*, the genus serving as a determinable substrate with respect to the determining specific difference, according to Auriol.⁸ Thus, when a genus is

⁷ See below n. 10.

⁸ *Rep. in Primum*, d. 2, pt. 2a, q. 1 in Brown 1995: 234: “... est considerandum quod aliqua possunt duobus modis convenire in tertio. Uno modo: quod illud tertium veniat ad constitutionem eorum per modum partis, aliquo addito, et per modum substrati, eo modo quo venit genus ad constitutionem speciei, quia venit per modum partis quia non est totalis ratio speciei, et aliquo addito, quia addita ratione differentiae quae est alia a ratione generis; et venit per modum substrati, venit enim per modum determinabilis (ed.: determinabilibus), differentia vero per

contracted to species, not only is the genus conceived more clearly, but a new *ratio* is also added. In fact, from the most general genera to the most special species every step along the Porphyrian tree is a contraction that involves not only the explication of what was only implicit in the genus, but also the addition of a new *ratio*.⁹ Further, Auriol maintains explicitly that this addition of the *ratio* is due to the object, it is not a purely psychological difference (*alietas rationis se tenet ex parte obiecti*).¹⁰ That is to say that, Dreiling to the contrary, there is a direct extra-mental ground for our universal concepts.¹¹

So far as I know, Auriol never gives a systematic account of the various ways he uses the term '*ratio*'. In practice Auriol sometimes seems to use '*ratio*' as a synonym for 'concept' or 'intention'. But when he comments explicitly on the way a *ratio* relates to a concept, Auriol says that a *ratio* partly determines the content of a concept. The *ratio* for Auriol is "what is able to be conceived" (*id quod est conceptibile*); we may call it a "conceptible". Thus, a *ratio* ex-

modum determinantis formaliter, et ideo genus se habet ut substratum respectu differentiae. Ista enim ambae rationes, tam substrati determinabilis quam rationis determinantis, remanent in constituto ex eis."

9 Note that the contraction of the concept of being to the most general genera (or any other concept, for that matter) is by way of explication only, because every thing and every *ratio* exists. For Auriol nothing escapes the concept of being: if one can have an intellectual acquaintance with x , then one can form the concept of being and predicate it of x , and the difference then is the purely psychological one of explication. Auriol's solution avoids the undesirable feature that being is like a genus contracted by outside 'qualitative' differences. On Auriol's theory of the concept of being in its historical context, see esp. Brown 1964 and Brown 1965.

10 *Rep. in Primum*, d. 2, pt. 2, q. 1, in Brown 1995: 236: "Et nota quod qualiter contractio fit isto modo per modum explicationis tantum docet Avicenna V *Metaphysicae*. Intendit enim quod talis explicatio non fiat per additionem rationis obiectivae sed tantum penes alium modum cognoscendi. Nam quando entitatem simpliciter contraho explicando per lapideitatem non addo rationem novam, sed eandem prius implicitam explico. Ideo est ibi tantum alius modus cognoscendi. Implicitum enim et explicitum sunt conditiones actus. Alietas autem rationis se tenet ex parte obiecti. Propter quod, concipere explicite et concipere implicite tantum sunt differentiae actus; non autem requirunt differentiam aliquam alterius et alterius rationis in obiecto." On Auriol's use of the term *modus concipiendi* or *cognoscendi* (they are synonyms) see Friedman 1997b.

11 Cf. also *Scriptum*, d. 23, in Perler 1994a, §44: 255, where Auriol sets second intentions apart from concepts of individuals and universal concepts of the first intention because "conceptus ille sit totaliter formatus ab intellectu, sicut 'genus',

ists prior to conception, and it is what contributes the core content to our concepts, this core content then being modified by the way that we conceive it (our *modus concipiendi*) – this is the basis of Auriol's ideas on explication that we saw above.¹² Elsewhere, Auriol makes it still more explicit that a *ratio* is any entity that can serve as a foundation for intellectual acquaintance.¹³ Moreover, every individual thing has a number of *rationes*. Take for instance Socrates and Plato:

... because they [Socrates and Plato] add the *ratio* of corporeality to the *ratio* of substance, and to the *ratio* of body [that of] sensibility, and to the *ratio* of animal [that of] rationality, but add to rationality absolutely nothing, therefore Socrates and Plato have utterly the same *ratio*, although they are really (*realiter*) distinct.¹⁴

Four things can be concluded on the basis of this passage, all of which are important to Auriol's theory of essential predication. The first is that every individual thing has a number of *rationes* or conceptibles, and these conceptibles are in some sense distinct

'species', 'syllogismus', et sic de intentionibus secundis." The text that Perler presents in this article is a crucial one for any interested in Auriol's philosophical psychology, but Perler's introduction to Auriol's ideas (esp. pp. 235-36, 239) relies too heavily on Dreiling (e.g. p. 239, n. 38, where, in an attempt to make Auriol's theory fit into Dreiling's mould, Perler misreads §§25-27 of his own text, which deal not with first intentions [as Auriol understands them], but with second intentions).

12 *Scriptum*, d. 8, ed. Buytaert: sec. 21, n. 133, 928-29, ll. 15-22: "Relinquit enim tertium modum differentiae, qui nec est realis nec rationis, sed alterius modi concipiendi eandem rem et rationem. Et si dicatur quod conceptus et ratio idem sunt, et ita si est alius conceptus, erit alia ratio; dicendum quod ratio appellatur id quod est conceptibile. Nunc autem in conceptu aliquid includitur ultra id quod est conceptibile, quia modus concipiendi. Propter quod possunt esse diversi conceptus absque diversitate conceptae rationis."

13 *Scriptum*, d. 2, ed. Buytaert: sec. 10, n. 84, p. 545, ll. 3-11: "... quaelibet propria entitas est formalis ratio obiectiva respectu intellectus. Illud enim cui competit intellectum movere per se – dictum contra 'per accidens' et contra 'per aliud' – videtur esse formalis ratio obiectiva. Formali namque rationi hoc competit ut nec per aliud moveat nec per accidens. Sed quaelibet entitas intellectum movet per se, contra per accidens et contra per aliud. Quod patet quia inter omnes realitates intellectus distinctionem ponit, quod facere non posset si unam attingeret alia mediante. Ergo quaelibet propria entitas est formalis ratio obiectiva."

14 *Scriptum*, d. 2, ed. Buytaert: sec. 9, n. 69, p. 493, ll. 85-95: "... quia <Sortes et Plato> addunt ad rationem substantiae rationem corporeitatis, et ad rationem corporis sensibilitatem, et ad rationem animalis rationabilitatem, et ad rationabilitatem autem penitus nihil addunt; idcirco, Sortes et Plato sunt penitus eiusdem rationis, quamvis realiter distinguantur."

from each other, while still all belonging to the same thing (*res*). Secondly, although these *rationes* are in some sense distinct from each other, they can also merge, one *ratio* acting as a substrate for another and yielding a third *ratio*; this is what we saw Auriol maintain above.¹⁵ Thirdly, it is clear that *rationes* are shared among individuals of the same species: Socrates and Plato differ really, but have the same *ratio*. Finally, these *rationes* are elements of Socrates' quiddity: they are essential properties.¹⁶

What seems to be of first importance with regard to a *ratio* for Auriol, however, is that it is the most basic unit of intellectual acquaintance. There is a fundamental relationship between a *ratio* and an intellect: of its very nature each *ratio* can serve as the basis for a concept. A *ratio* is simply an extra-mental feature or aspect that in-and-of itself partially fixes or determines the content of our concepts. So one really distinct thing, e.g. Socrates, can serve as the foundation of various concepts on the basis of all of its different *rationes*: one concept corresponding to the *ratio* of human being, one corresponding to the *ratio* of rationality, and so on. Thus what we have seen Auriol to claim, that "it is the nature of every singular thing to make one more concept of itself" beomes a little clearer. Each individual thing has several *rationes* or conceptibles that direct the mind to form certain concepts. These *rationes* are the one thing's disposition or aptitude to create certain concepts of itself. Because the *rationes* are shared, so the concepts are shared. Thus, on this reading of Auriol (and against Dreiling's reading), even if Socrates were the only human being with whom I ever had intellectual acquaintance, I would still form the concept human being. This is because Socrates has a metaphysical characteristic – his *ratio* – that directs me to form this concept; no comparison of Socrates' qualitative resemblance to other members of the species is necessary in order to predicate human being of him (as Dreiling would have it).

¹⁵ See n. 8.

¹⁶ Cp. n. 14 with n. 4 above. Yet another conclusion that I will add without proof is that Auriol is here adopting a modist ontological framework of *operationes* or *apparentia* that make the form known. See on this, Friedman 1997b.

Intentions, Intentional Existence, and Essential Predication

But what exactly does it mean that a *ratio* directs the mind to form certain concepts? The aspect of Auriol's doctrine that pulls together what we have seen so far is his theory of intentions and intentional existence. For Auriol, intentions are concepts. First intentions are concepts formed through direct intellectual acquaintance with extra-mental things. This is in contrast to second intentions, which for Auriol are formed without direct acquaintance with the extra-mental, but rather through the intellect's reflecting on its own concepts. Included in the class of concepts Auriol calls first intentions are universal concepts expressed by words like 'human being', 'animal', 'rose', 'flower'.¹⁷

What are these concepts or first intentions? In one of his central psychological texts, Auriol goes through an elaborate process of elimination. He denies that a concept can be any type of representative or token of the thing, if this representative has real – albeit mental – being. Examples that he gives of solutions of this sort are that the intention might be the intellectual act or an intelligible species or any type of accident terminating an act of the understanding: all of these inhere in the soul subjectively. If any of these were a concept, then when I predicated animal of human being, I would make a false predication, inasmuch as concept human being would not **be** concept animal. A predication of this sort would be as faulty as claiming 'Socrates is Plato', given that

¹⁷ *Scriptum*, d. 23, in Perler 1994a §64: 262 : "Secundum hoc igitur patet quod ... <intentio> est ipsemet conceptus obiectivus per intellectum formatus claudens indistinguishabiliter conceptionem passivam et rem quae concipitur per ipsum. Et idem est dictum intentio quod conceptus, et intentio prima idem quod conceptus primi ordinis, quos intellectus format circa res non reflectendo se super suos conceptus." Cf. above n. 11.

For a discussion of Auriol's place in the medieval discussion of intentionality and intentional existence see Katherine Tachau's contribution to this volume. Two of the more important works dealing with Auriol on intentions and concepts are Pinborg 1974 and Tachau 1988 (esp. pp. 85-112); see too Friedman 1997a, which sets Auriol's concept theory into its trinitarian context and also contains critical editions of *Scriptum* d. 9, pt. 1, and d. 27, pt. 2. Perler 1994b gives a helpful general picture of Auriol's ideas on concepts and intentional existence, but must be read with caution on some of the details it argues for; for an example, see below, n. 26.

Socrates and Plato are two different human beings.¹⁸ For much the same reason, we cannot allow Plato's solution to the problem of universals, that animal and human being as such (*ut sic* or *in quantum huiusmodi*) have any real extra-mental existence.¹⁹ The problem with theories of universals of this sort, according to Auriol, is that on them universals would not be universals at all, but would be particulars.

A second set of arguments used by Auriol points him to an answer to the question of what a concept is. If concepts were some type of representative with subjective being inhering in the soul, according to Auriol, or if concepts were Platonic ideas, then we would never have intellectual acquaintance with extra-mental things themselves, since our knowledge would extend only to these really existing entities.²⁰ On the other hand, if our concepts were particular things in the extra-mental world as they exist extra-mentally – a final alternative Auriol offers – we would be unable to make universal judgements of any kind, since there would be nothing universal about our knowledge: instead of knowing that all mules are sterile, we would know only that this mule is sterile and that that mule is sterile.²¹

18 *Scriptum*, d. 27, pt. 2, in Friedman 1997a: 432, ll. 487-90: "... conceptus esset falsus quo intra nos intuemur rosam esse florem, si vel rosa et flos quae praesentia experimur species essent intelligibiles, vel species in phantasmate, vel actus intellectus, vel formae accidentales existentes in mente: non enim unum esset aliud, si sic foret."

19 *Ibid.* in Friedman 1997a: 433-34, ll. 508-15: "Non potest etiam dari quintum, videlicet quod flos vel rosa quos in animo praesentialiter experimur sicut existentes extra in aliqua realitate Tum quia nec praedicationes essent verae unius taliter subsistentis de alio subsistente; tum quia nec scientiae essent de particularibus, sed de talibus subsistentibus rebus, nec, scito quod omnis triangulus habet tres, aliquid noscerem de particulari triangulo."

20 For this argument used about concepts having subjective being in the soul, see *ibid.* in Friedman 1997a: 433, ll. 495-99: "Tum quia nec scientiae nec definitiones nec disputationes essent de rebus quae sunt extra, quia non disputamus nisi de flore et rosa quos in anima praesentia intellectualiter experimur. Si ergo ista fuerint actus vel species et ibi sistitur, numquam disputamus nec habemus scientiam de rebus quae sunt extra, et sumus caeci circa ea." See above, n. 19, for the same argument used about Platonic ideas.

21 *Ibid.* in Friedman 1997a: 434, ll. 521-31: "Non potest etiam poni sextum, quod videlicet particulares rosae vel flores ut sunt extra in rerum existentia particulariter et distincte sint rosa vel flos simpliciter quod experimur in mente ... quia scientiae et definitiones non essent de naturis simpliciter et universalibus, sed de par-

How can we at one and the same time explain these three things: essential predication; necessary, scientific knowledge; and intellectual acquaintance with extra-mental objects? The only possibility that can allow all these at once, insists Auriol, is to maintain that concepts **are** extra-mental particulars, but having a different type of existence – a different *modus essendi* – than the real existence they have extra-mentally. Auriol calls this special type of existence ‘intentional’ or ‘objective’ existence.²² Thus Auriol claims that “in every intellection there emanates and proceeds nothing other than the cognized thing itself in a certain objective existence insofar as (*secundum quod*) it serves to terminate the intellect’s gaze.”²³ What characterizes this type of existence is that it is a particular extra-mental object, e.g. Socrates, but indistinguishably mixed together with (*indistinguibilter immiscetur*) passive conception, i.e. the formation of a concept of Socrates. A concept of Socrates **is** Socrates as conceived, it is Socrates as an object of the intellect.²⁴ Upon intellectual acquaintance, Socrates as really existing is converted through the act of conception, i.e. by being conceived, into Socrates as intentionally existing.

Socrates and a concept grasping Socrates, then, are the same thing with differing modes of existence. Auriol even says that “a thing and its intention do not differ numerically with respect to anything absolute”; they are the same thing. What thing and in-

ticularibus et individuis ut particularia et individua sunt, quod est contra Philosophum VII *Metaphysicae* et II *Priorum*, qui ait quod scire possum de omni mula quod est sterilis, vel de omni triangulo quod habet tres, et tamen ignorare de hac mula particulari”

22 Ibid. in Friedman 1997a: 434, ll. 540-43: “Relinquitur ergo ut detur septimum, scilicet quod sint verae rosae particulares et flores, non quidem ut existunt exterius, sed ut intentionaliter et obiective, et secundum esse formatum concurrunt in unum quid simpliciter, quod est praesens in intellectu per speciem intelligibilem vel per actum.”

23 Ibid. in Friedman 1997a: 429, ll. 375-77 “... in omni intellectione emanat et procedit, non aliquid aliud, sed ipsamet res cognita in quodam esse obiectivo, secundum quod habet terminare intuitum intellectus.”

24 *Scriptum*, d. 23, in Perler 1994a, §22: 248: “... obiectiva conceptio passive dicta non respicit rem per modum substrati, immo res quae concipitur est aliquid sui et immiscetur indistinguibilter sibi. Unde conceptio rosae idem est quod rosa, et conceptus animalis idem quod animal. Iste nimirum conceptus claudit indistinguibilter realitates omnium particularium animalium et quendam modum essendi, qui est intentionalis, qui non est aliud quam passiva conceptio.”

tention differ by is a respect or a relation; and this is no ordinary respect “fixed to or superimposed upon that thing, as are other relations, rather it is utterly intrinsic and indistinguishably joined to it”. This intrinsic relation, Auriol tells us, is the appearance of the thing as an object of perception (*apparere*) to a perceiver.²⁵ Hence, for Auriol, it is intrinsic to each and every thing to have two different modes of being: real or extra-mental being on the one hand, and intentional or objective being on the other. Unlike real being, the thing’s intentional being needs a perceiver in order to actualize it. This is only to say that, it is through the act of conceiving that a thing is put into intentional being. In fact, we can deduce from what we have seen of Auriol’s thought, that every particular thing, e.g. Socrates, has several potential intentional existences: one for each of Socrates’ *rationes* directing the mind to form certain concepts of him. And all of these different concepts of Socrates **are** Socrates. On Auriol’s account, this makes good sense: *rationes* are quidditative elements or essential properties without which a particular would not be the particular that it is. Thus, Socrates is not Socrates without being a rational animal, i.e. without having the *rationes* sensibility and rationality. Socrates is every bit as much a human being as he is Socrates, and upon Auriol’s theory the concept ‘human being’ is every bit as much Socrates as is the concept ‘Socrates’.²⁶ Thus upon intellectual acquaintance, Socrates (and in particular his *ratio* of rationality) directs us to form the concept ‘human being’, and that concept **is** Socrates, one of Socrates’ several potential intentional existences.

In this way Auriol attempts to deal with the problems he saw in other theories of concepts. On the one hand, he attempts to get

²⁵ *Scriptum*, d. 27, pt. 2, in Friedman 1997a: 436-37, ll. 607-12: “... considerandum est quod res in esse formato posita non claudit in se aliquid absolutum nisi ipsam realitatem. Unde non ponit in numerum res et sua intentio quantum ad aliquid absolutum, claudit tamen aliquid respectivum, videlicet apparere. Quod non debet intelligi ut affixum aut superpositum illi rei, sicut ceterae relationes, sed omnino intrinsicum et indistinguibiliter adunatum.”

²⁶ It should be noted that, pace Perler 1994b: 84 and 87, Auriol never claims that “intentional being is the thing taken in its universality” (p. 87); in fact concepts of singulars play an important role in his theory of essential predication (see e.g. *Scriptum*, d. 23, in Perler 1994a, §44: 255). I will deal with Auriol’s ideas on concepts of singulars in a forthcoming issue of *Vivarium* to be devoted to the French Franciscan.

our knowledge as firmly grounded on extra-mental things as possible: a concept simply is the intellected extra-mental particular in a different mode of being from that which it has extra-mentally; the concept, for Auriol, is essentially invisible, offering no barrier between conceiving mind and conceived object. At the same time, however, Auriol wants to preserve the universality of universal concepts and their use in essential predications, and he thinks that his theory of concepts does just that. Auriol is clear that a universal concept **is** all of its particulars: rose **is** all particular roses, animal **is** all particular animals. That is to say, animal is concept and every really-existing animal at the same time, so much so that Auriol claims:

... one should make the same judgement about a first intention as about a true thing, thus if this is in the first mode of *per se* (*per se primo modo*): 'animal is a true thing', so is this: 'animal is a first intention'. For in each of them being is predicated: in the first real being, in the second intentional being. Since animal, then, ... is not composed from reality and reason (*ratio*) as from two distinguishable [parts], but is something simply and indistinguishably joined together, both 'true thing' and 'first intention' can be predicated *per se* of it, because these are not parts, and are predicated in the first mode (*in primo modo*) ...²⁷

The concept animal **is** every thing whose nature it is to cause that concept upon intellectual acquaintance; this is because the concept is every such thing indistinguishably mixed together with passive conception. The concept 'animal' is all animals in intentional existence, because, as Auriol tells us, the same concept, animal, is formed upon intellectual acquaintance with any animal since all animals have the same *ratio*, sensibility.²⁸ Here lies the reason why Auriol, when he asks where the unity of a species lies, claims that it is "potentially and inchoatively in extra-mental things" and yet

27 *Scriptum*, d. 23, in Perler 1994a, §23: 248-49: "... idem est iudicium de prima intentione et de vera re, unde si ista est per se primo modo 'animal est vera res' et ista 'animal est prima intentio'. In utraque namque praedicatur ens: in prima ens reale, in secunda ens intentionale. Cum igitur animal ... nec sit compositum ex realitate et ratione tamquam ex duobus quae distinguibilia sint, sed sit aliquid simplicissime et indistinguibiliter adunatum, tam 'vera res' quam 'prima intentio' praedicari possunt per se de ipso, quia non se habent per modum partis, et praedicantur in primo modo"

28 *Rep. in Secundum*, d. 9, q. 2, a. 1, p. 106aD: "... quando praedicatur homo de Sorte et Platone, homo non est res alia a Sorte et Platone, nec tamen est una res in ipsis nisi unitate rationis, quae consistit in uno concipi, quia omnes illae res, puta Sortes et Plato et sic de aliis, conveniunt in uno concipi passive, et ideo sub illa ra-

the species is only actualized in the concept.²⁹ Extra-mental things of their very nature direct us to form certain concepts of themselves, and these concepts are shared because the features they are based on – the *rationes* – are shared.

Conclusion

By way of returning to the question with which this article started – “what does Auriol mean when he says that ‘Socrates’ and ‘human being’ are the same thing grasped by different concepts” – I think that we are now in a position to give a sketch of Auriol’s ideas on essential predication. It is the nature of the discrete thing, Socrates, as he exists in real extra-mental being to make a number of first intentions or concepts of himself, based on the various *rationes* that he possesses. These *rationes* are quidditative elements and they are conceptibles, characteristics of Socrates that direct the mind to form various universal concepts, which **are** Socrates, but Socrates in intentional existence. Because Plato and John and Mary all have the same *rationes* as do Socrates, differing only because they are different individual things (*res*), they too by their very nature make the same universal concepts of themselves, and these universal concepts **are** all of the individuals of their class because first intentions are thing and passive conception indistinguishably mixed together. Thus when Auriol says that ‘Socrates’ and ‘human being’ are the same thing grasped by different concepts he means it literally. Both of these concepts **are** Socrates. They differ merely intentionally, because it is Socrates’ nature to make many concepts of himself.

In this paper I have sketched Peter Auriol’s views on universal concepts and essential predication. In particular I have tried to show the way that Auriol’s theory is coherent in the sense that the disparate philosophical elements of which it is composed are logi-

tione attinguntur unica intellectione et uno intelligi et ideo est una ratio quae non est aliud quam unitas conceptus ...” Cf. also above, n. 24.

²⁹ *Rep. in Secundum*, d. 9, q. 2, a. 4, p. 109aD: “Ideo si quaeras, unitas specifica humanitatis in quo est formaliter? Dico quod in humanitate, non in animalitate, sed ut concepta est, et hoc modo idem est quod conceptus obiectivus hominis; sed illa unitas est in re extra in potentia et inchoative” This passage was adduced against Dreiling by Paul Vignaux in *Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique*, t. XI¹ sv. Occam, column 887.

cally interconnected and self supporting. Of course, the fact that Auriol's theory is coherent does not guarantee that his ideas are philosophically tenable. For one thing, the whole notion of intentional existence at the heart of Auriol's views on essential predication is problematic and was recognized to be so by Auriol's contemporaries.³⁰ A first step along the way to determining the philosophical viability of Auriol's ideas on essential predication and universal concepts will be the charting of the medieval reception of his views, in itself a part of the process of determining Auriol's role in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century debate on these central issues at the boundary of metaphysics, logic, and philosophical psychology.³¹

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³⁰ See for a thorough consideration of the merits and demerits of intentional being, Adams 1987: 73-105.

³¹ See for a good introduction to this debate Adams 1982. It should be mentioned that Auriol's ideas on universal concepts seem to be a well elaborated version of Henry of Harclay's ideas which both Walter Burley and William of Ockham attacked (see Adams 1982: 429-34).

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Intentions in Fourteenth-Century Bologna: Jandun, Alnwick, and the Mysterious “G”

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Summary: The present paper discusses problems connected with the attribution of the anonymous disputed question *Utrum intentiones sint subiective in intellectu vel in rebus* (Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Vat. lat. 6768, ff. 201rA-202rA). It shows that Anneliese Maier’s hypotheses on this question should be abandoned and that the author is most probably neither John of Jandun nor William of Alnwick, but an arts master belonging to the intellectual *milieu* of the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts in the first decades of the fourteenth century. As his identity cannot be ascertained beyond any doubt, I suggest that for now we add a “magister G” to the number of Bolognese masters already known for their adhesion to the modistic paradigm in the philosophy of logic.

In 1964 Anneliese Maier discovered how to decrypt the initials contained in a partial index of ms. Vat. lat. 6768, one of the most important witnesses of the philosophical activity at the University of Medicine and Arts in Bologna. Her discovery provided new, independent evidence concerning the intricate question of the attribution of many texts related to the so-called Bolognese Averroism and allowed her to confirm or discard several hypotheses formulated by Ermatinger and Kuksewicz (Maier 1964a). She almost had to admit defeat, however, when confronted with a *quaestio* bearing the title *Utrum intentiones sint subiective in intellectu vel in rebus* (Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Vat. lat. 6768, ff. 201rA-202rA according to the most recent numbering). As the corresponding part of the index is slightly damaged, Maier thought that today we can read only the last letter – a ‘G’ – of the initials which could have revealed the identity of the author of this *quaestio*. Unfortunately, the drafter of this index used two sets of initials in which

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the last initial is 'G': 'J.G.' (meaning Johannes de Genduno) and 'fr. G.' (referring to frater Guillelmus, that is William of Alnwick, *alias* Guillelmus de Anglia or Anglicus). Alnwick or Jandun? Maier left the question open, although she admitted that she was inclined to think that Alnwick was the author.¹

The main purpose of the present paper is to test whether it is possible today, more than thirty years after Maier's discovery, to progress a little further and go beyond her dilemma.

1.

The second copy of the *quaestio*, which came to light some years ago in a very damaged fragment conserved in Pisa, Biblioteca del Seminario Arcivescovile S. Caterina, is of little help (De Robertis - Sturlese *et alii* 1980: 68-69). This second text is also anonymous and, when legible, it has a remarkable number of mistakes in common with the copy already known to Maier.

A little step forward can be made looking at the structure of the *quaestio*. This is, in fact, probably a *reportatio* of a disputed question since it lacks the refinements one would expect from an *ordinatio*. As usual, the text is divided into a *disputatio* and a *determinatio*. The first part summarizes a lively debate where, besides the *respondens* and the *arguentes*, also *quidam alii* and a master – who is not necessarily the same person who determined the *quaestio* in the following session² – take the floor. Even though we do not find the *bidellus* giving leave to speak to the *scholares* according to an order previously written on a *cedula* – as the University Statutes of Bologna would have prescribed – nevertheless the record of the debate follows a pattern which is not unusual in other Bolognese disputed questions.³

This Bolognese flavour becomes even stronger in the second part, which begins with a *declaratio terminorum* – a preliminary explanation of the meaning of all the terms appearing in the title of the question. Given the title *Utrum intentiones sint subiective in intel-*

1 Maier 1964a, in Maier 1967: 360: "Der Inhalt und vor allem der ganze Aufbau der Quaestio lassen die erstere Möglichkeit [i.e.: Alnwick] als die bei weitem wahrscheinlichere erscheinen".

2 As a matter of fact, at least two of the three *rationes* put forward *a magistro* find an answer in the concluding session.

3 Cf. Malagola 1888: 262; Tabarroni 1992; Lambertini 1992.

lectu vel in rebus, the first part of the *determinatio* deals preliminarily with the meaning of such terms as ‘*intentio*’, ‘*intentio secunda*’, ‘*intellectus*’, ‘*esse*’, ‘*in intellectu*’, ‘*in rebus*’.⁴ The presence of such an opening section of the *determinatio* – and not only of semantic specifications regarding key-words, which was a widespread habit – appears to be not just a sign of didacticism on the part of the master but also a distinctive feature of Bolognese disputed questions. Historians of medicine such as Danielle Jacquart were among the first to notice this peculiarity (Jacquart 1985: 297-309; in general about the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts see Maierù 1994). After an almost complete examination of the material available, I cannot say that every Bolognese disputed question contains a *declaratio* or *expositio terminorum*, but I can indeed confirm that this feature is rather frequent and is seen by the Bolognese masters as a usual and integral part of their *determinationes* (Lambertini 1992).⁵ For example, in the questions on Aristotle’s *De anima* attributed to Matthaeus de Eugubio (Ghisalberti 1981; on difficulties of the attribution see Piana 1948, Alichniewicz 1986, Lambertini 1992) the eighth item, which strongly resembles a *determinatio* of a disputed question, has a *declaratio terminorum* which is quite similar to the one contained in our anonymous text. In particular, it shows the same attention to almost all the terms included in the title:

... quantum ad primum, termini quaestionis sunt sex: intellectus noster in nobis existens intelligat separata a materia quidditative. <Intellectus>; secundus terminus: intellectus noster; est in nobis existens: tertius terminus; intelligat: quartus; separata a materia: quintus; quidditative: sextus terminus. (M. de Eugubio(?), *Quaest. de Anima*, III, q. 8: 206).⁶

Thaddaeus de Parma has a liking for this kind of preliminary explanation as well, e.g. in his *Utrum genus predicetur per se de differentia*:

4 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201rB: “Circa primum sciendum quod termini questionis sunt VI, scilicet: intentio, intentio secunda, <intellectus>, sit, in intellectu, uel in rebus.”

5 For one – to my knowledge rare – example of *declaratio terminorum* outside Bologna, cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum (reportatio)*, qq. 10-11: 194.

6 The addition between brackets is mine.

... termini positi in questionis titulo dicuntur esse tres: genus; secundus: differentia; tertius: predicari per se (Th. de Parma, *Utrum genus predicetur...*: 231rB)

The case for the connection of our anonymous text to Bologna is also strengthened by the fact that, in codex Vat. lat. 6768, our anonymous *quaestio* belongs to a quire which contains exclusively disputed questions by Bolognese arts masters, such as Matthaeus de Eugubio, Thaddaeus de Parma, and Angelus de Aretio.⁷ The situation of the Pisan fragment is very similar, as all other texts contained there are of Bolognese origin.⁸

If it is highly probable that a disputed question containing such a *declaratio terminorum* was held in Bologna, then Maier's dilemma seems to fade away. As far as we know – despite the influence he exerted on authors such as Thaddaeus de Parma (Vanni Rovighi 1951) – Jandun had never been in Italy before his ill-fated descent to Rome together with the German emperor, during which it is difficult to imagine that he could have had time to make any sort of lecturing *tournée*. His most accurate biography would rather suggest the contrary (Schmugge 1966: 26-38).

The elimination of Jandun as the author is corroborated by the doctrinal contents of the *quaestio*. When the anonymous author of this *quaestio* defines *intentio*, he speaks in fact of a *cognitio*, or *ratio intelligendi*, taken from the *apparens* of the cognized thing. In another passage, *apparens* and *modus essendi* are used synonymously. Now, it is well known that Jandun was acquainted with an account of human knowledge founded on *modi essendi*, but rejected it,⁹ as, for example, in the following text:

7 Cf. De Mottoni - Luna 1987: 218.

8 It is interesting to note that three disputed questions totally or partially preserved in the Pisan fragment – *Utrum intentiones secundae...*, *Utrum conceptus speciei in sui essentia et formaliter sit compositus vel simplex*, and *Per quem modum habeat fieri ordo predicamentalis* – follow one another according to the same order in which they appear in Vat. lat. 6768; cf. Maier 1964a in Maier 1967: 360. The fragmentary text which appears at the beginning of the Pisan manuscript and bears the subscription “Explicit quaestio per magistrum Angelum (corr. in: ‘nescio’) disputata” is the conclusion of the *quaestio Utrum quantitas sit principium individuationis* which, in Vat. lat. 6768, ff. 229rA-B, is attributed to Angelus de Aretio.

9 See also Pinborg 1975a; Joh. de Jand., *Quaest. in Met.*, VI, q. 9: 84H: “Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut communiter dicitur quedam entia rationis sunt prime intentiones, alia sunt secunde intentiones; et dicunt quod prima intentio est prima intellectio rei que accipitur a proprio modo essendi, ut si intelligitur animal intellectione

... notandum quod ipsi ponunt genus, differentiam et speciem importare eandem materiam et formam, tamen dicunt quod hoc est sub diversis rationibus quae accipiuntur a diuersis modis essendi et apparentibus; unde dicunt quod alia est ratio qua animal significat istam naturam et alia est ratio qua rationale significat eandem naturam, quia ratio animalis communior est quam ratio rationalis, cum ista accipiat a modo essendi communiori, ut a sentire, et ratio rationalis accipitur a modo essendi, scilicet ratiocinari, qui est specialior...

Notandum quod licet ista opinio sit communis, tamen non stat cum principiis eorum. (Joh. de Jand., *Quaest. in Met.*, l. III, q. 12: 41K-O).

2.

Is "G." really William of Alnwick? His activity in Bologna as a *lector* is one of the few concrete facts of his biography (Piana 1982, Dumont 1987, Alliney 1993). A manuscript (Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., S. Croce, Plut. XXXI, dext. 8) has the following attribution in the upper margin of f. 79v: "Questiones magistri Guilelmi Amoyc Anglici lectoris bononie usque ad finem." In 1321 he was asked to give his *consilium* in the context of a heresy trial conducted in Bologna against two members of the Este family who were successfully resisting John XXII's allies in Ferrara (Bock 1937). Alnwick found them guilty of heresy. In 1323, however, the same John XXII complained that a certain "Guillelmus dictus Anglicus ordinis fratrum Minorum" preached in front of the Bolognese clergy and people claiming that it was heretical to deny the absolute poverty of Christ and the Apostles.¹⁰ Another codex (Città del

quae accipitur a sentire, quod ibi proprium est, tunc est prima intentio. Sed secunda intentio est intellectio rei quae accipitur a modo essendi communi, ut si intelligitur animal ut habet esse in pluribus, quia hoc est sibi commune et aliis et plante et colori. Et sic est secunda intentio; tamen melius est, ut uisum fuit prius, quod intentiones rerum capiantur a quidditate rerum ut uult Lyncolniensis primo Post."

¹⁰ See Eubel 1898: 259; Piana 1970; Piana 1986: 106-107; Ledoux 1937: XII-XIII suggested that the *determinatio* on the evangelical counsels (*Utrum consilia euangelica includant perfectionem*) contained in Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., Plut. XXXI dext. 8, 80vA-82vB and 62rA-vB could have been the occasion of the papal reaction. It is worth noting, however, that in this text Alnwick attacks Godfrey of Fontaines (f. 82vB) and one passage seems to refer to a period of time anteceding John XXII's *Quia nonnumquam* (1322) which lifted the ban on discussions regarding Nicholas III's *Exiit qui seminat*: "... et caueant sibi qui detrahunt paupertati aut statui fratrum minorum publice aut occulte quia excommunicati sunt omnes, quia uerba predicta ipsius decretalis [i.e. *Exiit*] deprauant uel aliter exponunt quam sonant a qua sententia per neminem nisi per romanum pontificem possunt absolui, ut habetur in fine ipsius decretalis; sic ergo patet quod consilium paupertatis perfectionem importet." (f. 82vA).

Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Ottob. lat. 318: 42vA and 50vB) witnesses explicitly that at least two disputed questions by Alnwick (that is *Utrum una et eadem relatione numero possit aliquid referri ad duos terminos* and *Utrum asserere mundum fuisse ab aeterno fuerit de intentione Aristotelis*; cf. Maier 1944) were held in Bologna. Most manuscripts containing some of Alnwick's *determinationes* also preserve copies of texts by Bolognese authors.¹¹ Such evidence convinced many scholars that many, if not all *determinationes* by Alnwick are the result of his Bolognese activity (Maier 1949; Kuksewicz 1966; but see also Stella 1968 and Alichniewicz 1992).

In suggesting that Alnwick could be the author of the anonymous *quaestio* which forms the object of the present paper, Aneliese Maier did not limit herself to the fact that the Franciscan theologian had taught in Bologna. She based her opinion mainly on a structural similarity between Alnwick's *determinationes* and our text. More precisely, she observed that they shared not only a lively dispute in the first part, but also the opening formula of the *modus procedendi*, namely: "In ista questione sic procedam ...". Maier's argument is far from conclusive, and in fact appears weak considering that most of Alnwick's texts known as *determinationes* contain only the determination of the *quaestio* and omit the report of the *disputatio*, even though they often presuppose a foregoing public discussion.¹² Moreover, if the Franciscan theologian had a preferred formula for introducing his solution of a *quaestio*, this was rather "Circa solutionem/In solutione istius questionis sic procedam" (see Ledoux 1937: XX-XLVI), while our anonymous question uses an impersonal "In ista questione sic est procedendum" (201rB). As a matter of fact, Alnwick's texts have been transmitted in different versions and different literary shapes, as Maier was well aware. Some of them are surely *reportationes*, while others bear clear signs of a careful editing by the author (Stella 1968; Piana 1982). In Ottob. lat. 318 Maier thought she found a *repetitio* of

¹¹ Besides more famous manuscripts, such as Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Ottob. lat. 318, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Vat. lat. 6768, and Firenze, Bibl. Naz., Conv. Soppr., J. III. 6, also Oxford, Bodl. Lib., Can. Misc. 226 deserves further examination from this point of view.

¹² For examples of Alnwick's texts that also include the *disputatio*, cf. Prezioso 1962; but also *Utrum in maiori quantitate continua sint plures partes in potentia quam in minori* (slightly different versions in Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Pal. lat. 1805 and Vat. lat. 6768, but also in Oxford, Bodl. Lib., Can. Misc. 226).

a *quaestio* by Alnwick (but see Stella 1968). On the other hand, some questions, like the ones published by Kuksewicz (1966; see also Veliath 1970), reveal the attempt to make into three distinct *determinationes* material which could, at least in part, derive from the same disputation; at the same time, in the written version Alnwick broaches a broad set of problems, which most likely exceeds the limits of an actual *disputatio*. In the face of such a textual tradition, where different levels of editing coexist, structural and stylistic comparisons can hardly go beyond “impressionistic” remarks. While waiting for a critical edition (Leonardi 1994: 11), which could be of great help also in this respect, I must limit myself to observing that, while Maier pointed at rather vague similarities, there is one striking structural difference between Alnwick’s *Determinationes* and our *quaestio*: the English Franciscan never uses an *expositio terminorum* similar to those we can find in Bolognese questions. The preceding observations cannot of course be used as an argument *against* Alnwick’s authorship; they merely show that stylistic features do not necessarily militate in its favour.

Without expanding on the subject, Maier clearly stated that the contents of the *quaestio* pointed rather to Alnwick than to Jandun (Maier 1964 in Maier 1967: 360). Although doctrinal comparisons are often inconclusive, we can move to a sketchy outline of the positions put forward in the *quaestio*. In the *disputatio* the *respondens* holds that second intentions are *subiective in intellectu* and *obiective in rebus*. Against an interpretation of the equally famous and obscure Avicennian saying that logic is *de intentionibus secundis adiunctis primis*, he argues that a first intention is not to be identified with the thing itself but with the thing as far as it is understood.¹³ This statement is questioned by the *magister*, who insists that one cannot find the *intentio* on the *res intellecta*, because the latter is already a compound consisting of thing and intention. Then he criticizes the idea of an objective existence of intentions in things. The *magister* is then attacked by *quidam alii* who maintain that intentions do exist in things and not in the intellect.

13 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201rA: “... ista ratio ymaginatur quod intentiones prime sint ipse res prout absolute et ut sic in ipsis fundentur intentiones secunde; sed hoc non est uerum, quia intentiones secunde fundantur solum in rebus intellectis ut intellecte sunt et non in rebus absolute acceptis.”

The reader could think that the *determinatio* would end just like many more famous texts, namely with the answer that intentions exist from one perspective in the things, but from another point of view they are in the intellect.¹⁴ The anonymous author of the *quaestio* explicitly dismisses this kind of solution, which he thinks begs the question, and maintains that second intentions exist *subiective in intellectu*.¹⁵ Properly speaking, an *intentio secunda* is a *ratio intelligendi* which is founded on an *apparens commune*, or *modus essendi communis* of the thing known and results from a reflexive activity of the intellect.¹⁶ From an ontological point of view, an intention is nothing other than an accident of the intellect. More precisely, since the expression *intentio* should always be understood as “*in aliud tentio*”, it is an *accidens respectivum*.¹⁷ The possibility that intentions exist *obiective* in the intellect is not even taken into consideration, although the *declaratio terminorum* includes an explanation of the phrase “*esse obiective in intellectu*”.

At any rate, the *determinatio* does not expand upon the relationship existing between second intentions and things. Our anonymous author remarks that intentions exist in the *res* only potentially, not *in actu*, so that they can be said to have *originaliter esse in rebus*.¹⁸ After stating that there is some kind of link to extramental

14 See, e.g., Radulphus Brito in Ebbesen 1978, Pinborg 1975b and 1980: 112-121.

15 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201vA: “Hiis uisib. moueantur dubitationes quedam, et primo quia posset aliquis dicere: totum illud quod dictum est nihil ualet, quia dicam quod intentio potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo ex parte intellectus, alio modo ex parte rei intellecte: primo modo dicam quod sunt in intellectu subiective, sed alio modo sunt in rebus, quia sunt ut sic habitudines consequentes rem ipsam, quare etc. Ad quod dicendum breuiter quod illa ratio petit principium, nam illud quod est dictum est eque dubium sicut principale quesitum ...”

16 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201rB: “Ad euidenciam secundi est sciendum quod intentio est duplex, scilicet prima et secunda, prima intentio est prima cognitio rei sumpta ab apparenti proprio rei; sed intentio secunda est ratio intelligendi rei sumpta ab apparenti communi rei et iste duo intentiones conueniunt in uno et differunt in pluribus. Conueniunt in uno quia utraque habet esse spirituale in intellectu, sed differunt: primo nam intentio prima sumitur ab apparenti proprio, sed secunda sumitur ab apparenti communi.”

17 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 202rA.

18 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 202rB: “Ad euidenciam quarti est intelligendum quod intentiones habent duplex esse: scilicet <unum est in> actu, et tale est in intellectu; aliud est in potentia et originaliter et tale est in re. Modo questio querit utrum intentiones quo ad eorum esse in actu sint in re uel in intellectu. Tantum de isto.”

things, his primary concern seems to be to show that second intentions exist only in the intellect as accidents in their subject. Logic as a science is therefore posterior to the other sciences, which deal with real extramental things.

Could Alnwick have held such a position concerning intentions? So far, in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, in his *Quaestiones de ente intelligibili*, in his *Determinationes*, I have been unable to find a text where Alnwick directly broaches and discusses thoroughly the subject of the *quaestio*. In the Assisi version of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, however, the universal taken as a second intention is defined in the following terms: “respectus rationis consequens operationem intellectus”; in the same context, the *res prime intentionis* is equated with the *quidditas*.¹⁹ In a passage of an unedited *determinatio*, Alnwick criticizes the position of those who admit the existence of a *distinctio secundum intentionem* which would differ both from a *distinctio secundum rem* and a *distinctio secundum rationem*. On this occasion, he briefly sketches his own understanding of intentions. Names of first intention, such as *homo*, *leo*, signify the natures of extramental things. They are called *intentiones* because they result from nature’s intention: “agens enim naturale intendit naturam suam communicare producendo sibi simile”. Such *intentiones* then form the basis for second intentions, which are produced by the intellect – as Alnwick writes echoing Scotus (Tachau 1988: 64) – “circa rem primae intentionis”.²⁰ In his *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*, things of first intention are equated with real extramental things, while *res secundae intentionis* are nothing other than *entia rationis* (Guil. Alnwick *Quaest. de esse intelligibili*, q. 2: 43; cf. also Dumont 1987: 63). Alnwick’s texts quoted so far are not exactly comparable with our anonymous question, since the Franciscan theologian is speaking of *res* either of first or second intentions, and not of intentions in themselves. At a glance, however, the reader is struck by the fact that Alnwick uses a terminology which is different from the one which can be found in our anonymous question. Although he would probably have agreed with the conclusion of the *quaestio*, i.e. that second intentions are *subiective*

19 Guil. Alnwick, *Quaest. in lib. Sent.*, I, q. 11, *Utrum sit necesse ponere species intelligibiles impressas in memoria preter speciem que est in fantasia*, Assisi, Bibl. Com., 172, f. 48v. On this ms. see Doucet 1932, Dumont 1987.

20 Guil. Alnwick, *Utrum quaecumque sunt distincta ex natura rei sint distincta realiter*, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Pal. lat. 1805, f. 114r.

in the intellect, in his account he does not use expressions such as “*prima cognitio*”, “*ratio intelligendi*”, “*apparens proprium*”, “*apparens commune*”, “*modus essendi*”. Moreover, in one passage of the question *Utrum ratione naturali possit evidentiter ostendi quod anima intellectiva sit forma corporis humani*, Alnwick seems to imply that first intentions do exist *subiective et formaliter* in the extramental thing:

... nulla potentia organica, que est sensitiva, est cognitiva relationis rationis, nec secundarum intentionum, quia potentia sensitiva et organica non movetur nisi ab intentione, que est in re subiective ex natura rei, non enim fabricat suum obiectum primum nec secundarium. Non est autem relatio rationis nec aliqua intentio secunda in re subiective et formaliter, tunc enim esset intentio prima ... (Guil. Alnwick, *Utrum ratione naturali...*: 28)

Now, although the author of our anonymous *quaestio* is primarily concerned with the status of second intentions, he suggests that all intentions, first and second ones, have an *esse spirituale in intellectu*:

Ad euidenciam secundi est sciendum quod intentio est duplex, scilicet prima et secunda, prima intentio est prima cognitio rei sumpta ab apparenti proprio rei; sed intentio secunda est ratio intelligendi rei sumpta ab apparenti communi rei; et iste duo intentiones conueniunt in uno et differunt in pluribus. Conueniunt in uno, quia utraque habet esse spirituale in intellectu, sed differunt ... (Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201rB)

Elsewhere in our anonymous *quaestio*, *intentiones* are said to exist only *in potentia* in extramental things. In addition, in one *ratio* which he introduces in favour of his conclusion, the author presents the assumption that “*intentio prima est in re*” as leading to absurd consequences.²¹ Finally, it seems unlikely that, defining first intentions as “*prima cognitio rei*”, he would assume without any qualification that they exist in the extramental things.

The contrast between these two accounts of the nature of first intentions can be symbolically summarized in the two etymologies they propose for the word ‘*intentio*’: in our anonymous *quaestio* (201rB) it is “*intentio, quasi in aliud tentio*” (as an act of the intellect), while in *Utrum quaecumque sunt distincta ex natura rei sint distincta realiter* (114r) Alnwick says “*et ideo dicuntur intentiones, quia a natura intenduntur*”. In a famous passage of his *Ordinatio*, Scotus pointed out that ‘*intentio*’ was an equivocal term. The texts we are

²¹ Anon., *Utrum intentiones secunde...*: 201vA: “*si intentio prima esset in re, sequeretur quod idem esset in actu et in potentia.*”

comparing seem to use this word in two different senses which the Subtle Doctor himself had recognized as possible meanings of ‘*intentio*’. In our anonymous question, *intentio*, no matter whether first or second, is equated with a concept, or at least with a mental construct, while Alnwick seems to understand first intentions rather as a ‘formal reason’ of the thing known (cf. Tachau 1988: 62).

Scholars are well aware of the fact that overall consistency is not always the primary concern of medieval authors, particularly when they approach problems from different points of view or in different literary contexts. Even if such divergent approaches to the nature of *intentiones* cannot therefore absolutely rule out Alnwick’s authorship, they certainly do not support Maier’s impression of a doctrinal affinity between the positions held by the Franciscan theologian and the author of our anonymous question. Another clue contained in the *declaratio terminorum* raises more serious doubts about the attribution to Alnwick. In his attempt to clarify the terms of the question, our anonymous author also gives a definition of *intellectus*. Distinguishing between *intellectus agens* and *intellectus possibilis* he touches upon an issue which was also intensively debated in Bologna in the first half of the XIV century (Kuksewicz 1968, Vanni Rovighi 1969). Understandably, he does not expand on the subject, which is not directly pertinent to the issue at hand, and limits himself to rather generic information. The agent and possible intellect are both immaterial powers, essential to human knowledge as an active and a passive principle. The agent intellect presides over abstraction, while the passive intellect is the recipient of the products of such abstraction. At least *prima facie*, such statements do not exceed the limits of an elementary exposition of Aristotelian psychology. The account of the proper operation of the *intellectus possibilis* – described as knowledge of the separate substances to be attained at the end of this life – has, however, a strong “Averroistic” flavour.²² This position

²² *Ibidem*: 201rB: “Ad euidenciam tertii est intelligendum quod intellectus est duplex, scilicet agens et possibilis. Intellectus agens est uirtus quedam actiua cuius proprium est separare quidditatem a principiis indiuiduantibus; sed intellectus possibilis est uirtus quedam cuius proprium est abstracta recipere Secundo differunt quia operatio intellectus agentis est perfectior operatione intellectus possibilis: nam intellectus agens habet intelligere substantias separatas et non intelligit aliquid eorum que sunt hic, sed operatio intellectus possibilis est intelligere substantias separatas solum in fine uite secundum Commentatorem.”

implies, in fact, the possibility of a natural, unlimited access of our cognitive powers to the knowledge of separate substances. Based on Averroes' *Commentarium Magnum* on Book III of *De anima* (comm. 36), such a doctrine found explicit support among the Bolognese arts masters known for their sympathies towards "Averroistic" theories, for example in Jacobus de Placentia's *Commentary on De anima*.²³

Now, Alnwick's engagement against some basic tenets of Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle is well known. He dealt with Averroes' psychological doctrines especially in three questions edited by Kuksewicz. In one of them, bearing the title *Utrum ratione naturali possit evidenter ostendi quod anima intellectiva sit forma corporis humani*, Alnwick not only attacks the pillars of "Averroistic" psychology, but he also explicitly rejects the interpretation of the role of the intellect which is accepted by our anonymous master.

... operatio intellectus possibilis est intelligere substantias separatas solum in fine uite secundum Commentatorem. (Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201rB)

Secundum etiam inconveniens non sequitur, sed eque concludit contra Commentatorem: ipse enim **figit** [the emphasis is mine], quod cum intellectus possibilis fuerit in dispositione adeptionis, tunc perfecte intelligit se et substantias separatas, et tamen illa intellectio non est eadem cum intellectu, quia illa intellectio est nova, nec semper infuit, immo si acquiritur, in fine quasi dierum hominis acquiritur, in illa tamen intellectione intelligens et intellectum sunt idem. (Guill. Alnwick, *Utrum ratione naturali...*: 22)

Although this text is not taken from Alnwick's proper *responsio*, but rather from his preceding discussion of different opinions, the contrast is indeed striking. It would seem at least odd that a theologian who was so deeply involved in a polemic against "Averroistic" psychology would use such a formula to describe the operation of the possible intellect, even in a context where the doctrine of the intellect was not at stake. After all, in another question he dismisses the same doctrine as a *finctio*: why should he adopt it here without any comment or specification? Alnwick's dissent from Averroes' gnoseology and psychology is a constant throughout his works. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, prol., q. 7, *Utrum*

²³ J. de Placentia, *Lectura cum quaestionibus super Tertium de Anima*, q. 11: 116-117; *ad textum Averrois comm.* 4: 191. Cf. also M. de Eugubio(?), *Quaestiones De Anima*, l. III, q. 3: 178.

possibile sit intellectum nostrum coniunctum cognoscere de Deo quid est per creaturas, although defending against Aquinas some arguments put forward by Averroes, Alnwick still maintains that human knowledge of God is not adequate to its object (Bassi 1993). Furthermore, the Assisi version of his *Commentary on the Sentences* contains a question devoted to gnoseological issues, bearing the title *Utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid ipsius ymaginis vel alicuius partis eius*. Here Alnwick, dismissing Averroes' *opinio* as *erronea*, maintains that the possible and agent intellect are the same intellectual power seen *sub diversis respectibus* and distinguishes between two "agent intellects": "Dico igitur quod est intellectus agens connaturalis ipsi anime, et alius separatus, scil. Deus. Primus pertinet ad ymaginem in quantum est connaturalis potentia ipsius anime concurrens ad actum intelligendi eliciendum."²⁴ Such a position seems difficult to reconcile with the gnoseology of our anonymous question even given its sketchiness. A similar attitude towards Averroes emerges also in Alnwick's Oxford *Quodlibet*, where the 5th question bears the title *Utrum homo possit consequi omnem beatitudinem per naturam quam naturaliter appetit*. After examining Aristotle's and Averroes' positions here, Alnwick denies that men can reach the ultimate knowledge of God they are longing for through the exercise of speculative sciences (Guil. Alnwick, *Quaest. de quodlibet*, q. 5: 339-347).

The doubts raised by a study of the theory of *intentiones* are therefore only strengthened when one moves to psychological issues; the reasons for calling an attribution to Alnwick into doubt are at least as strong as those which exclude Jandun's authorship.

3.

If we go beyond Maier's alternative between Jandun and Alnwick, a Bolognese arts master is clearly the best candidate. Besides the formal features of the *quaestio*, which – as we have seen above – point to the Bolognese milieu, also the terminology adopted in our *quaestio* to describe the nature of *intentiones* is consistent with that found in works by masters such as Gentilis de Cingulo, An-

²⁴ Assisi, Bibl. Com. 172: 51r. That *intellectus possibilis* and *agens* are the same power is a position also championed in *Utrum intellectus agens sit substantia separata*, Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., S. Croce, Plut. XXXI, dext. 8, 79vA-80rB.

gelus de Aretio, Thaddaeus de Parma, Matthaëus de Eugubio, Jacobus de Placentia (Lambertini 1989a, 1992). Intentions are in fact described as *cognitiones* or *rationes intelligendi* which the intellect “derives” from *modi essendi* or *apparentia* of extramental things. Moreover, the difference between first and second intentions is traced back to a distinction between *apparentia propria* and *communis*. This terminology is highly reminiscent of what we can call the “modist paradigm”, which was widely accepted at the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts up to the fourth/fifth decade of the XIVth century (Maierù 1992; Lambertini 1992; Marmo 1994; De Libera 1996: 283-304). After all, the blend of a “modistic” approach to logic and an “Averroistic” psychology is one of the most typical features of the philosophers active in Bologna in those years.

If style, terminology, and doctrine all point to the common background of the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts in the first decades of the XIVth century, the very fact that such features were shared by many authors makes it extremely difficult to progress towards a more precise attribution. Some basic doctrines, such as a “modistic” theory of intentions, are in fact accepted by almost all members of the group, who differ from one another only with respect to some details. On the other hand, it is well known that some of these masters, such as Matthaëus, tend to change terminology – if not opinion – from one work to another (Rossi 1992). Given our present knowledge it can only be ascertained that the position about intentions held in the *quaestio* is not incompatible with the theories supported by most of the Bolognese arts masters, while the point of view and the terminology adopted do not match exactly the works of any master known to me. At best one can tentatively exclude some possible authors on the basis of some evidence which is, however, far from being conclusive. Some provisional, negative results can be obtained for example using, instead of the theory of intentions, the doctrine of the role of the agent intellect in the cognitive process as a “test case”. The author of our anonymous *quaestio* writes: “Intellectus agens est virtus quedam activa cuius proprium est separare quiditatem a principiis individuantibus” (201rB). As the debate on this issue among the Bolognese arts masters was very detailed and they distinguished with great precision among positions differing only slightly, we are most probably entitled to interpret such a succinct

statement as taking a stand in the Bolognese discussion about the actual function of the agent intellect. Now, Thaddaeus de Parma, Matthaeus de Eugubio, Jacobus de Placentia, and Anselmus de Cumis are acquainted with an *opinio* maintaining (in Thaddaeus' wording) that "intellectus agens ... removet quiditatem a conditionibus individuans" or, according to Matthaeus, that "intellectus agens ponitur propter separare quiditatem a conditionibus materialibus". Jacobus de Placentia speaks of "separare quiditatem a conditionibus individuans"; Anselmus de Cumis has "denudare quiditatem a conditionibus individuans".²⁵ All these masters, however, agree in rejecting such an explanation of the role of the agent intellect – an explanation that can be traced back, as Vanni Rovighi (1951) pointed out, to Godfrey of Fontaines (*Quodlibet* V, q. 10: 35-40). The available texts do not allow us to establish whether the Bolognese *magistri* had in mind one of their colleagues defending such a view or were simply referring to the opinion of the famous Parisian master. At any rate, by choosing the wording "separare quiditatem a principiis individuans" the author of our anonymous question parts company with some of the best known exponents of the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts.²⁶

It seems, then, that we abandoned Maier's dilemma just to end up in a quandary again. As doctrinal evidence seems not to facilitate, but to make even more difficult the task of identifying the author of our question, one can be tempted to focus exclusively on the clue offered by the letter "G." In fact, the problems arising from an attribution either to Alnwick or to Jandun do not necessarily imply that the author of the index relied on false information, although this is of course possible.²⁷ Moreover, Maier's interpretation of "G." could be wrong. One can suppose that the origi-

25 Th. de Parma, *Quaestiones in tertium de Anima*, q. 15: 140; Matthaeus de Eugubio, *Utrum sit dare intellectum agentem vel propter quid ponatur, si ponitur*: 305; Anselmus de Cumis, *Utrum abstractio fantasmatum ab intellectu agente sit aliquid aut nichil*: 86; Jacobus de Placentia, *Lectura cum quaest. super III De anima*, q. 6: 87.

26 Alnwick also rejects the opinion that abstraction *circa fantasmata* represents the function proper to the agent intellect, cf. *Quaest. in libros Sent.*, I, q. 12, Assisi, Bibl. Com. 172: 49v.

27 The author of the index has proved to lack some information – it has proven possible to identify the author of texts he left anonymous (Ebbesen 1978; Tabaroni 1992) – but not to give wrong attributions.

nal initials were neither 'J. G.' nor 'fr. G.', but maybe 'M. G.' or even a simple 'G.' As a matter of fact, elsewhere the index has analogous initials, e.g. 'M. a.', signifying Angelus de Aretio, and 'M.', meaning Matthaëus de Eugubio. In such a case, Gentilis de Cingulo would be the most likely candidate. Unfortunately, a comparison with Gentilis' works does not lead to unequivocal results. The master from Cingoli does use *apparens* as a synonym for *proprietas* or *operatio* (meaning the feature of the cognized thing from which the intellect derives intentions) but never adopts the opposition between *apparens proprium* and *apparens commune*.²⁸ Instead of that, he prefers speaking of essential and not-essential *proprietates*, on which the intellect finds respectively first and second intentions.²⁹ We reach a similar stalemate trying to compare gnoseological terminology. Gentilis describes the activity of the intellect as an *abstractio* "a principiis individuantibus" like our anonymous author does, but this clue is too vague, since he never goes into details concerning the nature and function of *intellectus possibilis* and *agens*.³⁰

This lack of precise terminological agreement between Gentilis and our anonymous author, although not decisive from a theoretical point of view, does not allow us to confirm an attribution which could be suggested by that "G." Furthermore, we cannot ignore the fact that other, less famous Bolognese masters also have names that begin with this letter. In archival sources, Zilfredus de Placentia is sometimes called also Gilfredus, while among the masters whose works are still unknown to us we can find at least a Guillelmus de Dexara, a Galvanus de Reggio, and a Gerardus de Parma (Tabarroni 1992: 419-423).

28 See Gentilis de Cingulo, *Scriptum super Porphyrium*, lectio 1, Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. J.X.30, 1vB; Idem, *Commentum super quinque predicabilibus seu universalibus*, Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., Strozz. 99, 44r ff.; Idem, *Questiones Porphyrii*, q. 7, Palermo, Bibl. Com., 2 Qq. D. 142, 76rB-77rB (on this ms. see Tabarroni 1992). On Gentilis' theory of intentions Lambertini 1989a and Lambertini 1990.

29 Gentilis de Cingulo, *Commentum super quinque predicabilibus seu universalibus*, Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., Strozz. 99: 43r: "Sed gratia exempli uniuersale quod est secunda intentio est modus intelligendi rem aliquam sub aliqua posteriori proprietate reperta in illa, que proprietas non est essentialis illi rei in qua reperitur..."

30 *Ibidem*: 44r: "... si nos intelligimus essenciam hominis abstractam per intellectum a principiis indiuiduantibus". But cf. idem, *Scriptum super Porphyrium*, lectio 1, Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. J. X.30: 2vB: "Sed tu dices: in quo ergo intellectu habent esse talia uniuersalia? dicendum quod in intellectu hominum particularium, postquam iam sunt perfecte uirtutes deseruientes intellectui."

Conclusion

More than thirty years after Maier's ground-breaking article, the attempt to unveil the identity of the author of the disputed question *Utrum intentiones sint subiective in intellectu* contained in Vat. lat. 6768 is not yet rewarded with success. Research is no longer limited to an alternative between two thinkers, but is confronted with a wider range of possibilities. This apparent regression, however, is balanced by the fact that an increased knowledge of the Bolognese intellectual environment allows us to locate the author with much more plausibility in the *milieu* of the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts in the first decades of the fourteenth century.

A comparison with some of Alnwick's positions revealed that this Franciscan theologian active in Bologna supported a theory of intentions which was different from the one championed by the Bolognese masters. The disagreement between them and Alnwick in this field, however, was by no means as radical as the well-known clash between their respective opinions with regard to Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle.

Although identifying the anonymous author of the *quaestio* with Gentilis de Cingulo could be tempting, the available evidence is not sufficient to attribute the text to any particular figure. For this reason I would suggest that we designate the anonymous author as "magister G." for the time being. Now, however, we can study our anonymous question not only as a witness to the Bolognese teaching activity, but we can also regard "magister G." as an exponent of the Bolognese "modism". As a matter of fact, siding with other Bolognese masters such as Matthaeus de Eugubio in his critique of Hervaeus Natalis' theories (Lambertini 1989a), "magister G." did not rely on the notion of objective existence of intentions in order to clarify the ontological status of the object of logic. His account of the nature of intentions rested indeed uniquely on the interaction of extramental entities and accidental modifications which exist *subiective* in the intellect. The same basic attitude towards logic was shared by the "main stream" of the Bolognese tradition in the first decades of the XIVth century.

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Second Intentions in the Late Middle Ages

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Summary: Not until the end of the 14th century did anyone claim extra-mental reality for second intentions – not even the ultra-realist Walter Burley. According to him second intentions are concepts which have a foundation *in re*, but are not things in the strongest sense of the term. This account implies that the principle of one-to-one correspondence between language and the world (the keystone of medieval realism) has to suffer an exception, since no common nature matches second intention terms. It is just in order to do away with this blemish that Alyngton, Penbygull, Whelpdale, and Tarteys hypostatize second intentions and speak of them in terms of real determinations joined to the *res extra animam* and inhering in them. This procedure leads to a paradox when applied to those terms of second intention by which we speak of singulars considered as such, e.g. *'individuum'*: one would have to admit the existence of an individual common nature, i.e. an auto-contradictory entity present in all individuals as the cause of their being individuals. In order to avoid this paradox, Alyngton et al. classified the *'individuum'*-like terms among those terms, like *'Socrates'*, which refer to individuals and not to classes of individuals. The rule that terms can be listed as common ones only if they signify a common nature was safe, but at the expense of a counter-intuitive categorization of their semantic power. For this reason Sharpe criticized Alyngton's theory and proposed i) that all terms of second intention are common, even *'individuum'*-like expressions, and ii) that a sufficient condition for being a common term is signifying universally, i.e. signifying a unitary concept which, in its turn, refers to a multiplicity of things displaying at least a similar mode of being. In this way Sharpe restored the semantic rank that intuitively would be assigned to the *'individuum'*-like terms, but invalidated his defense of realism by accepting the nominalistic principle of the autonomy of thought in relation to the world. Aware of these inconsistencies, Paul of Venice maintained that a unique universal concept corresponds to terms of second intention, even to those which signify singulars as such, but no common nature. This conceptual unity suffices to ground a univocal definition of the things such terms refer to, so that all the second intention terms have to be considered as common expressions. These universal concepts are, however, caused by some peculiar aspects of the things that he calls *'intentiones in re'*. In this way, Paul reconciled the two different demands supported by Alyngton and Sharpe respectively, but avoided the difficulties of their approaches. Paul could keep the principle of the one-to-one correspondence between language and the world, while still being able to explain the semantic power of the terms of second intention in accordance with an intuitive conception of them.

1.

A branch of that ‘family of meanings’ named *intentio* plays a major role in the medieval discussions of logical and epistemological questions. The two main senses of the term occur already in the writings of Avicenna: the name ‘*intentio*’ can signify the content of a concept of the first level, like man, and then it is an *intentio prima*, or of a metalinguistic concept, like species, and then it is an *intentio secunda*. In fact, first intentions arise by abstraction from a group of individuals really existing in the world, and give expression to one of their shared properties, but second intentions are found only when our intellect reflects on the first intentions considered in their relationships to individual things themselves.¹ Unfortunately, what is kept vague in such a description is the ontological status of the *intentio*, which is ambiguous, since the intention seems to be at the same time a mental concept and its extramental foundation. This ambiguity provoked, among medieval authors, a sharp discussion, which over the course of time became more and more intriguing and intricate.

My purpose in this paper is to focus on some aspects of that discussion during the second half of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th centuries, among those authors, influenced by Burley’s logical system and by Wyclif’s metaphysics, we can call ‘Oxford realists’ – that is: Robert Alyngton, Johannes Sharpe, William Penbygull, Roger Whelpdale, John Tarteys, and Paul of Venice,² the last of whom, although Italian, spent at least three years at the Augustinian *studium* in Oxford starting in August 1390.

Since first and second intentions are entities of different levels, the question of the status of the *intentiones* has to be split up into two (sub)problems, each concerning one of the two distinct kinds of intentions. I shall leave out the one related to first intentions, as I do not want to deal with the problem of the ontological status of universals, and I shall concentrate my attention on the status of second intentions.

1 Cf. Avicenna, *De anima*, 1.5.86.

2 For a first introduction to these authors’ logical and metaphysical theories see A.D. Conti (ed.), Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalia*, pars ii: studio storico-critico: 295-336. On their lives and works see Emden 1957-59: I, 30-31 (Alyngton); III, 1680 (Sharpe); III, 1455 (Penbygull); III, 2031 (Whelpdale); III, 1849 (Tarteys); III, 1994-95 (Paul of Venice); and Lohr 1973: 96-97 (Alyngton); Lohr 1971: 279-80 (Sharpe); Lohr 1968: 207 (Penbygull); Lohr 1973: 122-23 (Whelpdale); Lohr 1971: 285 (Tarteys); Lohr 1972: 314-20 (Paul of Venice).

2.

Until the end of the 14th century nobody claimed the extra-mental reality of second intentions, not even an 'ultra-realist' such as Walter Burley.³

Thomas Aquinas' theory of intentions⁴ is marked by an epistemological approach according to which second intentions arise out of the various modes of cognition of our intellect, when it considers the (threefold) correspondence between the first intention (the *intentio intellecta* or *verbum mentis*), the nature potentially (*in potentia*) existing in extra-mental reality, and the individual things which instantiate it.⁵ Thus, second intentions fully exist in the mind only, not in the things themselves, but they have a *fundamentum in re*, as different types of common natures correspond to them:⁶

In omnibus autem intentionibus hoc communiter verum est, quod intentiones ipsae non sunt in rebus, sed in anima tantum; sed habent aliquid in re respondens, scilicet naturam, cui intellectus huiusmodi intentiones attribuit; sicut intentio generis non est in asino, sed natura animalis, cui per intellectum haec intentio attribuitur.

Duns Scotus⁷ conceives of second intentions as relations of reason (*relationes rationis*) generated by an act of comparing two objects apprehended previously, considered just as being known. Therefore second intentions have a diminished being in comparison with the *res extra animam* (both individual ones and common ones), since their own being is a simple *esse cognitum*.⁸

Walter Burley's doctrine shows the same kind of approach to the matter as the two foregoing theories. Although in his last commentary on the *Ars vetus* (A.D. 1337) the *Doctor Planus et Perspicuus* maintains that common natures fully exist *in re*, as entities really distinct from the individuals they are in and are predicated of, nevertheless he explicitly states that second intentions are con-

3 On his particular kind of realism see Conti 1990: 121-76.

4 On Thomas' theory of intentions see Schmidt 1966: 94-127.

5 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *ScG.* 4.11.

6 Thomas Aquinas, In I *Sent.* 33.1.1, ad 3m.

7 On Duns Scotus' theory of intentions see Swiezawski 1934: 205-60.

8 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 23, q. unica, ed. Vaticana, XVII: 305-07; *Ordinatio* I, d. 23, q. unica, ed. Vaticana, V: 352-353; *Reportata Parisiensis* II, d. 13, q. 1, ed. Vivès, XXIII: 440-42.

cepts – those *conceptus rei* that arise when we look on a common nature in relation to the *res* that share it:

Et est dicendum, secundum Avicennam in *Logica* sua, quod logica est de intentionibus secundis adiunctis primis. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod intentio, secundum quod nunc loquimur, est idem quod conceptus rei. Et conceptus duplex est, scilicet primus et secundus. Possum enim de homine habere unum conceptum quo concipio humanam naturam absolute, scilicet intelligendo vel concipiendo ipsum esse substantiam animatam sensibilem rationalem – et sic habeo unum conceptum solum primum – et possum conceptum de homine habere quo concipio naturam humanam in ordine ad illa quae participant eandem naturam, scilicet ad Sortem et Platonem – et sic habeo alium conceptum, scilicet conceptum comparatum, qui dicitur secundarius conceptus. Et iste abstrahitur a conceptu primo. Conceptus primus dicitur prima intentio; conceptus secundus dicitur secunda intentio Et ex his patet eandem rem esse primae intentionis et secundae intentionis, quia eadem res potest apprehendi sub primario conceptu intellectus et secundario, cum tamen prima et secunda intentio non sint eadem.⁹

Therefore, according to him, logic, which deals with second intentions, is a *scientia rationalis* and not *realis*:

Dico tunc quod subiectum primum <logicae> primitate adaequationis, sive subiectum contentivum circa quod, est res secundae intentionis, sive ens rationis. Et non est aliud intelligendum per ens rationis quam res secundae intentionis. Nam res secundae intentionis, vel ens rationis, est commune ad omnia per se considerata in logica secundum quod in logica considerantur.¹⁰

Second intentions, although mental concepts, are nevertheless closely connected with things, as they are caused in our minds by the common natures existing outside. Thus it is correct to affirm that they somehow inhere in the *res extra animam*: “Dico ergo quod liber *Praedicamentorum* est de rebus secundum quod eis insunt intentiones secundae, scilicet intentio generis generalissimi et generis subalterni, et intentio speciei, et sic de aliis.”¹¹

9 Burley, *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii*, Prol., in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, 2rB-vA.

10 Ibid. 2vA. These passages show that Knudsen’s interpretation (cf. Knudsen 1982: 494-95) of Burley’s theory of intentions is misleading, as he attributes to Burley the belief that logic deals with reality itself and that second intentions are something real: “Since according to Burley the intentions are features of reality, logic, which deals with the intentions, is indeed a ‘real science’” – p. 495.

11 Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, Prol., in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, 17vB.

Burley adapts to second intentions the same interpretative scheme that moderate realists, such as Albert the Great or Thomas Aquinas, used for explaining the different modes of being that essences have in and outside our intellect: just like a stone is said to be seen not by virtue of an act of seeing inhering in it, but by virtue of an act of seeing inhering in an animal or in a man, so a common nature is a genus or a species by virtue of a concept our minds abstract when considering it in relation to its individuals:

Secundo est notandum quod denominativum dicitur dupliciter, scilicet communiter <et> proprie. Primo modo omne concretum quod significat rem quae non est de essentia illius de quo praedicatur, cui correspondet aliquid abstractum, dicitur denominativum, sive sit intentionale sive reale, et hoc sive sit substantia sive accidens, et hoc sive significet accidens inhaerens illi de quo accidentaliter praedicatur sive significet accidens inhaerens alteri. Unde, communiter loquendo de praedicatione denominativa, haec est praedicatio denominativa: 'homo est species', 'animal est genus', quia praedicatum vere significat aliquid quod non est de essentia subiecti et praedicato correspondet aliquid abstractum, scilicet hoc nomen 'specialitas' vel 'generalitas'. ... Nam quoddam est concretum denominativum denominatione intrinseca et quoddam denominativum denominatione extrinseca. Exemplum primi ut 'homo est albus' et 'homo est grammaticus' ... Exemplum secundi sic dicendo: 'lapis videtur' vel 'petra est visa a me'; hae denominationes extrinsecae sunt, quia videre non inhaeret petrae, sed animali videnti.¹²

In sum, according to this account, second intentions have a *fundamentum in re*, but are not things in the strongest sense of the term. This implies that the principle of the strict correspondence between language (and/or thought) and the world – which every medieval realist recognized – had to suffer an exception.

3.

It is just in order to do away with this 'blemish' that Robert Alyngton,¹³ a fellow of Queen's College (Oxford) from 1379 (the same college where Wyclif started his theological studies in 1363 and Johannes Sharpe taught in the nineties), heavily modified the standard theory of the status of second intentions. In fact, in his com-

¹² Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de denominativis*, 19vA. Cf. also *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii*, cap. *de genere*, 8vA.

¹³ On Robert Alyngton's logical theories see De Rijk 1977: 125, 131, 135-36, 139-41, 145, 150, 154-55; Spade 1985: ix-x, and n. 8; Spade & Wilson 1986: xxii-xxiii, xxxiii-xxxv, xlii and xlvi-xlvii; Ashworth & Spade 1992: 50, 55-56 and 61-62. On his metaphysical doctrine see Conti 1993: 179-241.

mentary on the *Categories* (his major extant work) he not only considers second intentions as objective, but clearly hypostatizes them, speaking of them in terms of real determinations joined to the modes of being of the *res extra animam* and directly inhering in them:

Pro quo notandum quod res aliquando concipitur absolute, sine connotatione universalitatis aut particularitatis, et vocatur, ut sic, res primae intentionis; et terminus illam sine connotatione tali significans vocatur terminus primae intentionis (id est: primo mentis conceptui correspondens), ut 'homo', 'lignum', 'lapis' et huiusmodi. Sed secundo possunt res sumi aliquando, vel concipi, cum connotatione universalitatis aut particularitatis, ut sub ratione qua sunt individua, species, sive differentiae, vel accidentia communia vel accidentia propria; et vocatur, ut sic, terminus significans talem rem cum huiusmodi connotatione terminus secundae intentionis, eo quod post intellectum absolutum de re concipitur res quasi secundo sub ratione qua est individuum aut commune. Et vocatur universalitas aut particularitas res secundae intentionis, quae se habent per modum accidentis respectu naturae absolute conceptae, eo quod sunt extra essentiam naturae sic conceptae – quamvis de facto non sint accidentia, sed proprietates analogae circumeuntes omnia genera, competentes tam substantiae quam accidenti.¹⁴

As a consequence, Alyngton conceives of logic as an analysis of the general framework of reality, since according to him logic turns on structural forms (aimed at building up semantic contents), which are, as forms, independent of both such contents and the mental acts by which they are learned. It is through these forms that the network connecting the basic constituents of the world (individuals and universals, substances and accidents) is disclosed to us:

Sed circa istam partem istius libri occurrunt plura dubia. Primum utrum Aristoteles principaliter hic tractat de rebus significatis vel signis Quantum ad primum videtur mihi quod Aristoteles hic mixtim tractat de signis et rebus significatis; sed principaliter de rebus significatis Et haec videtur sententia Avicennae in prima parte *Logicae* suae, dicentis quod ad considerationem dictionum ducit nos necessitas. Logicus enim, ut huiusmodi, non habet primo occupari circa verba, nisi in quantum sunt sibi instrumenta ad communicandum Notandum secundo quod aliter determinat hic de substantia, qualitate, quantitate etc. et aliter in V *Metaphysicae*. Nam secundum Avicennam, in principio *Metaphysicae* suae, metaphysicus procedit scientifice circa singula quae conveniunt in ente analogo, logicus autem probabiliter. Et secundum sanctum Thomam, in IV *Metaphysicae*, logica potest considerari uno modo ut est scientia docens modum probabiliter procedendi, aut modum sciendi; et tunc considerat de rebus sub ratione qua eis insunt intentiones secundae, ut sub ratione qua est commune vel singulare, genus etc. Et tunc pro-

14 Alyngton, *Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia*, 88r.

cedit scientificæ. Et tunc habet pro subiecto, ut dicit Avicenna, et Lincolniensis, I *Posteriorum*, intentiones secundas prout opponuntur primis. Sed secundo modo potest logica considerari ut utens. Et tunc considerat circa subiectum aequè universale sicut metaphysicus, sed non scientificæ. Et sic, secundum Lincolniensem, logica est instrumentum metaphysicæ. Et sic ex dictis potest elici quod subiectum huius libri hic divisum in decem partes est ens in prædicamento reali significabile per signum incomplexum. Nec contendo etsi alii exponant hic de vocibus principaliter quæ supra exposita sunt de rebus; nihil enim ad me de his quæ foris sunt, sed satis mihi videtur dicere et explanare sententiam antiquorum.¹⁵

The strategy which calls for this choice is evident: as in the case of relations of reason,¹⁶ Alyngton is trying to substitute references to mental activity by references to external reality. In other words, he seeks to reduce epistemology to ontology. From a logical point of view, this means that the same interpretative pattern is employed in order to account for both the semantic power of proper names and common terms (i.e. those expressions that refer to a class of individuals), and of first and second intentions. Like proper names, common terms also primarily signify and label a unique object, that is a common nature; but unlike the object signified by a proper name, the reality of the common nature is 'distributed' among many individuals as their main metaphysical constituent, since it determines the typical features of the individuals themselves. By associating common terms with such an object as their main *significatum*, Alyngton thinks he can explain the fact that a common term can stand for and label many singular things at once.¹⁷

Only in this way does he believe we can successfully ground our knowledge; otherwise it would lack an adequate foundation.

15 Cf. *ibid.*, cap. *de numero prædicamentorum*, 78r-v.

16 Cf. *ibid.*, cap. *de relatione*: 119r-v, 121r and 122r. According to Alyngton what characterizes relations of reason is the fulfilment of at least one of these conditions: i) the subject of inherence of the relation, or its object (i.e. the *terminus ad quem*), is not a substance; ii) the object is not an actual entity; iii) the *fundamentum relationis* is not an absolute being (i.e. a substance, or a quality, or a quantity). In this way Alyngton eliminates from the definition of relations of reason any reference to our mind, and utilizes objective criteria only, based on the framework of reality itself. Cf. Conti 1993: 222-29 and 290-96.

17 Cf. Alyngton, *Litteralis sententia super Prædicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia*, 87v-88r, 93r-v, 94v-95r, 96r-v, 101v-102v.

4.

Still, this procedure, so effective, leads to a paradox when applied to those terms of second intention by which we speak of the singular objects considered as such, i.e. expressions like '*substantia prima*', '*individuum*', '*persona*' and so on. In fact, according to Alynghon (and many other "realists" of the period) a common term is always matched by a common nature existing *in re* (by which it can refer to a multiplicity of singular things – as we have seen); therefore, as the term '*individuum*' appears to be common, since it can stand for a multiplicity of things, it should signify an extramental common nature shared by them. As a consequence, we would have to admit the existence of an individual common nature, that is an (auto-contradictory) entity present in all the individuals as the cause of their being individuals.

Alynghon, who would not give up the principle of the one-to-one relation between philosophical language and the world, could remove the paradox only by classifying terms of this kind among the atomic (*discreti*) terms, i.e. those terms or nominal syntagms, like '*Socrates*' or '*aliquis homo*', which refer to individuals and not to classes of individuals. According to the English philosopher there are three main types of atomic terms: i) personal pronouns, which identify a singular definite referent by means of an ostensive definition (*a demonstratione*); ii) proper names; and iii) 'range-narrowed' expressions (*a limitatione intellectus*), i.e. those expressions which identify a singular referent as a member of a certain set. Expressions like '*substantia prima*' and '*individuum*' belong to this third category, as they presuppose a general concept (those of substance and being, in the example), the range of which is narrowed just to a unique object by an act of our intellect (among substances and beings, to one which is not common):

Ideo quantum ad motiva in contrarium respondendum est primo quantum ad illud quod tangitur de primario significato istius termini '*substantia prima*'. Ubi notandum quod iste terminus '*substantia prima*' est terminus discretus a limitatione intellectus. Est enim aliquis terminus discretus a demonstratione, ut pronomina demonstrativa; aliquis est discretus ex impositione, ut nomen proprium, quod uni soli appropriate imponitur; et tertio modo est aliquis terminus discretus ab intellectu limitatione, ut tales termini '*individuum*', '*singulare*', '*persona*' et termini aggregati ex signis particularibus et nominibus appellativis, ut '*aliquis homo*', '*quoddam animal*', et ita de aliis. Termini enim particulares ad hoc adduntur nominibus ut limitent ipsa nomina ad res particulares, quia aliter superfluerent. Et in isto tertio gradu est iste terminus '*substantia prima*' terminus discretus. Et tunc

dicitur ulterius quod sicut pronomen sine demonstratione nihil significat praeter quod significat naturaliter, et tamen sine demonstratione modum habet significandi discrete et ex demonstratione habet significatum quod discrete significat, ita iste terminus 'substantia prima' sine limitatione intellectus nihil primarie significat, quamvis sine omni tali limitatione significet discrete; et ex ipsa limitatione intellectus nunc significat principaliter hanc substantiam et nunc illam principaliter. Sed differunt a pronomine, cum pronomen ex demonstratione significat sine connotatione rationis in genere, et ideo dicitur significare substantiam meram; isti autem termini significant rem connotando proprietatem eius in genere et ordinabilitatem eius in specie vel in genere. Differunt etiam a nomine proprio, quoniam nomina propria fuerunt appropriate imposita ad significandum individua determinata et non quaecumque homo voluerit quodcumque et quotienscumque per intellectum limitare; sed haec nomina fuerunt imposita ad significandum discrete vel in particulari quodcumque homo voluerit sibi ipsi in tali genere vel specie limitare. Et propter hoc ad differentiam aliorum discretorum dicuntur termini particulares. Et sic non est dare substantiam primam in communi plus quam istum Robertum in communi.¹⁸

The rule that terms can be listed as common ones only if they signify a common nature is safe, but at the cost of a counter-intuitive categorization of their semantic power. In fact, according to Alyngton's account, saying that Socrates and Plato are *primae substantiae* simply means that i) each one is what he is, and that ii) what each one is is a non-universal substance. This solution, which entails that to be an individual is not a positive state of affairs, but a negative one, is consistent with the ontology worked out by Alyngton, where it is the absence of the property of being-common-to-many-things (*communicabilitas* or universality) that characterizes individuals as such. The following quotations may illuminate Alyngton's notion of communicability:

Pro quo notandum quod communicabile dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet realiter, vel per identitatem, ita quod sit ipsum cui communicatur – et isto modo universale communicatur suo singulari. Secundo modo est aliquid communicabile per informationem, ita quod illud cui communicatur non sit ipsum, sed ipso informatum – et isto modo communicatur forma materiae et accidens suo subiecto. Secundo notandum quod 'subiectum' sumitur aliquando pro extremo propositionis ... Sed alias sumitur 'subiectum' realiter pro omni quod recipit aliud in se formaliter. Et isto modo materia prima dicitur subiectum et forma dicitur praedicatum. Isto modo etiam generaliter substantia est subiectum respectu sui accidentis. Sed tertio modo ad propositum dicitur subiectum esse quod per se supponitur alteri tamquam inferius; et sic species dicitur subiectum seu pars subiectiva sui generis, et praedicatum dicitur realiter et communius respectu minus communis. Et sic in-

¹⁸ Ibid., cap. *de substantia*, 89v-90r.

telligit Aristoteles quando dicit: "Quando alterum de altero dicitur ut de subiecto" etc.; et sic praedicari realiter est formam inesse formato realiter aut communius inesse essentialiter minus communi. Et isto modo dicuntur seu praedicantur species aut genera realia de suis per se contentis etc.

Universale formaliter intellectum dicit tria, scilicet naturam quae est primae intentionis, et communicabilitatem multis suppositis, quae est res secundae intentionis, et abstractionem vel intelligibilitatem excludentem propriam et formalem sensibilitatem – nullus enim sensus materialis sufficit comprehendere hominem sub ratione qua est quidditative communicabilis

Pro quo intelligendo imaginanda est latitudo universalium universalitate causationis et latitudo universalium universalitate praedicationis. Et tunc, sicut semper universalium in ordine causarum essentialium vel est minus subiectum vel aliter non est subiectum accidentibus vel transmutationibus in accidente quam suum inferius, sic imaginatur Aristoteles proportionaliter quod sicut universalia praedicatione sunt communiora sic sunt ipsa naturaliter priora, et, ut sic, magis remote accidentibus subiecta. Sed correspondenter sicut universalia sunt minus communia et proximiora individuis quae sunt simpliciter incommunicabilia, sic sunt posteriora in natura et magis propinqua accidentibus quoad rationem substandi. Non enim substantia quoad essentiam suam est insensibilis et remissibilis, nec ut sic dicitur suscipere magis et minus, sed quoad actum substandi, quia prima substantia principalius et immediatius pluribus speciebus accidentium substat quam secunda substantia.¹⁹

5.

Some other authors belonging to the same cultural milieu followed Alyngton, as we can read almost the same words on the status of second intentions in the works of William Penbygull,²⁰ Roger Whelpdale,²¹ and John Tarteys.²² They also considered intentions as extra-mental realities, and the *'individuum'*-like terms

¹⁹ First quotation from *ibid.*, cap. *de regulis praedicationis*, 76r; second quotation from cap. *de substantia*, 93v; final quotation from *ibid.* 98v. See also cap. *de subiecto et praedicatione*, 75r.

²⁰ Cf. Penbygull, *De universalibus*: 194-95. On Penbygull's theory of universals, intentions, and predication see Conti 1982: 137-66.

²¹ Cf. Whelpdale, *Tractatus de universalibus*: 103rA-B: "Pro quo notandum est quod iste terminus 'homo singularis' est terminus discretus [est] ex limitatione intellectus. Tripliciter enim dicitur terminus discretus. Est enim aliquis terminus discretus a demonstratione, ut pronomina demonstrativa; et aliquis est terminus discretus ab impositione, ut nomen proprium, quod uni soli appropriate (a proprietate *ms*) imponitur; et tertio modo aliquis est terminus discretus ab intellectus limitatione, ut tales termini 'individuum', 'singulare' et 'substantia prima', et termini aggregati ex signis particularibus (suis partibus *ms*) et nominibus appellativis, ut

as a sort of definite descriptions which refer to a unique singular being.

Not every thinker of the next generation at Oxford agreed with Alyngton, however. As a matter of fact, in his *Quaestio super universalibus* Johannes Sharpe²³ criticizes this theory and proposes a different one.

Sharpe argues²⁴ that Alyngton's answer to the question about the status of those particular second intentions like *individuum* goes against linguistic usage (*communis modus loquendi*) as well as established facts (*ratio experimentalis*). If Alyngton were right, then the following argument (which everybody will admit) would be formally incorrect:

homo currit
et non homo communis
ergo homo singularis currit,

just like this other one:

homo currit
et non homo communis
ergo Sortes currit,

as the syntagm '*homo singularis*' would be an atomic term standing precisely for only one individual, just like '*Sortes*'. Furthermore, it

'aliquis homo', 'quoddam animal', et sic de ceteris. Termini enim particulares ad hoc adduntur nominibus, ut limitent ista nomina ad res particulares, quia aliter superfluerent. Et in <isto> tertio gradu est iste terminus 'homo singularis'."

²² Cf. Tarteys, *Problema correspondens libello Porphyrii*, 202r: "Tertio suppono quod tripliciter potest dici terminum esse discretum: ex demonstratione, ut pronomina demonstrativa; ex impositione, ut propria nomina; et ex limitatione intellectus, ut tales termini 'individuum', 'singulare', 'persona' et signa particularia. Suppono quod sicut nomina propria quandoque capiuntur proprie, quandoque appellative, et per consequens abusive, sic isti termini 'individuum', 'singulare' et ceteri qui sunt singulares ex limitatione intellectus quandoque capiuntur stricte, et hoc est quando capiuntur discrete seu limitate, et quandoque appellative, sive abusive."

²³ On Johannes Sharpe's logico-metaphysical theories see Conti (ed.), Johannes Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalibus*, pars ii: studio storico-critico: 211-38, and 323-36; de Libera 1992: 83-110. On his psychological and epistemological doctrines see Kennedy 1969: 249-70.

²⁴ Cf. Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalibus*: 132-33.

is a fact that anyone can understand this sentence '*homo singularis currit*' even without knowing who the man who is running is – which is, on the contrary, a necessary requisite (the *limitatio intellectus*) according to Alynngton's theory. Therefore, Sharpe had to regard second intentions of this kind as common ones, and had to modify the criteria for the universality of terms. In his opinion, to be matched by a common nature really existing in the world is no longer the necessary and sufficient condition for being a common term. According to him, signifying universally, that is to say signifying a unitary concept (*unitas intentionis*) which, in its turn, refers to a multiplicity of things displaying at least a similar mode of being, is an equally important condition for semantical universality as the foregoing. He thinks that not only those terms which signify a common nature existing *extra animam* have to be viewed as common, but also those ones which signify universally:

Unde dico quod est dare universalia in mente et extra mentem. Universalia in mente vel sunt intentionalia, et hoc rerum vel signorum, vel sunt habitualia, vel actualia, sicut universales intellectiones. Sed universalia extra mentem vel sunt signa subordinata illis universalibus in mente, cuiusmodi sunt termini universales scripti vel vocales, vel sunt res distinctae contra talia signa, de quibus iam locutum est Et in notitiam illorum universalium pervenimus ex notitia signorum universalium et e contra. Et ratione illius provenit multis deceptio, quod credunt nullum terminum esse communem nisi sibi correspondeat aliquid ex parte rei commune Et ratione illius ponunt aliqua communia extra genus et aliqua in genere Sed illa multiplicitas universalium videtur esse tracta a posteriori, scilicet a multitudine signorum communium; et ideo non reputo eam satis securam, cum prius naturaliter sit universalitas in rebus quam in signis, et etiam quia signa possunt esse communia aliis modis quam ab universalitate significatorum.

Multo maior varietas reperitur in communitate signorum quam rerum, sicut maior multiplicitas est effectuum quam suarum causarum. Dicitur ergo quod in quibusdam terminis solus modus significandi sufficit facere communitatem, ut videtur esse de istis terminis 'chimaera', etc., qui non sunt termini specifici ex hoc quod repraesentant aliquas species ex natura rei, sed quia habent quoddammodo similem modum significandi et praedicandi cum aliis terminis specificis quibus correspondent naturae specificae in re. Et similiter dicitur quod isti termini, licet aliquo modo sunt communes, scilicet 'singulare', 'individuum', 'persona', etc., propter modum indeterminate repraesentandi plura, licet hoc non sit pure aequivoce nec pure univoce, sed quoddammodo medio modo Pro quo ulterius sciendum quod unitas intentionis, qua plura immediate univoce repraesentantur, potest dupliciter causari. Uno modo ex unitate naturae in qua multa essentialiter vel accidentaliter conveniunt; alio modo potest causari talis unitas propter similitudinem vel proportionalem habitudinem multorum inter se, licet illa similitudo non sit in aliquo uno. Et ideo magis proportionalis vel consimilis habitudo posset vocari.²⁵

Thus according to Sharpe²⁶ there are six different kinds of common expressions (*signa extra mentem*), both spoken and written: i) those which universally signify a common nature existing *in re*, like the term '*humanitas*'; ii) those which universally connote (*important*) a common nature existing *in re*, without directly signifying it, like the term '*album*', that refers to white things and connotes the form of whiteness; iii) those which do not refer to anything existing *in re*, but which are somehow correlated with a universal concept, like the terms '*vacuum*' and '*chimaera*'; iv) those to which no common natures existing *in re* correspond, but a common trans-categorical negative concept, under which a multiplicity of things can be collected (*quarto modo dicitur terminus talis communis per habitudinem ad conceptum communem extrinsecum vel accidentalem, transcendentem vel negativum, cum hoc quod communiter multa significet pro quorum quolibet potest supponere*), like the term '*individuum*'; v) equivocal terms as such, since they are connected with a multiplicity of different notions; and vi) demonstrative pronouns, like '*hoc*', when used to supposit for a common nature, even if they can signify in an atomic manner (*discrete*) only.

Sharpe admits that the nominalistic explanation of the universality of signs holds in the particular case of second intentions, thus implicitly refusing Alyngton's reduction of epistemology to ontology – since, according to his account, epistemology has its own range and rules partially independent of those of ontology. He writes:

Et illum secundum modum solum acceptant negantes universalialia, credentes se per ipsum salvare naturam universalium – quod tamen non est verum. Et alii, ponentes universalialia, solum acceptant primum. Sed ego credo utrumque modum esse accipiendum. Primo ergo modo principaliter et secundo modo secundarie causatur unitas intentionis proprie specialis et generalis. Sed secundo modo specialiter causatur unitas quarundam intentionum quae non sunt proprie in genere, sed circumeunt multa genera.²⁷

In this way Sharpe restores the semantic rank that intuitively would be assigned to the '*individuum*'-like terms (something Alyngton was unable to do), but on the other hand his defense of realism is invalidated by the acceptance, albeit restricted, of the

25 Ibid.: 68-69; and 129-30.

26 Cf. *ibid.*: 69-71.

27 *Ibid.*: 130-31.

nominalistic principle of the autonomy of thought in relation to the world. In fact, it is evident that he can no longer justify from a semantic and/or epistemological point of view the extra-mental reality of universals.

6.

Aware of all these inconsistencies, Paul of Venice tried to solve the problem on a partially different ground.²⁸ In his last work, the commentary on the *Categories* (A.D. 1428), after analyzing the positions of Alyngton and Sharpe,²⁹ he proposes a new way of dealing with it, inspired by the interpretative model utilized by him for explaining the semantic scope of transcendental terms.

Paul criticizes Alyngton's solution, which he claims to be false (*"ista opinio non est vera"*), and accepts the general idea behind Sharpe's theory, which he tries to improve on in some particular aspects. According to the Italian philosopher, Alyngton does not take into consideration the fact that there are definitions associated with expressions like *'substantia prima'* – something impossible if they were atomic terms. On the other hand, Sharpe's explanation, based on the principle of the *unitas intentionis*, does not work when applied to all the terms of second intention, as it leads to positing the existence of a species common to all species, a genus common to all genera, and so on. This consequence is undesirable in Paul of Venice's view, as he, misunderstanding the sense of Sharpe's claims, reifies Sharpe's *unitas intentionis* and considers it an extra-mental common entity.

Paul maintains that a unique universal concept corresponds to terms of second intention, even to those which signify singulars as such, but no common nature. This 'conceptual' unity is sufficient to allow for univocally defining the things these terms refer to when considered just as the bearers of the signified property:

Aliqua communia important unam vocem, unum conceptum et unam naturam, ut genera et species; quaedam important unam vocem et unum conceptum, sed non unam naturam, ut transcendentia; quaedam vero important solum unam vocem, ut pure equivocata. Haec autem communia, videlicet substantia prima, individuum,

²⁸ On Paul of Venice's life, works, and thought see Conti 1996.

²⁹ Cf. Paul of Venice, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia, dubitatio: utrum sit dare substantiam primam in communi*, 57rA-B.

singulare, particulare et huiusmodi, non important tantum unam vocem, quia definiuntur, neque important unam naturam, quia non est dare aliquam substantiam primam in qua unitive concurrunt omnes substantiae primae ... Relinquitur ergo quod talia dicunt unam vocem et unum conceptum, ex quo definiuntur. Non ergo est dare substantiam primam in communi communitate unius naturae, sed communitate unius conceptus; ita quod est dare unum conceptum communem omnibus primis substantiis, et iste conceptus est hoc commune, substantia prima. Hoc autem commune non est substantia prima nec secunda, sed est quidam conceptus communis praedicabilis de omni substantia prima, qui est extra omnia praedicamenta, sicut isti conceptus, genus et species, et alii consimiles secundae intentionis.³⁰

However, according to Paul, who in this matter agrees with Alyngton and disagrees with Sharpe, all concepts of second intention are correlated with and caused by some peculiar aspect of the things he calls ‘*intentiones in re*’ and which he describes³¹ as those modes of being and structural relations which are the objects of our last level of abstraction (*abstractio specificationis*). Thus, not only first intentions, but second intentions also, though in a slightly different manner, have a direct foundation in extra-mental reality:

³⁰ Ibid., cap. *de substantia*, 57rB.

³¹ Cf. Paul of Venice, *Summa philosophiae naturalis*, pars v, cap. 40, 90vB: “Quarta <abstractio> est specificationis. Et est illa qua intellectus elicit species secundae intentionis ex speciebus primae intentionis. Nam intellectus post formationem conceptus hominis percipit naturam humanam communicari multis individuis, et vocat illam speciem. Similiter post formationem conceptus animalis cognoscit naturam animalis inesse multis speciebus, et vocat illam genus. Et dicuntur esse conceptus specificationis quia specificant modum se habendi quidditatis extra animam”; *Scriptum super libros De anima* III, t.c. 11, 137vA: “Quartus ordo est modificativus. Nam, postquam intellectus pervenit ad primum conceptum specificum abstractum per viam divisionis, considerat modos illius naturae proprios et communes, quibus illi competunt accidentia propria vel communia per se vel per accidens, separando ea quae sunt per se ab his quae sunt per accidens – sicut communicari multis et praedicari de multis, qui sunt modi essentialia quidditatum universalium; esse disciplinabile, esse risibile, quae sunt proprietates naturae specificae, licet actus non reperiatur nisi in individuis. Et tunc facit intellectus demonstrationes, quibus demonstrat modos et proprias passiones de naturis illis. Considerans enim intellectus naturam humanam esse in multis, cognoscit illam esse communicabilem; et considerans illam solum communicari hominibus, cognoscit illam esse speciem specialissimam. Deinde, considerans solum illa in quibus est illa natura ridere et disciplinari, cognoscit omnem hominem esse risibilem. Consimiliter dicitur de natura generica. Nam, considerans intellectus istam communi-

Et sicut isti conceptus <scilicet secundae intentionis> non sunt termini mentales, sed intentiones extra animam potentes movere intellectum, ita isti conceptus, substantia prima, individuum, singulare, particulare et huiusmodi sunt extra animam. Si enim conceptus substantiae in communi est extra animam, et conceptus substantiae secundae est extra animam, necesse est quod conceptus substantiae primae sit extra animam. Si enim divisum est extra animam, oportet quodlibet dividendum esse extra animam.³²

In this way, he successfully reconciled the two different demands supported by Alyngton and Sharpe, but avoided their difficulties. Like the former, Paul could keep the principle of the one-to-one correspondence between language and the world (the keystone of medieval realism); like the latter, he could explain the semantic power of terms of second intention in accordance with an intuitive conception of them.

The basis of this theory is an extension of the notion of being (*ens*) – which he defines as *id quod est*, or *id quod habet esse*³³ – to cover even the *modi essendi* themselves,³⁴ which are entified to some extent, so that ‘*individuum*’-like terms can eventually have a foundation (*fundamentum*) which is almost as real as a *res praedicamentalis* without being a common nature. The realism was safe, and the logic was too.

cari pluribus speciebus, intelligit illam esse genus; et percipiens omnia illa in quibus est illa natura aliquando dormire, aliquando vitaliter operari, intelligit cuilibet animali inesse somnum et vigiliam tamquam proprias passiones etc.”

32 Paul of Venice, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia*, 57rB.

33 Cf. Paul of Venice, *Lectura super libros Metaphysicorum* IV, 1, 1, 125vB: “Si enim quaeritur propter quid substantia aut accidens est ens, convenienter respondetur ‘quia habet esse’, aut ‘quia est id quod est’”; *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii*, cap. *de specie*, 22rb: “Unde ‘ens’ significat omnia sub ista ratione, quae est: esse illud quod est.”

34 Cf. *Lectura super libros Metaphysicorum* V, 2, 2, 179vB: “Secunda distinctio est quod ens aut substantia, aut quantitas, aut qualitas, et sic de aliis praedicamentis. Ista distinctio demonstratur, quia sicut ens secundum accidens est illud quod importat praedicationem accidentalem, ita ens secundum se est illud quod importat praedicationem essentialem; sed modi praedicandi sumuntur a modis essendi, alioquin praedicationes non essent nisi figmenta; ergo tot sunt modi essendi quot sunt modi praedicandi; sed modi praedicandi sunt decem, secundum decem figurarum praedicamentorum; ergo modi essendi sunt decem; et per consequens ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta.” See also *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de numero praedicamentorum*, 51rA.

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IV

The Buridanian Tradition

Buridan's Logic and the Ontology of Modes

GYULA KLIMA

Summary: The aim of this paper is to explore the relationships between Buridan's logic and the ontology of modes (*modi*). Modes, not considered to be really distinct from absolute entities, could serve to reduce the ontological commitment of the theory of the categories, and thus they were to become ubiquitous in this role in late medieval and early modern philosophy. After a brief analysis of the most basic argument for the real distinction between entities of several categories ("the argument from separability"), I point out that despite nominalist charges to the contrary, "older realists" – that is, authors working before and around Ockham's time – were not committed to such real distinctions, and thus to an overpopulated ontology, by their *semantic* principles. However, what *did* entail such a commitment on their part, along with the argument from separability, was treating abstract terms in several accidental categories as "rigid designators", that is, essential predicates (species and genera) of their *supposita*. Therefore, although in the form of "extra-categorical" *modi essendi* modes were well established in earlier medieval thought, their appearance *within* the theory of categories was conditioned on analyzing several abstract terms in the accidental categories as non-essential predicates of their particulars, something that "older realists" would in general not endorse. (This does not mean that even "older realists" were universally committed to really distinct entities in all ten categories. See on this e.g. notes 13 and 18.) Next, I show how this type of analysis is achieved "automatically" by Buridan's theory of "eliminative" nominal definitions (in contrast to the older "non-eliminative" theory). However, since "realist" semantic principles in themselves did not yield a commitment to really distinct entities in all categories, it was also open for later "realists" to operate with not-really-distinct modes in several categories, although using different, "non-nominalist" tactics to treat the abstract accidental terms signifying them as non-rigid designators. The conclusion of the paper is that, as a consequence, both nominalist and later "realist" thinkers were able to achieve the same degree of ontological reductions in their respective logical frameworks, and so it was not so much their ontologies as their different logical "tactics" that set them apart.

Real distinction and the argument from separability

In one of his questions on Aristotle's *Physics*, Buridan invites us to consider whether an object of a certain shape (*figuratum*) is identical with or distinct from its shape (*figura*).¹ Although the ques-

¹ Buridan, *Quaestiones Physicorum*, lb. 2. q. 3. To be sure, in the question Buridan distinguishes between taking *figuratum* for the *substance* having some shape and

tion in itself might not seem too exciting, the way it was handled by Buridan and other medieval philosophers has far-reaching implications concerning their general conceptions of the relationship between language, thought, and reality.

To see these implications, let us take, as philosophers so often did over the centuries, a piece of wax. First let us roll it into a ball. So now our piece of wax is spherical. Then let us shape it into a cube, so that now, say, one minute later, we have the same piece of wax as before, but with a different, cubic shape. So now it is cubical.

This much is common experience, so probably nobody would raise objections to the above description of the process of the transfiguration of our piece of wax. But here is another description of the same process. Let us call our piece of wax² *W* for brevity's sake. When we rolled *W* into a ball, then it became spherical, that is to say, sphericity came into existence in *W*. Thus, if we refer to the time when *W* was shaped into a ball as t_1 , we can say that at t_1 *W*'s sphericity existed. However, at the later time, let us call it t_2 , when *W* was shaped into a cube, *W* took on cubic shape, that is to say, *W*'s cubicity came into existence, while its sphericity perished. So at t_2 *W*'s sphericity did not exist, while *W*'s cubicity did.

Now, humanist squeamishness about the barbarity of the contrived abstract terms aside, many philosophers would certainly feel uneasy about the coming and going of the strange new entities apparently referred to by these terms in this new description. After all, why should we admit such new, obscure entities into our ontology?

Apparently, we are forced to do so on the basis of the following simple argument, which henceforth I will refer to as *the argument from separability*.³ When *W* first was a sphere, this was on account of its having spherical shape. Then, after its change, *W* became a

taking it for the *quantity* of the substance thus and so shaped. As he assumes the distinction of substance and quantity, he says that *figuratum* taken in the first way without a doubt signifies something distinct from what *figura* signifies, and thus the question really concerns the identity or distinction of the *quantity* of a substance and *its* shape. However, since in the following discussion the distinction between substance and quantity will not be relevant, for the sake of simplicity of expression I will ignore this nicety, and will speak freely, for example, about the identity or distinction between a piece of wax and its shape. I do not think this will do any harm if we keep in mind that what is *really* at stake for Buridan here is the distinction between the *quantity* of the wax and the shape that renders this quantity thus and so arranged in space.

2 Or, rather, its quantity: see previous note.

cube, on account of taking on cubic shape. But since spherical shape certainly cannot be the same as cubic shape, and nothing can have two different shapes at the same time, when *W*'s cubic shape came into existence, its spherical shape must have ceased to exist. And so, since after the change *W* remained in existence, while its spherical shape ceased to exist, *W* cannot be identified with its spherical shape before the change; indeed, by parity of reasoning, nor with its cubic shape after the change. Thus, in order to account for this change we must assume three distinct entities in our analysis: *W*, *W*'s spherical shape, and *W*'s cubic shape.

Ockham's charge

This is, however, precisely the kind of consideration William Ockham would reject as arising from a mistaken, what we might call "realist", conception of the relationship between language and reality, according to which – says Ockham – "a column is to the right by to-the-rightness, God is creating by creation, is good by goodness, just by justice, mighty by might, an accident inheres by inherence, a subject is subjected by subjection, the apt is apt by aptitude, a chimera is nothing by nothingness, someone blind is blind by blindness, a body is mobile by mobility, and so on for other, innumerable cases".⁴ And this is nothing, but "to multiply beings according to the multiplicity of terms ..., which, however, is erroneous and leads far away from the truth".⁵

Despite Ockham's accusation (to be echoed by later nominalists over and over again),⁶ the "realists" Ockham attacks were not

³ Perhaps it is interesting to note here that Scotus referred to the same type of argument as *via separationis*. In any case, this seems to indicate that by his time this type of argumentation was considered as one of the basic types of argument to decide issues of ontological distinctness. Cf. *Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia*, t. 7, *Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Parisiis, apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1893, lb. 7, q. 1, pp. 350-355.

⁴ Ockham, *Summa Logicae*.169.

⁵ *Ibid.* p.171.

⁶ "the realists are those who contend that things are multiplied according to the multiplicity of the terms," whereas "those doctors are called nominalists, who do not multiply the things principally signified by terms according to the multiplicity of the terms." This is from the manifesto of the Parisian nominalist doctors of 1474, printed in Franz Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia*, Münster, 1925, p. 322. Quoted and translated by Menn: Forthcoming.

committed to an overpopulated ontology by their *semantic* principles. First of all, it should be clear that the “obscure entities” purportedly referred to by these contrived abstract terms are not the universal, eternal beings of some Platonic heaven of ideas. The entities to be considered here are just as individual and just as temporal as the things we are all familiar with in our everyday experience.⁷ Secondly, and this is more to the present point, as far as “realist” *semantic* principles are concerned, these entities need not even be “new”, that is, they need not even be distinct from the other, “familiar” entities, such as the piece of wax we started out with.

The main principles of a “realist” semantics

To see this in more detail, let us consider the following. The “realist” semantics Ockham attacks can be characterized at least by the following assumptions:

1. Concrete as well as abstract common terms signify ultimately whatever their concepts represent as their formal objects. I shall call what they ultimately signify their *significata*.⁸

⁷ In fact, the theory of ideas in the crude form in which it is usually presented was regarded by late medieval philosophers as so absurd that some even doubted Plato would have ever held it in that form. “Adeo opinio Platonis apparet impossibilis, ut fuerint nonnulli suspicati Aristotelem id imposuisse Platoni. Et certe Augustinus, qui fuit Platonicus, lib. 83 *Questiones*, q. 46, dicit, quasi interpretans Platonem, ideas non esse nisi rationes in mente Creatoris, nec esse distinctas ab essentia divina, sed essentiam Dei esse Ideam omnium rerum, quia est quodam modo omnia, atque adeo Deus se intuens ut exemplar res extra producit, quae est concors sententia theologorum. [...] At vero creditu est difficillimum Aristotelem, tempore ipso Platonis, eiusque discipulis viventibus rem tam absurdam imposuisse Platoni, nisi Plato dixisset.” D. Soto: *In Isagogen*, q. 1, p. 30. II. Cf. Aegidius Romanus, ISN, d.19, pars 2, q. 1, and Wyclif: 61-69.


⁸ Both from primary sources and from secondary literature we usually get a characterization according to which these ultimate *significata* are the *forms* of particulars. However, that the ultimate *significata* of common terms need not necessarily be regarded metaphysically as *forms* in all cases was a commonplace among thinkers who otherwise would provide such a characterization. As St. Thomas wrote: “...dicendum est quod illud a quo aliquid denominatur non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammaticae loquendo. Denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae.” QDP, q. 7, a. 10, ad 8 Cf. also e.g. Cajetan: “Verum ne fallaris cum audis denominativum a forma denominante oriri, et credas propter formae vocabulum quod res denominans debet esse forma eius quod denominatur, scito quod formae nomine in hac materia in-

2. As the subject of a proposition, a common term supposits *personally* for (i.e., refers to) whatever is in actuality in respect of its *significata* (relative to the time and modality of the copula of the proposition, taking into account the possible ampliative force of the propositional context).⁹ What is thus supposed for by a term in the context of a proposition I shall briefly call here the term's *supposita*.

3. On account of their different mode of signifying (*modus significandi*), the *supposita* of abstract terms are the same as their *significata*, whereas the *supposita* of concrete terms may or may not be the same as their *significata*. In any case, the *supposita* (and hence also the *significata*) of abstract terms are always the same as the *significata* of their concrete counterparts. So, this semantic principle specifies only that the *significata* and *supposita* of abstract terms are the same, and that they are the same as the *significata* of their concrete counterpart, but it leaves open the question whether the *supposita* of a concrete term are the same as its *significata*. Using our example of W and its sphericity, this is shown in the following figure:

telligimus omne illud a quo aliquid dicitur tale, sive illud sit secundum rem acci- dens, sive substantia, sive materia, sive forma." Cajetan, *In Praedicamenta*: 18. In general, it is precisely this point that lies at the bottom of the distinction between *extrinsic vs. intrinsic denomination*. In fact, Buridan attributes the original idea of the distinction between semantic and metaphysical considerations to Averroes: "Nam, sicut dicit Commentator, duodecimo *Metaphysicae*, grammaticus videt in multis differre dispositionem et dispositum, et sic movetur ad imponendum eis nomina diversa, ut 'albedo' et 'album'; et quia non est ejus inquirere an in omnibus vel in quibusdam sic differant dispositio et dispositum, ipse secundum similitudinem ad illa in quibus manifeste differunt imponit etiam aliis nomina per modum dispositionis et dispositi, seu determinationis et determinabilis, vel etiam determinati, derivando ab abstracto concretum vel e converso, relinquens metaphysico considerationem an illa nomina supponant pro eodem vel pro diversis, propter quem diversum modum significandi grammaticalem illa nomina habent diversos modos praedicandi." Buridanus, *Lectura de Summa Logicae: De Praedicabilibus*, c. 7, n. 4.

⁹ Thus, *album* in *album currit* refers to whatever is actual at the time of the utterance of this proposition in respect of what is signified in it by *album* (whatever it is in itself), that is, all things that are white at that time. However, say, in *album currebat*, owing to the past tense of the verb, the same term refers to whatever is or was actual in the same respect, that is, whatever is or was white at that time. For further details and reconstruction of the theory of ampliation see Klima: Forthcoming.



4. An affirmative categorical proposition is true if and only if the *supposita* of its subject are actual in respect of the *significata* of its predicate (relative to the time and modality of the copula, taking into account the possible ampliative force of the propositional context) as determined by the quantity of the proposition. (This, of course, is just a general formulation of the familiar *inherence theory of predication*.)

These semantic principles in the form listed here, of course, appear nowhere in the works of medieval logicians. Still, I think it can be claimed with a justifiable degree of confidence that they provide a fair characterization of the kind of semantic theory that was at work in the logical doctrines Ockham attacked.¹⁰ However, on the basis of this characterization it should also be clear that Ockham's attack, as far as the issue of the ontological commitment of this semantic theory is concerned, was rather unjustified.

Ockham's charge disproved

Ockham's charge, which Buridan shares,¹¹ is that the "realists" posit distinct entities for each term in each category as their *significata*. In view of 3, however, we can see that, *as far as the semantic theory is concerned*, this need not be the case at all. In fact, using the

¹⁰ For references to justify the historical correctness of these formulations, especially in St. Thomas Aquinas's case, see Klima 1996.

¹¹ "Notandum est quod de actione et passione et de aliis quattuor ultimis praedicamentis ego non intendo sequi doctrinam auctoris *Sex Principiorum*. Quia puto quod erravit ex eo quod credit nullos terminos diversorum praedicamen-

previous example, it is easy to see that these semantic principles leave open the question whether we should regard *W* and its shape as the same entity or as distinct entities. For concerning our example this theory states only the following. At t_1 *W* was a sphere, so at t_1 the proposition ‘*W* is a sphere’ was true. Hence, by 4, the theory is committed to holding that at t_1 *W* was actual in respect of the significate of the predicate ‘sphere’, which, by 3, is what can be referred to in another proposition by the corresponding abstract term, namely, ‘sphericity’. Thus, the theory is committed to holding that at t_1 *W* was actual in respect of sphericity, which is just another way of saying that *W*’s sphericity existed, whence we can conclude further that the theory is committed to holding that at t_1 the proposition ‘A sphericity exists’ was true. However, again, in virtue of 3, this commitment *does not* imply a further commitment to a “new” entity besides *W*, for *W*’s sphericity, namely, what was supposed for by the term ‘sphericity’ in this existential claim, *as far as the semantic theory is concerned*, may or may not be identical with *W*, namely, with one of the *supposita* of the term ‘sphere’ at t_1 in the proposition ‘A sphere exists’.

But then, what can we make of the fact that at t_2 *W* still existed, whereas its sphericity ceased to exist? Again, *as far as the above-described semantic theory is concerned*, this fact need not imply the distinction between *W* and its sphericity. For in terms of this theory, if we assume the identity of *W* and *W*’s sphericity, all this means is that whereas the term ‘*W*’ at t_2 still supposed for *W* in the context of the proposition ‘*W* exists’, the term ‘sphericity’ no longer supposed for the same thing in the context of the proposition ‘A sphericity exists’ at the same time.

In fact, if we take a look at Buridan’s reply to the same type of argument we can see that his solution is essentially the same: despite the fact that, in virtue of its transmutation, *W*’s sphericity ceased to exist, while *W* remained in existence, we need not thereby be committed to their distinction, for we may analyze the description of this change solely in terms of the change of the supposition of the term ‘sphericity’. What happened need not be re-

torum supponere pro eodem, et ideo credit quod actio esset una forma et passio alia, et quod passio esset effectus actionis; quod est totum falsum, ideo dicta ejus fecerunt multos errare.” Buridanus, *Lectura de Summa Logicae: De Praedicamentis*, c. 6, n. 1.

garded as one entity ceasing to be while the other remained in existence. Rather, what we had here was just one and the same entity staying in existence, which before the change could be referred to both by the name 'W' and by the name 'sphericity', but which after the change could be referred to only by the name 'W', but no longer by the name 'sphericity'.

“Rigid designators” and the argument from separability

This analysis, however, immediately gives rise to at least two further questions. First, if it is not the ceasing to be of W's sphericity that accounts for the fact that the term 'sphericity' can no longer refer to W's sphericity, then what is it? *Something*, after all, *did* change here! Second, if Buridan's solution was in principle available to the upholders of the older semantic theory attacked by Ockham, then why is it that they, in fact, would maintain a distinction between W and W's sphericity? Was there some further (semantic, or perhaps other) reason besides these simple semantic principles on account of which they were in fact committed to such a distinction?

It is the answer to the first question that for Buridan, and, most significantly, for late-medieval “realists” as well, gives rise to the ontology of modes. (To be sure, talk about *modi*, especially, about “extra-categorical” *modi essendi*, was nothing new in Buridan's time.¹² The novelty in the treatment of *modi* in late-medieval phi-

12 In fact, such an “old realist” as Giles of Rome, felt it inevitable to introduce *modi essendi* as the *esse essentiae* (as opposed to the *esse existentiae*) of the *forma partis* (as opposed to the *forma totius*) and of accidental forms. (Aegidius Romanus, *Theoremata*, th. VIII.) Indeed, he even goes on to explain that such a *modus* is not a third thing besides the accidental form and its subject. (*Theoremata*, th. XV.) Yet, he insists that the accidental form itself can never be the same as its subject, for from the union of an accident and its subject there can never result one nature. Also, he insists that, since whatever is in a category is there on account of its nature, nothing can be in two categories. (*Theoremata*, th. XIII-XIV.) So, since these *modi essendi* are not categorical entities, despite the fact that *outside* of the categories Giles recognizes *modi* and along with them some distinction that is not a distinction of one thing from another, he does not find such considerations applicable to the *per se* entities he acknowledges *within* the categories. And, most importantly from the point of view of our present argument, apparently he does so precisely because he regards the abstract terms of the nine accidental categories as the direct, essential predicates (*species* and *genera*) of their particulars *in linea praedicamentali*.

losophy, therefore, seems to be rather their systematic introduction into the theory of the categories.¹³) However, to see why the same new ontological scenario should emerge for an uncompromising nominalist and for late-medieval “realists” alike, we have to deal first with the second question.

Let us, therefore, consider again the original argument for the distinction of *W* from its sphericity. Very simply stated, the reason why we concluded that *W* had to be distinct from its sphericity was that during the transmutation *W* remained in existence, while its sphericity did not. Now why does this seem to be a sufficient reason for our conclusion? The answer is simple: if *W* and its sphericity are one and the same entity, then the assumption that *W* exists at t_2 while its sphericity does not implies the contradiction that one and the same entity both exists and does not exist at the same time. Therefore, *W* and its sphericity cannot be the same entity. This argument is simple and conclusive. But then how can Buridan deny its conclusion?

We have to notice here that the validity of this argument rests on a tacit assumption, which is so simple that it is quite easily overlooked, although almost everything else depends on it in this question. When in the argument we make the assumption to be refuted, namely, that *W* and its sphericity are one and the same entity, we also make the tacit assumption that the terms ‘*W*’ and ‘*W*’s sphericity’ – to borrow an expression from modern semantics – designate *rigidly* whatever they designate.¹⁴ If a term designates

13 An interesting “transitional” figure in this regard seems to be Durand de Saint Pourçain. See Durandus de Sancto Porciano, ISN d. 33, q. 1, where he makes a special point of the denominative character of the predicates signifying *modi* (among which he also considers *tangere* and *tangi*). Cf. also his ISN d. 30, q. 2, n. 15, approvingly referred to by Suarez (Suarez, *Disputationes*, disp. 7, sect. 1, n. 19.) Another, perhaps even more important figure seems to be Henry of Ghent, who explicitly talks about categorial relations as modes. See Henninger, 1989, pp. 40-58. (I am grateful for this reference to Russ Friedman.) Indeed, Henry apparently utilized modes to account also for the last six categories, which, despite the fact that he is chronologically “older”, would *doctrinally* place him among the “later realists”. I think this observation may have enormously interesting historical implications concerning the formation and interaction of nominalist and realist trends in later-medieval philosophy and theology, but pursuing these issues lies far beyond the scope of this paper. Further interesting remarks concerning the emergence of categorial *modi* in the works of Peter Olivi and Jean de Mirecourt can be found in Maier 1958. Cf. also n. 18.

14 See Kripke 1980: *passim*.

rigidly whatever it designates, then it designates its designatum or designata in any possible circumstances in which this designatum exists or these designata exist. Now, in fact, it is only with something like this assumption in mind that we can conclude from the transmutation of *W* that the entity that was designated by the term ‘*W*’s sphericity’ at t_1 does not exist at t_2 . For otherwise, if we do not assume this rigidity, then nothing prevents the same entity that was designated by this term at one time from persisting and still ceasing to be designated by the same term at another time. But it is easy to see that this is precisely the point also of Buridan’s solution.

This is most obvious in Buridan’s reply to the argument, which he posited earlier in his *quaestio* in the following form:

Again, tomorrow this magnitude which now is spherical will exist, and tomorrow the sphericity will not exist, because the magnitude will not be spherical, but cubical; therefore, this magnitude is not the same as this sphericity.¹⁵

His response points out that without the assumption of the rigidity of designation, the argument is formally invalid:

To the other [argument] I reply that the argument is formally invalid, for we could argue in the same way that this man is not the same as this white thing, pointing to the same thing, for tomorrow this man will exist, but this white thing will not exist.¹⁶

The reason why the comparison with the case of the white man who gets separated from his whiteness is justified is explained more clearly in the next reply:

To the other [argument] I reply that it is in the same way and not otherwise that this magnitude can be separated from this sphericity as a man from this white thing, provided that this man is white; for this separation cannot occur so that this magnitude would exist at a certain time when this sphericity will not exist. But the separation *can* occur so that this magnitude exists at a certain time, when, however, it is not a sphericity, *so this sphericity will exist, when it* [i.e. the magnitude] *will not be a sphericity*.¹⁷

15 “Item cras erit hec magnitudo que nunc est sperica et cras non erit spericitas quia magnitudo non erit sperica sed cubica, ergo non est eadem hec magnitudo et spericitas.” Buridanus, *Quaestiones Physicorum*, lb. 2. q. 3.

16 “Ad aliam dico quod forma argumenti non valet, sic enim argueretur quod non est idem homo et iste albus demonstrando eodem, quia cras erit iste homo, sed non erit iste albus.” Ibid.

17 “Ad aliam dico quod eodem modo et non aliter potest haec magnitudo separari ab hac sphericitate sicut hic homo ab hoc albo, posito quod iste homo est al-

However, this last, crucial remark, namely that the sphericity of the wax will still exist when the magnitude will no longer be a sphericity, expresses precisely the denial of the claim that the term ‘sphericity’ rigidly designates whatever it designates, that is, the claim that the term ‘sphericity’ is an essential predicate of anything of which it is true at all.

So it seems that the difference between the upholders of the older theory on the one hand, and Buridan, as well as late-medieval realists, such as Soto, Fonseca, and Suárez on the other, boils down to this, namely, that while the former would consider abstract terms in the accidental categories to be essential predicates of their particulars, the latter would reject this assumption.¹⁸ But if so, then what accounts for this “change of mind”? Indeed, who is right? Or is this just a matter of changing conventions?

Now, this point, as it obviously affects the distinction of the categories, was certainly not regarded as a matter of convention by the “realists”. Indeed, it was not regarded as such by Buridan either. He remarks:

bus; non enim potest sic esse separatio quod haec magnitudo sit aliquando quando ista sphericitas non erit. Sed sic potest esse separatio quod sit ista magnitudo aliquando quando (quod *ed.*) tamen non sit sphericitas, unde haec sphericitas erit quando illa non erit sphericitas.” Ibid., emphasis mine.

18 What seems to be at the bottom of the “older realist” commitment, then, is interpreting abstract accidental terms as the genera and species, that is, essential predicates, of their particulars. To be sure, even those authors who can justifiably be regarded as “older realists” in the sense of working within the semantic framework outlined above plus endorsing the view that abstract terms in the accidental categories are essential predicates of their supposita (such as Thomas Aquinas or Giles of Rome, or even such a *chronologically* later – yet, *doctrinally* “older” – figure as Cajetan, indeed, anyone who held that abstract accidental terms could be arranged on “predicamental trees” analogous to the familiar one in the category of substance) were prepared to regard several abstract terms as non-essential predicates of their supposita. But then they either had to regard such terms as not being (properly) in a category, or deny that *all* abstract accidental terms are essential predicates of their supposita, in which case, of course, it was open to them to identify entities across categories. (For this point see n. 30 below.) So, perhaps, in the strict sense of holding that all abstract terms in all nine accidental categories should be essential predicates of their supposita, and consequently holding the distinctness of these supposita from the supposita of substance terms and from those of terms from other categories, only Ockham’s possibly imaginary opponent could be considered an *absolute* “older realist”. On the other hand, it is also interesting to observe that the unidentified author of the *Logica Campsale*

Neither can the distinction of the categories be taken simply from the distinction of utterances, for we should not change the number [of categories] commonly given by the philosophers on account of different languages. Also, we impose utterances to signify by convention. Therefore, the number of categories would be a matter of convention, which is unacceptable.¹⁹

On the other hand, it is not just the distinction of things either that accounts for this distinction, for the same things may be supposed for by terms that belong to different categories:

... we should know that the distinction of these categories cannot be taken from the [distinction of] things for which the terms in the categories supposit, for, as was argued earlier, the same calidity is action and passion, and quantity, and quality, and relation; and the same Socrates is a man, and white, and three cubits, and father, and agent, etc.²⁰

However, what *is* regarded by Buridan as accounting for the distinction of the categories is the difference between the connotations of the various concepts by which we conceive of possibly the same things:

But [the distinction of the categories] is taken from the diverse intentions according to which terms are connotative or even non-connotative in different ways. It is from these diverse connotations that the diverse modes of predication of terms about first substances derive; and thus [the categories] are distinguished directly and immediately in accordance with the diverse modes of predication about primary substances.²¹

Anglicj, valde utilis et realis contra Ocham (Pseudo-Richard of Campsall, 1982), being a staunch defender of the real distinction of the entities in all ten categories, actually fits very well the description of Ockham's opponent(s), so this opponent (or these opponents) may not have been entirely imaginary after all. In any case, a comprehensive account of which authors and to what extent could be regarded as "older realists" in this *doctrinal* sense is beyond the scope of this paper.

19 "Nec potest eorum [sc. praedicamentorum] distinctio sumi simpliciter ex parte vocum, quia non oportet propter diversa idiomata mutare numerum quem communiter ponunt philosophi. Et voces etiam imponuntur ad significandum ad placitum. Ideo plurificarentur praedicamenta ad placitum nostrum, quod est inconveniens." Buridanus, *Quaestiones in Praedicamenta*, q. 3, pp.17-18.

20 "... sciendum, quod non potest distinctio horum praedicamentorum sumi ex parte rerum, pro quibus termini praedicamentales supponunt, quia sicut prius arguebatur, eadem caliditas est actio et passio et quantitas et qualitas et ad aliquid; et idem Sortes est homo et albus et tricubitus et pater et agens, etc." *ibid.*

21 "Sed [distinctiones praedicamentorum] sumuntur ex diversis intentionibus, secundum quas termini sunt diversimode connotativi vel etiam non connotativi. Ex quibus diversis connotationibus proveniunt diversi modi praedicandi termino-

Again, this much, as far as *concrete terms* are concerned, is common doctrine both for Buridan and for the older as well as the later “realists”. However, there is one particular aspect of Buridan’s treatment of the categories which brings him together with later “realists”, and distinguishes both his and the latter’s approach from that of the older “realists”. This is his treatment of several *abstract terms* from the nine accidental categories as being connotative, and thus as being non-essential predicates of their particulars.²² But, as we can see, this is precisely what allows him to reduce the number of the kinds of really distinct entities, while formally keeping the distinction of the ten categories.

Nominal definitions and the semantic complexity of abstract terms

Treating several abstract terms as connotative rather than absolute terms, and hence regarding them as accidental rather than essential predicates of their particulars, is not just a capricious in-

rum de primis substantiis; et ita directe et immediate distinguuntur penes diversos modos praedicandi de primis substantiis.” Ibid.

22 Cf.: “De prima dubitatione secundum dicta alias manifestum est, quod multi sunt termini vocales non habentes in mente conceptus simplices sibi correspondentes, sed quod terminus vocalis habet conceptum sibi correspondentem complexum ex multis simplicibus. Et sic ille terminus vocalis indiget diffiniri diffinitione explicante quid nominis per orationem complexam ex multis dictionibus saepe ad diversa praedicamenta pertinentibus. Et sic talis terminus dicitur esse de unoquoque illorum praedicamentorum; non tamen simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet cum additione, loquendo ut quia est de tali praedicamento quantum ad talem terminum, quem includit, et de alio praedicamento quantum ad alium talem terminum. Sed tamen ego credo, quod simpliciter sine additione debeat dici de illo praedicamento, cujus magis retinet modum praedicandi secundum suam totalem aggregationem. Verbi gratia licet prandium significet comestionem de mane et cena comestionem in vespere, tamen prandere et cenare pertinent ad praedicamentum ‘agere’ et non ad praedicamentum de quando, quia si quaeratur, quid Sortes facit, dicimus quod ipse prandet vel quod ipse cenat. Sed si quaeramus, quando comedet Sortes vobiscum respondetur forte, quod cras, et tunc quaeritur magis specificice, scilicet quando cras, et respondetur: in prandio, vel respondetur: in cena. Et sic illud praedicatum ‘in cena’ est de praedicamento ‘quando’, et non de praedicamento actionis simpliciter loquendo. Unde licet ‘in cena’ et ‘cenare’ bene habeant aliquas easdem significationes, tamen cum illis habent diversas connotationes, propter quas habent diversos modos praedicandi. Et similiter reponitur hoc in uno praedicamento et illud in alio.” Buridanus, *Quaestiones in Praedicamenta*, q. 14: 103.

novation on Buridan's part. He has serious theoretical reasons for doing so, rooted in the very principles of his philosophy of mind and language.

For Buridan what a term signifies is determined by the kind of concept the term is subordinated to, but the syntactic features of spoken or written terms do not provide us with a safe guide to decide whether they are subordinated to simple or complex concepts. In particular, the syntactic simplicity of a spoken or written term may conceal just any sort of conceptual, and hence semantic complexity. But then the way for us to find out about this sort of hidden complexity is conceptual analysis: by providing the exact nominal definition of such a simple term we reveal precisely this hidden semantic complexity, when the grammatical construction of the nominal definition faithfully mirrors the conceptual construction hidden by the syntactic simplicity of the spoken or written term.²³ Therefore, as Buridan himself explicitly concludes, if a term has a nominal definition, then the term has to be subordinated to a complex concept.²⁴ However, a complex concept corresponding to a nominal definition has to be connotative. The reason for this is that the only complex absolute concepts are those corresponding to quidditative definitions, which can be given only of absolute terms.²⁵ But absolute terms do not have nominal defi-

²³ For more on this see Klima 1991.

²⁴ "In secunda clausula manifestatur quorum terminorum sunt tales diffinitiones. Propter quod sciendum est quod dictiones vocales impositae sunt ad significandum conceptus immediate, et mediantibus eis res conceptas significant. Sunt autem conceptus nostri aliqui simplices, aliqui ex pluribus simplicibus complexi, prout alias dictum est. Si ergo imponatur dictio aliqua ad significandum conceptum simplicem, sive incomplexum, tunc talis dictio non est interpretabilis, sed si alicui sit ignota ejus significatio, notificabitur sibi aliquando per aliam dictionem synonymam, sicut puero gallico per idioma gallicum docetur idioma latinum, aliquando docetur hoc per ostensionem rei significatae et vocis expressionem, sicut infanti a matre docetur suum idioma, aliquando etiam docetur hoc per dictionis descriptionem vel quidditativam diffinitionem. Sed si dictio imposita fuerit ad significandum conceptum ex pluribus simplicibus conceptibus complexum, tunc indiget interpretatione per plures dictiones significantes seorsum illos conceptus simplices ex quibus est in mente complexio. Sic enim 'philosophus' interpretatur 'amator sapientiae' (dicitur enim 'philosophus' a 'philos' graece, quod est 'amator' latine, et 'sophos', quod est 'sapientia', quasi 'amator sapientiae'), et ideo nihil plus vel nihil aliud debet nobis significare ista dictio 'philosophus' quam ista oratio 'amator sapientiae', et e converso. Notandum est autem quod aliquando conceptum complexum ex pluribus simplicibus imponimus ad significandum per

nitions, since they are subordinated to simple concepts.²⁶ Therefore, any term that has a nominal definition is subordinated to a complex concept which has to be connotative, and so the term has to be connotative too. So, if we are able to provide a nominal definition of an abstract term, then the abstract term in question “automatically” comes out from this analysis as connotative, and thus, if its *connotata* are distinct from its *supposita*, as an accidental predicate of its particulars.²⁷ Therefore, providing nominal definitions of abstract terms referring to these particulars can be used to “eliminate” these particulars as distinct entities, for such an analysis will at once invalidate the principal argument for their distinction from entities referred to by absolute terms.

However, at this point it is very important to note a fundamental difference between the way Buridan treats nominal definitions, and the way “realists” treat them. The difference can be most clearly seen if we compare Buridan’s treatment with what Cajetan says about nominal definitions in his commentary on Aquinas’s *De Ente et Essentia*:

Just as the *quid rei* is the quiddity of the thing, so the *quid nominis* is the quiddity of the name: but a name, as it is the sign of the passions that are objectively in the soul (from bk.1. of Aristotle’s *Perihermeneias*), does not have any other quiddity

unam simplicem dictionem vocalem, sicut possumus facere ad placitum nostrum, et expedit saepe ad brevius loquendum. Et aliquando conceptus complexus ex determinatione et determinabili pro aliquo supponit, et aliquando pro nullo, sicut dictum est alias, sicut ‘animal album’ pro aliquo supponit, aut etiam ‘animal non album’, sed ‘homo hinnibilis’ pro nullo supponit, vel etiam ‘equus non hinnibilis’. Si ergo conceptum complexum significatum complexe per hanc orationem vocalem ‘animal album’ ego volo significare per dictionem incomplexam, ut per hanc vocem ‘A’, et similiter conceptum ‘hominis hinnibilis’ per hanc vocem ‘B’, tunc haec dictio ‘A’ pro aliquo supponit, sicut ‘animal album’, et haec dictio ‘B’ pro nullo supponit, sicut nec ‘homo hinnibilis’. Et utraque dictio habet diffinitionem dicentem quid nominis; nam haec oratio ‘animal album’ est diffinitio hujus dictionis ‘A’ et haec oratio ‘homo hinnibilis’ hujus dictionis ‘B.’” Buridanus, *Lectura de Summa Logicae: De Demonstrationibus* c.2, n. 4.

25 “Quinta clausula apponit etiam istam aliam proprietatem, scilicet quod termini connotativi, sicut sunt termini accidentales concreti et multi tales abstracti, non habent diffinitiones proprie dictas quidditativas.” *ibid.*

26 “Unde solus terminus vocalis cui non correspondet conceptus simplex, sed complexus, habet proprie diffinitionem dicentem quid nominis, scilicet praecise significantem quid et quo modo ille terminus significat.” Buridanus, *Lectura de Summa Logicae: Sophismata* c. 1, conclusio 11a.

27 Cf. Buridanus: *Quaestiones in Praedicamenta*, q.2: 9-12.

than this, namely that it is a sign of a thing understood or thought of. But a sign, as such, is in a relation to what is signified: so to know the *quid nominis* is precisely to know what the name is related to, as a sign [is related to] what is signified. Such knowledge, however, can be acquired through the accidental properties of what is signified, as well as through its common, or essential properties, or simply by a gesture, or whatever else you like. For example, if we ask a Greek about the meaning of *anthropos*, if he points to a man, at once we know the *quid nominis*, and similarly in other cases. But to those asking about the *quid rei*, it is necessary to indicate what belongs to the thing in virtue of its essence. And this is the essential difference between the *quid nominis* and the *quid rei*: namely, that the *quid nominis* is the relation of the name to what it signifies; but the *quid rei* is the essence of the thing related or signified. All the other differences that are usually claimed follow from this difference: namely, that the *quid nominis* is of non-entities, complexes, [defined] by accidental, common, and external [properties]; while the *quid rei* is of incomplex entities [defined] by their proper, essential [properties]. For a spoken word's relation can be terminated to non-existents, and it can be clarified by accidental and similar properties, but the thing's essence can be known only by proper, essential properties of incomplex things.²⁸

As can be seen, Cajetan's nominal definitions, in contrast to Buridan's, need not at all be synonymous with their *diffinita*, whence they do not serve any sort of conceptual analysis that Buridan had in mind with *his* nominal definitions. For Cajetan a nominal definition can be just any sort of indication of a sample of the *supposita* of a term, indeed, it may have nothing to do with the signification of its *diffinitum*. But then, giving a nominal definition of a

28 "Sicut quid rei est quidditas rei, ita quid nominis est quidditas nominis: nomen autem, cum sit nota earum quae sunt obiective in anima passionum (ex primo Perihermeneias), non habet aliam quidditatem nisi hanc, quod est signum alicuius rei intellectae seu cogitatae. Signum autem ut sic, relativum est ad signatum: unde cognoscere quid nominis nihil est aliud, quam cognoscere ad quid tale nomen habet relationem ut signum ad signatum. Talis autem cognitio potest acquiri per accidentalitatem illius signati, per communia, per essentialia, per nutus, et quibusvis aliis modis. Sicut a Graeco quaerentibus nobis quid nominis anthropos, si digito ostendatur homo iam percipimus quid nominis, et similiter de aliis. Interrogantibus vero quid rei oportet assignare id quod convenit rei significatae in primo modo perseitatis adaequate. Et haec est essentialis differentia inter quid nominis et quid rei, scilicet quod quid nominis est relatio nominis ad signatum; quid rei vero est rei relatae seu significatae essentia. Et ex hac differentia sequuntur omnes aliae quae dici solent: puta quod quid nominis sit non entium, complexorum, per accidentalitatem, per communia, per extranea; quid rei vero est entium incomplexorum per propria et essentialia. Relatio enim vocis potest terminari ad non entia in rerum natura, et complexa, et declarari per accidentalitatem et huiusmodi, essentia autem rei non nisi per propria essentialia habetur de entibus incomplexis." Cajetanus, *Super Librum De Ente et Essentia*: 290.

term need not reveal anything about the simplicity or complexity of the concept it is subordinated to. Thus, for those who hold such a conception of nominal definitions there is nothing in giving a nominal definition that would make them conclude that the concept of the term thus defined must be complex, and that, as a consequence, the term itself should be an accidental predicate of its particulars.²⁹

Conclusion: separability, modes, and the disintegration of scholastic discourse

As we have seen, despite nominalist charges to the contrary, “realist” *semantic* principles in themselves did not determine the distinctness of the semantic values of abstract and concrete terms, and so by these principles alone “realists” were not committed to the distinctness of the semantic values of abstract terms in the nine accidental categories either. The principal argument for the distinctness of these semantic values, the argument from separability, however, does imply such a commitment, if these abstract terms are regarded as “rigid designators”, that is, as essential predicates of their particulars. In fact, the main reason for this type of commitment in the case of “older realists” seems to be precisely their treating (most, not necessarily all) abstract accidental terms as signifying the species and genera of particular accidents *in linea recta praedicamentali*, and hence as being their essential predicates.³⁰

²⁹ In fact, Cajetan in his *Commentary on the Categories* insists that Aristotle’s theory concerns entities as conceived by simple concepts. So in his conception such eliminative analyses of categorial concepts would be excluded from the start. See Cajetan, *In Praedicamenta*, Prologus: 1-7.

³⁰ Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 7; see also Aegidius Romanus, *Theoremata*, theorems XIII-XIV, and Cajetan, *In Praedicamenta*: 188-92. For the qualification that “most, not necessarily all” accidental terms were so treated, see in particular the alternative opinions Cajetan refers to in this passage, and the way Soto uses the old distinction between *relativa secundum esse* vs. *secundum dici*. Indeed, even Aquinas allows the possibility of one and the same entity belonging to different categories: “Sed si actio et passio sunt idem secundum substantiam, videtur quod non sint diversa praedicamenta. Sed sciendum quod praedicamenta diversificantur secundum diversos modos praedicandi. Unde idem, secundum quod diversimode de diversis praedicatur, ad diversa praedicamenta pertinet. Locus enim, secundum quod praedicatur de locante, pertinet ad genus quantitatis. Se-

But then, anyone who wishes to get rid of this type of commitment obviously has to eliminate the “rigidity” of abstract accidental terms in some way or another. A powerful nominalist tactic to this effect was conceptual analysis in terms of nominal definitions. Such analysis eliminates the apparent semantic simplicity of abstract accidental terms, thereby showing that the abstract term in question is not absolute, but connotative, and so it is not essentially true of its particulars. As a result, a nominalist can justifiably claim that such a term may become false of its particulars without the perishing of its particulars. But then in the case of such a term the argument from separability does not work, and so apparently nothing prevents the identification of its semantic values with those of other, absolute terms.

Thus, if we say that the nominal definition of ‘sphericity’ is ‘a quantity whose outermost points are equidistant from a given point’, then it may seem obvious that a quantity which is now a sphericity may remain in existence without remaining a sphericity, on account of simply changing the distance of its outermost points from a given point in space. However, this of course will not cause its perishing, it will only change the *way* it is arranged in space, its *modus*. But this *modus* does not have to be another thing over and above the quantity of a body thus and so arranged in space. Indeed, if it were something really distinct from the quantity thus and so arranged, then it could be separated from this quantity by divine power, which means that there could be a quantity with definite dimensions, but no shape, or, conversely, there could be a shape, but no quantity so-shaped, which is absurd.³¹

cundum autem quod praedicatur denominative de locato, constituit praedicamentum ubi. Similiter motus, secundum quod praedicatur de subiecto in quo est, constituit praedicamentum passionis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur de eo a quo est, constituit praedicamentum actionis.” *In Meta.* lb. 11, lc. 9, n. 2313. See also n. 34. below.

³¹ Of course, “older realists”, such as Scotus, were also quite aware of the possibility of this type of argumentation (for example, in the case of real relations), which Stephen Menn calls the “voluntaristic argument”. See Menn: Forthcoming. Their solution was to refer to the essential dependency of one thing on another, which, despite their real distinction, would render their separation contradictory, and hence not possible even by divine power. In a different context, Henry of Ghent also talks about the inseparability of real relations from their foundations on account of their essential dependency on them: “De relativis etiam secundum esse dictum erat, quod quaedam erant relativa per se secundum duos modos, sci-

Thus the spherical shape is just a quantity thus and so arranged, and it ceases to be this quantity when the quantity ceases to be thus and so arranged. So the *modus* referred to by the term 'sphericity' is nothing but the thing referred to by the absolute term 'quantity'. Still, it is *not* the same thing as this quantity, absolutely speaking, for the same thing may go on existing without its continuing to be this *modus*. So the *modus* cannot be said to be the same thing, absolutely speaking, yet it cannot be said to be a distinct thing absolutely speaking either. So it has to be distinct just *somehow* [*aliqua*], in a qualified sense, namely, as Suárez would call such a qualified distinction, *modally*.³²

On the basis of this reconstruction I think it is easy to see how naturally the ontology of *modi* arises in such a framework.³³ But, as a matter of fact, not all elements of this framework are necessary for the emergence of *modi*. As we could see, to invalidate the argument from separability it was enough to regard abstract accidental terms as non-rigid, that is, as non-essential predicates of their particulars. Buridan's method to show that such a term is non-essential is conceptual analysis in terms of nominal definitions. But this is not the only possible way to arrive at the same conclusion. In fact, the "older realists" already had appropriate tools for treating several abstract accidental terms as non-essential predicates of their particulars, and so, as not necessarily picking out really distinct entities. As Domingo Soto's work shows, the traditional distinction between *relationes secundum esse* and *relationes secundum dici*, combined with identifying relations with their foundations, can achieve exactly the same result in ontology as the different,

licet modo numerorum et modo potentiarum. Quae sunt verissima relativa, quia referuntur per essentialem dependentiam fundatam in aliquo quod per se pertinet ad utrumque eorum, in quantum refertur ad reliquum, ita quod singulum sit relativorum per se, et id quod habet in se, per se refertur ad suum correlativum. Ita quod, si desinat referri, hoc est quia deficit per se in ipso illud super quod fundatur ille respectus, et si de novo incipit referri, hoc est quia de novo incipit esse in eo id super quod ille respectus fundatur, sive fuerit ipsa essentia eius super quam fundatur, sive aliquid aliud." Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl.* III, q. 10. But then, it seems that Henry's more radical solution was eventually to opt for the real identity and merely *intentional distinction* of relations and their foundations. See n. 13 above.

³² Cf. Suárez, *Disputaciones*, disp. VII, sect. I.

³³ For further details concerning Buridan, see Normore 1985. For comparisons with Ockham, see Adams 1985.

nominalist tactic.³⁴ But, instead of using Buridan's eliminative nominal definitions, Soto uses these "old tricks" to eliminate real distinctions between the semantic values of terms belonging to several categories, especially of those belonging to the last six categories, containing the Pseudo-Porretanus's by then infamous "six principles". Indeed, quite characteristically, he expresses astonishment at the fact that others think nominal definitions could not be given of absolute terms, a direct consequence of Buridan's understanding of the function of nominal definitions. As he says:

Furthermore, a nominal definition is what explicates the quiddity of a name, and the quiddity of a name is its signification: that definition, therefore, which explicates what a name signifies, is the nominal definition. And this, as Aristotle says in bk. I. of his *Posterior Analytics*, is presupposed from the beginning of each science. For example, if we set out to deal with the science about man, we have to presuppose what the name 'man' signifies. And the phrase which explains what it signifies is the nominal definition, even if it would not explain the nature of man at all, as if you were to say, "man signifies the animal than which none is more excellent". And so I do not know from where recent authors [*iuniores*] took it that an absolute name cannot be defined by a nominal definition, for what is signified by an absolute name, such as 'elephant', is just as well explained, as [what is signified by] the name 'white'.³⁵

34 "Est ergo conclusio quod sex ultima praedicamenta sunt relativa secundum dici, quae non sunt vere relativa, sed res absolutae, quae tamen explicari non possunt nisi per respectum ad res a quibus dependent". Soto, *In Categorias*, 237 b. Cf.: "Cum enim substantia omnium sit fundamentum, tria in rebus est considerare, scilicet, aut id quod est substantia, aut accidens quod formaliter est in substantia, aut res quae extrinsecus sunt circa substantiam. Res primi generis sunt in praedicamento substantiae. Res secundi generis sunt in tribus proximis praedicamentis; si enim accidens quod formaliter est in substantia est absolutum, aut est quantitas aut qualitas, et si relativum, est ad aliquid. Res tertii generis pertinent ad sex ultima praedicamenta." *ibid.* In fact, since Soto also argues that even *relationes secundum esse* properly in the category of relation are not really distinct from their *fundamenta*, precisely because, as we would say, they are not rigid designators of their particulars, his ontology is basically the same as Buridan's. See *ibid.*: 213-17.

35 "Rursus definitio quid nominis est illa quae explicat quidditatem nominis, & quidditas nominis est eius significatio: illa ergo definitio, quae explicat quid nomen significet, est quid nominis. Quae (ut auctor est Aristo.i.post.) praesupponitur in initio cuiusque scientiae: vt aggredienti investigare scientiam de homine, supponendum est quid significat ly homo. Et illa oratio qua declaratur quid significat, est definitio quid nominis, licet nullam naturam hominis explicaret. Vt si diceres, homo significat illud animal, quo nullum est praestantius. Et ideo nescio unde collegerunt iuniores, quod nomen absolutum non potest definiri definitione quid nominis, postquam ita bene explicatur, quid significat nomen absolutum, elephas, sicut nomen album." Soto: *Summulae*, f. 22c. For this usage of *iuniores* cf. f. 214 i.

Nevertheless, despite this difference with regard to nominal definitions, both Soto and Buridan are able to regard the semantic values of several abstract accidental terms as not really distinct entities from the semantic values of absolute terms on account of the fact that they treat these abstract terms as connotative, although on different grounds.

“Nominalists”, in their theory of signification, make the fundamental distinction between absolute and connotative terms, which establishes only absolute terms as essential predicates of their particulars, or as we would say, rigid designators, and hence the only carriers of ontological commitment to really distinct entities. Combining this semantics with the eliminative nominal definitions of abstract terms, the desired ontological reductions are “automatically” achieved.

Later “realists” remain “realists” insofar as they stick to old semantic principles as well as to old reductionist tactics. But at the same time, apparently prompted by the “nominalist” charges, they are also eager to show that they are no more committed to an unreasonably overpopulated ontology than the nominalists are. A natural consequence of this program was the consistent use of *modi* – not only in the form of “extra-categorical” *modi essendi*, as they appeared in the works of “older realists”, but also in the form of “categorical” entities – culminating in Suárez’s systematic treatment of the theory of distinctions. However, this systematic use of *modi* apparently opened up the conceptual possibility of eliminating *all* really distinct accidents, “which – as Descartes puts it – would be added to substances (like little souls to their bodies), and could be separated from them by divine power”.³⁶ Indeed, since aside from considerations concerning the theology of the Holy Eucharist, the main reason for assuming the distinct existence of inherent accidents was the mostly implicit assumption that their abstract names were their essential predicates, the elimination of this assumption, *both by the nominalists and by the later realists in their own ways*, naturally led to the elimination of really distinct accidents in favor of the modes of substances in most categories by both groups of thinkers. But then it should come as no surprise that it was precisely the possibility of this sort of elimination, by whatever conceptual means available, that was to be ea-

36 AT 3: 648, quoted and translated in Menn 1995: 185.

gerly seized upon by the representatives of the emerging modern science and philosophy, who in this way could do away with *all* the “obscure entities” purportedly referred to by the “barbaric” abstract terms of “the schools”.³⁷

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From Oral Lecture to Written Commentaries: John Buridan's Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

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Summary: This paper focuses on John Buridan's reported commentaries, especially on the oldest manuscripts, with the aim of finding new evidence regarding the process from oral lecture to written commentary. Six among the more than 250 manuscripts containing authentic works by Buridan were written in Paris during the philosopher's lifetime, and at least two of them show how the oral teaching of the Parisian master was converted into a written form. The *Expositiones*, i.e. the literal commentaries, play an important role in these oldest manuscripts. These were understood as the foundation of the subsequently treated *Quaestiones*, and they had a fixed place in university teaching. The Parisian manuscript BN, lat. 16131 probably contains an original reportation (the original student's copy book) of both exposition of, and questions on, Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The manuscript Darmstadt, Hessische LuHB, Hs. 561 contains a "compiled", i.e. revised, lecture on the same Aristotelian work, but not the final version as edited in 1518 by Josse Bade. The present study will examine the formal character of these different versions and their relation to one another.

The great majority of medieval commentaries on Aristotelian works have only been transmitted because students "reported" the classroom lectures. From a philological point of view, the tradition of such a text is a very complex one, because wherever several manuscript copies of the same lecture exist, these cannot be traced back to one single autograph written by the master himself. In the case of reported commentaries, the text we might be able to find that is closest to the original are the notes of a student attending the lecture. The manuscripts now extant were (usually)

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produced later on the basis of older copies, but were (probably) rarely ever copied directly from the original notes. In fact, it is quite probable that the original notes had to be revised and that the extant manuscripts are based on revised notes. Hence there is a huge gap in our knowledge of the way the original teaching eventually became the text in extant manuscripts. If we managed to fill this gap, we would grasp more clearly both the method of teaching Aristotle in the schools and the value of the extant manuscripts as a source for understanding both what was taught and the teaching method. An understanding of the process by which oral lectures became written commentaries would not only be helpful for the production of more reliable editions and for a better historical understanding of the teaching in the medieval university, but would constitute a basic tool for the interpretation of Aristotelian commentaries.

To fill this gap in our knowledge the best starting point would be to search for manuscripts containing original reportations written by the reportator himself in the classroom. Such manuscripts might tell us how such a reportator really worked. But even if we suspected that such notes were still in existence, how could we tell such direct classroom notes from other types?¹ To find such original reportations is all the more difficult because the secondary literature on Aristotelian commentaries has to date rarely concerned itself with such problems.² In the entire literature on the Aristotelian commentary tradition, I have been able to find only two references to such original reportations. As Grabmann first noted, several anonymous commentaries in the famous manuscript Munich, Bayerische SB, clm 9559 have to be considered a student's copy book.³ The second reference is to a manuscript

1 How difficult it is to distinguish original notes from a faithful copy is shown in the excellent edition of the *Lectura in librum de anima a quodam discipulo reportata* by René-Antoine Gauthier. See the introduction, p. 9*.

2 Useful reflections on the reportation and the critical editing of a reportation can be found in Hamesse 1986, 1987, 1989; see also Meier 1954.

3 See Grabmann 1924a and 1924b. For later additions and corrections, see Duin 1954; [Siger of Brabant], *Quaestiones super libros Physicorum*, ed. Ph. Delhaye; Boethius de Dacia, *Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione*, ed. G. Sajó; Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, ed. W. Dunphy. Fernand Van Steenberghen and other scholars, who have worked for many years on this manuscript tend to see it as an original copy book of notes taken by a student. They think, however, that they

that is not so well known. In his doctoral thesis, Bernd Michael asserts that a commentary by John Buridan on the *Metaphysics*, found in ms. lat. 16131 of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, is just such a reportation.⁴

The reported commentaries of John Buridan

To the scholar wishing to explore reported commentaries, John Buridan makes for an excellent subject of study. The Picardian master taught for more than thirty years at the faculty of arts in Paris and lectured on almost all Aristotelian works. All or most of his works must be considered reportations of oral lectures. That this is the case is suggested by many titles and colophons:⁵

‘reportatus’ in Buridan’s (literal) commentaries. (all italics mine)

- (001) Expliciunt questiones cum expositione textus supra Artem Veterem a magistro Iohanne Buridan et fuit *reportata* ab Alano preposito etc. Et sic sit finis etc. (Expositio in *Artem Veterem*, Tortosa, Bibl. Capitol Catedral, cod. 108, f. 74 [XIV c.]).⁶
- (002) Expliciunt *dicta* Priorum data Parysius per venerabilem magistrum Johanne Biridanum anno Domini MCCCL6 (Expositio in duos libros *Analyticorum Priorum* Aristotelis, Praha, Knihova Metropolitni, cod. L.34 [1277], f. 136r [XIV c.]).
- (003) Explicit expositio libri Physicorum *lecta Parisius in vico straminis* a Reverendo doctore et Summo enim Philosopho Magistro Johanne Bridans, anno domini 1350, de ultimo opere, per me Antonium de Camareno (*seu Cammeno*) artium scholarem Bononie studentem. (Expositio libri *Physicorum*, Città del Vaticano, BAV, Urb. lat. 1489 [A.D. 1350], f. 69vA).
- (004) Expliciunt *dicta* Byridens super totum physicorum anno 1352 feria secunda post festum Iohannis baptiste (Expositio in octo libros *Physicorum* Aristotelis, Erfurt, WAB, CA F.298, f. 87rA).

were not taken directly in the classroom but copied at home (Van Steenberghen 1977: 194; Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, ed. W. Dunphy: 26). Hamesse 1987, on the contrary, agrees with Ph. Delhaye ([Siger of Brabant], *Quaestiones super libros Physicorum*: 6-7) that at least parts of some commentaries were written directly in school.

4 Michael 1985: 792-4, 800f., 811f.

5 Colophons of the same text in various manuscripts often contradict each other. Such discrepancies do not exclude the possibility that the terminology of titles and colophons is significant, but they demand that we be careful in our interpretations. See Flüeler 1994: 79-88.

6 Exposition and questions are distinct. The colophon refers to two separate though complementary texts.

- (005) Et sic finis istius libri etc. Expliciunt *dicta* magistri Johannis Birydensis. (Expositio in duos libros *De generatione et corruptione*, Erfurt, WAB, CA Q.325 [XIVc.], f. 105v).
- (006) Expliciunt *dicta* super librum Meteororum anno 1342 ascripta magistro Johanni Buridani. (Expositio libri *Meteororum*. [A.D. 1342], Erfurt, WAB, CA Q.342, [?Paris, c. 1370], f. 65vB).
- (007) Et in hoc explicit *lectura* tercii libri de anima *reportata parysius a magistro Johanne biriden*. Deo gracias. (Expositio in tertium librum *De anima*, Paris, BN, lat. 16130, f. 35vB).
- (008) Explicit expositio textus tercii libri de anima una cum aliis duobus primis, *lecta parisius*. Anno domini m^occc^o lxii. Deo gratias; f. Ir: Ista leccura libri de anima atque questiones ejusdem libri sunt compilate per Reverendum docctorem Magistrum Johannem de biridanis. (Expositio in tres libros *De anima*, Vendôme, BV, ms. 169, [A.D. 1362 ?], f. 44v, Ir).⁷
- (009) Explicit *dicta* super libellum de memoria et reminiscentia. (Expositio libri *De memoria et reminiscentia*, Erfurt, WAB, CA F.298, [ca. A.D. 1352], f. 128vA).
- (010) Expliciunt *dicta* super librum De somno et vigilia. (Expositio libri *De somno et vigilia*, Erfurt, WAB, CA F.298, [ca. A.D. 1352], f. 132rA).
- (011) Expliciunt *reportata* super librum de longitudine et brevitate vite (Expositio libri *De longitudine et brevitate vite*, Erfurt, WAB, CA F.298, [ca. A.D. 1352], f. 136r-137r).
- (012) Expliciunt *dicta* super libellum de longitudine et brevitate vite (Expositio libri *De longitudine et brevitate vite*, Erfurt, WAB, CA Q.325, [XIV], f. 139r).
- (013) Expliciunt *reportata* super librum de iuventute et senectute a magistro Johanne Buriden. (Expositio libri *De iuventute et senectute, De morte et vita, De respiracione*, Erfurt, WAB, CA F.298, [A.D. 1352], f. 135v).
- (014) Incipit expositio textus metaphisice *reportata sub byriden* venerabili doctore, (Expositio in duodecim libros *Metaphysicorum*, Paris, BN, lat. 16131, f. 124rA).
- (015) Expliciunt expositiones libri metaphisice super duodecim libros *lecte* a reverendo magistro *Iohanne buridan*. Finito libro sit laus et gloria Christo. Amen. Amen. (Expositio in duodecim libros *Metaphysicorum*, Carpentras, Bibl. Inguimbertaine, cod. 292 [L. 288], f. 42vA).

These colophons show sufficiently that most or all of Buridan's literal commentaries originated as lectures and that the extant manuscript copies go back to a reportation. In order to study the way reported commentaries were made, I propose to examine a few manuscripts containing commentaries attributed to John Buridan, including the above-mentioned manuscript Paris BN lat. 16131, to test Michael's claim.

⁷ The manuscript contains first the exposition (f. 1r-44vb), then the questions (f. 48ra-115rb).

The oldest manuscripts containing works attributable to John Buridan

Most of the manuscripts containing works attributable to Buridan were copied after his death in 1360. Seven out of approximately 250 manuscripts⁸ were certainly written during Buridan's lifetime. Six of these contain Aristotelian commentaries:

- 1) Paris, BN, lat. 16131, (ca. 1340, Expositio et Questiones supra libros *Metaphysice*).⁹
- 2) Darmstadt, Hessische Landes- und Hochschulbibliothek, Hs. 516, (1346 and 1347-ca. 1355, Expositio compilata et Questiones compilate supra libros *Metaphysice*, Expositio <reportata> et Questiones <reportate> supra libros *Metaphysice*).¹⁰
- 3) Paris, BN, lat. 16125, (XIV inc., f. 2rA-4vB: Capitula et conclusiones octo librorum *Physicorum*).¹¹
- 4) Paris, BN, lat. 16130, (ante 1336, f. 25rA-35vB, Expositio tertii libri *De anima*).¹²
- 5) Erfurt, WAB, CA F.298, (ca. ante 1352, f. 51rA-87rA: Expositio I-VIII librorum *Physicorum*, f. 89rA-106vB: Buridan (?), Questiones super *De anima*, f. 109rA-120, Expositio supra *De anima*, f. 122rA-137rA, Expositio supra *Parva naturalia*, f. 137rB-145rB, Buridan (?), Questiones supra *De sensu et sensato et De memoria et reminiscentia*).¹³
- 6) Uppsala, UB, C. 615, (ca. 1350, f. 99r-99v, 104r-111v: Due questiones de universali).¹⁴
- 7) Basel, UB, F.V. 10 (ca. 1343), f. 161r-179v: Questiones in *Parva naturalia*).

The small number of extant manuscripts dating from Buridan's lifetime¹⁵ indicates that his fame was established only after his

⁸ The estimate made by Michael 1985: 307.

⁹ I present a full description of this manuscript in Flüeler 1997.

¹⁰ I present a full description of this manuscript in Flüeler 1997.

¹¹ The manuscript contains works of Jacobus Lombardus and Simon de Faversham, cf. Seňko1982: II, 16-18; Michael 1985: 566, 605. According to Michael, Buridan's text is only a *tabula* of the *Expositio*: "... die Zuordnung des Expositio-Fragments muß als ungelöst gelten." (605).

¹² This seems to be the oldest ms. containing a commentary by Buridan. It belonged to Thomas Le Myésier, who died in 1336; cf. Hillgarth 1971: 327f. Nr. 18 and 190ff.; Michael 1985: 677f.; Seňko1982: II, 27-29.

¹³ Cf. Michael 1985: 564, 575, 680, 687, 736f., 745f., 753, 760, 767, 778; Schum: 204f.; Markowski 1987, passim; Patar 1991: 48*f.

¹⁴ Cf. Michael 1985: 434f. (including secondary literature).

¹⁵ The attribution to Buridan of a fragment in ms. Darmstadt, Hessische LuHB, Hs. 2197 is uncertain. This manuscript was copied during Buridan's lifetime at the

death. But if these few manuscripts allow for any conclusions, one of them will have to be that during his lifetime, his expositions,¹⁶ i.e. the literal commentaries, were as important as his questions, and that these two types of works were understood to be complementary, although they were never mixed and never formed a unity in the strict sense. They were never transmitted as a *lectura cum questionibus*, even if some colophons do pretend just this.¹⁷

The historical importance of literal commentaries

Buridan has become famous for his highly influential commentaries in question form, while his expositions have been pushed into the background. Most of the literal commentaries are known only in a single manuscript. Some of them, in particular those on natural philosophy, are extant in only two or three copies. Only an

place he taught. It contains on f. 128r-135 eleven questions on *Physics* I, written by the scribe Johannes Margan de Yvia in about 1346. The questions are the following: 1. *Utrum totum sit sue partes.* (cf. Buridan, Qq. *Physicorum*, ed. 1509, I, q. 9); 2. *Utrum infinitum sit ignotum.* (cf. I, q. 11); 3. *Utrum omnes ens naturale sit determinatum ad maximum.* (cf. I, q. 12); 4. *Utrum ex nihilo possit aliquid fieri.* (cf. I, q. 15); 5. *Utrum privatio sit sive dicatur aliquid esse in rerum natura.* (cf. I, q. 23?); 6. *Utrum entia naturalia sint determinata ad minimum.* (cf. I, q. 13); 7. *Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis principia intrinseca sint contraria.* (cf. I, q. 14); 8. *Utrum materia sit ens, videlicet prima materia.* (cf. I, q. 20); 9. *Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis naturalis materia prima sit principium intrinsecum.*; 10. *Utrum sint tria principia rerum naturalium et non plura tribus.* (cf. I, q. 16); 11. *Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis forma sit principium intrinsecum.* The questions are related to Buridan's last lecture on the *Physics* (ed. Johannes Dullaert, Paris 1509), but differ sufficiently from them that it is difficult to determine whether the commentary is a different redaction by Buridan himself or is merely influenced by Buridan. The fragment is anonymous. When the manuscript was bought in 1407 by Philippus de Otheye, prior of Saint Jacob in Liège, he wrote at the top: *Questiones primi libri Physicorum et non est nisi unus quaternus. Nescio quis composuit.* And later he added: *Buridanus composuit* (in the Index to the same volume, the same Philippus conjectures: *puto quod sunt a Buridan*). The attribution is thus conjectural.

16 In the titles and colophons, Buridan's literal commentaries are most often called *expositio* (*expositio textus*, *expositiones*) or *dicta* and only occasionally *commentum*, *lectura*, or *reportata*, but never *sententia*, *lectiones* or *explanatio* (cf. colophons 001-015). The frequency of the terms *expositio* and *dicta* suggests those might be the most historically justifiable names for this type of commentary.

17 See colophons 001, 008, and 020 presented in this paper.

exposition of the *Metaphysics* has four copies.¹⁸ The busy editors of the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries limited themselves to editing the questions, while ignoring the literal commentaries. By contrast, Buridan most certainly did not neglect them. In fact, almost all his question commentaries have a corresponding exposition, and where the exposition is missing, it may well have been written and is now lost.¹⁹ Not only did expositions have a fixed place in the syllabus, but they have to be considered the foundation of the subsequent disputations.

In spite of their historical importance, the literal commentaries have been neglected by modern editors. The reason for this is simple: these commentaries are boring, most of them add little of value to the interpretation of the Aristotelian work, and they are rarely useful for determining the commentator's own philosophical doctrine. As a result, only two expositions attributed to Buridan have been edited to date. The commentary *On the soul* (*De anima*) edited by Benoît Patar²⁰ is anonymous in both extant manuscripts,²¹ and the authorship cannot be determined beyond doubt,²² although a very close dependency on Buridan cannot be denied. The second literal commentary is on *De motu animalium* and has been edited by Frederick Scott and Hermann Shapiro.²³ Although the attribution has never been called into question, it is not entirely firm. The text has been transmitted anonymously, and only the history of the manuscripts suggests Buridan as its au-

18 Lohr 1970: 166 refers to eight mss; Michael 1985: 795-99, 816-7 lists five. Erfurt, WAB, CA F.322, f. is attributed to Buridan by Amplonius Rattinck de Berka (1410/12) but probably contains a different text. See Markowski 1987: 111. Darmstadt, Hessische LuHB, Hs. 516, contains a different redaction, as will be shown below. Lohr mentions also Firenze, BN, Centrale Conv. Soppr. C.5.262, (s. ?), 144ff., but Michael 1985, 926f. doubts the authorship.

19 Michael 1985: 243. In his repertory, Bernd Michael has identified 27 different expositions.

20 Patar 1991: 3-163.

21 Avignon, Musée Calvet, ms. 1093 (85 suppl.) (XVinc.), f. 219r-245v and Brugge, StB, 477, f. 238vB-263vB. (Cf. Michael 1985: 715 n. 44 and 719 n. 49 and 734; Patar 1991: 31*, 52*-64*, 67*-110* passim). Description of Brugge SB 477 in Pattin 1978: 13-16.

22 See review of Patar 1991 by Ch. Flüeler (*Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 36 [1989]: 512-519). Zénon Kaluza is of the same opinion in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 79 (1995): 136-139; also S. Ebbesen, *Dialogue* 33/4 (1994): 758-761.

23 John Buridan, *In De motibus animalium*.

thor.²⁴ Recently, Bernd Michael has tried to attribute to Buridan a fragmentary literal commentary on the *Ethics*.²⁵ Unfortunately this attribution is far from certain. The fragment has been edited by Jerzy Korolec,²⁶ on the basis of ms. Paris, BN, lat. 17831.²⁷ If it is indeed Buridan's work, it is a very derivative piece, for it is based completely on Albert of Saxony's literal commentary on the *Ethics* as lectured sometime in 1356-58²⁸ and on Thomas Aquinas' commentary on the same book. In fact, it seems more likely to me that the work is a later addition to Buridan's questions by an unknown artist.²⁹

24 The Erfurt ms. (WAB, CA Q.325, f. 132rA-137rA) is attributed to John Buridan by Amplonius Rattinck de Berka in his library catalogue of 1410/12 (*Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz* 1928 [Rpt. 1969]: II, 36.17: "commenta Buryden de motibus animalium"; cf. Michael 1985: 628, 760 and 781). Ms. Vat. lat. 2162 contains a collection of Buridan's literal commentaries on Aristotle's natural philosophy. The commentary on *De motu animalium* (f. 164vB-167rA) is the last text of this collection, and the attribution is probably missing because the last folio has been lost.

Ms. Vat. lat. 2162 contains: *Physica* (f. 1rA-56rB, f. 56rA: Et sic dictum est de totius libri physicorum expositione *Edita* a magistro Iohanne Buridani (!) cuius anima requiescat in pace. Amen. Qui scripsit scripta sua dextera sit benedicta. Amen.), *De celo et mundo* (f. 57rA-79rB; f. 65rA: Explicit expositio primi libri de celo et mundo a magistro iohanne buridan *edita*; f. 79rB: Expliciunt expositiones quatuor librorum de celo et mundo *compilate* a reuerendo magistro buridan deo gratias.); *Meteora* (f. 80rA-108vB; f. 108vB: Expliciunt expositiones libri metheteororum magistri iohannis buridaen (!). scripte anno domini. M°.ccc°lxxvi°. ultima die mensis februarij. deo gracias.); *De anima* (f. 110rA-127vA; f. 127vA: Expliciunt expositiones supra totum librum De anima *compilate* a magistro reuerendo Io buridam); *De generatione et corruptione* (f. 127vA-141vA; f. 141vA: Explicit expositio tocius libri de generatione. Anonymous but attributed in a late XV-century hand); *Parva naturalia* (f. 141vB-167rA; no titles and colophons. The last text [*De motu animalium*!] is incomplete).

25 Michael 1985: 877-78.

26 Anonymi *In Ethicam*, ed. J. B. Korolec: 71.

27 Carefully described in Seňko 1982: II, 94-98.

28 Albert lectured on the *Ethics* between 1356 and 1358 (cf. *Auct. Univ. Par.* I, 199 and 255). For the dating of Albert's lectures on moral philosophy, see Flüeler 1992: I, 153. The fragmentary literal commentary in Paris BN lat. 17831 was composed later. If Buridan were the author, then the text would have been composed between 1358 and October 11, 1360, the latter being the most probable date of Buridan's death (see Michael 1985: 399-402).

29 See Flüeler 1998.

The relation between the exposition and the questions

A very basic problem for our investigation is the connection between the literal commentary and the questions. In the commentaries of the early 13th century, the expositions form the principal part and the questions are usually inserted in the literal commentary in such a manner that together they add up to some sort of *lectura cum questionibus*.³⁰ This interweaving, while very common in the early 13th century, became increasingly rare in the second part of that century.³¹ In Buridan's time, the two modes of commenting on Aristotle were (almost) always separated.³² Buridan's questions can be read as an independent work, although references to the complementary literal part are quite frequent, as can be easily shown in his exposition on *De celo*, which I had the chance to consult in ms. Brugge, StB, 477 (14th century), f. 210vB-238vB. In the literal commentary, Buridan refers to the corresponding questions (f. 164vB-210vB) when he says (f. 211vB): *Motus circularis est alicuius corporis simplicis ... et in hac ratione cadit una dubitatio que indigebit speciali questione.* (reference to I, q. 6); (f. 214rA): *... sed videbitur in questionibus;* (f. 216vA): *... de hoc dicetur in questione ...;* (f. 219rA): *... de hoc dicetur in questionibus ...;* (f. 219rB): *... Verum est quod contra istam suppositionem sunt pluries*

30 The best edition of this type is still: Anonymus, *Lectura in librum de anima a quodam discipulo reportata*, ed. R.-A. Gauthier. See the interesting case of Siger's Commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, which are extant in four versions (Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, ed. W. Dunphy, Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, ed. A. Maurer). Here, the literal commentaries (*commenta*) are still mixed with the questions, but plainly secondary.

31 Late examples are, for instance, the anonymous commentary on the Economics in Lilienfeld, StB, 155, f. 253vA-261rB or the *Lectura Politicorum cum questionibus* in Basel, UB, F.VI.25, f. 162r-201v.

32 The commentary in Paris BN lat. 17831 contains Buridan's famous questions on the *Ethics* (f. 1ra-250vb), attributed to him by the scribe (f. 52vb, 94va), and a fragmentary literal commentary inserted in between, and connected with, the questions. The literal commentary starts after the 13th question of the second book on f. 45ra and ends at the beginning of the third book on f. 54vb. The fragmentary literal commentary has been edited by J. Korolec (*Anonymi In Ethicam*, ed. Korolec). Michael 1985: 877 attributes it to Buridan. If he is right, it is the only commentary attributed to Buridan which has such a mixed form. It is, however, rather uncertain whether the fragment is by the same author as the questions. See on this Flüeler 1998.

magne difficultates que indigent seorsum tractari in questionibus; (f. 221vB): ... *Et iste conclusiones sicut ponuntur sunt false et rationes sophistice, sicut videbitur in questionibus;* (f. 222rA): ... *et verum est quod circa ista dicta sunt multe difficultates, quas oportet tractare in questionibus;* (f. 233rA): ... *et hoc est difficile dicere et tractabitur in questionibus ...;* (f. 233rA): ... *et de hoc oportet videre in questionibus ...* In short, in the manuscripts the exposition and the questions represent two separate but complementary genres. What exactly is their connection? Could it be that these two modes of commenting formed a unity in the oral lecture and that their separation is the work of the reportator?

The first redactions of Buridan's commentaries:

The commentaries on the *Metaphysics*

Manuscripts copied during Buridan's academic activity at the place he taught are not necessarily closer to the original form, since they could already contain contaminations. Two manuscripts, however, were copied during or shortly after Buridan's lecture. Both contain commentaries on the *Metaphysics*. The following investigation will focus on these two manuscripts, namely Paris, BN, lat. 16131, and Darmstadt, Hessische LuHB, Hs. 516. The Darmstadt ms. in fact contains two different versions of Buridan's commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, and each manuscript includes both the literal commentaries and the questions. These three literal commentaries and three commentaries in question form have to be distinguished from the so-called "last lecture" on the *Metaphysics*, extant in several manuscripts.³³ Thus, we possess all in all four versions of commentaries on the *Metaphysics* attributable to John Buridan. The complex and extensive tradition of Buridan's commentaries on this Aristotelian work provides clear evidence for the great esteem in which he held it.³⁴

³³ See Michael 1985: 795-799, 802-813.

³⁴ Buridan lectured several times on the most important Aristotelian works, like the *Ars vetus*, the *Physics* or the *De anima*, but it remains very difficult to distinguish the various lectures.

The reported lecture on the *Metaphysics* in Paris, BN, lat. 16131: An original reportation?

According to Bernd Michael, the Parisian manuscript lat. 16131 is an original reportation.³⁵ The hurried handwriting, the occasional blank spaces, and the titles are three characteristics that confirm this claim.³⁶ A sceptical reader might easily doubt this. At what point does a hasty hand qualify as a sign of a directly reported lecture? Are breaks not also common in many commentaries which are nevertheless copies? The titles provide the least convincing argument, because they could have been copied by a later scribe. Certainly, the manuscript has to be studied more carefully. Finally, Michael's claim seems weakened by the colophon at the end of the questions,³⁷ where the same hand writes with the same ink, probably at the same time: *Non audivisti plus, quia non legit amplius. Et illud propter magnum frigus, quod tunc fuit in hieme, de quo adhuc doleo* (f. 122vB). The questions are in fact – as the literal commentary is also – a mere fragment. This enigmatic phrase suggests that the scribe wrote this manuscript for a reader who heard Buridan's lecture (*non audivisti plus*) and not for his teacher Buridan. We do not know which winter it was when the cold was so severe that Buridan had to interrupt his lecture, but it must have been in the early forties.³⁸ When the scribe wrote: *tunc fuit in hieme*, he did not necessarily mean that this event happened in the past. It was standard that the word *tunc* (with the perfect tense) in a colophon refer to the time at which the scribe finished his task.³⁹ It there-

35 Michael 1985: 793f. and 811f.

36 "Der Duktus der Schrift, die gelegentlichen Lücken im Text und die Überschriften zu den beiden überlieferten Texten legen es nahe, daß es sich bei den hier überlieferten Texten um direkte Nachschriften des gesprochenen Wortes, also um Reportationen im strengen Sinne handelt ..." (Michael 1985: 793).

37 The questions in Paris lat. 16131 are certainly a work of Buridan. The original title is: *etiam questiones supra primum librum metaphisice aristotelis reportate a byrid...* The questions are written in the same hand as the following exposition, while the *etiam* is a hint that the questions are related to the exposition, which should come first. I suppose that the order has been changed by a bookbinder.

38 For the history of manuscript, see Flüeler 1997.

39 Examples: Albertus de Saxonia, *Qq. de celo et mundo*, Bamberg, SB, Astr. 2 (HJ V,2), f. 77: *Et sunt questiones Magistri Alberti de Saxonia; Explicunt dicta alberti super 4 libros de celo et mundo per me Michaellem de Krain- (?) artis baccalarium tunc temporis studentem wienne. Anno 1444. In die S. laurencij; Blasius Pelacanus de Parma, Sententia*

fore seems probable that the sentence was written during the very winter. Our colophon is, however, in this case more complex, because the scribe seems to make a temporal difference between: *tunc fuit* and *adhuc doleo*. The meaning is not plain. The difference between *tunc* and *adhuc* suggests that *tunc* really refers in this context to a past event. The sentence – and the whole manuscript – would then have been written down later, that is after the passing of the cold winter. But this is not the only possible interpretation. What does “*de quo adhuc doleo*” mean? The sentence can be understood in completely different ways depending on whether *de quo* is referring to ‘*frigus*’ or to ‘*quia non legit amplius*’. In the first case, it means that the scribe is still suffering from the cold, because the cold spell (‘*frigus*’) has not passed, or that he is (still) suffering from the pain caused by it. In this case, the colophon and therefore the entire manuscript would have been written a certain time after the lecture, and thus could not be considered an original reportation. But *de quo doleo* could also mean that the scribe regrets that Buridan has not finished his lecture (“*quia non legit amplius*”). If the sentence should be read in this latter sense, it does not necessarily mean that some interval passed between the lecture and the present manuscript copy. An admiring and thankful student would never have written: *de quo dolui* (!), as if his regret ceased with the last sentence he wrote. The colophon remains ambiguous, and several readings are possible. In order to prove Michael’s claim, we have to go beyond the colophon and look at the manuscript itself.

Our manuscript, Paris, BN lat. 16131 is written in a hasty hand. Such a hand is indicative of a personal copy. Pamélon Glorieux has called this kind of handwriting a “*littera inintelligibilis*”. The breaks between the lectures are visible by the change of ink, the changing speed of the hand (which is more hasty at the end of the

super libro De celo et mundo, Wien, ÖNB, cod. 2402 (A.D. 1451), f.1rA-64rA. *Explicit Sententia super librum De celo et mundo, compilata per famosissimum arcium doctorem magistrum Blasium de Parma de Pelacanis in Bononia, recolecta anno Domini M^oCCCLXXX^o in scolis reverendi doctoris P.Ar., scripta per me Nicolaum Artucz tunc studentem, M^oCCCCLI die primo Martii, amen etc. in felicissimo Studio Paduano etc.*); Johannes Canonicus, *Questiones super VIII libros Physicorum*, Fribourg, Bibliothèque des Cordeliers, cod. 14, f. 166v: *Explicit tabula super Canonici super libros Physicorum scripta per reverendum patrem fratrem Johannem Joly tunc temporis guardiani A.D. 1478 in die XL martyrum.*

lecture), and by a typical initial letter or labelled *lemma*. The end of a lecture is finally confirmed by notes like: *et hoc dicit; lectio bona placet; hoc est quod dicit. lectio; lectio bona*. At the beginning of a lecture, the handwriting of the scribe is more careful than at its end. This pattern is even more evident in the questions: at the beginning of a question the handwriting is clearer, more regular, and more controlled, getting more hurried and wider towards the end. Obviously, the scribe got tired at the end of a session. On this basis, we can conclude that a lecture had an average length of three to four columns. The division of the text into treatises and chapters had a didactic goal, because a single lecture usually had the length of a chapter. If we study the manuscript carefully, there seems no doubt that there was a break between every lecture. Now, it is very improbable that a scribe would stop writing after every question and every single lecture of the literal commentary when copying an ordinary manuscript.

That our manuscript must be very close to the oral teaching is further confirmed by the relation between literal commentary and questions: the exposition of the text and the questions are separated. The first part of the manuscript contains the questions (f. 2-122), the second the literal commentary (f. 124-214). Although incomplete, both are certainly Buridan's work.⁴⁰ The literal commentary ends in the middle of the 12th book, the questions in the middle of the 9th book. The colophon (*Non audivisti plus...*, f. 122vB) is attached at the end of the questions. What does this prove with regard to the relation between lecture and questions? The literal commentary and the questions were obviously not written one after the other, but simultaneously. This can be confirmed by the composition of the fascicles. The student used four different kinds of paper with different watermarks. The sequence of the watermarks is the same in both parts of the manuscript. This means that the scribe started with one particular kind of paper, and when it was consumed, he bought a different kind and used it both for the literal commentary and for the questions. Given that this change of paper and its corresponding watermarks occurs four times, we must conclude that the commentaries were written down in an alternating fashion, but in the same time period and in two different fascicles. The change of both hand and

40 See my description of the manuscript in Flüeler 1997.

ink between one lecture and the other and the composition of the fascicles can easily be explained on the assumption that the writer changed the fascicles after each lecture, writing first a lecture of the exposition in one fascicle and then the question in the other fascicle, and so on.

In our case, the two connected ways of commenting on the Aristotelian text were not carried out synchronously, since they did not follow the same rhythm. That Buridan took longer with the questions than with the literal commentary can be inferred from the fact that, when the cold forced him to interrupt his lectures, the commentary had arrived at book 12 while the disputations had only reached the 9th book. If in our manuscript the questions precede the exposition, this reversal is due to the ignorance of the bookbinder. The greater accuracy of the title at the beginning of the exposition and the colophon at the end of the questions equally indicate that the literal commentary should have come first.

We may now return to the initial question: is our manuscript really an original reportation made in the classroom? The answer must be in the affirmative. The codicological analysis shows that the manuscript cannot have been a simple copy but was made when Buridan lectured on the *Metaphysics*. The scribe was most probably the reportator. The characteristics of our manuscript have to be a sign that the commentaries were written either (a) directly during each lecture or (b) shortly afterwards, but before the subsequent lecture. Neither the ambiguous colophon nor the external description of the codex permit us to resolve this residual problem. In order to achieve even greater clarity, one would have to compare the language, the structure and the context of the commentaries on the *Metaphysics* in Paris, BN, lat. 16131 with other presumed original reportations.⁴¹ I tend to favor the view

41 I know only five other manuscripts that might contain such original reportations. 1) parts of ms. München, Bayerische SB, clm 9559 were probably written either directly in the classroom (f. 18r-22rB, maybe even f. 18ra-39vb, [(Siger of Brabant), *Quaestiones in Physicam*] and 47ra-82va [Anonymi *Quaestiones in De somno et vigilia, Meteora, De iuventute et senectute, De anima*]) or copied shortly after the lecture by the reportator himself (as Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, ed. W. Dunphy) Cf. n. 3, above. 2) A commentary on *De anima* taught at Erfurt (Vat. Pal. lat. 1056, f. 235rA-272rB). 3) The second commentary on the *Metaphysics* in ms. Darmstadt, Hessische LuHB, Hs. 516 (f. 105rA-167rB) might also be such a reportation (see my description of this ms. in Flüeler 1997). 4) Some of the commentaries in ms. Darmstadt, Hessische LuHB, Hs. 2197, like Oresme's (?) *Sententia*

that the manuscript is an original reportation, because the hand gets visibly tired and more hurried at the end of a lecture. This phenomenon is explicable on the reasonable assumption that the teacher tended to speak faster at the end of a lecture at the same time as the reportator's hand got weary and sloppy.

The lecture on the *Metaphysics* in Darmstadt,
Hessische LuHB, Hs. 516: An original
“compiled” lecture.

As mentioned earlier, we have to distinguish four different versions of Buridan's commentaries on the *Metaphysics*. All of them consist of a literal commentary and corresponding questions. Does this mean that Buridan lectured four times on the *Metaphysics*? Not necessarily. It could be that the different versions are nothing more than different redactions of the same lecture. That Buridan did revise his reported lectures can be shown on the basis of the manuscript Darmstadt Hessische LuHB, Hs. 516, which contains two (i.e. two literal and two question) commentaries on the *Metaphysics*.

The first commentary in the Darmstadt manuscript⁴² is attributed to Buridan several times in the colophons. It is not mentioned in older catalogues, but has been taken by Benoît Patar to have been inspired by Buridan and to be but a work of a pupil, possibly Johannes de Vesalia.⁴³ This turns out to be incorrect. In this case,

libri Metheororum (f. 100r-123r) may have been written directly during the lecture by the student Johannes Margan de Yvia. Finally, we have to mention ms. Paris BN, lat. 16297 which contains reportations of Siger's lectures taken by Godfrey of Fontaines. Armand Maurer claims that these commentaries were not written directly in the classroom, but copied by the reportator at home (Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, ed. A. Maurer: 10-11).

The present study is limited to commentaries on Aristotelian works. In other reported works (Commentaries on the *Sentences*, sermons, etc.), original reportations also seem to be very rare. An original reportation of a sermon is indicated by Meier 1954: n. 55. Very close to oral language are the sermons of Vincent Ferrer reported by Fridericus de Amberg in Fribourg in 1404 (Fribourg, Bibliothèque des Cordeliers, cod. 62, f. 45r: *reportavi omnes sermones, quos tunc predicavit de ore suo meliori modo, quo potui et in sexternis sequentibus propria manu conscripsi*). Christoph Jörg has shown that the manuscript in Fribourg are not the original notes but a revised copy. (Jörg 1975: 82).

42 See my description of the ms. in Flüeler 1997.

43 Patar 1995: 52*-63*. It is certainly not a work by Johannes de Vesalia, because Philippus de Othey mentions in the table of contents that “magister Johannes

we should trust the colophons written by the scribe Henricus Johannis de Dandrediche⁴⁴ in 1346 telling that he “compiled” these commentaries in front of his master, John Buridan:

- (016) (f. 8vB) Et in hoc terminatur sententia tocius quarti libri methafisice que fuit completa in nocte sancti martini anno domini M° ccc° xlvj° per manum Henrici Iohannis de danrediche ante magistrum iohannem bridam nacionis picardie. (*bigger letters, but same scribe.*) Explicit sententia quarti methafisice compilata ante reverendum doctorem et magistrum magistrum Iohannem Bridam scripta per manum Henrici Iohannis de Danrediche etc. Incipit sententia quinti eiusdem compilata a magistro eodem, etc.

or:

Vesalia” lectured in the same year (1346), and he refers to Johannes’ commentary on *De anima*, reported by Johannes Margan de Yvia in 1346 and extant in ms. Darmstadt, Hessische LuHB, Hs. 2197, f. 136r-192v (*Sententia* and Questions). This codex contains in the first part (f. 1-192) works by Nicole Oresme, *Questiones super libros De generatione* (f. 27v-51v), id., *Questiones primi libri Meteororum* (f. 58r-98r, 125r-127v, different redaction!), id., *Sententia Meteororum* (f. 100r-123r, hitherto unknown!) and Johannes’ de Vesalia *Sententia libri De anima* (f. 136r-157v) and the corresponding questions (f. 158r-192r). The second part contains commentaries on the Logic, all copied by the scribe Henricus Johannis de Dandrediche. The last commentary, on the *Sophistical Refutations* (f. 219r-231r), is again attributed to Johannes de Vesalia, and it is probable – as its owner Philippus de Otheye conjectured in 1407 – that the rest of the second part is also by the same master.

This codex is like a “twin” of Darmstadt, Hessische LuHB, Hs. 516 and has a very similar history. The colophons and composition of the commentaries indicate that they were reported and compiled by students at the university of Paris. The colophons written by the scribes are the following (all other titles and colophons were added by Philippus): f. 81rb: Expliciunt questiones primi *Meteororum compilate ante venerabilem magistrum* Nicholaum de Oresme Normannum Deo gratias. Incipiunt questiones secundi eiusdem ab eodem; f. 106ra: Explicit sententia primi *Meteororum reportata ante magistrum* Nicholaum Oresme nationis Normannorum. Incipit sententia secundi eiusdem reportata ab eodem; f. 176rb: Expliciunt questiones supra primum et secundum *De anima* in numero 37 *reportate ante magistrum* Johannem; f. 192vb: Expliciunt questiones supra librum *De anima reportate ante magistrum* Johannem de Vesalia in vico straminum parisiis per manus Johannis Margan de Yvia anno domini m° ccc° 46° Deo gratias; f. 231rb: Expliciunt questiones libri *Elencorum scripte coram reverendo magistro* Johanne de Vesalia.). I thank Dr. Kurt H. Staub (Darmstadt) who informed me about the relation between Hs. 516 and Hs. 2197 and Prof. St. Caroti (Parma/Firenze), the editor of Oresme’s questiones on *De generatione*, who sent me the final proofs of his introduction.

⁴⁴ Denifle & Châtelain 1889-97: II, 644: Magister Henricus de Daurediche, Leod. dioc. [de can. S. Pauli Leodien.] member of the Picardian nation in 1349.

- (017) (f. 21vA) (*bigger letters, but same scribe.*) Explicit sententia sexti Methafisice compilata ante reverendum magistrum et doctorem magistrum Iohannem Buridam que fuit scripta per manum Henrici Iohannis de Danrediche.

That Henricus is in fact the scribe of the manuscript is confirmed by another manuscript (Darmstadt, Hessische LuHB, Hs. 2197), which was written by the same scribe. But what exactly does *compilata ante magistrum* mean?

The technical term ‘compilatus’ is very common in the language of colophons. A “compiled” commentary was never a compilation in the sense of a compound of materials from several sources.⁴⁵ Compiled commentaries were, especially in Paris, revised versions of reported works. Many of Buridan’s commentaries are called compiled versions in this sense of the word. Usually, it was the master himself who compiled his lectures. In the case at hand, however, his pupil Henricus sat in front of Buridan, writing down his master’s revision. Generally, the master used a reported text as the basis of his compiled version. Frequently, but not always – as our case proves – the compiled version was accepted as an edited text and used for further copies.⁴⁶

‘**compilare**’ in Buridan’s commentaries (all italics mine):

- (018) Expliciunt questiones super octo libros phisicorum aristotelis Reverendi magistri Iohannis Burydani *compilate parisius* conscripte et finite Wyenne feria tertia ante festum sancti Michahelis archangeli hora 9na Anno dominice incarnationis 1413 (Questiones super libros *Physicorum* [ultima lectura], Wien, ÖNB, cod. 5332, f. 218rB).
- (019) Expliciunt expositiones quatuor librorum de celo et mundo *compilate* a reverendo magistro buridan. deo gratias (Expositio super *De celo et mundo*, Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 2162, f. 79rB).
- (020) Ista lectura libri de anima atque questiones eiusdem libri sunt *compilate* per Reverendum doctorem Magistrum Iohannem de buridanis ... Explicit expositio textus tercii libri de anima una cum aliis duobus primis, lecta parisius. Anno domini m° ccc° Lxii. Deo gracias. (Expositio libri *De anima*, Vendôme, BV, ms. 169, f. 1rA and 44vB).

⁴⁵ See for instance the *Summa* of Nicolaus de Argentina O.P. (Imbach and Lindblad 1985: 155-233). A typical compilation is e.g. the *Libellus de zelo christiane religionis veterum principum Germanorum* by Lupoldus de Bebenburg (edition in preparation by J. Miethke and Chr. Flüeler, MGH Staatsschriften). The meaning of *Compilatio* is discussed in Rouse and Rouse 1992.

⁴⁶ We very often find the following remark in the colophons: *editus et compilatus a magistro*. To our knowledge the Darmstadt ms. was not used for other copies.

- (021^a) Expliciunt expositiones supra totum librum de anima *compile* a magistro reverendo Io(hanne) buridam. (Expositio libri *De anima*, Città del Vaticano, BAV Vat. lat. 2162, f. 127vA).
- (021^b) Expliciunt Questiones super librum De anima per reverendum magistrum Buridanum *Parisius compile* Prage reportate. (Questiones super librum *De anima*, Basel, UB, F.I.11, f. 118r).
- (022) Et sic per dei gratiam et auxillium finite sunt questiones peroptime super Tribus libris De anima Aristotelis *compile* per excellentissimum doctorem arcium Magistrum Johannem Byridam *parisius*. Et scripture per me ffredericum de meysenam sub anno domini M° C°C°C° octuagesimo 2° indicione quarta quarta die mensis mayj etc. (Questiones super tres libros *De anima*, ultima lectura, Berlin, SB Preuss. Kulturbesitz, lat. fol. 566, f. 65rA).
- (023) Expliciunt questiones super Tertium Librum de Anima Aristotelis edite disposite et ordinate per Rev.dum et eximium Artium Doctorem et Magistrum Iohannem Bridani *Parisius compile*. (Questiones super libros *De anima*, ultima lectura, Sarnano, BC, cod. E.14, f. 46).
- (024) Expliciunt questiones super libris de anima edite et *compile parisius* per reverendum doctorem artium et in sacra theologia bachalarium Magistrum Johannem buridanj de Atrabato Necnon scripture per Wijlhelmum Hamer de Keyserwerde Anno domini M°cccciiij duodecimo die mensis octobris. (Questiones super libros *De anima*, ultima lectura, Città del Vaticano, BAV, Reg. lat. 1959, f. 69r).
- (025) Expliciunt questiones libri de anima *Compile* per reverendum magistrum Johannem biridanum per manus Nicolai de farchas hida (?) reportate wienne in studio generali. Sub anno domini millesimo trecentesimo nonagesimo septimo. lauda scriptorem ... (Questiones libri *De anima*, ultima lectura, Wien, ÖNB, cod. 5454, f. 56vB).
- (026) Expliciunt questiones parvorum librorum naturalium a magistro glorioso, magistro Johanne Buredaen *compile* nec non finite anno domini M CCC septuagesimo quarto in festo sancti Augustini doctoris. (Questiones super *De morte et vita, De respiratione, De iuventute et senectute*, St. Gallen, Stiftsbibl., cod. 775, p. 253).
- (027) Expliciunt questiones super novem libros Ethicorum, tractate et *compile* a bone et reverende memorie ac recolende magistro Johanne Burida (!) nationis Picardie, cuius anima in Christo Jhesu in perpetuum requiescat. Amen. Amen. (Questiones super *Ethica Nicomachea*, Douai, BM, cod. 692, f. 225r).
- (028) Incipiunt questiones libri ethycorum Aristotilis *compile* per reverendissimum magistrum Johannem Biridan Parisius ... (Questiones libri *Ethica Nicomachea*, Stuttgart, Württemberg. LB, cod. HB X 16, f. 1rA).
- (029) Et sic est finis questionum primi libri posteriorum a magistro Johanne burydano reverendo *Compile parysius* cuius anima requiescat in pace. Amen. Amen. (f. 224vA): Et sic est finis 19 questionis et per consequens omnium questionum primi libri posteriorumque secundi a magistro burydano bone quam valentes multum *parysius compile*. (Questiones librorum *Posteriorum*, Liège, BU, cod. 44C, f. ? and 224vA).
- (030) Explicit expositio totius libri methaphisice a magistro Johanne buridani

compilata. (Expositio libri *Metaphysice*, Paris, Bibl. Mazarine, ms. 3516, f. 79rB).

- (031) Explicunt questiones *edite et compilate* necnon ad pennam date Parisius per acutissimum doctorem cognomine Buriden cuius anima ... Anno domini Millesimo CCC° nonagesimo primo in die conceptionis b. Maria virginis. (Buridan (?), *Questiones in libros Physicorum*, Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 3019, f. 121v).

The compiled commentary on the *Metaphysics* in the Darmstadt manuscript is an original compiled commentary. Buridan compiled both his literal commentaries (017, 019, 020, 021) and his questions together with his pupil Henricus de Dandrediche and this compilation is extant in the Darmstadt ms. Although where Buridan lectured several times on the same book, it would be important to know which lecture he compiled, in this case we do not know on which lecture Buridan and Henricus Iohannis de Dandrediche based their compiled version. In order to get closer to the solution of this question, we should first try to fix the order of the extant versions of Buridan's commentaries on the *Metaphysics*. But since the present study is only preliminary, we shall limit ourselves to a few observations.

A tentative order of the different versions of Buridan's commentaries on the *Metaphysics*

That the text in the Parisian manuscript BN lat. 16131 is probably Buridan's earliest commentary on the *Metaphysics* is suggested both by the age of the manuscript⁴⁷ and by a comparison of the questions in this reported lecture with other attributable versions on the same Aristotelian work. We can easily identify the last lecture (*ultima lectura*) on the *Metaphysics*, which is extant in several copies⁴⁸ (e.g. in Carpentras, Bibliothèque Inguimbertine cod.

⁴⁷ See the description in Flüeler 1997.

⁴⁸ Paris, BN, lat. 14716: f. 165vB: Explicunt questiones septimi libri methaphysice *de ultima lectura* magistri Iohannis buridani; f. 191vB: Et sic finiuntur omnes questiones tocius libri methaphysice a reuerendo philosopho magistro Iohanne Buridam, cuius anima requiescat in pace. Amen. Finis ultimatus. Explicunt questiones tocius libri methaphysice a magistro Iohanne buridani *de ultima lectura*. Deo gracias. Amen. See also ed. Paris, J. Badius 1518: In *Metaphysicen* Aristotelis. Questiones argutissimae Magistri Iohannis Buridani *in ultima praelectione ab ipso recognitae & emissae*: ac ad archetypon diligenter repositae ... (f. III, AA ij): Ioannis

292).⁴⁹ The commentaries in the Darmstadt manuscript must, then, lie in between the first and the last of Buridan's lectures. The exact relation between the two Darmstadt commentaries, and hence their relation to the first and the last version, is more difficult to determine. A cursory comparison of the table of questions shows that the Darmstadt compiled commentary (f. 1rA-102r) is closer to the first, reported commentary of the Parisian manuscript and could be a compilation of the first reportation or a compilation of a hitherto unknown middle lecture. The second commentary of the Darmstadt manuscript (f. 105rA-167vB) is very similar to the last version and could be a different reportation of the same lecture. Several things point to the possibility that the second commentary in the Darmstadt Codex is very close to the oral lecture and was written by the reportator.⁵⁰

Preliminary conclusions

1. Ms. Paris, BN lat. 16131 contains a reportation of the exposition and questions on the *Metaphysics* by John Buridan. They were given as lectures probably in the early forties and written by the reportator either directly in the classroom or shortly afterwards on the basis of notes jotted down in the classroom.

2. There exist various versions of commentaries on the *Metaphysics* attributable to Buridan. The one edited by Josse Bade in 1518⁵¹ is so different from that in Paris BN lat. 16131 that it must

Buridani Artium doctoris subtilissimi peritiles questiones in *ultima eius lectura edita super duodecim libros Metaphysice*; (f. xxvi, EE ij) ... *edita a Magistro Ioanne Buridano in ultima eius lectione & recognitione facta in schola parrhisiensi*; (f. lxxvii) Hic terminantur Metaphysicales quaestiones breues & vtilis super libros Metaphysice Aristotelis que ab excellentissimo magistro Iohanne Buridano diligentissima cura & correctione ac emendatione in formam redacte fuerunt in *ultima prelectione ipsius Recognitione* rursus accuratione & impensis ...

⁴⁹ Michael 1985: 795-799 and 802-807.

⁵⁰ The handwriting changes at the beginning of the subsequent lecture and the following question. The handwriting is more careful at the beginning than at the end, and sometimes even the type of ink changes. All over the second part of the manuscript we encounter the same hasty scrawl which is very difficult to read. Both for the exposition and the questions the watermarks show the identical fruit (see the description in Flüeler 1997). In this case we might have as many as two original reportations on the same book by the same author!

⁵¹ John Buridan, *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Quaestiones*, ed. J. Badius.

be based on another lecture. But not every different redaction implies a different lecture course. The case of the first commentary on the *Metaphysics* in the manuscript Darmstadt Hessische LuHB Hs. 516 shows that Buridan revised his lectures and called these revised reportations “compiled commentaries”. A compilation was made either by the master himself or under his direction (*ante ipsum*).

3. The literal commentary and the question commentary are complementary. In the Parisian and the Darmstadt manuscripts, they were written by the same scribe in much the same way. The oldest extant manuscripts of Buridan’s commentaries demonstrate that the literal commentaries are, from a historical point of view, as important as the questions. Buridanism after Buridan’s death was especially interested in the questions, which resulted in the neglect of the literal commentaries.

4. The literal commentary and the questions were written by the reportator in two different fascicles. Arguments from internal evidence show that until the middle of the 14th century the literal commentary was considered the foundation of the questions, which followed temporally and logically. But since the questions were reported in a separate fascicle, they could easily be circulated separately. In other words, the questions were not extracted from the literal commentary, but existed separately from the very beginning.

5. The literal commentary is shorter than the questions and was not lectured synchronously with the latter. From our Parisian ms., it becomes evident that Buridan was expounding the 12th book and had just started to discuss questions dealing with the 9th book when the cold winter forced him to interrupt his lecture.

6. In the literal commentary, Buridan subdivided each book of the *Metaphysics* into treatises (*tractatus*) and chapters (*capitula*). A chapter corresponded usually to one lecture. The average length of a lecture in the Parisian ms. is about 3-4 columns (of 40-45 lines each) for the literal commentary, and (usually) one question of 4-7 columns on average for the question commentary.

7. According to the Parisian ms., Buridan discussed 93 questions during (about) 96 sessions and probably dedicated the same number of lectures to the exposition of the text.⁵² When he broke

52 See the description of the manuscript in Flüeler 1997.

off the lecture the exposition was almost finished, since the 13th and 14th books were usually not lectured on in Paris.⁵³ We may conjecture that Buridan planned to add several questions on the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th books.⁵⁴ According to the “final lecture” edited by Josse Badius, this corresponds to 27 missing questions. The complete commentary on the *Metaphysics* would have had approximately 100 sessions for the literal commentary and about 130 sessions for the questions.

8. The following two problems in particular need to be resolved:

First, if the scribe of Paris, BN, lat. 16131 did in fact write the manuscript in the classroom, he must have tried to report the lecture as faithfully as possible. A comparison with the other versions of Buridan’s commentaries on the *Metaphysics* suggests that the Parisian manuscript contains a “complete” commentary and not just a report of the most essential points covered. It is even probable that Buridan was lecturing ‘*ad pennam*’ so that the reportator was able to write down what the teacher said word for word.

Secondly, the different versions of Buridan’s commentaries on the *Metaphysics* are dependent on one another. A comparison of the various versions will show how Buridan used older materials to produce new redactions or even new lectures. Since the changes are especially significant in the questions, it will help us to understand how Buridan’s metaphysical doctrine developed.⁵⁵

⁵³ Concerning the omission of the 13th and 14th books, see Carpentras, *Bibl. Inguibertine*, cod. 292, f. 39va (Expositiones libri Metaphysicorum): “Et sic finitur tercius liber methaphisice et per consequens omnes duodecim. Alii duo communiter non leguntur, ideo pro presenti dimittuntur”; f. 119rb (Questiones in libros *Metaphysicorum*, ultima lectura): “Super alios duos libros magister Johannes Buridanus nichil fecit, quia non solent legi.”

⁵⁴ See John Buridan, *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Questiones*, ed. J. Badius, which is a complete commentary.

⁵⁵ De Rijk 1997, an interesting study devoted exclusively to the various versions of Buridan’s commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, unfortunately reached me too late to incorporate a discussion of it here. It should be noted, however, that de Rijk has identified another version of this work and considers ms. Erfurt WAB CA F.322, f. 1r-39ra (upon books I-II and IV-VI) to be the oldest version, even older than ms. Paris, BN, lat. 16131.

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Thuo of Viborg and Marsilius of Inghen

E.P. BOS*

Summary: In qu. 15, book VII of his *Disputata Metaphysicae*, the Danish philosopher Thuo of Viborg (d. 1472) discusses singular, essential concepts. His view appears to be dependent on Marsilius of Inghen (ca. 1340-1396). Thuo investigates in various ways the nature of singularity and our knowledge of singulars. The function and ultimate goal of terms is to be used in propositions in accordance with the rules of the theory of supposition.

In the 1991 issue of *CIMAGL*, Andrea Tabarroni edited the *Disputata Metaphysicae* of Henricus Ruyn (= Heinrich Runen of Rostock), an Erfurt master from the 1430s-40s. That edition was intended to be preliminary to the one he will soon publish in the *Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi*, namely the *Disputata Metaphysicae* of Thuo Nicholai de Vibergia (= Tu[v]e Nielsen from Viborg, Jutland, Denmark), which is preserved in the same manuscript as Henry's work (Erfurt, WAB, CA Q. 436). Like Henry, Thuo, who died as archbishop of Lund in 1472, was a fellow of Collegium Porte Celi in Erfurt in the 1430s, and Dr Tabarroni has dated his course on the *Metaphysics* to the winter semester of 1438-9, while Henry may have given his course on an earlier occasion.

In his article from 1991 Dr Tabarroni noted that Henry's and Thuo's commentaries share structural features reflecting the teaching techniques practiced in Erfurt at the time, and also that Henry's work bears witness to the influence that Marsilius of Inghen's (ca. 1340-1396) *Questions on the Metaphysics* exerted at the university of Erfurt in the early fifteenth century. He later discovered that the same holds for Thuo's work. In this article I shall confirm his observation by analysing Thuo's fifteenth question on book VII and comparing it with the corresponding question in Marsilius' commentary. Both texts are printed in the appendix to this paper.

The problem dealt with in Thuo's question is whether there can be essential concepts of singulars, and in view of the length of the text he devoted to it one would think it held special interest for

* I wish to thank Mrs. Van der Lecq for her comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Thuo. Nevertheless, it will appear that Thuo was almost totally dependent on Marsilius. In general, Marsilius owed a great debt to John Buridan, and freely borrowed from the latter's questions, but in this particular case the Marsilian question, which has exactly the same topic and title as Thuo's, has no close match in Buridan's commentary, though it remains Buridanian in spirit.

In the fourteenth century there was a lively interest in concepts of individual substances and of individual accidents. Philosophers tried, more than in the preceding centuries, to develop a semantics of individual terms. From the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries we may discern at least two Parisian traditions. The first one – to which Buridan and Marsilius belong and which may be labeled 'nominalistic' – claimed that individual things are different one from another on their own account; generality only resides in concepts, which are more or less general ways of knowing individual substances and accidents. Among later philosophers in this tradition we may mention John Dorp (fl. 1400), and John Mair (1467/9-1550).

The rival tradition in Paris seems to have its origin in the early works of John Duns Scotus (1265-1308/9). It could be called an intentionalistic tradition, emphasizing concepts in the mind and holding that individual things differ one from another in virtue of some reality ('this-ness') added to their natures. George of Brussels (fl. 1495, d. 1510), Mauritius Hibernicus (commentary on Scotus' *Super Universalia Porphyrii*, 1504), and Peter Ta(r)taretus (ca. 1522) belong to this tradition.

In his *Disputata Metaphysicae* VII.15 Thuo of Viborg asks whether there are singular essential concepts,¹ and he explains that by an essential concept he means one that connotes nothing extrinsically. It later becomes clear that he means a concept that refers to (*supponit pro*) something without connoting anything extrinsic to the essence of that thing. It further becomes clear that he uses 'essence' for the concrete thing itself. This recalls twelfth-century usage (by Abelard, e.g.), but Thuo shows no more awareness of this fact than does Marsilius or Buridan.² Thuo does not define a singular concept, but he obviously takes it to be one that supposit

1 See Appendix I. Thuo's text will be edited in full by Dr. A. Tabbaroni in CPhD XIII.

2 King 1994: 423.

for just one thing, e.g. the concept of Socrates. So he implies that there are not only singular and general vocal terms, but also singular and general concepts, and accordingly, singular and general ways of signifying. This is all in line with the theories of Marsilius of Inghen and Buridan.³

The thesis (*conclusio*) that Thuo defends in his question is that there are singular essential concepts, and he supports this with three arguments before introducing objections and responses to those objections. In the first two arguments, Thuo claims that we actually have concepts of singulars that do not include their accidents, and that we could have a concept of some thing even if it had no accident at all. The third proof rests on the claim that individual terms of the category of substance are essential and not connotative.

Generally speaking, Thuo presents three types of arguments supporting his position on individuality: 1) arguments based on the cognition of individuals; 2) arguments based on the theory of the Aristotelian categories; 3) arguments based on imagined situations. In all three approaches the theory of supposition is of crucial importance. Thuo draws a distinction between the semantics of terms of the category of substance, that do not have connotation, and those of the accidental categories, that do have connotation. More elaborate forms of this view may be found in Marsilius of Inghen and John Buridan.⁴

Now, first the arguments based on cognition. Thuo's opponent says that individuals are distinguished by accidental properties, so that there cannot be a proper essential concept of an individual, because a singular term always refers to something other than the individual's essence. Thuo simply denies this: individuals are distinguished essentially, and since an essential concept only represents the essence of its thing, such a concept is possible.

The objection discussed by Thuo also occurs in Marsilius,⁵ and he characterizes it as the strongest argument of those who reject

3 Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, VII, 17. Marsilius says in his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* that grammatical functions, such as singular number and plural number, do not play a part in the distinction between singular and general terms.

4 See Appendix II for a provisional edition of qu. 17 of book VII of Marsilius' *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*.

5 See Appendix II, arg. 1.

singular essential concepts (*ratio fortior adversariorum*), later explaining that such people themselves attach particular importance to it. Marsilius had good reason to take it seriously inasmuch as his own views about how we cognize individuals shared some features with those on which the argument was based. In his Commentary on the *Sentences*, Marsilius says that the external senses represent an individual thing through representing its accidental properties – its individual colour, magnitude etc. Thus, for Marsilius, the senses furnish the background for such expressions as ‘hoc coloratum’ and ‘hoc magnum’, which refer to individual accidental properties and themselves belong to one of the accidental categories. While each of these pieces of sense-cognition is of accidents only, all pieces concerning one particular thing are “virtually” (i.e. structurally) one.⁶ But knowledge of an individual is not just the sum of the knowledge of its properties, the individual is known *modo singulari*,⁷ for as objects of its understanding the intellect has singular and determinate concepts (*conceptus singulares et determinati*), such as ‘Plato’ and ‘Socrates’. Thus Marsilius escapes the objection that individuals are only recognized by way of their different accidents. In his view, the subject as bearer of the accidents is indirectly understood. Here, as elsewhere, he advocates a dualistic semantics in which the meaning of a term consists of two kinds of significates.

In the *Metaphysics* question, in answer to the opponents’ “strongest argument”, Marsilius replies that human beings do indeed distinguish by means of accidents.⁸ This may cause trouble if somebody cognizes an egg and unbeknownst to him this is later exchanged with another egg. He may then mistake the new egg for the original one. But this does not imply that substantial terms have a connotation or that the deceived person had only one and

6 Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. Straßburg 1501, prologus, qu. 1, f. 10rb: “Que notitia quamvis diversis nominibus sic exprimitur, tamen est una incomplexa omnium horum expressorum virtualiter inclusiva, et ob hoc singularis est, quia rem sub suis proprietatibus individuantibus representat.” See also Bos 1987: 24-5.

7 Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones in De celo et mundo*, MS Cuyck en St. Agatha, Kruisherenklooster, C 12, book I, qu. 15, f. 139va: “Ad sextam: negatur consequentia. Ad probationem dicitur quod non est ex hoc, sed quia significat conceptu communi et terminus singularis modo singulari.”

8 See App. II, the text, arg. 1.

the same concept of the old egg and of the new one – it only means that he has been deceived by the accidents.

There is a similar discussion in Buridan.⁹ It is difficult to identify the opponents to whom Marsilius refers. Some philosopher of the fourteenth century? Perhaps even some twelfth-century thinker, such as Gilbert of Poitiers (1076-1154), about whom Garcia (1984: 175) says: “Gilbert does not say anything concerning the discernibility of individuals. He does say, however, that the numerical diversity of corporeal things is proven by the variety of their accidents and ultimately by their location.” This would not be the only place in which Marsilius discusses with a twelfth-century Platonist. Elsewhere he enters into debate with Richard of St Victor.¹⁰

The second type of argument relies on the theory of the categories. For Thuo, as for Marsilius and Buridan, the members of the categories are spoken or written terms and their corresponding concepts rather than extramental things grasped by the concepts.¹¹ In his third argument Thuo says that we are looking for a *conceptus singularis determinatus*, such as the concept of Socrates. This is a proper member of the category of substance rather than, e.g., ‘this man’ or ‘this ox’, which are *conceptus singulares vagi* only and, Thuo agrees with his opponent, they include a deictic element which is extrinsic to the category of substance. By parity of reasoning it would seem that one would have to reject the most promising candidates for the role of individual essential concepts in the accidental categories, viz. concepts like ‘this whiteness’ or ‘this white’ (*hoc album*). Thuo holds that we do have concepts of the essences of individual whitenesses etc., but they contain no deictic element. The demonstrative pronoun is just a device used in oral and written language for lack of proper names of accidents, so one should distinguish between the role of the pronoun in ‘this white’ and in ‘this body’. The two objections that claim that the pronoun of ‘this man’ and ‘this white’ implies an extrinsic connotation and so cannot be essential concepts are objections

⁹ King 1994: 415 refers to John Buridan, *Questiones in Metaphysicam* VII, qu. 17, ad 4 (f. 52rb).

¹⁰ See *Questiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. cit., f. 14va.

¹¹ Cf. John Buridan, *Summulae, Tractatus III* (ed. Bos), p. xxii, p. 21, ll. 11-15; p. 120 f.

that Thuo has taken over from Marsilius, but Marsilius does not provide the analysis of the deictic element that Thuo offers (though Thuo could find some inspiration in Marsilius' text).

Finally, Thuo argues his point by presenting imagined situations. Thuo takes this vantage point in his second proof of the initial thesis. He asks us to imagine that God create a substance without any accidents – something God could surely do. Such a substance would be intelligible, and this shows that there can be essential concepts of singulars. Once again, Thuo depends on Marsilius, who had forcefully put the point like this: “If nothing existed but God and Marsilius without any of his extrinsic common [properties], Marsilius would still be Marsilius!”.

Conclusion

In the Buridanian tradition, singularity is the basic characteristic of created things, substances and accidents alike. As for terms, they exist for the sake of appearing in propositions and function there according to the rules of supposition. This is the tradition to which Thuo belonged, and our analysis of his question on individual essential concepts has made it abundantly clear that Marsilius of Inghen was of the first importance in shaping his thought.

Appendix I

Thuo de Viberga, *Disputata Metaphysicae*¹²

Utrum sit aliquis conceptus singularis essentialis.

Conceptus essentialis est conceptus nihil connotans extrinsece.
 Conclusio. Aliquis est conceptus singularis essentialis.

Patet per experientiam, quia experimur in nobis quod habemus conceptum convenientem essentiae Socratis, seclusis omnibus accidentibus a Socrate.

Secundo probatur sic. Seclusis omnibus accidentibus rei singularis, essentia est intelligibilis sine accidentibus, et sic potest formari de illa conceptus singularis. Ut ponatur quod creatur aliqua

¹² Book VII, Q. 15, ed. Andrea Tabbaroni, forthcoming in CPhD.

substantia nullum habens accidens: est intelligibilis; et si sic, tunc res singularis potest habere conceptum singularem.

Tertio. Termini individuales praedicamenti substantiae sunt essentialis et non sunt connotativi extrinsece; ergo etc.

1. Arguitur. Non est ponendus conceptus singularis essentialis, ergo. Antecedens probatur, quia individua distinguuntur per accidentia, ergo conceptus individui erit repraesentativus accidentis. Consequentia tenet, quia conceptus repraesentat rem ut res se habet ad esse. Antecedens patet, quia non distinguimus Socratem a Platone nisi per accidentia.

1. Respondetur quod individua distinguuntur essentialiter et conceptus essentialis non est repraesentativus nisi essentiae rei.

2. Arguitur. Omnis conceptus essentialis Socrati est essentialis Platoni. Probatur, quia omnis conceptus est similitudo et quicquid est simile uni similitum est simile cuilibet similitum in eadem specie similitudinis; ergo quilibet conceptus absolute repraesentans Socratem etiam repraesentat Platonem.

2. Respondetur quod illud "quicquid est simile etc." est verum de similitudine repraesentationis reali, non autem quoad conceptum singularem.

3. Item arguitur. Si ponendus esset conceptus singularis, maxime esset conceptus aggregatus ex pronomine demonstrativo et termino substantiali, ut 'hic homo', 'hic bos' secundum Philosophum in *Praedicamentis*. Sed hoc non, quia ibi est demonstratio et illa est extrinseca praedicamenti substantiae; patet quia spectat ad relationem.

3. Respondetur quod per hoc complexum intelligitur conceptus vagus singularis, non autem singularis determinatus. Ad Philosophum dicitur quod ibi posuit exemplariter.

4. Item arguitur. Non potest esse conceptus essentialis huius albedinis, ergo nec ipsa substantia. Antecedens probatur, quia si esset aliquis, maxime correspondens huic complexo 'haec albedo'; sed hoc non, quia ibi est demonstratio, quae est extrinseca.

Sed si dicitur quod conceptus absolutus, si sic, tunc [est] conceptus iste erit repraesentativus cuiuslibet, et sic non est singularis.

4. Respondetur quod conceptus repraesentans essentiam huius albedinis sine actu demonstrativo, iste est essentialis, licet explicatur per actum demonstrativum. Hoc est propter defectum vocabuli, quia non habemus vocabulum impositum, quia 'hoc al-

bum' est terminus pronominalis, quia non habemus terminos in-complexos hoc significantes; ergo etc. Per hoc complexum 'hoc album' circumloquimur individuum terminorum accidentalium, sed <per> 'hoc corpus' non etc.

5. Item arguitur. Iste terminus 'Socrates' non est terminus singularis, ergo. Antecedens probatur, quia iste terminus 'Socrates' videtur connotare unionem materiae cum forma, ergo non est conceptus essentialis. Consequentia tenet, quia est passio entis, ut habetur IV et X huius. Antecedens probatur, quia materia et forma Socratis non sunt Socrates nisi unitae.

5. Respondetur quod conceptus Socratis non connotat unionem, sed absolute supponit pro composito ex materia et forma; et licet ibi requiritur unio, non tamen ut sic importat unionem. Patet, quia tunc esset terminus accidentalis, quod est falsum.

6. Item arguitur. Iste terminus 'Socrates' ultra materiam et formam aliquid connotat, quia materia et forma sunt perpetuae et Socrates non; ergo ultra materiam et formam aliquid connotat. Consequentia tenet, quia alias Socrates esset perpetuus, quia materia est perpetua.

6. Respondetur quod 'Socrates' supponit absolute pro materia et forma nihil connotando, licet per disiunctionem materiae a forma Socrates corrumpatur.

Appendix II

Marsilius de Inghen, *Questiones in Metaphysicam*, VII, qu. 17.¹³

Queritur decimo septimo utrum possit esse aliquis conceptus singularis essentialis, id est: utrum possit esse aliquid individuum vere in predicamento substantie.

Et arguitur quod non (1) quia nullus conceptus singularis est quin conveniat pluribus suppositis indifferenter, igitur nullus est singularis. Consequentia tenet quia: singularis conceptus non est plurium suppositorum distinctorum representativus.

¹³ Except where specified, the text is prepared from MS Vienna, *Österreichische Nationalbibliothek*, Vind. Pal. 5295, ff. 110va-112rb. According to Lohr 1971: 328, there are at least ten extant manuscripts containing this work.

Antecedens probatur dupliciter: Primo quia: non habemus viam distinguendi inter individua nisi per accidentia, ut notum est, et ergo si conceptus qui essentialiter representat Sortem, non solum erit Sortis, sed etiam representabit alium similiter dispositum cum Sorte [f. 110vb] in accidentalibus, igitur non convenit solum Sorti, sed alteri sibi simili.

Secundo probatur quia: quidquid est principalis similitudo unius similium, etiam est essentialis similitudo alterius similium in eadem specie similitudinis, ut si aliquid representat unum alborum prout est simile, etiam representat aliud album prout est simile. Modo, conceptus essentialis in aliqua specie est representativus unius similium quia representat rem istius speciei et omnes res in ista specie sunt similes, et per consequens representat aliud similium, et ergo nullus est conceptus singularis essentialis, quia iste non convenit pluribus. – Et ista est ratio fortior adversariorum.

(2) Secundo principaliter arguitur sic: si esset aliquis conceptus singularis essentialis, maxime esset conceptus essentialis ex pronomine demonstrativo et termino substantiali, ut dicendo ‘hic homo’, vel conceptus pronominis demonstrativi, <ut> dicendo ‘hoc’. Modo, nullus istorum est singularis essentialis, igitur etc. Maior patet quia: ‘iste homo’, ‘hoc animal’ etc. videntur esse individua de predicamento substantie, et presertim quia *ly* ‘hoc’ maxime demonstrat substantiam. Minor patet quia: ista individua portant secum demonstrationem et per consequens prospectum qui ulterius representat situm etc., et ergo sic connotarent extrinsecum, scilicet situm.

(3) Tertio sic: non potest esse conceptus singularis albedinis, igitur nec substantie. Consequentia tenet quia: albedinis est conceptus communis essentialis ita bene sicut substantie, et ideo¹⁴ non posset eius esse singularis conceptus sicut substantie. Antecedens patet quia: vel esset conceptus qui correspondet huic complexo ‘<hec> albedo’; et hoc non, per rationem precedentem; vel esset conceptus nudus albedinis, et hoc non, quia iste est representativus cuiuslibet albedinis.

(4) Quarto sic: conceptus cui apud animam correspondet iste terminus ‘Sortes’ non est singularis essentialis, igitur nullus est. Consequentia tenet quia: si aliquis esset, maxime esset iste.

¹⁴ quare MS.

Antecedens probatur multipliciter: (a) primo quia convenit successive diversis. Iam enim convenit Sorti habenti manum, et cras, si manus abscinditur, tunc significat aliquid quod remanet preter manum, de quo etiam nunc dicitur. Modo, istud non esset si esset essentialis, cum ut sic deberet dici de uno et eodem uno re, sicut alio, ut videtur.

[f. 111ra] Confirmatur (b) secundo: aliqua sunt nunc distincta, de quorum quolibet nunc diceretur iste terminus 'Sortes' univoce, igitur non est essentialis. Consequentia tenet quia: essentialis conceptus singularis sine nova impositione solum dicitur de una re.

Sed antecedens probatur: (b1) posito quod Sortes cum brachio vocetur A, et sine brachio B, tunc bene Sortes successive diceretur de A et B quia: absciso brachio¹⁵ adhuc verum est dicere quod residuum est Sortes, scilicet B, quod non esset nisi univoce diceretur de B. Modo, B et A realiter sunt distincta, quia unum non est aliud. Distinguuntur enim suppositionaliter, quia unum non est aliud, sicut totum et pars.

(b2) Secundo probatur antecedens nam: iste terminus 'Sortes' videtur connotare unionem materie cum forma, igitur non est essentialis. Consequentia tenet quia: ex quo unum unionem connotat, non est terminus essentialis, sed passio entis, quarto huius; et antecedens patet, nam materia et forma Sortis non dicerentur Sortes nisi essent unite¹⁶.

Confirmatur nam: si Sortes sit terminus essentialis purus, hec argumentatio valeret 'quicquid hec dualitas nunc est (demonstrando formam et materiam), hec ipsa semper erit; sed hec dualitas nunc est Sortes, igitur hec dualitas semper erit Sortes'. Conclusio est falsa quia post mortem Sortis, et maior patet, quia hec dualitas est perpetua. Vel formetur sic maior 'quidquid hec dualitas est, hoc semper erit quando erit', et sic non erit dubia. Sed minor ista est nota. Modo, vel oportet consequentiam non valere in *Datisi*, quod videtur inconveniens, vel quod consequentia non valet propter connotationem istius termini 'Sortes', quia scilicet propter unionem quam connotat et quod argumentum deficit propter fallaciam figure dictionis.

(5) Quinto: non potest esse terminus communis essentialis, igi-

¹⁵ absciso brachio (MS Krakow, Bibl. Jag. 709, f. 95va)] absciso B brachio MS.

¹⁶ vite (?) MS.

tur nec singularis. Consequentia nota est, et antecedens probatur: primo quia quicumque terminus communis vel est singularis numeri, vel pluralis. Si singularis, tunc connotat singularitatem; si pluralis, tunc ipse connotat pluralitatem. Modo ista videntur esse extrinseca, et ex consequenti videtur sequi quod tales termini non sunt essentialia.

Confirmatur quia: si termini communes essent essentialia, maxime essent isti termini 'animal', 'homo' etc., ut patet in *Predicamentis*. Sed isti non sunt essentialia, quia connotant totalitatem, igitur etc. quia: non omnis substantia animata est homo, quia manus tua esset animal.

Item, non omnis substantia animata sensitiva est animal, quia alias capud equi esset animal; sed hoc non dicitur esse ex alio [f. 111rb] nisi quia isti termini connotant totalitatem.

Oppositum videtur velle Philosophus in isto septimo¹⁷ supponens in pluribus locis quod conceptus singulares¹⁸ sint et possint esse etiam essentialia, ut in tractatu tertio 'diffiniens'¹⁹ hunc solem etc.' ubi per 'hunc solem' intelligit terminum singularem sive conceptum singularem essentialem.

Item, in capitulo secundo septimi dicit quod substantia maxime videtur dici de quatuor, scilicet de quod quid erat esse, de universalis, de genere et de subiecto, et per 'subiectum' intelligit individuum predicamenti substantie, per Commentatorem,²⁰ quod maxime dicitur substantia, ut dicit Philosophus in littera.

Item, in *Predicamentis* manifeste habetur quod alique sunt prime substantie et alique secunde, et prime substantie dicuntur que maxime, primo et principaliter dicuntur, et dicuntur principaliter substare quia nichil extrinsecum connotant.

Item, si vis negare primam substantiam, tunc nulla erunt individua in predicamento substantie. Consequens negaret Aristotiles et negant communiter loyci.²¹ Et patet consequentia quia: termini connotativi extrinseci non sunt in predicamento substantie.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII, ii, 1028 b 35.

¹⁸ essentialia MS.

¹⁹ diffiniens (MS Krakau, *Bibl. Jag.* 709, f. 95va)] diffinitiones MS.

²⁰ contarem (?) V. See Averroes, *In Metaphysicam* VII, comm. 2, f. 153 I.

²¹ E.g. Peter of Spain, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. de Rijk, p. 20; John Buridan, *Summulae, Tractatus III* (ed. Bos), p. 22, ll. 24-33.

In questione primo premittenda sunt notabilia, secundo respondendum est ad questionem.

Quantum ad primum est primo notandum quod terminus singularis dicitur terminus qui ex modo sue significationis sibi principaliter convenientis²² natus est supponere pro uno solo supposito, et vocat Porphyrius²³ terminum singularem individuum et etiam²⁴ Petrus Hispanus²⁵, et dicunt quod individuum est quod de uno solo predicatur et intelligit idem quod dictum est.

Secundo notandum quod terminus essentialis dicitur qui pro aliqua re supponit nichil extrinsece illi essentie²⁶ importando, nec etiam istam essentiam pluries super se reflectendo, quod dicitur propter terminos relativos aliquos ut est idem etc. Idem enim dicitur ens inquantum non est distinctum a seipso; connotat enim comparisonem eiusdem ad se, scilicet significando ens et connotando quod istius essentialis est sibi ipsimet causa et indistincta.

Tertio notandum quod *quidam* sunt dicentes quod rationes ante oppositum concludunt, presertim prima cum sua confirmatione, et ratio facta de isto termino 'Sor'. Et si isto modo debet dici, oportet istos negare totum modum predicamenti substantie, ymo, si ratio de Sorte concludit, tunc isti termini 'aer', 'aqua' etc. non essent termini substantiales, nam Deus potest separare formam substantialem aeris ab eius materia, et tunc potest argui de aere sicut de Sorte [f. 111va] sic: quicquid hec dualitas nunc est, cras erit; sed nunc est aer, igitur cras erit aer. Conclusio enim est falsa quia: cras forma aeris non tunc informat materiam aeris, et per consequens non erit tunc ista dualitas aeris. Apparet ergo quod iste terminus 'aer' etiam sit connotativus, ratione cuius consequentia non valet, cum premissae sunt vere. Et si sic, tunc sequeretur quod nullus alius conceptus sit essentialis, etiam communis, in predicamento substantie quia: compositorum eadem ratione non est sicut nec aeris. Item, simplicium non est conceptus essentialis maiori ratione quia talia non cognoscuntur nisi per discursum et comparisonem per sensum, de quibus magis deberet capi conceptus essentialis. Modo, omnia ista sunt inconvenientia et contra

²² solum *add.* MS.

²³ *Isagoge*, 7, 21-23.

²⁴ etiam (*Bibl. Jag.* 709, f. 95va)] apud MS.

²⁵ Peter of Spain, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. de Rijk, p. 19, l. 30.

²⁶ connotando *add. sed exp.* MS.

processum Philosophi in *Predicamentis*, et in isto septimo²⁷. Igitur etc.

Quarto notandum quod modi significandi gramaticales non dicuntur²⁸ esse connotata per terminos, nam licet secundum gramaticos 'petra' dicatur quasi 'pede trita' et ratione istius dicunt gramatici quod petra sit generis feminini, quia dicitur quasi passa, modo non oportet quod iste terminus 'petra' hec connotat, ut notum est, et sic patet de vocalibus vel scriptis. De mentalibus patet nam iste terminus 'homo' in mente significat te, non tamen connotat singularitatem super te, sed significat te tamquam suppositum eius, quia naturalis modus significandi eius est quod pro quolibet homine singulari natus est supponere tamquam pro suo supposito.

Quinto notandum quod intellectus noster est potentie talis abstractione quod prospecta re conceptu singulari vago potest abstrahere conceptum essentie istius rei communiter et simpliciter ab omnibus proprietatibus accidentalibus que possunt sibi convenire. Istud apparet quia: alias non posset in nobis produci iste conceptus quibus corresponde<n>t isti termini 'substantia', 'corpus', 'animal' etc., nam non videmus res per tales terminos significatas nisi per accidentia. Non enim percipimus substantiam sub ratione substantie, sed per accidentia.

Sed nunc venit questio quia: opinio adversariorum concedit quod conceptus essentiales communes sunt et etiam alii, utrum etiam possent esse singulares, quia hoc adversarii negant.

Hec de primo.

Quantum ad secundum est conclusio responsalis: quod potest esse conceptus singularis. Istud primo videtur patere per experientiam. Unus- [f. 111vb] -quisque enim experitur quod habet conceptum singularem Marsilii nichil dicentem sibi nisi essentiam Marsilii, et consequenter de qualibet re prospecta videtur sic esse.

Et confirmatur per *commune dictum* quia: dicit *Commentator* primo *Physicorum*²⁹ quod duplex est conceptus singularis, scilicet determinatus et conceptus singularis vagus. Et quid intelligit per 'conceptum singularem determinatum' nisi conceptum essen-

27 Aristotle, *Metaphysica* VII, iv, 1029 b 1-12.

28 *lectio incerta*.

29 Averroes, *In Physicam* I, 49, ed. Iuntina IV, f. 15r (*incertum*).

tialem? Quia si³⁰ accidentia connotat, igitur videtur dici vagus. Et hec conclusio videtur esse de mente *Philosophi*.

Secundo probatur ex effectu nam: si sic, conceptus cui correspondet iste terminus 'Marsilius', diceret extrinsecum accidens. Quod non videtur quia: quodcumque accidens dederit, adhuc iste terminus 'Marsilius' de pronomine demonstrante Marsilium diceretur secluso isto accidente, ymo, si solum esset Deus et Marsilius extrinsecis communibus Marsilio seclusis, adhuc Marsilius esset Marsilius.

Tertio probatur per rationem³¹ nam: per abstractionem intellectus potest a convenientia communi sive generali sive speciali trahere conceptum generalem sibi specialem. Quare non potest a convenientia individuali trahere conceptum essentialem et singularem? Modo primum potest, igitur et secundum. Consequentia nota est, et maior patet quia: non videtur causa diversitatis sive ratio; et minor patet per omnes, sive secundum opinionem dicentem quod non possit esse conceptus singularis essentialis, sive secundum aliam dicentem oppositum.

Hec de secundo articulo.

Ad rationes.

(Ad 1) Ad primam: negatur antecedens. Ad probationem: conceditur quod distinguimus inter res per accidentia. Et negatur consequentia. Sed conceditur quod, qui haberet conceptum essentialem Sortis videns alium sibi similem in accidentalibus, crederet se videre Sortem et decipere<tur>, eo quod conceptus iste derivatus est ab abstractione accidentium talium que sunt similia accidentibus Sortis a quibus abstrahit conceptum essentialem Sortis representativum; ut si esset ovum ante me, et ego verterem me, et tu poneres aliud ovum, et ego viderem³², secundum crederem primum; non tamen conceptum³³ quem haberem de primo ovo, essentialem, habeo de secundo ovo, sed quia credo secundum ovum esse primum, hoc est: quia deciperem in accidentibus.

Item, eodem modo [f. 112ra] sequeretur quod termini communes de predicamento substantie essent connotativi quia: si ter-

³⁰ scilicet MS.

³¹ per rationem *add.* MS.

³² videres MS.

³³ conceptus MS.

ram videres sub speciebus aque, crederes terram esse aquam, non tamen iste terminus 'aqua' propter hoc connotat, ut adversariimet dicunt.

Ad secundam probationem: negatur maior nam: conceptus singularis qui est in me representans Sortem, nullo modo postea representat Platonem si obiceretur michi Plato, etsi Sortes et Plato essent similes in accidentibus³⁴, quia tunc non essent singulares. Verum est tamen quod sensus deciperetur quia crederet quod conceptus iste representaret sibi Platonem, sed non representat quia conceptus dixit primo hoc prospectum, quod fuit Sortes, et iam non diceret istud prospectum, sed aliud, scilicet Platonem. Posset tamen maior concedi de similibus communibus, sed tunc non esset ad propositum maioris, nec contra propositum.

(Ad 2) Ad secundam: negatur quod maxime essent isti termini 'hoc animal', 'iste homo' etc. Ad probationem dicitur quod *Philosophus* in *Predicamentis* ponit ista complexa loco individuorum et terminorum singularium. Pronomina enim demonstrativa important demonstrationem et rem prospectam connotative, licet significant substantiam.

(Ad 3) Ad tertiam potest negari antecedens, et dicitur quod albedinis potest esse conceptus essentialis singularis. Et ad probationem dicitur quod iste conceptus representat non denominative, nec conceptu communi, sed representat hanc essentiam huius albedinis singulariter et absolute. Potest tamen admittendo antecedens negari consequentia. Ad probationem dicitur quod non valet consequentia 'substantiarum possunt esse conceptus singulares absoluti, igitur et accidentium', quia accidens non habet rationem essentialem per se stantis sicut substantia, et ergo intellectus naturaliter format conceptum singularem essentialem eam representantem, sed albedinem intellectus representat ut inheret. Utrum autem albedinis posset esse conceptus singularis absolutus vel non, non discutitur in presenti. Probabiliter tamen potest dici, iuxta prius dicta, quod sic.

(Ad 4) Ad quartam negatur antecedens. Ad probationem (a) dicitur quod idem sunt et unum Sortes cum manu et Sortes sine manu, quia manu deposita a Sorte adhuc manet Sortes, quia iste terminus 'Sortes' non connotat habere manum vel pedem.

³⁴ accidentalibus MS.

Ad secundam partem,³⁵ scilicet confirmationem, (b) dicitur quod ista ratio petit unam communem dubitationem, nam sicut arguitur de conceptu singulari determinato, ita posset argui de quolibet vago determinato [f. 112rb] universaliter. Et ergo dixi quod non est inconveniens terminum singularem de duobus suppositis non omnimode eisdem successive verificari quorum unum erat aliud, etiam quorum unum nunc est pars, et aliud totum. Modo, A erit B in casu confirmationis (b1) ergo³⁶ tunc iste terminus 'Sortes' successive diceretur de duabus suppositis. Dicitur quod supponat pro eis successive, sed tamquam pro uno, quia unum erat aliud.

Ad tertiam (b2) negatur quod iste terminus 'Sortes' connotat unionem, sed supponit simpliciter pro isto *hoc aliquid* composito ex materia et forma. Ad probationem: conceditur quod materia et forma non sunt Sortes nisi unite. Verum est <quod> nec ens nec unum sunt sine unione, non tamen unionem connotant. Ad probationem: negatur maior, nam ista dualitas essentialiter nunc est Sortes et post corruptionem Sortis mutatur ista dualitas, et tamen non est nec erit tunc Sortes. Si diceres probando maiorem 'quidquid ista dualitas est, hoc est per suam essentiam', verum est. Sed consequentia non valet: 'cum nunc sit Sortes quod semper erit Sortes' quia: licet essentia est hoc quod est, tamen successive ista dualitas aliter et aliter potest se habere et habebit Sorte mortuo. Eadem enim ratione, si solutio³⁷ non valeret, probaretur quod iste terminus 'celum' vel 'aer' non sit substantialis. Potest tamen concedi 'quidquid ista res nunc est vel ista dualitas, semper erit vel aliqua que fuerit ipsum'.

(Ad 5) Ad quintam negatur antecedens. Ad probationem conceditur quod termini communes sint singularis numeri vel plurali<s>. Et negatur quod ista connotant, licet habeant modum significandi talem gramaticalem, sed singularis pro quolibet suo uno supposito natus est supponere, pluralis numero pro pluribus suppositis pro quibus³⁸ quilibet terminus singularis natus est supponere.

35 patet MS.

36 *incerta lectio.*

37 solutio MS Krakau, *Bibl. Jag.* 709, f. 95va] soluta MS.

38 quibus MS Krakau, *Bibl. Jag.* 709, f. 96ra] quolibet MS.

Ad confirmationem: conceditur maior, et negatur minor. Ad probationem istius conceditur quod quelibet pars hominis sit homo saltem integralis prout ly 'homo' significat absolute sine totalitatis connotatione.

Rationes post oppositum sunt pro dictis.

Hec de questione.

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Nicholas Drukken de Dacia in Paris c. 1340

NIELS JØRGEN GREEN-PEDERSEN

Summary: Nicholas Drukken de Dacia was a master of the arts faculty in Paris c. 1340-1345. His commentary on the *Prior Analytics* contains valuable information about the doctrinal debate in this period, concerning e.g. nominalism (Ockham), the syllogism, and the theory of consequences.

A “Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy” would probably never have developed, if the founders of the Society for Danish Language and Literature had not formed the plan for a complete edition of the works preserved from the Danish scholastic authors, i.e. the *Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi*. The author I shall deal with, Nicholas Drukken de Dacia, and the Erfurt-manuscript containing his work were known already to the founders and thus formed part of the inspiration for the *Corpus*. Relatively much is known about Nicholas’ life: he was licensed as a master of arts at the university of Paris on May 15th 1340; his *inceptio* took place in January 1341; he was proctor (*procurator*) of the English-German nation in 1342, 1343, 1344, and 1345 and rector of the university in 1344.¹ After 1345 he disappears from the documents in Paris, but he received various ecclesiastical benefices until 1355 when he is mentioned as *continuuus commensalis* (household member) of cardinal Petrus de Croso of Auxerre.² This may indicate that he was a fellow of the Sorbonne, as suggested by William Courtenay and Katherine Tachau.³ Documents from June 1357 inform us that Nicholas was dead by then.⁴

Nicholas has left us a commentary on Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics* which has the interesting beginning: “... *omissa recommendatione, quia lectura est cursoria*”.⁵ In other words: the book claims to derive

1 Chart. Auct. 1894: 38,31-32; 44,43-44; 60,3; 60,16; 66,38; 78,35; 80,21; 68,11-14.

2 Dipl. Dan. 1966: nos. 368-369, pp. 303-305.

3 Courtenay & Tachau 1982: 88.

4 Dipl. Dan. 1967: nos. 42 & 46, pp. 41; 45-46.

5 Nicolaus Drukken, *APr*: qu. 1.

from a cursory reading, which was the job of a bachelor. This is remarkable, since we do not really know the difference between ordinary and cursory readings of a text. To judge from Nicholas' text it does not mean that cursory works are particularly short. His whole work is only slightly shorter than e.g. John Buridan's commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, and several of Nicholas' questions are longer than the corresponding ones in Buridan. Nicholas' commentary does not offer elementary help to understand Aristotle's text either. It consists of 40 questions discussing problems dealt with in Aristotle's text in roughly the same order, but the references to Aristotle are few and insignificant. Certainly they would not help a beginner to understand Aristotle's text. Further, Nicholas has no questions on book II of the *Prior Analytics*, and the work seems to be complete, since the text in the Erfurt-manuscript ends with an *explicit*. As far as I know all other existing commentaries contain questions on book II, though sometimes few. Now, book II is of a much more theoretical and general character than book I which exposes the technique that must be mastered in order to use a syllogism. Could it be, then, that cursory readings of the *Prior Analytics* did not include book II?

Remarkable features of Nicholas' work are the several extensive passages it contains parallel to passages in Ockham's *Summa Logicae*. This in spite of the fact that Nicholas was among the masters from the English-German nation who on October 19th 1341 signed a decision intended to be equivalent to a statute against the *secta Occanica* and its teaching.⁶ In 22 questions (out of 40) I have found parallels with Ockham's *Summa Logicae*, and in at least 15 questions the parallels are so long or so close that the easiest explanation would be to assume that Nicholas had Ockham's *Summa Logicae* at hand when he composed his commentary. Ockham's name is never mentioned; the closest we come is the phrase: "... *duae conclusiones cuiusdam magistri*";⁷ elsewhere Nicholas says *aliqui* or *multi* or nothing at all. Nicholas does not always agree with Ockham. It frequently happens that he cites Ockham's view and then adds e.g.: "This may be well said, but a more easy way would be ..." or: "However that may be, to me it seems better to say ..." Nicholas gives e.g. a rather long summary of Ockham's description of

6 Chart. Auct. 1894: 52,42-53,10.

7 Nicolaus Drukken *AP*: qu. 17,49.

modal propositions, but he does not find Ockham's treatment convincing and therefore proposes a different one.⁸ It should be stressed that he never criticises Ockham directly or sharply, but rather says: fine, but I would prefer... It is worth noting that Nicholas supports Ockham's view about supposition, particularly about *suppositio simplex*. In this connection he attacks Walter Burley's opinion rather strongly and by name.⁹ How does this agree with the decision against the *secta Occanica* which Nicholas signed?¹⁰

What then about Nicholas and John Buridan? Here I have found parallel passages in 16 questions, but none of these forces us to assume that Nicholas has read Buridan's commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, and no parallel is extremely close. Three passages merit special attention. One shows that Nicholas knew Buridan's explanation of the *dici de omni*,¹¹ but others held that view besides Buridan. The second summarizes Buridan's opinion about what validates the *sylogismus expositivus*,¹² but again Buridan is not the only one to have supported that view. Thirdly Nicholas knows the definition of a valid consequence which Buridan uses,¹³ but Buridan himself ascribes that definition to other authors (*alii*).¹⁴ We may think it incredible that Nicholas did not know Buridan's commentary on the *Prior Analytics* (later than 1327 and probably earlier than his *Consequences*, which is tentatively dated c. 1335 by Hubien),¹⁵ but I do not think we can prove anything on this point.

It is possible to list almost as many parallels between the *Prior Analytics* of Nicholas and that of the so-called Pseudo-Scotus. Here I have found parallels in 12 questions, and these are as close as those with Buridan. But the Pseudo-Scotus is probably later than Nicholas, and the author's attitude on several points was clearly different from Nicholas'; he was, e.g. not a nominalist.

Buridan, then, hardly exerted an important influence upon Nicholas, but Nicholas was a firmly convinced nominalist, and he

8 Nicolaus Drukken *APr.* qu. 23,93sq.

9 Nicolaus Drukken *APr.* qu. 33,29sq.

10 Cf. Courtenay & Tachau 1982.

11 Nicolaus Drukken *APr.* qu. 5,63sq.

12 Nicolaus Drukken *APr.* qu. 39,64-67.

13 Nicolaus Drukken *APr.* qu. 6,69-71; 9,139-40.

14 Iohannes Buridanus, *Consequentiae* I,3, p. 22,48sq.

15 Iohannes Buridanus, *Consequentiae* p. 9.

hardly ever missed an opportunity to state it. This is the background for his strong opposition to Burley's description of *suppositio simplex*, where he argues that such a standpoint would demand that we ascribe real existence to universals, while only singulars have real existence.¹⁶ The same attitude is expressed in several connections. One informative place is the question: *Utrum dici de omni sit dispositio subiecti vel dispositio praedicati* (qu. 5). This is a traditional question in the commentaries on the *Prior Analytics*, and at least since Albert the Great¹⁷ the standard answer was that *esse in toto* is a disposition or condition of the subject, while the *dici de omni* is a disposition of the predicate. Nicholas has no time for that. Instead he uses the question to stress that the *dici de omni* is not a real existing entity (*res*), be it an accident or quality or whatever, that belongs to or is added to either of the terms or to the proposition as a whole. There is, he says, no thing which such a proposition signifies besides the things which are signified by the terms in the propositions of the syllogism. Hence the *dici de omni* is nothing but a proposition in which we cannot pick out anything under (*sumere sub*) the subject about which the predicate cannot be predicated. Consequently the common saying that all valid syllogisms are governed by the *dici de omni* amounts to the demand that any valid syllogism must contain a universal premiss.¹⁸ I do not know any author who describes the *dici de omni* as a kind of abstract entity which is "added to" the syllogism; not even Radulphus Brito, who might be expected to hold such an opinion. Further we may wonder: it is true, of course, that any valid syllogism must contain a universal premiss, but if this is all there is to the *dici de omni*, how can it be *the* basic rule on which the whole syllogistic is founded? And Nicholas makes it plain on several occasions that this is his opinion, as we shall see later.

Similar strong expressions of a nominalistic conviction are found in Nicholas' discussions of what a syllogistic figure and mood is¹⁹ and in his discussion of what the conversion of a proposition is.²⁰

16 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 33,29sq.

17 Albertus Magnus *APr*: I,I,c.7, p. 468a.

18 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 5,76-113.

19 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 5; 36; 37.

20 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 6.

Let me return to the syllogistic. A particular form of the syllogism is what the medievals called the *syllogismus expositoryus*, i.e. a syllogism with a singular middle term. The curious name of this syllogism derives from its background in Aristotle's use of the method of *ekthesis*, in Latin *expositio*, to prove the validity of certain moods of the third syllogistic figure.²¹ Whatever this controversial method consists in, it contains at least the procedure of picking out a singular under the terms in the syllogism. I don't know when the medievals formed the idea about such a syllogism, but there must have been some debate about it. Radulphus Brito (c. 1300) hesitates a good deal concerning it. He does not know if it is really a syllogism, because it frequently does not contain a universal premiss. Hence it is not governed by the *dici de omni*, but by the rule: any two things that are identical with one and the same third, are identical with each other (*quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, illa inter se sunt eadem*).²² According to Ockham certain "modern theologians" denied the validity of the expository syllogism, apparently because of problems it caused in statements about God.²³ Ockham does not think it worth the trouble to argue against this opinion, as it denies something which is self-evident and hence needs no proof. But he thinks that this syllogism can only occur in the third figure,²⁴ probably because Aristotle uses *ekthesis* only in the third figure. Buridan's most developed and interesting discussion of the expository syllogism is found in his *Consequences*.²⁵ Here Buridan bases this syllogism upon the same principle as Radulphus Brito, but he takes the further step of considering this principle as also validating syllogisms with universal or particular terms. About the traditional opinion that the *dici de omni* is the governing principle for all syllogisms Buridan says nothing in this discussion, though he does in his commentary on the *Prior Analytics*.²⁶ It seems to me that Buridan in his *Consequences* somehow considers a syllogism with singular terms to be more basic than other syllogisms. If this reading is true, Buridan may be on his way towards an opinion similar to the view expressed in our

21 Aristoteles *APr*: I,6, 28a 24-26; I,2, 25a 15-17.

22 Radulphus Brito *APr*: I qu. 30, f. 307va-b.

23 Ockham, *Summa Logicae* II, 27,65sq.

24 Ockham, *Summa Logicae* III-1,16.

25 Iohannes Buridanus, *Consequentiae* III,4, pp. 84-85; 88-89.

26 Iohannes Buridanus *APr*: I qu. 6.

time by Paul Thom, who claims that Aristotle's syllogistic can be rephrased into an elegant system based upon the principle of *ekthesis*.²⁷

Nicholas' text reflects all these discussions. He rejects Ockham's view that the expository syllogism is only found in the third figure, and he lists the rules which must be observed for this syllogism in the other figures.²⁸ In one question he reports – apparently with approval – that some people (*aliqui*) claim that an expository syllogism cannot be denied, unless one denies “one's senses and experience” (*sensum et experientiam*), so that nobody having a sound mind would deny it.²⁹ In another question Nicholas states that it is a plausible thought that such a syllogism “is made known to us by experience to our senses or intellect” (*notificatur per experientiam ad sensum vel ad intellectum*). About the rule which Buridan supports Nicholas hesitates. He finds that it contributes little (*parum facit*) to the validity, but in any case it must be reformulated so that it becomes clear that it is a conditional rule about propositions and predicates. We should say: if any two predicates are verified of one and the same singular term, then they can be verified of each other. Once more we see the nominalist sticking out his head. In the end, however, Nicholas seems to prefer the standpoint that an expository syllogism is validated by the *dici de omni* like any other syllogism. In this respect it makes no difference whether a proposition has a singular or a universal subject-term. In neither case is it possible to pick out anything under the subject about which the predicate is not predicated; and this is all that is required.³⁰ Though I find Nicholas' solution less interesting than Buridan's, Nicholas' answer is a simple and convincing one.

Nicholas' text contains interesting discussions about the definition of a valid consequence (qu. 4,7,9,14). In his opinion it is not the case that a consequence is valid because the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent being true. This view would entail that any true proposition would imply any other true one, like e.g. 'You are sitting. Therefore the person next to you is sit-

²⁷ Thom 1981: § 45, pp. 174-176.

²⁸ Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 39,26sq.

²⁹ Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 8,46sq.

³⁰ Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 39,64sq.

ting' or 'Socrates runs. Therefore God exists'.³¹ By these examples Nicholas thinks that he has shown the absurdity of this opinion. He states instead that in any valid and formal consequence the antecedent signifies the significate of the consequent³² or that the total significate of the consequent is the significate of the antecedent³³ or that the significates of the antecedent and the consequent are the same so that whatever is signified by the consequent must be signified by the antecedent; but not the other way around.³⁴ This inclusion of the significate of the consequent in the significate of the antecedent is what is called the form of a consequence (*forma consequentiae*).³⁵ Therefore in every valid and formal consequence our intellect by knowing (*cognito*) the antecedent can infer the consequent by its natural judgement (*naturale iudicium*).³⁶ This means that we cannot have a consequence consisting of two propositions with separate (*disparata*) significates, like: 'A man runs. Therefore a stick stands in the corner'.³⁷ Consequently Nicholas denies the well-known rules: 'From the impossible anything follows' and 'The necessary follows from anything'. Nicholas knows that these rules are frequently called material consequences, but since our intellect cannot understand or infer the consequent from the antecedent in such cases, they are invalid. Accordingly, only formal consequences are valid.³⁸ Finally Nicholas claims that his definition of valid consequence is precisely what the old logicians (*antiqui logici*) meant when they said that the consequent is included in or understood in the antecedent.³⁹ It is true, in fact, that such a manner of defining a valid consequence is found in several earlier medieval logicians, at least since Peter Abelard; and probably the idea derives from Boethius.⁴⁰ Nicholas, however, states the definition in a much more precise form than the earlier authors do. With them it is often unclear

31 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 9,144sq; 9,164sq.

32 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 9,154; 14,120.

33 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 4,64-65; 7,118-19.

34 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 9,172-73.

35 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 14,127.

36 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 4,82-83; 7,111sq.; 9,173-74.

37 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 7,108sq.

38 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 9,164sq.; 14,115sq.

39 Nicolaus Drukken *APr*: qu. 14,123sq.

40 Cf. Green-Pedersen 1981: 61-62. – Green-Pedersen 1984: 276-279.

what they really mean by “inclusion” etc. Further, it is plain how different Nicholas’ concept of valid and formal consequence is from the modern truthfunctionally described concept of implication. Or to put the same in other words: Nicholas’ idea of logical form is completely alien to what most modern authors of logic have in mind when they use this term.

In one place Nicholas seems to express the opinion that his definition of valid consequence implies or perhaps is equivalent to the definition which states that a consequence is valid if in no possible case the state of affairs can be as signified by the antecedent without being as signified by the consequent (*nullo casu possibili posito sic potest esse sicut significatur per antecedens, quin sic erit sicut significatur per consequens*).⁴¹ I shall not discuss if Nicholas is right in judging this definition equivalent with his own – even to the degree that he uses it in two cases to determine the validity of certain consequences.⁴² But this is the definition of a valid consequence which John Buridan uses,⁴³ though he ascribes it to other people (*alii*) and underlines that we must be careful to understand the expressions used in it correctly. It is difficult to decide if we should regard this as evidence of Nicholas’ acquaintance with Buridan’s writings or teaching. It deserves to be mentioned that Ockham’s influence upon Nicholas’ conception of valid consequence only concerns a few and in particular a single minor point.

It is interesting to notice that Nicholas once imagines that someone might ask him to give a proof of (*demonstrare/probare*) his definition of valid consequence.⁴⁴ His answer is that he cannot. But the possible opponent might be led to grasp the definition himself by considering that our intellect could not possibly infer the consequent from the antecedent, if the two have separate or disconnected (*disparata*) significates. If we were to hold that to be possible, we would have to take the standpoint that we can conclude anything from anything. The opinion that not everything can be proved, but something must simply be grasped or understood and thereby be seen to be true, is also expressed by Nicholas elsewhere. He explains that we cannot prove a description about the thing it de-

41 Nicolaus Drukken *APr* qu. 9,138sq.

42 Nicolaus Drukken *APr* qu. 6,69sq.; 16,76sq.

43 Iohannes Buridanus, *APr* I qu. 5;6. - *Consequentiae* I,3, p. 22.

44 Nicolaus Drukken *APr* qu. 7,103sq.

scribes; the description can only be stated and seen to be true or adequate.⁴⁵ This view is very much in line with Nicholas' statement – mentioned above – that nobody of a sound mind could deny an expository syllogism, unless he would deny his senses and experience. Such a standpoint agrees very well with Nicholas' general nominalistic attitude, which in my eyes must take as its starting-point things that are simply experienced or grasped.

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⁴⁵ Nicolaus Drukken *APr.* qu. 4,96sq.

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